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The chapters in this dissertation all explore a single set of questions, applying them to a variety 
of different historical and political contexts. The questions are: how are exceptional emergencies 
distinguished from quotidian political events? What is the vision of political “normalcy” in 
relation to which a state of exception can be declared, and in light of which the legitimate ends of 
exceptional, emergency powers defined? How do the background conceptions that define an 
“emergency” also shape the political dynamics of emergency powers? As I argued in chapter 
one, these questions push beyond the two predominant approaches in the contemporary 
literature: the first was the “naïve realist” view that emergencies have a self-evident, objective 
character, so that identifying an event as an “emergency” is a straightforward matter of 
accurately perceiving some factual state of affairs. The second was the decisionist or 
“deconstructive” view, which argues that emergencies can never be identified or verified 
factually, but rather are constituted independently of any “facts,” for example by a valid legal 
procedure for declaring a state of emergency, or by a sovereign decision on the exception. 
Neither of these two approaches, however, can provide us with an adequate account of the 
politics of emergencies, that is, the sense in which the definition of what counts as an emergency 
can be a dynamic arena of persuasion, justification and conflict, not only over the temporary 
consequences of emergency powers, but over the identity and content of normalcy as well. 
Distinguishing between normalcy and a state of emergency is not just a matter of perception (as 
   
in the realist account) or decision (in the skeptical account); it is also, crucially, an act of 
interpretation and a process of political judgment, where the determination of an emergency is at 
the same time an evaluative claim about the identity of political normalcy. In other words, the 
definition of what counts as an emergency is simulations a way of defining what is the state of 
affairs that is being threatened, which also implies a judgment about the value of preserving a 
state of affairs that would justify exceptional measures. Thus, while the realist approach obscures 
this political realm of interpretation and judgment by reducing the definition of to a self-evident 
determination of facts, the skeptical approach dissolves the concrete political content and stakes 
of the definition of emergencies by abstracting and isolating the subjective decision on the 
exception from the broader ideological or normative context that determines whether such a 
decision will be considered authoritative, or legitimate.  
 Thus, the historical and contextual approach adopted in these chapters is motivated by 
two basic theoretical claims of the dissertation: first, that the what counts as an emergency is 
neither a self-evident fact nor the product of an unconstrained decision, but is constructed 
through a set of background assumptions and political judgments about the identity and value of 
normality. Secondly, the different ways that emergencies are defined and understood play a 
decisive role in shaping the political outcomes of emergency powers, so that for example the 
same institutional framework of emergency powers may produce very different political 
outcomes as the underlying conception of an emergency shifts.  
 The first section of this dissertation, comprising the first three chapters, explore these 
questions through an interrogation of theoretical literatures: the first through an interrogation of 
twentieth century and contemporary works on emergency powers, the second through modern 
republican thought and the third through theories of modern constitutionalism. The final three 
   
chapters focus more narrowly on a case study: the transformation of legal and political theories 
of emergency powers in the United States. Chapter 4 analyzes 19th century theories of martial 
law; Chapter 5 looks at the theme of emergency and security during the New Deal period, and 
Chapter 6 investigates how the 20th Century concepts of War Powers and National Security 
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Introduction: What is an Emergency? 
 
In 1973, a U.S. Senate special committee on the “termination of the national emergency” 
commissioned an official report on the statutes then in effect that conferred extraordinary, 
emergency power on the executive. The results still make for instructive reading. It was widely 
known that a large number of statutes delegated extraordinary powers to the president, but 
among the many senior legislators and executive officials consulted for the report, “no one 
knew” quite how many, and no comprehensive list existed anywhere of the emergency statutes 
that were currently in force. Here is the report’s opening summary of its findings: 
 
Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are 
now in effect four presidentially-proclaimed states of national emergency… [from 1933, 1950, 1970 and 
1971]  
 
These proclamations give force to 470 provisions of Federal law. These hundreds of statutes delegate to the 
President extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Congress, which affect the lives of American 
citizens in a host of all-encompassing manners. This vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough 
authority to rule the country without reference to normal Constitutional processes. 
 
Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may: seize property; organize and control the 
means of production; seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and 
control all transportation and communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; 




For the majority of the twentieth century – and, we can subsequently add, for nearly all far of the 
twenty-first so far – the US has been under a state of declared national emergency.1 The authors 
of the report seem to assume that readers will find this to be a dramatic and startling about this 
fact, as well as them profoundly troubling  We do not necessarily learn anything new from this 
about the powers the government actually chose to exercise. Nevertheless, there still something 
startling, and troubling about this        
If there is anything startling, and disturbing, about this fact, it’s not so much because of 
what it tells us anything new about what the powers that were actually exercised in this period. 
Rather, it is disturbing because it seems to suggest a major disconnect between the special 
conditions in which we tend to think that emergency powers could be justifiable and legitimate, 
and the actual conditions in which emergency powers have been, and continue to be, available.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the emergency declarations that triggered such measures persisted for 
decades after the initial emergency may still strike us as problematic or even alarming. If so, it is 
worth trying to spell out the intuitions behind this reaction. What causes us to be queasy about 
the idea of permanent emergency government for the better part of a century?   
                                                
1 The outcome of the 1973 Senate committee was the National Emergency Act (1976), which rendered these open 
delegations of emergency powers dormant two years after its enactment, and attempted to mandate procedures that 
would make executive emergency declarations more transparent and temporary. From the Act’s passage in 1976 
until 2007, 43 national emergencies have been declared; about half of these remain in affect. Unfortunately, the 
transparency measures of the Act were significantly undercut by a 1977 law that granted the president authority to 
order members of the armed forces to active duty, without requiring a declaration of war, national emergency, or any 
other legislative authorization. 90 Stat. 517; 10 U.S.C. 12302. See the CRS Report for Congress: National 
Emergency Powers, 2007. As of 2011, the national emergency declaration by President Bush on September 11, 2001 
is still in effect, renewed in 2010 by President Barak Obama. So is the controversially open-ended Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force, passed by Congress September 18, 2001. The AUMF was claimed by President Bush as a 
basis for the first wave of indefinite detentions and military tribunals in the War on Terror. The current Obama 
administration cites the same law as a basis for its powers to hold individuals suspected of terrorism indefinitely 
without trial – even after having been acquitted of any crime by civilian courts – conduct “targeted assassinations” 
of foreign nationals and even US citizens in foreign countries with which the US is not formally at war (such as 
Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan), and other extraordinary powers. See Scott Shane, “U.S. Approves Targeted Killing 
of American Cleric, New York Times, April 6, 2010; Eli Lake, “The 9/14 Presidency,” Reason Magazine, April 6, 





 One possible explanation for the queasiness has to do with type of regime often 
associated with permanent emergency powers. Regimes that are seen by a majority or a 
significant minority of their population as unrepresentative and lacking in legitimacy may be 
forced to rely on harsher, more coercive measures in order to maintain in power. In such cases, 
from the perspective of a democratic, republican constitution, maintaining political control for 
the regime has become a permanent emergency, and nominally temporary emergency provisions 
effectively become permanent scaffolding over the constitution in order to prop it up. Permanent 
emergency powers in such a regime can no longer be characterized as what Clinton Rossiter 
called “constitutional dictatorship,” and have become, simply, dictatorship.2 The United States 
post-1933, however, does not easily fit this case. While American history has undoubtedly been 
punctuated with moments of high-level state repression and violence, repression is more aptly 
characterized as temporary and focused on a particular segment of the population, rather than a 
permanent instrument of political rule and governance.3 However one gauges the legitimacy 
problems of the US state, it has not depended upon extra-judicial coercion and violence as an 
                                                
2 Rossiter, C. (1963). Constitutional dictatorship: crisis government in the modern democracies. New York,, 
Harcourt. 
 , Arato, A. (2000). "Goodbye to Dictatorships?" Social Research 68(1): 925-955. 
  
3 Goldstein, R. J. (1978). Political repression in modern America from 1870 to the present. Cambridge, Mass. 
New York, Schenkman Pub. Co. ; 
Two Continents Pub. Group. 
 ; Cole, D. (2005). Enemy aliens : double standards and constitutional freedoms in the war on terrorism. 
New York, New Press : Distributed by W.W. Norton. 
 Another peculiarity of the US is that some of the most severe non-temporary forms of repressive violence – 
such as, for example, in labor relations in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or in the Jim Crow South 
– were not at the hands of the federal government but occurred at the state level and, particularly, within civil 
society. See, for instance,Rana, A. (2010). The two faces of American freedom. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press. 
 . Authors such as Loic Wacquant have argued that we should interpret the dramatic growth in the American 
penal system since the 1980s as a permanent instrument of governing a poor, marginalized sector of the population 
through state coercion and violence. Wacquant’s interpretation does not directly affect the issue here, however, since 
the penal system is an instrument of the ordinary legal order rather than emergency powers. See, Wacquant, L. 




ordinary means of domestic governance. Outbreaks of outright illegality and repression, as 
serious as they have been, have not been the norm.4   
 If near-permanent emergency powers have not resulted in outright dictatorship, they 
nevertheless raise very troubling questions in a constitutional democracy. The most basic reason 
sounds trite, though it isn’t: emergency powers are supposed to be reserved for emergencies. An 
emergency in the ordinary sense of the term is defined as “a state of things unexpectedly arising, 
and urgently demanding immediate action.”5 There are three main elements here, all of which are 
relevant. The first pertains to knowledge; an emergency is unexpected, unforeseen, something 
that cannot be known in advance. Secondly, there is a reference to time: an emergency arises 
suddenly, turns up without warning. And the response must be equally swift, if not immediate. 
Third, an emergency is urgent, serious, a dangerous threat that demands action. These three 
aspects of the ordinary definition of emergency are all fundamental in juridico-political 
discussions of emergency powers as well. In that context, “emergency" refers to a political event 
that, due to its unexpectedness, suddenness and dangerousness, demands a swifter and more 
powerful response than the ordinary procedures and limitations of constitutional government is 
capable. All three of these conditions seem to be necessary for there to be an emergency in the 
sense here. Obviously, quotidian politics is full of unexpected, transitory events that do not 
present a threat to something vital to the political order, and are not emergencies in the political 
sense. Moreover, ordinary, everyday politics is full of debates about potential dangers and threats 
on the horizon – think for instance, of ongoing arguments over future consequences of the 
environment, the national debt, nuclear proliferation, to name a few examples. None of these, 
                                                
4 Ackerman, B. A. (2010). The decline and fall of the American republic. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
  
5 This definition comes from The Oxford English Dictionary. Other definitions that I have checked, include the same 
three dimensions stressed in this one. 
  
5 
however would be an emergency in this sense precisely because we can argue over the future 
consequences of long-term, foreseeable trends in the present. 
 The quotation with which I began, then, seems to confront us with a disturbing gap 
between the basic meaning of our terminology and our practices. The Senate Report describes of 
emergency powers that are permanent, ordinary, indistinguishable from the norms of ordinary 
governance? How should the trend toward permanent emergency powers and the normalization 
of emergency powers be interpreted? How should it be diagnosed, and what should be our 
response?  
 
Two Diagnoses: Emergency Powers vs. the Exception 
The observation of permanent emergencies has resonated through a large and diverse scholarly 
literature. One the one hand, it has drawn the attention of numerous constitutional scholars and 
legal theorists. Thus, David Dyzenhaus has perceptively suggested that contemporary emergency 
powers confronts us less with the stark outlines and boundaries of a legal black hole than with “a 
multitude of black (or grey) holes within the ordinary law of the land…[that are] likely to 
become a permanent feature of legal order and to spread.6  Bruce Ackerman observes that 
“emergency measures have a habit of continuing well beyond their time of necessity,” and warns 
that permissive judicial review leads to “the normalization of emergency conditions – the 
creation of legal precedents that authorize oppressive measures without any end.”7 Oren Gross 
has given one of the most detailed and comprehensive accounts of how “[e]mergency regimes 
tend to perpetuate themselves, regardless of the intentions of those who originally invoked 
                                                
6Dyzenhaus, D. (2006). The constitution of law : legality in a time of emergency. Cambridge ; New York, 
Cambridge University Press., 61. 
7 Ackerman, B. (2004). "The Emergency Constitution." Yale Law Journal 113(8).,1030, 1043. 
  
6 
them.”8 On the other hand, a number of prominent post-Marxist or continental political 
philosophers seem to have made a similar observation. Giorgio Agamben has recently 
pronounced that “the state of exception has by now become the rule.”9 Mark Neocleous pushes 
this observation to characterize capitalist modernity as a whole: “the pattern is almost always the 
same…what appear initially to be extraordinary powers developed under the auspices of 
something labeled ‘emergency’ very quickly and easily infiltrate the ordinary legal system, 
become regularised as a technique of government and normalised as a technology of power.”10 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri speak of “a permanent state of emergency and exception” 
underlying the structure of Empire, and in a later work declared that “the state of exception has 
become permanent and general; the exception has become the rule, pervading both foreign 
relations and the homeland.”11  
While there is a broad convergence in this observation of a trend toward normalization 
and permanence, scholars have diverged sharply in how the trend should be diagnosed. At the 
broadest possible level, it is possible to between two basic approaches among contemporary 
theorists of exceptional or emergency powers. The first approach is juridical and institutional in 
its orientation, and focuses on what I will refer to as emergency powers. The second is 
genealogical and deconstructive in its orientation, and focuses on what I will refer to as the state 
of exception. By the exception, I mean, following Carl Schmitt’s famous definition, a 
fundamental break or suspension of the legal order, issuing from a sovereign decision.12 By 
emergency powers I mean an exceptional framework of rules, norms, and institutions that 
                                                
8Gross, O. (2006). "What 'Emergency' Regime?" Constellations 13(1): 74-88., 75. 
9 Agamben, G. (2005). State of exception. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.,9. 
10Neocleous, M. (2008). Critique of security. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press., 67. 
11, Hardt, M. and A. Negri (2000). Empire. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press., Hardt, M. and A. Negri 
(2004). Multitude : war and democracy in the Age of Empire. New York, Penguin Press..;, 7. 
12 See Schmitt, C. and ebrary Inc. (2005). Political theology four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press.,5-6, 12-3. 
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suspends part of the ordinary legal system, and regulates whatever “emergency powers” are 
authorized. Thus, whereas in the state of exception the unconstrained sovereign decision is prior 
to and unlimited by any legal constraints, emergency powers establish special powers that are 
limited by legal procedures and institutional means. Theories of emergency powers generally 
presuppose that even exceptional powers are normatively limited, and distinct from absolute, 
unconstrained sovereignty. Theorists of the state of exception, in contrast, generally argue that 
the possibility of an absolute sovereign decision is necessarily presupposed by any actually 
existing legal system, and at the same time necessarily transcends any attempt to normatively 
codify or limit it. Whereas theories of emergency powers attempt to show that, even in an 
extreme crisis, absolute sovereignty can be restrained by institutions and laws, theories of the 
exception claim to demonstrate that, in a genuine crisis, emergency powers are irrelevant. 
 Of course, like all such broad categories, these necessarily oversimplify a great deal of 
methodological and normative variation within each approach, as well as some scholars who 
draw selectively from both approaches, but they nevertheless help clarify and organize the 
current state of the literature. The juridical and institutional theorists all share as a premise the 
goal of limited emergency powers, and reject the necessity of sovereign decisionism. The major 
debates within the emergency powers school involve which institutional frameworks of 
emergency powers are the most effective ways to meet legitimate needs during an exceptional 
emergency, while preventing sovereign decisionism and the temptations of political 
officeholders to abuse emergency powers for their own ends. Theorists of the state of exception, 
on the other hand, generally draw on Schmitt’s argument for the purposes of unmasking and 
critiquing the authoritarian premise of absolute sovereignty lurking behind the façade of liberal 
constitutionalism. In contrast to the juridical and institutional focus of emergency powers 
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theorists, the state of exception literature tends to adopt some variation of a genealogical analysis 
of the discourses of governance through which sovereign power operates, and/or a 
deconstructive approach aimed at destabilizing the metaphysical binary oppositions on which 
liberal theories of the rule of law depend.  
 
 
The Black Box of Emergencies 
Despite the important methodological and normative differences between the juridical, 
institutional literature and the genealogical, deconstructive literature, they both share a common 
oversight. In different ways, both approaches isolate emergency powers and the exception from 
the complex political question of what counts as an exception or emergency in the first place. 
Institutions of emergency powers as well as the sovereign decision on the exception are both 
understood as political responses to some external state of affairs. This external state of affairs, 
in both literatures, tends to be characterized briefly and vaguely with phrases such as “extreme 
peril,” “dangerous emergency” and the like, usually without further analysis.13 Neither explicitly 
interrogates how such identifications are made, with what criteria and through what process of 
judgment.   
I argue that this tendency to take for granted the identity of the external state of affairs, 
and to isolate it from the juridical and conceptual framework of exceptionalism, has limited and 
curtailed the potential contributions of both schools. In fact, what constitutes a “dangerous 
emergency” that breaks with the normal state of things in any particular polity is neither self-
evident nor historically uniform. The exceptional or emergency character of an event is 
                                                
13 Phrases taken at random from, respectively, Schmitt, Political Theology and,Fatovic, C. (2009). Outside the law : 




necessarily an interpretation not only of the character of the external event, but also of the 
identity and norms of the political community itself. Whether domestic unrest, for example, 
appears as an urgent emergency or as part of the fabric of ordinary political life is determined by 
the underlying assumptions and prevailing categories that define a state of normalcy, as well as 
what constitutes a threat to that normalcy, and the identity of what must be preserved against 
such threats. The character of an emergency, we might say, does not reside independently in 
events themselves but in the broader political understandings through which events as political 
events are interpreted, debated, acted upon. The approach undertaken here will be to broaden the 
inquiry from an exclusive focus on the institutional ensemble of emergency powers or the 
theoretical structure of the state of exception to include within these questions the underlying 
problem of what counts as an emergency in the first place. This perspective, I argue, can help 
advance beyond some of the theoretical deadlocks and limitations that have hampered the 
literature in both fields, and frame more succinctly the politics of emergencies as an essential 
component of theorizing both emergency powers and the state of exception.     
 
The chapters in this dissertation all explore a single set of questions, applying them to a variety 
of different historical and political contexts. The questions are: how are exceptional emergencies 
distinguished from quotidian political events? What is the vision of political “normalcy” in 
relation to which a state of exception can be declared, and in light of which the legitimate ends of 
exceptional, emergency powers defined? How do the background conceptions that define an 
“emergency” also shape the political dynamics of emergency powers? As I argued in chapter 
one, these questions push beyond the two predominant approaches in the contemporary 
literature: the first was the “naïve realist” view that emergencies have a self-evident, objective 
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character, so that identifying an event as an “emergency” is a straightforward matter of 
accurately perceiving some factual state of affairs. The second was the decisionist or 
“deconstructive” view, which argues that emergencies can never be identified or verified 
factually, but rather are constituted independently of any “facts,” for example by a valid legal 
procedure for declaring a state of emergency, or by a sovereign decision on the exception. 
Neither of these two approaches, however, can provide us with an adequate account of the 
politics of emergencies, that is, the sense in which the definition of what counts as an emergency 
can be a dynamic arena of persuasion, justification and conflict, not only over the temporary 
consequences of emergency powers, but over the identity and content of normalcy as well. 
Distinguishing between normalcy and a state of emergency is not just a matter of perception (as 
in the realist account) or decision (in the skeptical account); it is also, crucially, an act of 
interpretation and a process of political judgment, where the determination of an emergency is at 
the same time an evaluative claim about the identity of political normalcy. In other words, the 
definition of what counts as an emergency is simulations a way of defining what is the state of 
affairs that is being threatened, which also implies a judgment about the value of preserving a 
state of affairs that would justify exceptional measures. Thus, while the realist approach obscures 
this political realm of interpretation and judgment by reducing the definition of to a self-evident 
determination of facts, the skeptical approach dissolves the concrete political content and stakes 
of the definition of emergencies by abstracting and isolating the subjective decision on the 
exception from the broader ideological or normative context that determines whether such a 
decision will be considered authoritative, or legitimate.  
 Thus, the historical and contextual approach adopted in these chapters is motivated by 
two basic theoretical claims of the dissertation: first, that the what counts as an emergency is 
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neither a self-evident fact nor the product of an unconstrained decision, but is constructed 
through a set of background assumptions and political judgments about the identity and value of 
normality. Secondly, the different ways that emergencies are defined and understood play a 
decisive role in shaping the political outcomes of emergency powers, so that for example the 
same institutional framework of emergency powers may produce very different political 
outcomes as the underlying conception of an emergency shifts.  
 The first section of this dissertation, comprising the first three chapters, explore these 
questions through an interrogation of theoretical literatures: the first through an interrogation of 
twentieth century and contemporary works on emergency powers, the second through modern 
republican thought and the third through theories of modern constitutionalism. The final three 
chapters focus more narrowly on a case study: the transformation of legal and political theories 
of emergency powers in the United States. Chapter 4 analyzes 19th century theories of martial 
law; Chapter 5 looks at the theme of emergency and security during the New Deal period, and 
Chapter 6 investigates how the 20th Century concepts of War Powers and National Security 
impacted the idea of emergency powers.  
 
An Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 seeks to substantiate the basic thesis of this dissertation through a close analysis of 
two of the most important recent theorists of emergency powers: the mid-twentieth century 
works of Carl Schmitt, and the more recent contributions of Bruce Ackerman. I argue that, in 
spite of the apparently contradictory positions taken in Schmitt’s work, they nevertheless fit 
within a unified theoretical orientation that Schmitt did not always make explicit. This theoretical 
framework can be clarified and reconstructed by paying attention to the background idea of 
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emergency and specifically what entity was under threat in Schmitt’s writings. That entity, I 
argue, was the modern, sovereign state as it had existed in the European interstate order since the 
mid-17th century, and which Schmitt perceived to be in radical crisis. Clarifying this basic 
orientation point of Schmitt’s theory is crucial, I argue, not only for interpreting the background 
context of his writing more importantly for understanding how it is relevant for the present. 
Secondly, I pose the same question to Bruce Ackerman’s influential recent work on emergency 
powers, and interrogate Ackerman’s definition of an emergency rooted in the concept of 
security. While Ackerman’s institutional proposal itself is sophisticated and salutary, I argue, the 
background conception of what constitutes an emergency is more problematic, conceptually 
inconsistent and politically at cross purposes with his own stated goals. Both Schmitt and 
Ackerman, in different ways, illustrate the value and importance of a reflexive, rather than 
realist, understanding of what defines an emergency.  
Chapter 2 picks up from the argument in favor of breaking with a naïve positivist 
conception of emergencies in order to see how they are constituted in relation to the forms of 
political organization and normative commitments that give them their contours. At the most 
basic level, the contours of emergency politics are shaped by the most fundamental form of 
political organization in modernity: the state. In the most obvious sense, since the physical 
existence of the state is a precondition for any other political good valued by that polity, 
Rousseau’s dictum that “it is always the general will that the state shall not perish” could be 
considered the fundamental maxim of emergency powers. But the apparently self-evident sine 
qua non status of the state belies a host of difficult questions that emerge from this premise. The 
second chapter three examples of tensions within different strands of the modern state give rise 
to different forms of emergency politics. These tensions are, first, between collective liberty and 
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reason of state; second, between popular sovereignty and representation, and third, between the 
state as both a guarantor and a threat to individual security. I explore these themes, each of which 
is internal to the structure of modern state, as it appears in modern political thought and show 
how each of these three tensions becomes an arena for debates over emergency politics. The first 
tension takes place predominantly in the modern republican tradition and gives rise to an 
extended argument over how to interpret the institution of the dictatorship. The second occurs on 
the field of political representation and provides the backdrop for debates surrounding 
plebiscitarianism and emergency politics. The third is an understanding native to liberalism, and 
structures an ongoing liberal ambivalence toward the state and individual security. Each of these 
three arenas of emergencies, I argue, continues to shape debates over emergency powers in the 
present. Locating the terms of these debates within tensions that are internal to the modern state 
suggests that these debates are in some sense non-eliminable so long as we continue to organize 
political life within the form of the modern state. If so, rather than eliminating the tension itself 
or find some abstractly optimal balance point, theories of emergencies should aim at making the 
tension as self-reflexive and transparent as possible. 
If Chapter two focuses on the state in order to analyze the imbricated relations of political 
power and normative commitments that give substance to different conceptions of emergencies, 
Chapter three turns to constitutionalism in order to analyze different juridical forms of 
emergency powers that accompanied the rise of modern constitutionalism. The emergency of 
modern constitutionalism and the normative emphasis on general, abstract, universally binding 
law ironically brought the problem of contingency in politics into sight in a new way. Defenders 
of the rule of general and standing laws over the discretion of political rulers were 
simultaneously forced to grapple the boundaries of normativity outside of which singular 
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instances could not be subsumed under general norms. Specifically, constitutionalism confronted 
its boundaries in three main dimensions: epistemic (politics may be non-foreseeable, 
unanticipated), temporal (politics may be too sudden for the tempo of procedural decision-
making), and spatial (politics outside the sphere of the applicability of the law). The institutional 
and juridical forms developed to cope with these boundaries to the ordinary rule of law without 
undermining it include the institutional and juridical forms of emergency powers and war 
powers. Through an analysis of the theories of dictatorship in Machiavelli and Rousseau and of 
prerogative in Locke and Blackstone, I argue that the distinction between legally authorized vs. 
extra-legal emergency powers is not in itself a key determinant of whether emergency powers 
have a more or less authoritarian character. Rather, alongside this distinction we should include 
the question of the location of judgment about the legitimacy of the emergency – is judgment 
located exclusively within institutions of the state and legal procedures, or does it incorporate the 
role of public judgment and contestation? How vital are the counter powers in civil society and 
the public sphere, and how likely are they to meaningfully scrutinize and contest emergency 
declarations? If we add the state/civil society axis alongside the legal/extralegal one, this 
significantly transforms the debate over extra-legalism.   
Chapter 4 turns to the United States and locates the dominant paradigm of emergency 
powers from the end of the 18th century until the civil war within the framework of constitionalist 
emergency powers described in chapter 2. Against prevailing interpretations in the scholarly 
literature, I argue that the dominant paradigm of emergency powers in this period was not some 
version of the Lockean prerogative but martial law. Focusing on martial law allows us to see 
how this theory of emergency powers fit within the theoretical architecture of the constitutional 
state, grounded on the categorical opposition between the external state of nature and war (in 
  
15 
which no commonly binding positive law or neutral judge obtained) and the internal state of 
effective legal sovereignty, which made constitutional rights legal citizenship possible. Martial 
law referred strictly to instances where effective internal sovereignty was ruptured, where courts 
could not open their doors and function. Only in those instances could the legally constituted 
persona of citizenship be stripped and executive or military officials detain individuals without 
charge or try them for crimes against non-statutory laws of nature. After giving a description of 
the theoretical and juridical contours of martial law, the chapter traces the increasing tension 
between the martial law paradigm and the process of democratic inclusion and expansion over 
the course of the 19th century. This process, culminating in the radical reconstruction after the 
Civil War, the martial law paradigm was forced to confront a distinction that was essentially 
anamolous or penumbral to it: the distinction between “commissarial” martial law instituted by 
the constituted power to restore the status quo ante and “sovereign” or revolutionary martial law 
commissioned by the constituent power to create a new order. This distinction, brought on by the 
disruptive demands for racial and economic democratization, rendered martial law’s theoretical 
foundation in the distinction between law and politics untenable. Faced with an essentially 
democratic revolutionary regime of martial law in the occupied south, courts lost any ability to 
present themselves as purely juridical, non-political interpreters of the constitutionality of 
emergency powers. Ironically, the case that stands in the midst of the process, ex parte Milligan, 
has been stripped of its context and has become the apex of the legalist, court centered civil 
libertarian theory of emergency powers.   
Chapter 5 examines the reorganization of a juridical theory of emergencies based on 
security rather than effective internal sovereignty, and a juridical framework of emergency 
powers based on police powers rather than martial law. The new paradigm, incubated in the 
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period of progressive legal realism and put in place during the New Deal, was crafted to 
incorporate new regulatory and administrative powers during the New Deal. The dire economic 
insecurity brought about by the Great Depression constituted an emergency that justified 
suspending constitutionally entrenched property rights and limitations on federal power. The 
constitutional framework for this new security-based justification of emergency powers was not 
war and sovereignty based paradigm of martial law but the regulatory and discretionary 
framework of police powers. This shift implied replacing the categorical per se criteria of 
effective internal sovereignty with the “realist” criteria of judicial balancing tests, legislative 
delegation and interpretive accommodation.  
Chapter 6 analyzes the process through which the new theory of emergency powers that 
developed in relation to domestic regulatory powers shifted, beginning in the midst of WWII, 
from the economic back to the external, military realm. It explores how this innovation 
consolidated in the discourse of national security, decoupling the identification of normalcy with 
a state of peace and restructuring the international field as more or less permanently punctuated 
with crisis and ongoing emergency powers. The theme running throughout was the one 
established in Chapter 2 of the bedrock distinction between the paradigms of crime and war 
undergirding the modern constitutional state. The dissertation concludes with a reflection on how 
the discourse of security applied to the field of emergency powers has given rise to legal and 
institutional categories that threat to rupture this axial distinction between crime and war, 





















Chapter I. Emergency Powers, the Exception and the “Self” of Self-
Preservation   
 
Beyond Realism and Skepticism 
The current literature, then, is split between the schools of emergency powers and the exception. 
Another way of characterizing the contemporary literature is through the distinction between 
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realist and skeptical approaches to the distinction between normal and emergency states. What I 
am calling the realist approach equates an emergency with some factual state of affairs that could 
be recognized by any independent observer. As John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino describe it: 
 
Some (let’s call them “realists”) claim that this ontological [between norm and exception] 
difference is objective and evident, that everybody can recognize its existence or supervenience; 
as a result, a neutral, involuntary mechanism can be established in order to detect its appearing or 
disappearing as a state of the world. An analogy would be as when the level of a river goes over a 
given threshold and an automatic mechanism systematically triggers an alarm or some other 
action or performance.14  
 
On this account, being correct or mistaken about an emergency is simply a matter of accurate 
perception, as Nomi Lazar puts it, analogous to identifying whether a fruit is really an orange or 
a lime.15 In contrast, the skeptical approach brackets this reference to a factual state of affairs. As 
Ferejohn and Pasquino describe 
 
Some other thinkers (let’s call them “skeptics,” or we may call them Schmittians) claim that there 
is no absolute evidence of the existence of an exceptional situation, that people will inevitably 
disagree about its existence, and thus we need to attribute to some agency (organ or institution) the 
epistemic authority to declare the exception. The skeptics believe in the epistemic dimension and 
are reserved concerning the ontological one.16  
  
                                                
14 Pasquino, J. F. a. P. (2004). "The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers." International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 2(2)., 226. 
15Lazar, N. C. (2009). States of emergency in liberal democracies. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University 
Press., ch. 2.  
16 Ferejohn and Pasquino, “Law of the Exception,” 226. 
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The perspective I will advocate in what follows is an alternative to this contrast between 
skepticism and realism as well. Neither of these approaches are adequate to grasp the way in 
which the definition of what counts as an emergency can be a dynamic arena of persuasion, 
justification and conflict, not only over the temporary consequences of emergency powers, but 
over the identity and content of normalcy as well. Distinguishing between normalcy and a state 
of emergency is not just a matter of perception (as in the realist account) or decision (in the 
skeptical account); it is also, crucially, an act of interpretation and a process of political 
judgment, where the determination of an emergency is at the same time an evaluative claim 
about the identity of political normalcy. In other words, the definition of what counts as an 
emergency is simulations a way of defining what is the state of affairs that is being threatened, 
which also implies a judgment about the value of preserving a state of affairs that would justify 
exceptional measures. Thus, while the realist approach obscures this political realm of 
interpretation and judgment by reducing the definition of to a self-evident determination of facts, 
the skeptical approach dissolves the concrete political content and stakes of the definition of 
emergencies by abstracting and isolating the subjective decision on the exception from the 
broader ideological or normative context that determines whether such a decision will be 




Carl Schmitt: the Anatomy of the Exception 
I want to turn to a reading of Carl Schmitt as a means of clarifying the concepts of emergency 
powers and the exception, as well as the distinction between realism and skepticism. Schmitt, has 
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been a major – if not the major – intellectual source for both of the contemporary schools I’ve 
outlined and I will argue that Schmitt’s work provides a basis for distinguishing between 
emergency powers and the state of exception within a single theoretical framework. Presenting 
this framework will require some theoretical reconstruction, since the overall coherence of this 
theory has been obscured to some extent by Schmitt’s tendency to shift abruptly from work to 
work in political focus and orientation. For this reason, the importance of both emergency 
powers and the state of exception in Schmitt’s work has often been overlooked, particularly by 
recent scholars of the state of exception who are eager to claim Schmitt as entirely their own.17 A 
number of theorists of emergency powers, on the other hand, have been attentive to Schmitt’s 
two conceptions, but have overemphasized the contradiction between them and underemphasized 
their relationship as distinct parts of a larger theory.18 It will be helpful, therefore, in bridging the 
distance between these two very different approaches and theoretical vocabularies to see how 
emergency powers and the exception function alongside one another in the theory of Carl 
Schmitt.  
 The alternative interpretation of Schmitt I will present here follows directly from the 
basic questions I have been emphasizing so far in this chapter: how are emergencies 
distinguished from ordinary conditions? What characterizes the underlying conception of 
political normalcy with reference to which judgments can be made about the degree, type and 
urgency of the threat? How do these background conceptions that define what is an emergency 
                                                
17 E.g. Agamben. Of course numerous commentators have made this observation. In addition toMcCormick, J. P. 
(1997). Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism : against politics as technology. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press., who I will discuss in detail, see in particular Andrew Arato, “Goodbye to Dictatorship?” for an 
illuminating discussion of Schmitt’s Dictatorship. Other works that have commented from different perspectives on 
this issue includeBalakrishnan, G. and C. Schmitt (2000). The enemy : an intellectual portrait of Carl Schmitt. 
London ; New York, Verso., Kennedy, E. and ebrary Inc. (2004). Constitutional failure Carl Schmitt in Weimar. 
Durham, Duke University Press. 
   
18 John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. 
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shape or inform the nature of emergency powers or the state of exception? I want show that this 
line of inquiry brings into shaper focus some important aspects of Schmitt’s theory that have 
been overlooked or distorted by other interpretations. One of these is that provides a vantage 
point that helps to clarify an underlying theoretical consistency in Schmitt’s various accounts of 
emergency powers and the exception that is often overlooked. A second advantage comes from 
focusing closely on the relationship between the positive account of emergency or exceptional 
powers and the concrete identification of what was the essential political form definitive of the 
“status quo” that must be preserved from existential threat. Clarifying this relationship and the 
essential role it plays in Schmitt’s theory is important not only for a more nuanced historical 
interpretation of Schmitt’s text; it also helps us to judge how Schmitt’s theory can be a used to 
illuminate our own time, as well as how reapplying his theory without regard for different 
contexts can lead to misconstruing or distorting the present.   
Schmitt has been invoked variously as an example of both the positivist and the skeptical 
approaches discussed previously. On the one hand, liberal scholars have responded to Schmitt’s 
challenge that liberalism is fatally naïve about emergencies and the political exception. Taking 
Schmitt’s challenge at face value, they have highlighted a variety of different institutional means 
by which liberalism can, pace Schmitt, effectively anticipate and respond to emergencies, 
understood in terms of the naïve positivist approach described above. On the other hand, some 
radical critics of liberalism have embraced a “skeptical” interpretation of Schmitt’s theory of the 
sovereign decision, transforming the state of exception into a theoretical or logical postulate that 
calls into question a priori the integrity of the rule of law.  After highlighting the limitations of 
both of these, I argue that Schmitt held neither a skeptic nor a positivist approach to emergencies, 
but rather had a sophisticated account of the political relations that shape any possible 
  
22 
identification of the norm and the exception in a particular political order. Thus, reconstructing 
the continuity and consistency in Schmitt’s writings on emergency powers and the state of 
exception will require a different approach than either the skeptical or the positivist one. 
Schmitt’s continuous preoccupation with the nature and identity of the underlying emergency of 
his own time is informed by Schmitt’s theoretical account of the political conditions for 
identifying such a threat.  
What in Schmitt’s view faced an existential threat was the state, as it had existed in 
Europe since the creation of the Westphalian order. In Schmitt’s view, the modern state, standing 
above and apart from society internally, and possessing exclusive jus belli externally, faced a 
series of emergency threats to its existence, and his Weimar works explored a number of 
different potential means for overcoming these threats. Understanding Schmitt’s idea of the 
modern state is crucial because it clarifies the nature of the emergencies that preoccupied 
Schmitt, and the identity of what emergency powers are charged with preserving or restoring. 
Obviously, this conception of the state was hardly uncontroversial or universally shared among 
Schmitt’s contemporaries, and Schmitt’s attempts to discredit its competitors comprise a major 
polemical axis of his work. It is this preoccupation with the modern state that has receded or 
even disappeared in many influential subsequent interpretations of Schmitt’s theories of 
emergency powers.19 Abstracting concepts from Schmitt’s texts such as sovereignty, or the state 
of exception from the concrete political content they had in his work has the advantage of greatly 
expanding interpretive possibilities, as well as freeing the interpreter to apply the concepts to an 
impressive range of historical and contemporary phenomena, philosophical as well as literary 
works, etc. The downside, however, is the danger that the wildly disparate content becomes 
                                                
19 To cite two prominent examples: Mouffe, C. (1995). "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy." The 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10(1). and Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer and State of the Exception, 
discussed in more detail below 
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interchangeable, and concepts themselves become indeterminate and cease to illuminate 




Schmitt’s decisionism: beyond skepticism and positivism 
In their distinction between “realist” and “skeptical” theories discussed above, Pasquino and 
Ferejohn affirm a widespread interpretation of Schmitt as the paradigmatic “skeptic” – indeed, 
they even use the categories “skeptic” and “Schmittean” interchangeably.20  For them, this 
amounts to the idea that there will never be any ultimate “fact of the matter” of whether the 
exception exists or not, and therefore it is defined not by an external state of affairs but rather by 
“some agency (organ or institution)” that possesses “the epistemic authority to declare the 
exception.”21 Thus, in Republican Rome, the exception existed when the Senate initiated a 
proposal for the consuls to appoint a dictator. Likewise, for Schmitt’s Political Theology the 
exception exists when the sovereign has made a decision to that effect – no reference to external 
political or sociological conditions necessary. I will argue in a moment that this is a very 
incomplete and distorted account of what Schmitt is saying, but first let us turn to a prominent 
contemporary theorist of the exception that embraces such an interpretation, Giorgio Agamben.  
Agamben adopts a kind of radicalization of Ferejohn and Pasquino’s skeptical or 
epistemological interpretation of Schmitt’s exception. The distinction between norm and 
exception refers only to the decision of the sovereign, without any reference to an externally 
existing state of affairs. Agamben is highly critical of any attempt to define or give content to the 
                                                
20 Ferejohn and Paquino, 226. 
21 Ibid.  
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idea of necessity that could identify the existence of a state of exception. The problem, for 
Agamben, is that  
 
writers continue more or less unconsciously to think of [necessity] as an objective situation. This 
naïve conception – which presupposes a pure factuality that the conception itself has called into 
question – is easily critiqued by those jurists who show that, far from occurring as an objective 
given, necessity clearly entails a subjective judgment, and that obviously the only circumstances 
that are necessary and objective are those that are declared to be so.22 
 
There are strong epistemological grounds for a skeptical critique of any reference to extra-
juridical “facts,” the most sophisticated example being Hans Kelsen’s neo-Kantian conception of 
legal positivism. From a Kelsonian perspective, any possible act that could be attributed to the 
state must come from an agent who is legally authorized to perform that act – such as the Roman 
Senate initiating a proposal for the consuls to appoint a dictator. From such a perspective of 
normative validity, the state of exception can be objectively described in juridical terms without 
any reference whatsoever to extra-juridical “facts.” The problem is that Agamben rejects this 
legal positivist approach even more vehemently than the idea of objective necessity. Agamben’s 
starting point, following Schmitt, is that the state of exception cannot be circumscribed or 
contained by any system of norms.23 Hence, the “skeptical” solution described by Ferejohn and 
Pasquino of looking at which agent is authorized to declare an exception is unavailable to him. 
Strikingly, Ferejohn and Pasquino don’t seem to have noticed that this “epistemological” 
solution doesn’t work for Schmitt’s famous dictum in Political Theology about the sovereign 
decision on the exception, for which it is invariably cited. The broader argument of Political 
                                                
22 ibid., 29-30. 
23 See Agamben, State of Exception at, for instance, 1, 8, 23.  
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Theology  is designed to work against it. The argument in chapter one of that work, which builds 
upon the opening definition of sovereignty and also helps explain it, is in fact crafted with 
precisely Han’s Kelsen’s sophisticated account of legal skepticism as its target. Kelsen’s 
approach held, essentially, that in order to avoid lapsing into dogmatism or mysticism, 
jurisprudence must necessarily adopt a radically skeptical attitude regarding relations of 
causality or “factual contingencies.” Jurisprudence must rigorously limit itself to determinations 
of normative validity and refrain from any causal determinations by extra-juridical forces. The 
reason for this is that since all legal norms have the structure of an ought rather than an is. It 
makes no sense to inquire whether a legal norm is “true or false”; a juridical norm can only be 
“valid or invalid,” and validity can derive only from another, higher norm. Thus, for Kelsen 
jurisprudence must exclude all judgments of causality, and must therefore necessarily regard the 
legal order as a self-enclosed unity, deriving norms from higher legal norms, and bracketing the 
extra-juridical domain of causality and “facts” altogether.24   
The purpose of Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty is that it would rupture the hierarchy 
of norms that the skeptic necessarily relies upon in order to distinguish norm from exception. If 
Schmitt’s definition is accepted, then even if a Rechtstaat constitution does not assign any single 
agent sovereign authority for an unconstrained decision, this does not mean that such an agent 
doesn’t exist politically (although he would not be identifiable through means of legal validity 
alone). Rather, it means that the identity of the sovereign becomes clear in an exceptional 
moment; the sovereign will be whichever political agent has the authority and legitimacy 
(whether or not they have legal validity) to make collectively binding decisions regarding the 
                                                
24Kelsen, H. (2002). Pure theory of law. Union, N.J., Lawbook Exchange., 6-8; 19-20; Kelsen, H. (1999). General 
theory of law and state. Union, N.J., Lawbook Exchange., 14.  
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self-preservation of the political community. If the political community exists at during a crisis, 
such a decisive entity must be in existence.  
Despite the prominent role Agamben assigns to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, 
Agamben removes the idea of the anomic sovereign decision on the exception from its context in 
an argument that sovereignty and the terms by which an “exception” is identified cannot be 
established formally and abstractly, but must be analyzed as concrete political sociological 
determination. Agamben’s position is the exact opposite of this: for him, neither the juridical 
order nor concrete judgments about the nature of ‘necessity’ or the exceptional situation can tell 
us anything important about the state of exception: “Not only does necessity ultimately come 
down to a decision, but that on which it decides is, in truth, something undecidable in fact and 
law.”25 Schmitt attempted to link the concept of the exception indissolubly together with a 
reference to concrete political agency. Agamben’s theoretical framework, which does not 
recognize agency in general,26 not only decouples the exception from any determinate political 
reference, it actually transforms the concept itself into a sort of trans-historical actor on its own. 
The exception, as it increasingly becomes a norm of governance, “also lets its own nature as the 
constitutive paradigm of the juridical order come to light.”27 The nature that comes to light is the 
same that was originally disclosed in the Roman legal category homo sacer and reached fruition 
in the concentration camps, namely, the law’s relation to bare life, a theme in which Agamben 
discovers the “historico-political destiny of the West.”28 It may seem surprising for an interpreter 
of Foucault and Derrida to end up with this kind of metaphysics and the resurrection of 
speculative philosophy of history, but it is a logical enough outcome of Agamben’s 
                                                
25 State of Exception, 30. My italics 
26 see, Passavant, P. A. (2007). "The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben." Political Theory 35(2): 147-174.  
27 Agamben, State of Exception, 6.  
28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 17. 
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methodology. Having decoupled his major theoretical concepts from any determinate political 
content, the concepts have effectively become their own content, and have become identical to 
the truths they illuminate. If Schmitt’s concept of the exception can still be useful for interpreting 
the present, it would have to maintain, rather than abandon, its focus on an external political 
world. In order to explore this further, I will now turn to a very different attempt to reflect on 
how Schmitt’s work can illuminate the problem of emergency powers in the 0present, namely, 
John McCormick’s insightful distinction between Schmitt’s theories of emergency powers and 




Republican Emergency Powers, anti-Republican Exception 
McCormick, both in his Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, and in subsequent articles, has 
developed an interpretation of Schmitt that is organized around a contrast between Schmitt’s 
theory of commissarial dictatorship from his 1921 Dictatorship with the better-known account of 
the state of exception in Political Theology, published in 1922. As McCormick demonstrates, 
although these works are separated by only a year, they contain radically different accounts of 
the scope and nature of exceptional powers. McCormick argues that Schmitt’s early position in 
Dictatorship clearly articulates and distinguishes dictatorship in its “proper sense” as a 
temporary, emergency authority that is commissioned to suspend ordinary separation of powers 
and take “concrete measures” for the sake of restoring the status quo ante of the constitutional 
order. This model of limited, constitutional emergency powers Schmitt calls “commissarial 
dictatorship,” which he contrasts to a second type that emerges from the French Revolution: 
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“sovereign” or revolutionary dictatorship. Sovereign dictatorship is (despite the misleading 
name) an extraordinary power that is commissioned by the revolutionary constituent power 
rather than the constituted power, and is exercised for the sake of instating a new constitutional 
order rather than returning to the old constitutional status quo ante. Thus, Dictatorship presents 
us with a fundamental contrast between legal, temporally limited, restorative emergency powers 
in the form of commissarial dictatorship, and extra-legal, future oriented, technically indefinite 
and unlimited revolutionary dictatorship in a state of exception.  
 Although Schmitt does not explicitly present the distinction in normative terms, 
McCormick is at least somewhat justified in interpreting Schmitt’s Dictatorship as a clear 
endorsement of the model of commissarial dictatorship, positively depicting its non-sovereign, 
temporally and functionally limited character, in sharp contrast to the unbounded and unlimited 
instrumentalism of sovereign dictatorship that is vividly illustrated for Schmitt in the Bolshevik 
dictatorship of the proletariat. McCormick argues, persuasively, that Schmitt’s glowing depiction 
of limited emergency powers reflects a surprisingly pro-republican stance, as does his keenness 
to dispel the liberal hostility to dictatorship, and defend it as a crucial institutional means of 
strengthening and bolstering republican constitutionalism during crises.  
 In McCormick’s interpretation Political Theology, from its very first sentence declaring 
that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” is a wholesale rejection and repudiation of 
the position staked out in Dictatorship. After all, if the exception cannot be codified or 
anticipated in advance, the ambition of constitutional emergency powers of subjecting even 
extraordinary crisis government to the limited status of a “commission” is futile. Schemes to 
require legal authorization, maintain the separation of powers, and impose time and scope 
limitations on exceptional powers are at best superfluous, to be swept aside when a real crisis 
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hits. Thus, from this perspective Political Theology directly targets and overcomes the three 
basic pillars of Schmitt’s early case for emergency powers: first, that exceptional power can be 
anticipated and restrained in advance by legal rules; second, that the authority to use exceptional 
measures can remain a commissioned authority distinct from sovereignty itself; and third that the 
distinction can be maintained between the sovereign power to change the constitution, and 
limited emergency measures authorized only to restore the status quo ante. In the later theory, 
each of these limits is breached by fusing together dictatorship with unconstrained sovereignty. 
In the passage from Dictatorship to Political Theology we can see, McCormick remarks, the 
process where “a particularly brilliant Weimar conservative became in fact a Weimar fascist.”29 
For McCormick, at the core of Schmitt’s break with constitutionalism in favor of fascism 
is a kind of radicalized Weberianism that amplified the tension between legal and charismatic 
legitimacy into an irreconcilable antagonism. On this account, Schmitt associated legal 
legitimacy as such – including the rule-governed instrumentality of comissarrial dictatorship – 
with disenchantment, empty instrumentality, and the loss of meaning or value in politics. This 
was why Schmitt regarded the explosive charisma unleashed in the sovereign decision on the 
exception with such feverish optimism: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through 
the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.”30 He regarded the charismatic 
basis of plebiscitarian leadership as the sole remaining source of legitimacy available to post-
1917 Europe that could still infuse political life with non-instrumental meaning and value.31 
Thus, McCormick argues, from Political Theology onward Schmitt continued to look to the state 
of exception as both a weapon against legal rationalism and a source for reigniting charismatic 
                                                
29 McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 148. In another version of this argument, “Dilemmas of 
Dictatorship,” in Dyzenhaus, D. (1998). Law as politics : Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism. Durham, NC, Duke 
University Press. (He makes the same claim at 236-7 and again on 242). 
30 Schmitt, Political Theology, 15. 
31 McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 148. 
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legitimacy. Works such as The Guardian of the Constitution and Legality and Legitimacy applied 
this model specifically to Weimar institutions as a means of undermining the republic from 
within, deliberately contrasting an enfeebled parliamentary legality to the superior legitimacy of 
extraordinary powers exercised by the plebiscitary president as an embodiment of the popular 
will.32 McCormick’s conclusion is that the contrasts between Dictatorship with the subsequent 
theory not only illuminates the dangers of plebiscitarianism and unbounded decisionism; it also 
demonstrates in commissarial dictatorship a model of emergency powers that would not 
undermine liberalism but on the contrary could serve as an important means for strengthening. 
Thus for McCormick liberals can learn from Schmitt’s early theory of emergency powers as a 
liberal defense against the later Schmitt’s false diagnosis of liberalism’s fatal weakness in its 
inability to acknowledge the exceptional dimension of political life.33  
Other interpreters of Schmitt would contest McCormick’s distinction between the 1921 
liberal-republican friendly Schmitt, and the 1922 and after fascist Schmitt. Some scholars such as 
Antonio Negri and Andreas Kalyvas have proposed a democratic reading of Carl Schmitt that 
encompasses both moments. They do so by giving, to different degrees, priority to Carl 
Schmitt’s theory of constitution making, his identification of the constituent power as the 
unbounded, sovereign decision reflected in a constitution. In post-French Revolutionary 
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modernity, Schmitt recognized that the people had replaced God or the Monarch as the sole 
legitimate bearer of the constituent power, and thus provided an image of revolutionary 
constitution-making as a radical democratic act of the sovereign people deciding on the political 
form of their collective existence.34 Placing this account of sovereignty as democratic constituent 
power at the center of Schmitt’s theory, Kalyvas suggests that Political Theology too, must be 
interpreted as referring to the sovereign people, on whose decision the legal order rests.35 On the 
other hand, the theory of commissarial dictatorship praised by McCormick is criticized by 
Kalyvas as a reflection of Schmitt’s authoritarian, repressive, statist inclination that for Kalyvas 
must be distinguished from the core theory of democratic sovereignty.36 
These accounts of a radical, democratic sovereign exception could not be more at odds 
with McCormick’s conclusion of a fascist one. Which is the more plausible interpretation for 
understanding the exception as it relates to emergency powers? I want to defer answering this 
question directly, and instead argue from the perspective of what Schmitt identified as the entity 
that must be preserved, and how he identified the nature of the possible emergency threats. I 
want to show that establishing this perspective is important for adequately answering the 
question I’ve laid out about emergency powers and the exception, since it establishes the 
determinate political content of these concepts.  
 
The state and the political 
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Gopal Balakrishnan has argued that while Schmitt’s Weimar writings have not remained 
consistent with one another in terms of the solutions they advocate, there is a strong consistency 
among them in terms of underlying subject matter. The explore from different perspectives the 
same intense preoccupation with what Schmitt saw as the threats to Germany’s existence a 
sovereign state. These threats stemmed from a variety of sources, but two of the most important 
were the transformation of the international order and Germany’s position in it, as well as the 
transformation in the relations between state and society catalyzed by the parliamentary mass 
democracy of the Weimar republic.37 Domestically, these developments made it virtually 
impossible for the state to act as an autonomous political agent, distinguishing itself from and 
standing above a “nonpolitical” realm of society. Rather, the state found itself occupied by 
society, in the form of mass electoral parties each purporting to represent the interests of a 
particular social group in parliament. In this way the state became a forum in which multiple, 
often fierce social antagonisms and conflicts were expressed. Internationally, it was the system 
of independent, formally equal sovereign persons, each possessing full jus belli. Seen from the 
tumultuous perspective of the Weimar republic, the post-WWI transformations of the interstate 
order, the rise of multiparty pluralist liberal democracy, and the intensity of class conflict 
established the conditions where emergency threats to the state could have explosive and 
shattering effects. I want to briefly demonstrate how the basic categories of Schmitt’s theory 
were crafted to diagnose and respond to this condition, and build from these to reconstruct his 
theories of the exception and emergency powers. 
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 The Concept of the Political opens with Schmitt’s assertion that “the concept of the state 
presupposes the concept of the political.”38 This fact, according to Schmitt, is overlooked by the 
prevailing social scientific tendency to define the political with reference to the state, thereby 
resulting in vagueness and circularity. Likewise, the problem with prevailing juridical criteria of 
the political is that they presuppose the state to be in all cases the “unequivocal and eminent 
entity confronting nonpolitical groups and affairs – in other words for as long as the state 
possesses the monopoly on politics.”39 Schmitt’s point is that the vagueness and insufficiency of 
these definitions has become especially problematic at the historical juncture where this 
conception of the state as the exclusive political entity, standing apart from a non-political 
society, can no longer be taken for granted. According to Schmitt, liberal pluralism and mass 
democracy have resulted in an “interpenetration” of state and society, fragmenting the character 
of the state as a unitary agent, and transforming it into a forum occupied by a multiplicity of 
social interests and groups engaged in endless, unprincipled bargaining and maneuvering. In 
such conditions, anything in society is open to becoming politicized, and inversely the state has 
lost its claim to having a self-evidently political character.40 Once the state/society antithesis 
have been called into question, it clearly no longer suffices to define the political as competition 
for power to influence the state, since it is not clear anymore what makes the state “political” in 
the first place. This is the situation to which Schmitt’s famous definition of the political as the 
distinction between friend and enemy is directed. If it’s no longer self-evident that the state is the 
sole, exclusive form that political association could take, this means that the state could not 
necessarily be assumed any longer to be the exclusive authority for deciding friend/enemy 
distinctions that take priority for a population over all other memberships and allegiances.  
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This, for Schmitt, was epochal transformation in the concept of the state as it had 
existence from the mid-17th century.  The modern state emerged through the pacification of 
internal conflict and the assertion of unified, comprehensive jurisdiction within a territorial order. 
Such a state enjoyed exclusive rights of war and peace, and authority over matters of collective 
security and self-preservation and freely distinguished between friends and enemies on its own 
terms. The essence of the modern state was its status as the decisive political entity for a territory 
and a population.41 And as long as this theory coincided with political reality within Europe, the 
problem of defining the political independently of the state did not emerge. What Schmitt’s 
isolation of the political apart from the state reveals, however, is the vivid possibility that non-
state associations emerging from society may gain the capacity to make friend/enemy 
distinctions of their own, which cut across and supersede national territorial boundaries.42 If, in 
the extreme instance of violent conflict, party allegiance subordinates all others and members are 
willing to risk their lives for the sake of the party rather than the state, it is the party that is the 
political entity in this case. As a keen reader of Marx, Lenin and Lukacs, Schmitt was especially 
attentive to the possibility that, in the context of class conflict, economic class could intensify 
beyond the point of a merely “private” association and become the decisive entity, gaining the 
capacity to distinguish friends and enemies along the lines of international class struggle and 
displacing the nation state altogether as the primary unit of the political.43  
Ulrich Preuss, stressing the historical context of Schmitt’s thought, has argued that the 
decisive point of reference for Schmitt’s Weimar writings was the emergence of political 
cleavages in which “the identification of one social class with ‘the people’ as the undisputed 
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holder of sovereignty… revolutions have become more or less concealed class struggles – or, in 
other words, class struggle has been politicized, with the consequences that the economic and 
social conflict has escalated almost to the level of modern religious civil wars. This class struggle 
evidently lurks in the background of Schmitt’s concept of the political…”44 From this 
perspective, a major focus of Schmitt’s attack on liberalism was that it blinded and deprived 
itself of the means to fight its own enemies. From Schmitt’s perspective, liberal pluralism was 
incapable of grasping the possibility of economic conflict to transcend private interest and take 
on an openly political intensity directed against the state itself. Moreover, Schmitt claims that 
liberalism’s squeamishness about repression, and about state power in general, leave it 
unguarded and defenseless against its more politically astute enemies.45 Paradoxically, the 
depoliticized, liberal pluralist state may extend its reach throughout the whole of society, yet “it 
is allowed to do nothing. In particular it must not defend its existing form in any crisis…”46 In 
other words, the inability of the liberal state to distinguish between friends and enemies is 
reflected by the inability to distinguish or decide about the priority between the ordinary 
functioning of liberal pluralist norms from the political identity of the state and its form of 
existence in the event that they come into conflict.47  
 
The State and the Exception 
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From this perspective it becomes clearer how Schmitt’s understanding of modern state and the 
crisis facing it is built into his basic theoretical concepts and categories, from which the concepts 
of emergency powers and the exception are drawn. By far the clearest and most systematic 
elaboration of this theoretical background is Schmitt’s major theoretical treatise, Constitutional 
Theory. In that text, the understanding of the political that was isolated and scrutinized on its 
own in The Concept of the Political becomes the basis for Schmitt’s reconstruction of 
fundamental concepts such as the state, constitution, sovereignty, the people, the exception, etc. 
There he defines the state as “the political unity of the people.” In theoretical terms, this political 
unity is determined by some combination of an immanent identity of its members, and a 
representation that symbolizes to the members their “higher” existence as political unity.48 In 
every case, however, the necessary condition and “essential presupposition of the political 
existence” of any state is that it has the capacity to distinguish between friend and enemy for 
itself.49 Schmitt’s own preferred definition of a constitution is not a contract or a collection of 
constitutional provisions but is defined as the concrete, self-conscious decision made by a 
political unity about the form of its political existence. The state, in this understanding, 
necessarily preexists the constitution it gives itself, and as long as the people continue to exist as 
a political unity, the state is always free to decide anew on the form of its political existence.50 
Schmitt distinguishes this idea of a constitution from the sum of all constitutional laws and 
provisions in a constitutional text. Not all constitutional laws are a part of the constitution proper. 
Only the provisions of the text that form a singular decision on the type and form of a people’s 
political existence – such as the form of government, separation and division of powers and even 
potentially the preamble and table of rights if they are the products of a political will to some 
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concrete and determined existence – make up the constitution proper. The constitution in this 
sense is inviolable, unchangeable by any constituted power, and is the source from which all 
constitutional laws and statutes derive their validity. Only the latter, and not the former, can be 
changed through constituted, procedural means such as amendment.51 
Thus, at this stage Schmitt has already built in three distinct levels of priority as they 
concern the “self” of self-preservation. On the most basic level, the state itself preexists its own 
constitution, and the state’s political existence as such evidently takes precedence over any 
particular form of existence it has chosen for that time to give itself. Secondly, however, 
according to Schmitt’s definition not only the state as such but also of the constitution is literally 
an existential value since it reflects the state’s fundamental decision about its form of political 
existence. The constitution and the state’s political existence effectively amount to the same 
thing: 
 
Every existing political unity has its value and its “right to existence” not in the rightness or 
usefulness of norms, but rather in its existence…. Consequently, its “right to self-preservation” is 
the prerequisite of all further discussions; it attempts, above all, to maintain itself in its existence, 
‘in suo esse perseverare; (Spinoza); it protects ‘its existence, its integrity, and its constitution,’ 
which are all existential values.52 
 
Interestingly, Schmitt has defined constitution in such a way that absorbs the bedrock principle 
of self-preservation, and is not reducible whatsoever to legality, or mere constitutional law, 
which are of secondary priority and have authority by virtue of the constitution as a decision 
about a mode of political existence. Thus, the third level involves the authority to suspend or 
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violate constitutional laws for the sake of preserving the constitution as a mode of political 
existence. Here Schmitt argues, referring to Art. 48 of the Weimar constitution, that during a 
state of exception the president is entitled not only to suspend certain constitutional rights that 
are enumerated by name in the Article. Further, Schmitt argues that the President may issue 
measures that violate other constitutional provisions beyond the ones explicitly enumerated. 
Denying this on the grounds that the “constitution is inviolable” according to Schmitt is based on 
the false premise that confuses the constitution with every individual constitutional law, refusing 
to acknowledge a difference in importance between the provision establishing the German Reich 
as a republic, and provisions regulating the personal papers of civil servants.53 For Schmitt, it 
follows necessarily from the inviolability of the constitution that there must be a distinction 
between it and constitutional laws that can be violated, when necessary, to preserve the 
constitution. To deny this would mean, effectively, placing “the individual statute above the 
entirety of the political form of existence.”54  
At this point we can clarify in formal, theoretical terms Schmitt’s answer to our question 
about the terms by which it is possible to distinguish “emergencies” that would require an 
exception from the ordinary condition of political “normalcy” in which all norms in the legal 
order apply. An emergency is a threat to the state’s existence, which is to say a threat the specific 
form of political existence that a people as a political unity has decided for itself, the defense of 
which requires suspension of constitutional laws or statutes. Any state, insofar as it has decided 
on a concrete form of existence, necessarily wills the means of its self-preservation. The “self,” 
however, of Schmitt’s formulation of self-preservation is not reducible to neutral criteria like 
physical integrity or safety. It could likely include something like a way of life, insofar as that is 
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the object of a fundamental decision, or what he refers to as “the proclamation of a ‘new state 
ethos.’” Political existence never has an entirely static, self-enclosed character since for Schmitt 
it necessarily entails particular relations to the concrete political existence of other entities, 
including as a necessary precondition the possibility of enmity.   
The three levels at which we could potentially identify a political entity – the level of the 
state or the political unity of the people that may preexists or outlive any particular constitution, 
the level of the constitution, or the concrete form of political existence a people gives itself, and 
the level of the legal order or the system of constitutional laws and statutes  whose validity 
derives from the constitution. The third level of the legal order is clearly what Schmitt refers to 
as “the normal situation [that] is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid.”55 Establishing and 
preserving a condition of normality and the ordinary functioning of the legal order is simply to 
fully realize and apply the constitution it has given itself, and is therefore necessarily the end of 
any state whether in ordinary or extraordinary moments.  
The second level concerns the inviolability of the constitution, as distinct from constitutional 
laws that may be temporarily suspended or violated for the sake of preserving the constitution. I 
will call the suspension of constitutional laws but not the constitution emergency powers,56 which 
refer to measures that are temporary, do not violate provisions of the constitution itself and stop 
short of enacting permanent law or constitutional change. Schmitt argues in the case of Art. 48, 
and implies more generally, that as long as these conditions are met the emergency measures can 
be regarded as authorized by the constitution, even if there is no explicit textual authorization for 
the particular measures or laws violated. The discussion of Art. 48 in Constitutional Theory and 
                                                
55 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 46. 
56 I realize I risk confusion here since Schmitt in both Constitutional Theory and Dictatorship refers to the state of 




the model of commissarial dictatorship in Dictatorship both qualify as emergency powers in this 
case. As the model of constitutional dictatorship made clear, a final condition of emergency 
powers is that whatever their temporary powers may be, they remain limited, constituted powers 
strictly barred from the sovereign power to transform the constitution. Thus, if the president (in 
the Weimar case) invokes Art. 48 in order to not just violate certain basic rights temporarily, but 
to actually abolish the basic right permanently, this is no longer a constitutionally authorized 
emergency measure, but now impinges upon the fundamental political decisions and substance 
of the constitution.57 By making permanent changes to the constitution itself, the president is no 
longer acting as a limited, constituted power but as a sovereign, or constituent power.   
 The third level concerns the distinction between the constitution and the political entity 
that creates the constitution. The third level, in other words, Schmitt is clear that if the 
constitution is a decision by a politically unified people about its existence, then this political 
unity must already be in existence in order to make a decision about itself. The state, then, 
preexists the constitution it creates; it is the constituent power. For the same reason, a people that 
has become aware of itself as a constituent power cannot be bound by its own creation but 
retains the authority to give itself a new constitution whenever it chooses. This, of course, is the 
level from which authors such as Negri and Kalyvas have drawn their account of democratic 
constituent sovereignty. It is also the account Schmitt gave in his theory of sovereign 
dictatorship, as the revolutionary agent of the sovereign people, commissioned to use 
extraordinary measures to bring about a new, future constitutional order. 
 
Democracy and the Plebiscitarian Exception 
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Let me recall the diagnosis we saw in Concept of the Political. I argued that text must be read as 
an account of the crisis of the modern state losing its status as the unique political entity, and 
from that account sketching a series of possible forms in which this threat could be identified, 
including the interpenetration of state and society, and the intensification of class conflict to the 
point where new friend/enemy groupings emerge on the field of the social, rather than the state. 
The fusion of revolutionary popular sovereignty with class struggle, creating “the identification 
of one social class with ‘the people’ as the undisputed holder of sovereignty” is precisely the 
radical danger expressed by Schmitt’s early concept of sovereign dictatorship. While the original 
model was the French Revolution, Schmitt repeatedly stresses that the contemporary 
embodiment of the concept in the dictatorship of the proletariat, which radicalizes the future 
orientation of sovereign dictatorship and regards the state apparatus itself as an unconstrained 
coercive means to create the conditions of a future communist society in which it can ultimately 
wither away.58 Thus, dictatorship of the proletariat is a full realization for Schmitt of the most 
radical dangers of sovereign dictatorship, in which an as yet unrealized future state of affairs, 
however distant or vague, legitimates an unconstrained and unbounded strategic use of state 
coercion and violence. In this context, Schmitt notes, the earlier liberal toleration for ‘mild’ 
commissarial dictatorship is irreversibly transformed. In the world of 18th century liberalism, the 
state confronted a “non-political” society composed of private individuals. Mild emergency 
powers such as “fictive state of siege” might be necessary to disperse the occasional crowd and 
keep the rabble in order, but remained limited in scope. Schmitt suggests that 1848, and the 
emergence of the European proletariat as a revolutionary force, fundamentally changed the 
coordinates of the state’s relationship to society, transforming the social realm into a kind of 
                                                




semi-permanent emergency for the state and requiring an armory of much harsher emergency 
powers than liberalism was prepared to accept.59   
 Thus, the commissarial/sovereign distinction reflects Schmitt’s concrete diagnosis of the 
emergency at hand. Sovereign dictatorship brings to light the dangerous possibilities of the 
principle of popular sovereignty, which can take the form not only of the foundation of the 
liberal state but also as a concrete  political “enemy” of that state, in the form of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. In this context, the tendency of liberal, “bourgeois” political thought to 
assimilate dictatorship to a generic label for authoritarianism represents for Schmitt a dangerous 
intellectual tendency stemming from liberalisms inability to identify its enemies. Against the 
utopian rationalism of sovereign dictatorship and the liberal rationalism of a self-enforcing 
system of constitutional norms, Schmitt defends the idea of conservative commissarial 
dictatorship as a crucial institution for preserving the republican constitutional state in a political 
world that is inevitably beset by emergencies and exceptional situations.60 
While McCormick overlooks this context of Dictatorship, he also erroneously attributes 
to Political Theology a view of the president endowed with extraconstitutional powers by virtue 
of his “personal embodiment of the popular will[…].”61 As McCormick discusses, this 
plebiscitarian basis of presidential authority became an important theme that is integrated with 
emergency powers in Schmitt’s later Weimar writings, but such positive references to popular 
sovereignty or plebiscitarianism are strikingly absent from Political Theology. Indeed, that 
context contains no positive references to democracy or the principle of popular sovereignty at 
all. On the contrary, the book closes with an appreciative discussion of the counterrevolutionary 
conservative theories of de Maistre, Bonald and Donoso Cortés. The latter in particular 
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fascinates Schmitt because, writing after 1848, recognizes the unavoidability of democratic 
legitimacy and the collapse of monarchical legitimacy, and therefore advocates permanent 
repressive dictatorship as the only remaining possibility to preserve the principle of state 
authority from democratic immanence. Political Theology, in other words, examines the same 
problem of the crisis of the state through the politicization of the social, but instead toys with the 
opposite solution of a permanent, sovereign, counterrevolutionary dictatorship.62 Finally, the 
plebiscitarian presidential model, to which McCormick assimilates Political Theology, should be 
regarded as a third model altogether. The fundamental difference is that, while commissarial 
dictatorship and the decisionist, counterrevolutionary dictatorship are both seen as measures 
against revolutionary popular sovereignty, the plebiscitarian model reflects Schmitt’s later view 
that we saw in Constitutional Theory, that popular sovereignty can also be a crucial means of 
strengthening state authority against society rather than weakening it. Thus, while McCormick is 
clearly correct in emphasizing the important differences between Schmitt’s theories of 
commissarial dictatorship and the state of exception, and his contrast between the two models is 
important and illuminating. On the other hand, by uncoupling the structure of the state of 
emergency from the question of how the emergency is identified and what is under threat, 
McCormick’s account overlooks an important dimension of continuity between the two models, 
and distorts his interpretation of the models of emergency powers themselves. Both commissarial 
dictatorship and the sovereign decision as different responses to the underlying emergency 
threat, however, a more complex picture emerges of republican and anti-republican strains 
throughout Schmitt’s Weimar writings, and qualifying McCormick’s endorsement of Schmitt’s 
commissarial theory of emergency powers as a positive model for liberals.63     
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 The argument for restoring the concrete political referents of Schmitt’s concepts of 
emergency powers and the exception is to say that they are not valuable means for understanding 
the present. Rather, I think their value today resides to a large extent in that by reflecting on the 
differences between Schmitt’s context and political ends and our own, we are forced to reflect on 
what is distinctive about the underlying assumptions of contemporary emergency politics: how is 
an emergency identified and what is understood to be under threat? How do institutional 
arrangements and proposals reflect those assumptions and attempt to intervene in them? With 
these questions in mind, I now want to turn to two contemporary theories of emergency powers. 
  
II. Emergency Powers, Self-Preservation and Security 
 
Turning to the major debates that characterize the state of the current field, I shall set out a 
typology of four basic frameworks for analyzing the purpose and function of emergency 
institutions. These different institutional models give different answers to the question of which 
institutional actor is supposed to identify a state of exception, as well as the institution authorized 
to exercise emergency powers and the institutional sources of oversight or restraint. What these 
different institutional arrangements have in common, however, is not only the scant attention 
given to the problem of what counts as an emergency. The second commonality among these 
various authors is an implicit or tacit account of the necessity of emergency measures that shifts 
from an existential logic of self-preservation (emergency measures that are necessary to save the 
state or constitutional order from destruction) to a looser, more expansive logic of security 
(measures that are necessary reassure a frightened populace, or decrease the probability of harm). 
In other words, I will argue that although the problem how what constitutes an emergency is left 
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under-theorized in each case, we can nevertheless observe in the defenders of each model a 
tension between the necessity of self-preservation and the necessity of security as criteria for a 
state of emergency. Whereas the justification of emergency powers is often drawn from necessity 
as a logic of self-preservation, the purpose and scope of emergency powers are premised a 
different conception of necessity as a logic of security rather than self-preservation. 
 Thus, while the detailed focus on institutional design is a welcome and important addition 
to the literature, the associations claimed by scholars between specific institutional frameworks 
and specific political outcomes remain somewhat indeterminate. Hence, in the ongoing debate 
over within this literature over which institutional model will best restrain emergency powers 
and prevent their abuse and normalization, the most important advocates of the competing 
models – such as Bruce Ackerman and Oren Gross – have excluded precisely what mediates 
between formal institutions and concrete political outcomes, and hence what would provide 
traction and determinateness in the ongoing debate: the realm of political judgment and 
interpretation that determines the identity and value of what must be preserved, and therefore 
what counts as an emergency in the first place.  
 
Oren Gross’ containment strategy 
One prominent model of emergency powers has been proposed by Oren Gross as “extra-legal 
measures.” This idea distinguishes between normal and exceptional states and restricts 
emergency powers to the latter, it also falls under the dualist genus. In contrast with legal 
dualism, however extra-legal dualism proposes that emergency powers should be employed 
outside the legal order, “extra-legally.” Theorists of extra-legal emergency powers share the legal 
dualists concern for maintaining the integrity of the rule of law, but they argue that establishing 
  
46 
procedures and providing legal sanction for emergency powers will lead to their increased use 
and abuse, thereby undermining the state of ‘normalcy’ itself. Instead, if emergency powers are 
found to be necessary, their exceptional and extra-legal character should be frankly 
acknowledged and highlighted, and exposed to the light of public evaluation afterward. Of the 
several recent accounts of extra-legal dualism, I shall take Oren Gross’ proposal as an example 
of this approach.64  
How does Gross identify the criteria for establishing when an emergency is severe 
enough to make extra-legal emergency powers legitimate? He sometimes suggests that there is 
no need to stipulate criteria in advance; it seems to be up to the public official to decide when an 
emergency is extreme enough to make it necessary to act outside the law, as long as it is frankly 
acknowledged as such. Once the emergency is over the extra-legal actions must be submitted to 
public judgment or “ratification,” so that it is the public that ultimately determines whether the 
official’s earlier judgment of necessity was valid or invalid.65  The criteria for how such a public 
judgment might be made, however, remains quite abstract. Gross indicates the criteria he has in 
mind with terms such as “severe crisis,” “dangerous exigency,” “severe emergency” and the like, 
but what, if any boundaries these terms stipulate remains vague.  
Gross supports his case for the extra-legal measures model with a wide-ranging survey of 
alternative institutional models for dealing with emergencies. His actual justification for extra-
legal measures, however, can be summarized in three basic claims. First, Gross’ fundamental 
premise is that politics inextricably involves the potential for unpredictable and dangerous 
emergencies. The potential for such emergencies logically entails the inextricable possibility of 
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necessary emergency measures that conflict with the rule of law.66 Secondly, he argues that 
neither institutionalized dualist models of emergency powers, nor the monist alternatives, are 
capable of maintaining the integrity of the “normal” constitutional order; both forms are 
vulnerable to gradually assimilating and incorporating exceptional powers within the legal order. 
Since legal dualism is unstable but since the potential of emergencies cannot be eliminated, when 
emergency measures are necessary, they should be extra-legal. Both fundamental steps in Grosss 
argument depend on the concept of necessity; more precisely, they hang on an ambiguity of the 
concept necessity, which “doubles the parts of indispensible and inevitable.”67  Thus, on the one 
hand he explains that extra-legal action is legitimate when “such action is necessary for 
protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity,” that is, such action is indispensible 
for the preservation of the nation against a threat. 68 Elsewhere, Gross places more emphasis on 
the second sense of inevitability alongside the first:  
 
When faced with serious threats to the life of the nation, government will take whatever measures it 
deems necessary to abate the crisis. Regardless of whether government ought to do so, history 
demonstrates that it does. 
 
Here necessity means indispensible in the immediate sense, but in terms of the broader point of 
the sentence makes a claim about inevitability as well. The double sense of necessity, therefore, 
describes a judgment in the present, and also makes a claim about the future: “if the necessity is 
extreme and grave, it may well be that what is necessary is for the executive to disregard 
                                                
66 Typically this premise is asserted as self-evident. For example, “Violent emergencies challenge those tenets [of 
the liberal legal tradition of generality, publicity and stability of legal norms], since they often call for particularly 
and extremely broad discretionary powers,”Gross, O. and F. Ní Aoláin (2006). Law in times of crisis : emergency 
powers in theory and practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., 2.  
67 Quoted in Walzer, M. (2006). Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations. New York, 
BasicBooks., 8. 
68 Gross, Law in Times of Crisis, 111. 
  
48 
constitutional obligations and act against explicit constitutional dictates and statutory norms if, 
again, that is what must be done to save the nation.”69  From the idea of the necessity of 
emergency measures, defined as whatever would be indispensible to self-preservation in the 
event of some unknown emergency, Gross moves to the inevitability of such measures actually 
being employed once the unpredictable emergency in question actually occurs. Exploiting this 
double sense of necessity helps to establish an aura of logical certainty around the claim that 
emergency measures challenging the rule of law will be employed at some point, though we 
cannot predict or foresee when or against what threat. This aura of certainty, of course, is illusory 
and does nothing to change the abstract, speculative nature of the claim. Finally, to compound 
the ambiguity, Gross occasionally drops the reference to the self preservation altogether and 
shifts to a much broader meaning of extra-legal action to “advance the public good under 
circumstances of great necessity,” or that the only relevant criteria for extra-legal actions is that 
they are “genuinely for the public good.”70  The criteria for the validity of extra-legal emergency 
action, in other words, is so lacking in determinate content that it can slide between action that 
promotes the public good, and an action necessary for self-preservation, without apparent 
consequence.  
 
Extra-Legal torture warrants 
The same problem of indeterminate categories is demonstrated in more detail in an article by 
Gross applying his model to the problem of torture.71 Gross tells us that he wishes “defend an 
                                                
69 Ibid., 52 
70 My italics: 137, 143, see also 152. 
71 Oren Gross, “Are Torture Warrants Warranted?” Minnesota Law Review 88 (2004). My analysis here is 
influenced by Kevin Jon Heller, “The Rhetoric of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson’s Pinteresque Conversation,” 
Georgia Law Review 40 (2006) and Leonard Feldman, “Terminal Exceptions: Law and Sovereignty at the Airport 
Threshhold” Law, Culture and the Humanities 3, no. 2 (2007). 
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absolute prohibition on torture,” according to which torture is categorically prohibited on a priori 
grounds. At the same time, Gross claims that  
 
the way to deal with what may be called the “extreme” or “catastrophic” case is neither by reading 
it out of the equation nor by using it as the center-piece for establishing general policies. Rather, 
the proposal made below focuses on the possibility that truly exceptional cases may give rise to 
official disobedience [i.e. the extra-legal measures model]. 
 
Although he does not use the term itself in this passage, his idea here seems to rely on the same 
double sense of “necessity” that we saw earlier. Gross’ argument begins by invoking the idea of 
an “extreme,” “catastrophic” circumstance, which is simply a circumstance defined as one in 
which torture would be necessary, in the sense of indispensible. On this basis, since we know 
with certainty that in the event that such an “extreme” case arise the use of torture would be 
inevitable, it would be an irresponsible form of denial to refuse to squarely face this fact and 
acknowledge it. Gross characterizes his own stance on torture as a categorical prohibition, 
seemingly on account of his belief that in the extreme case torture would be an inevitability for 
all absolutists, and moreover that according to his extra-legal measures model the inevitable 
torture would be illegal (though the torturer would have the chance to be exonerated ex post) and 
therefore, in a sense, legally prohibited.72    
This extreme or catastrophic case that combines the indispensability with the inevitability 
of torture, turns out to be n the well-known “ticking time bomb” counterfactual invoked by Alan 
Dershowitz, among others, as an argument for legalizing torture.  
                                                
72 Thus Gross his idea of “pragmatic absolutism” as follows: “[w]hile non-consequentialist reasoning supports a ban 
on torture, it does not, in and of itself, present a compelling case for an absolute ban,” 7. I am not sure that this is 




Consider, for example, a ticking bomb scenario when the suspected terrorist is captured by state agents in the 
mall where he planted the bomb and as the bomb may go off shortly, he is interrogated on the spot. Should 
he refuse to divulge information about the location of the bomb and the bomb goes off he, as well as 
thousands of innocent civilians in the mall, will be killed in the blast. 
 
Although Gross acknowledges the arguments of critics that the counterfactual is built upon a 
series of conditions that are not only implausible but mutually exclusive in practical terms. For 
instance, to have the intended effect of justifying torture the scenario requires that officials have 
total certainly that 1) the suspect in custody really is a terrorist and they will not torture the 
wrong guy by accident and at the same time 2) they have no idea and have no other possible 
means of finding out information about the known terrorists’ activities. The officials have 
absolute certainty 3) that a bomb exists in the mall and is about to explode immanently and 
moreover 4) that the suspect knows the whereabouts of the bomb, so that his protests to the 
contrary are in fact lies that he will continue to tell until 5) he is tortured, they will know how to 
distinguish the he has been telling lies from the truth, and moreover not only do they have 
certainty beforehand that the torture will succeed in saving lives, but moreover 6) only torture 
and nothing else will work (so that for instance there is sufficient time to torture the suspect into 
divulging the location of the bomb and diffusing it, but somehow there was insufficient time to 
simply evacuate the mall during the same interval. And so on.73  
 Gross, oddly, is not concerned with the absence of any evidence of so many implausible 
conditions every occurring simultaneously in reality.74 He simply notes that such a case would be 
                                                
73 For a more detailed deconstruction of this hypothetical, see…  
74 The one example that Gross cites is an obscure German kidnapping of the child of a wealthy industrialist, from 
2002. The kidnapper, already in police custody, at first would not divulge the whereabouts of the kidnapped child, 
and subsequently revealed the information after police threatened to use torture. The police arrived at the location 
  
51 
an exception rather than a norm, and therefore should not be the basis of a rule. At the same time, 
he warns, “one should not ignore the reality of hard cases, however rare they may be,” and 
repeats that the catastrophic case is not artificial but “real,” and to ignore the reality of the 
catastrophic case is “utopian or naïve.”75  That Gross could flatly make this claim about a 
hypothetical scenario is astonishing. A footnote directs the reader to “see Part II” of Gross’ 
article, which discusses a variety of hypothetical constructions by moral philosophers and legal 
theorists (most of the cartoonishly implausible classroom variety, such as Kant’s famous verdict 
that it would be immoral to lie about the whereabouts of a friend, even to prevent the friends 
murder if the inquirer is an armed assassin, or Alan Dewirth’s quandary about whether a mother 
has any rights not to be tortured to death by her son, etc), but not one single empirical case that 
even approximates the conditions stipulated by the ticking time bomb scenario.  
Even more bizarrely, Gross rejects the argument for legalization of torture, and defends 
an absolute legal prohibition on torture, while at the same time describing hypothetical 
constructions as “real” evidence that extra-legal measures must include the possibility of torture. 
It is very striking that Gross does not see any difficultly in the idea that one can endorse an 
absolute, categorical prohibition on torture, and at the same time without contradiction affirm a 
set of conditions in which torture would be justifiable as an extra legal measure. The case of 
torture, however, is an extreme example of a suppressed tension in the extra legal measures 
model in general: the model endorses, on the one hand, the view that officials may be justified in 
taking emergency measures that violate the law and in such cases should not face legal sanctions 
                                                                                                                                                       
only to discover that the victim had been murdered long before the interrogation took place. It’s not clear what this 
bizarre example is supposed to demonstrate, since it bears little resemblance to the ticking time bomb scenario. 
Needless to say, the police in the real-world case were in the dark about nearly everything, most importantly about 
the fact that the victim they were frantic to save at all costs was in fact already dead, and moreover the information 




for their acts, and on the other hand, that because a publically approved and indemnified action 
does not claim any legal authority, having such a model in place is not a “dualist” legal 
procedure, nor does it affect or alter the inviolability of legal norms. This seems to raise a 
number of difficulties. One set of questions, which I will only mention without pursuing, involve 
the question of whether the extra legal measures model is in any coherent or meaningful sense 
not a part of the legal order. For example, to say that a law can and should be violated under 
certain circumstances for which the sanctions attached to violation would be suspended, doesn’t 
this unavoidably affect the substance of the law itself? Does it really leave the law utterly 
untouched to have such a model in place? Moreover, if the model stipulates conditions under 
which an official may decide to act in violation of a legal norm, in anticipation of a procedure for 
judging the validity of the action, with the authority to waive the penalty ordinarily proscribed 
for the violation, then it is unavoidably a part of the legal order materially if not formally, and 
cannot plausibly be described as totally separate and sealed off from it.  
This tension becomes especially troubling in relation to Gross’ view of the reality that 
extra-legal torture will be in exceptional circumstances justified. The unwarranted conclusions 
about the inevitability of torture, combined with his questionable assumption that extra-legal 
torture leaves the integrity of an absolute legal ban intact. The result is a seriously distorted 
picture of the permissibility of torture that effectively inverts the moral and legal stakes that it 
initially invokes in the absolutist position. Once justified torture is seen as inevitable, it can 
appear that the absolutist prohibition turns out to be permissive, and the permissive position has a 
better claim to the status of an absolute prohibition. As he puts it, “[t]he question then becomes 
not whether state agents will use preventive interrogational torture in the face of a moral 
principle to the contrary (they will), but rather what moral judgment and legal effect should 
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accompany such action.”76  Echoing Dershowitz’s own reasoning, Gross insists that by “not 
discussing the practice of torture we do not make it go away; we drive it underground.”77  It is 
the advocates of an absolute ban on torture – and refuse to make an exception for extra-legal 
torture – who in reality are endangering the rule of law. In the absolutist scenario, the public may 
come to regard 
 
the legal system as unrealistic because it fails to adjust to the needs of fighting national crises. As a 
result, particular norms, and perhaps the legal system in general, may break down, as the ethos of 
obedience to law is seriously shaken…” 
 
The premise here, once again, is that the question of torture is not if but when and how, and 
therefore since no honest model is truly an absolutist prohibition, it appears as if the extra-legal 
measures model is the one that best approximates such a stance, and moreover can maintain a 
non-hypocritical legal absolutist ban. 
 
Ackerman’s Emergency Constitution: Madisonian Engineering 
 
A second example of emergency powers is Bruce Ackerman’s proposal, first published in a long 
2004 article, and later extended in Before the Next Attack, for an institutional, procedural 
framework of emergency powers. Ackerman’s proposal as a whole illustrates why scholarly 
work on the design of emergency institutions should not be isolated from a critical analysis of the 
underlying meaning and criteria of an emergency. Ackerman’s institutional proposal is a creative 
and sophisticated response to the most harmful institutional dynamics of the current framework 
                                                




of emergency powers, containing several resourceful provisions to channel executive emergency 
powers through multiple levels of oversight, and reinforce the separation of powers at the points 
where it has broken down in recent experience and is most urgently needed.  
 The many ingenious features of Ackerman’s proposal, however, risk being overshadowed 
by a fundamental flaw in the proposal whose source is extra-institutional. Ackerman’s critical 
response to the experience in recent years of emergency powers based upon on a vague and 
expansive notion of security was unfortunately limited to the institutional level. Even worse, 
Ackerman adopts wholeheartedly the loose conception of security as a justification for the 
suspension of ordinary civil rights and procedures. Specifically, he embraces a highly dubious 
argument that terrorism, by its very nature, is inherently unsuited for the paradigm of criminal 
justice because it attacks the political conditions that make criminal justice possible.  After a 
quick review of the – mainly positive – institutional features of his proposal, I shall examine 
more closely Ackerman’s arguments about security, terrorism, and the choice between the 
paradigms of crime, war and emergency. The question, in other words, will be how Ackerman 
proposes that we distinguish between the normal conditions in which criminal justice is effective, 
and the “emergency” of terrorism and insecurity that require suspension of the criminal justice 
model and the activation of emergency powers.  
Ackerman is fond of quoting James Madison’s succinct justification for his keen interest 
in institutions: “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”78 This could serve as an 
especially appropriate motto for Before the Next Attack, since its turn to institutional means for 
counteracting ambition with ambition and multiplying the forms of power and counter-power 
seem to be motivated by a more genuinely Madisonian sense of anxiety over the demagogic 
                                                
78 See for instance The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, 67, as well as Before the Next Attack, 4. 
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potentials in popular politics. Paradoxically, for Ackerman it is precisely the almost total absence 
of formal emergency powers in the US constitution that makes emergency powers so potentially 
dangerous and destabilizing. Thus, while Ackerman is sympathetic to the civil libertarian 
concern that emergencies may lead to egregious rights violations, he rejects the rigid monist 
insistence on the absolute inviolability of rights in emergency and normalcy alike as 
institutionally naïve and politically counterproductive. For Ackerman, it is a political truism that 
if constitutionally inviolable rights stand in the way of what political leaders deem to be an 
effective response to an emergency, “serious politicians will not hesitate before sacrificing 
rights” to restore public confidence. Moreover, the rigid monist rejection of emergency powers 
effective places legality and legitimacy in direct conflict, to the detriment of legality. Such a 
scenario invites politicians to adopt a heroic pose and “gain popular applause by brushing civil 
libertarian objections aside as quixotic.”79 Secondly, Ackerman is skeptical of the rigid monist 
tendency to rely upon the judiciary to enforce constitutional limitations and restrain the president 
in an emergency. Pointing to the disastrous precedent of Korematsu, Ackerman argues that the 
court-centered strategy will similarly backfire. As courts capitulate to the superior legitimacy of 
the president in an emergency, the decisions that result will validate and integrate temporary 
emergency rights violations as a permanent part of subsequent constitutional normality. “The 
result is the normalization of emergency conditions – the creation of legal precedents that 
authorize oppressive measures without any end.”    
If the rigid monist strategy backfires by encouraging either outright illegality or 
normalization of the exception, Ackerman is equally critical of the extra-legal dualist solution of 
preserving the integrity of the legal order by requiring that extraordinary responses to an 
                                                
79 Ackerman, “Emergency Constitution,” 1030. 
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emergency take place without any legal sanction at all. For Ackerman, this strategy too is likely 
to produce outcomes that are the opposite of its intended effects – undermining rather than 
preserving the rule of law. Once lawlessness is made available as a legitimate form of emergency 
powers, political leaders may find its temptations irresistible, and will have strong incentives to 
create and recreate the emergency conditions that validate their own extra-legal power.80  For 
Ackerman, since the incentives for politicians to invoke and attempt to exploit emergencies 
cannot be eliminated or safely contained outside the legal system, the task becomes to channel 
them through institutional and legal procedures, reintroducing the separation of powers, restrain 
the scope of exceptional authority, and formalizing their temporary duration. In Madisonian 
form, Ackerman seeks to create a “political economy” of virtue, structuring institutional 
incentives and disincentives to ensure that political power remains limited and pluralized.81  
Thus, Ackerman proposes a “supermajoritarian escalator,” mandating quick legislative 
endorsement to a declared state of emergency, and moreover requiring the legislature to renew 
the state of emergency regularly, at short intervals. The “escalator” idea is that each time the 
state of emergency is renewed, an increasingly higher supermajority of legislators will be 
required. So, for instance, the initial endorsement would require only a majority of legislators, 
the first renewal would require 60%, the second escalates to 70%, and after the third, remains at 
the level of 80%.82 This feature responds to the obvious danger of illegitimately extending the 
state emergency longer than necessary by forcing the legislature to regularly reexamine and 
debate the question of whether the emergency still exists. Secondly, the tendency to settle into a 
routine reauthorization of the emergency is counteracted by the increasingly high demands of the 
supermajority. By the time the 80% requirement is reached, Ackerman argues, termination is 
                                                
80 Ibid., 1044.  
81 Ibid., 1031 
82 ibid., 1047. 
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virtually inevitable as it is nearly impossible to maintain such a high degree of consensus in 
modern plural societies for long – unless, of course, the country is subject to regular, continuing 
attacks that merit the emergency.83 Third, the model is meant to empower and provide political 
cover for minority parties and civil libertarians, allowing dissenting legislators to point to their 
first round votes as evidence that they took the emergency seriously at first, but the conditions 
are no longer present.84 At the same time, Ackerman argues, the escalator will have a salutary, 
moderating affect on the executive, as maintaining emergency authority over time forces him to 
hold together a larger and larger legislative coalition. This means that executive emergency 
powers can be maintained only if they do not alienate or demonize particular minority groups 
that would otherwise be singled out for abuse.85  
 
‘Effective sovereignty’ and the expansion of security 
In contrast to much of the emergency powers literature, and to his credit, Ackerman is attentive 
to the distinction between existential self-preservation and security, and the corresponding 
distinction between war and terrorism, both of which form an important part of his argument. 
Ackerman vividly describes the political incentives for a president to insist that his response to a 
terrorist attack is a loosely defined, global war on terror.86  
What is the basis, then, for insisting that a terrorist attack is not a war but an emergency? The 
most significant historical precedents of presidential emergency powers, such as the suspension 
of habeas corpus during the Civil War, or internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II – with devastating effects on civil liberties – occurred during wars in which “our political 
                                                
83 Ibid., 1048 
84 Ackerman, B. A. (2006). Before the next attack : preserving civil liberties in an age of terrorism. New Haven, 
Yale University Press., 91-2. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 16-7. 
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existence as a nation was at stake.” Noting that even severe and repeated terrorist attacks do not 
even come close to threatening the nation’s existence, he remarks of the earlier experiences 
during war that, “the most important thing to say about these precedents is that they are 
irrelevant.” Attacks may kill thousands of citizens and terrify millions, but they do not pose an 
immediate danger to the constitutional order, threaten the state’s control over its territory or 
impede the functioning of basic political institutions. Ackerman’s argument follows what we 
could call the war paradigm: in response to an existential threat, the executive asserts whatever 
emergency powers are deemed necessary at the time to overcome the threat and preserve the 
state, often with devastating effect to civil liberties. The existential logic of the war paradigm 
asserts the necessary priority of the self-preservation of the state and constitutional order over 
any particular law or individual right, since the precondition for the legal order and recognition 
of individual rights is the existence of the state.  
The war paradigm’s existential logic also entails a departure from what we can call the 
paradigm of crime. Criminal justice is predicated on the assumption that criminal guilt is a 
property of individuals and not collectivities, that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
etc., as expressed by the array of rights and procedural protections that are the basis of the crime 
paradigm. A fundamental priority of the crime paradigm, therefore, is the exclusion of false 
positives, e.g. minimizing the risk  that innocent people are wrongly punished. A fundamental 
priority of the war paradigm, by contrast, is the exclusion of false negatives, e.g. minimizing the 
risk that individuals who are hostile enemies and may pose some threat to the state are not left 
free to do harm. Like the argument for the priority of self-preservation over legality, the priority 
of excluding false negatives has a close affinity with the existential logic of war. Ackerman 
points out, plausibly, that even though terrorist attacks have nothing to do with the logic of self-
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preservation, the rhetorical and legal strategy behind the war on terror was to illegitimately but to 
some extent successfully employ the war paradigm and invoke some of the most dramatic 
precedents of past wars, sometimes pushing even beyond these.87 Faced with the alarming 
expansion in response to terrorism of the war paradigm far beyond anything resembling an 
existential threat, Ackerman proposes the category of “emergency” as a more constitutionally 
appropriate and politically responsible framework for terrorism. 
 
Why isn’t terrorism crime? 
Ackerman’s critical diagnosis of the response to terrorist attacks with the war model is insightful 
and compelling, but his argument for why terrorism requires a separate category of emergency, 
and therefore by its nature cannot be addressed by the crime paradigm, is much less compelling. 
As we’ve seen, for Ackerman the distinguishing characteristic of an emergency has nothing to do 
with an existential threat to the state or constitutional order, so in fact falls outside the events 
contemplated by most existing constitutional emergency provisions.88 Why not simply treat 
terrorism as a crime? After all, if the crime paradigm was regarded as sturdy enough that 
domestic communism at the height of the cold war, as well as mafia organizations at their most 
powerful, were both treated as criminal conspiracies. Why should terrorism be an exception?   
This question, which Ackerman anticipates in his response, can be reformulated as the 
question posed at the beginning of this chapter: what are the criteria by which Ackerman 
proposes to distinguish the condition of emergency from the give and take of ordinary politics? 
What makes terrorism the former and not the latter? What distinguishes terrorism from crime and 
qualifies it as an emergency is its irreducibly public and political character, in that it involves a 
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challenge to what he calls “effective sovereignty.” For Ackerman, this is what fundamentally 
places a terrorist attack outside the purview of criminal law and constitutes an emergency 
exception from ordinary politics. Unlike even the most formidable criminal organization, the 
basic purpose of even a small-scale terrorist attack is “to destabilize a foundational relationship 
between ordinary citizens and the modern state: the expectation of effective sovereignty.” In 
other words, whereas terrorism does not present an existential threat to the state or the political 
community, it does present a direct and public threat to the public perception of the state’s ability 
“to maintain control over the basic security situation.”89  
 Consistently with his earlier arguments, Ackerman emphasizes that effective sovereignty 
does not refer to the state’s physical control over the territory, or the capacity of state institutions 
to function within its borders. Rather, the emphases on public expectation and appearance are 
crucial to the definition – what is at stake in a terrorist attack is the public perception of 
widespread insecurity and a crisis of the state’s legitimacy that is grounded in its ability to 
maintain an expected measure of security and regularity.90 Ackerman identifies the central 
imperative of emergency powers as what he calls “the reassurance interest.”91 Thus, unlike the 
model of emergency powers designed for an existential threat such as a war or invasion, the 
emergency means in Ackerman’s sense are aimed at calming domestic opinion and public 
reassurance as much as they are aimed at overcoming a physical danger or threat.  “The 
proclamation of an emergency publicly recognizes that the terrorist assault on effective 
sovereignty strikes at a fundamental aspect of the social contract, and seeks to reassure the public 
that aggressive action will be taken to contain the crisis.”92  
                                                
89 Before the Next Attack, 42.  
90 Ibid., 55-6. 
91 Ibid., 44. 
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To see some of the major problems  with this argument, let’s begin by looking more 
closely at the way Ackerman draws boundaries around the paradigm of criminal justice. 
Concerning the former, he points out that although a Mafia organization may be many times 
larger, more powerful and more deadly than a terrorist group, the aims of the former are limited 
to its own economic gain, and has no interest in openly and publically challenging the legitimacy 
of the political order.93 For this reason, Ackerman claims that even a small terrorist attack by a 
marginal group without support would still threaten effective sovereignty whereas even large 
scale organized crime on a much more deadly scale does not. But it’s not clear why this must be 
true as a general rule. For instance, the exceptionally high levels of violence between the state 
and drug trafficking syndicates in Mexico appear to be seen by the Mexican public as a crisis of 
an unmistakably public, political character, and clearly seems to have constituted a fundamental 
challenge to the legitimacy of the Mexican state for some time. Indeed, the Mexican example 
would seem to be a much more paradigmatic case of Ackerman’s idea of effective sovereignty 
challenged than sporadic terrorist attacks in North American and Europe.94 This is the case 
despite the fact that the syndicates have no political ambitions that are not instrumental to their 
ability to make money.  
Conversely, it is clearly false that all terrorist attacks, even minor or ineffective ones, 
necessarily challenge effective sovereignty. The 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City, for instance, 
was by any standard a very serious and horrifying terroristic attack, but is there any evidence that 
it caused a fundamental precondition of criminal justice – public faith that “the government was 
really in control of its affairs within the nations borders”95 – to collapse? It isn’t clear either that 
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the al-Qaida bombings in London and Madrid struck such a heavy blow to British and Spanish 
effective sovereignty so as to render their criminal justice paradigms inoperative. Indeed, the 
only example of a North American or European terrorist attack in recent memory in which 
Ackerman’s account is even arguable is the case he clearly has in mind, of September 11, 2001. 
Whether or not the idea of effectively sovereignty is an effective way of interpreting the impact 
of those attacks, there’s no question the immediate aftermath of 9/11 produced a very high, 
certainly for many people an unprecedented, level of public fear and insecurity. And yet, even 
though this ought to be the paradigmatic example of how shattered effective sovereignty 
rendered the possibility of employing criminal justice impossible, what actually occurred is 
much more complex. Even in the midst of ubiquitous war-talk and the Bush administration’s 
revival of military tribunals and worse in the years immediately following 2001, several 
prominent and visible criminal trials related to the attacks also occurred in that period, most 
notably the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui. Once again, while the level of public anxiety and its 
causes in this period can be debated, it’s not true that the blow to effective sovereignty rendered 
the paradigm of criminal justice unavailable for 9/11 related crimes. Despite the Bush 
administration’s decision to eschew the crime model as a response to terrorism, criminal trials 
such as the Moussaoui trial still occurred successfully. Of course it would be possible to argue 
that the trial should not have taken place and the difficulties it encountered only prove the 
potentially damaging effect trials like this have on the justice system. This argument was made 
often by critics of the trial, while some of its defenders countered by pointing out that 
Moussaoui’s criminal conviction in civilian court inspired confidence and security in ordinary 
political institutions rather than the opposite.96  The fact that there was a large public debate 
                                                
96 see for instance, Kendal Coffey, “The Case for Military Tribunals,” Wall Street Journal, May 26 2003, 
http://kendallcoffey.com/pdfs/publications/Case_for_Military_Tribunals.pdf and Jonathan Hafetz, “What the 
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about such trials, with broad disagreement on both sides, might itself cast some doubt on the idea 
of threatened effective sovereignty, which would seem imply a sense of insecurity so radical and 
pervasive that it would create a fairly broad consensus. We might consider a widespread public 
debate about whether or not effective sovereignty has collapsed as evidence that it has not.   
The other example of criminal justice that Ackerman wants to distinguish from terrorism 
is the Cold War allegations of a domestic communist conspiracy. These did obviously have a 
political character, but according to Ackerman never cast effective sovereignty into question 
either. The reason is that during the Cold War “the danger remained abstract to ordinary people,” 
and was never concretized or dramatized in an event that made the perception of insecurity vivid 
and palpable to the broader public.97 Unlike the innumerable quotidian risks with which we 
reckon daily, terrorism is “qualitatively different from many of the other uncertainties of life” 
and uniquely triggers “fundamental doubts about our collective capacity to maintain the fabric of 
public order.”98 Once again, there is very little evidence for this categorical assertion about the 
unique status of terrorism. It’s not easy to know how to objectively compare the public fear of 
one era to another, and Ackerman does not attempt an explanation.99 One of these that seems 
particularly implausible is the claim that fear of terrorism post-9/11 is much more vivid and 
concrete to ordinary people than was fear of communism or nuclear war during the Cold War. 
With the exception of a tiny sliver of the population that had some direct, immediate experience 
of these phenomena, surely the average American’s fear of terrorism is every bit as abstract and 
mediated as the Cold War fears. In all three cases the object of fear was accessible only through 
                                                                                                                                                       
Moussaoui Verdict Teaches Us,” at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/what-moussaoui-verdict-teaches-
us.php  
 
97 Before the Next Attack, 42. 
98 Ibid., 45.  
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the media, popular culture and the like, and all three at various moments became a means 
through which public officials attempted to mobilize political coalitions, contributing to an 
atmosphere of widespread disinformation. Finally, Ackerman distinguishes the unrealized Cold 
War nightmares of the past with the terrorist attacks of the future, which “will almost certainly 
recur at unpredictable intervals, each shattering anew the ordinary citizens’ confidence in the 
government’s capacity to fend off catastrophic breaches of national security.” The confident 
near-certainty of this prediction, of course, does not alter the fact that it is sheer speculation. 
Ackerman’s treatment of previous conspiracy cases together with his future predictions amount 
to an astonishing sleigh of hand, dismissing numerous historical examples in which criminal 
justice has been an effective response to large-scale political and criminal conspiracies, and at 
the same time treating unsupported speculation about the future as an indubitable certainty.100  
 
The priory of order argument, from self-preservation to security 
Leaving to the side for now these objections about the classification of terrorism, I want to turn 
to Ackerman’s argument for why the crime paradigm must be set aside. Assuming for the 
moment that terrorism uniquely inspires fear and insecurity, why does that mean that the 
criminal justice paradigm is inapplicable as a matter of principle to terrorism?  I want to look 
carefully at the use Ackerman makes of the concept of effective sovereignty to invoke a kind of 
existential logic of necessary priority, and extend that same reasoning about self-preservation in 
order to apply to the case of public insecurity. As we’ve seen, the logic of an existential threat 
justified violating a law in order to preserve the legal order from destruction, since the condition 
of possibility of that or any other law is the existence of the legal order. Even though Ackerman 
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has explicitly rejected the claim that self-preservation has anything to do with effective 
sovereignty, he nevertheless adopts exactly the same argument for the priority of order over 
legality and reapplies it to the case of security. Now the claim is that the public perception of 
security (i.e. effective sovereignty) is an essential precondition for procedural trial rights, and 
therefore these rights may be suspended in order to restore the public perception of security: “the 
normal operation of the criminal law presupposes the effective sovereignty of the state, but a 
major terrorist attack challenges it. Before it can operate a criminal justice system, the state must 
first assure its effective sovereignty.”101 Ackerman’s repeated references to the priority of 
effective sovereignty over criminal justice have a double significance: priority implies both the 
temporal priority of restoring effective sovereignty first and criminal justice second, and also the 
priority of value or importance of effective sovereignty as a necessary presupposition that must 
be in place for criminal justice to be possible.102  
 Thus, Ackerman’s necessary presupposition argument and his reference to “the 
expectation of effective sovereignty which serves as the premise of social order” appear to 
reproduce the logic of self-preservation, only now within the realm of reassurance and public 
perception rather than that of existential threats.103 Importing the logic of self-preservation into 
the realm of security allows Ackerman to present the priority of the “reassurance function” over 
criminal justice as if it were a logical necessity analogous to the physical integrity of the state 
rather than, primarily, a means of reassuring a frightened public. Thus, without providing further 
specification or evidence, Ackerman writes that the model of criminal law “has proved itself 
adequate when dealing with dangerous conspiracies, but only within a social context that 
                                                
101 Before the Next Attack, 43. 
102 In addition to the quote above: “the criminal law is itself based on premises [i.e. effective sovereignty] that 
fundamentally limit its operation,” 39. And again, “the criminal law treats individual cases as if the larger question 
of effective sovereignty has already been resolved.” (Ackerman’s italics), Ibid., 44. 
103 Ibid., 46 
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presupposes the government’s effective sovereignty.”104  And since effective sovereignty has 
been defined as the condition that is undermined by a terrorist attack, the charge of terrorism is a 
priori excluded from the paradigm of criminal justice, and categorically placed in an emergency 
paradigm whose first response is to target groups or collectivities rather than individuals for 
detention. 
The concern with false positives and requiring proof of “the culpability of individual 
suspects at the time of their alleged offense.” Instead, by definition the charge of terrorism 
triggers the concern with false negatives that derives from the war paradigm, and is associated 
with a model of collective guilt and collective punishment. Ackerman clearly does not intend to 
provide anything like a veiled justification for cynically mollifying popular anger by targeting a 
group of people for collective retribution or punishment. Nevertheless, his uncritical fusion of 
security with the logic of self-preservation and his postulation of state “reassurance” as a 
necessary precondition for criminal justice risk undermining the very liberal principles that 
motivate Ackerman’s intervention in the first place.       
 
The politics of security 
A possible reason Ackerman keeps veering off course in this discussion has to do with some 
difficulties inherent in the concept of security itself.105 One the one hand, I’ve been pointing out 
that for Ackerman the idea of effective sovereignty does not imply some kind of objective 
indicator of social order, but rather primarily has to do with the public perception of the state’s 
ability to maintain order, the appearance of political control over territories, etc. On the other 
hand, his discussion more frequently treats security as if it were a straightforwardly objective 
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quantity, which can be measured or calculated independently of the way it is perceived or 
experienced. It is worth pointing out, however, just how radically different the two views may 
be. For instance, Ackerman is surely right that most people find certain ways of dying more 
frightening than others. He’s probably right, also, that our society tends to view the prospect of 
violent death at the hands of a politically motivated killer more frightening than, say, the 
prospect of dying from disease or accident (although it is a interesting a very difficult question 
why this should be so).106 If this is true, it already indicates that security cannot be a matter of 
mere statistical probability of death or bodily injury. Even in the exceptional year of 2001, in the 
United States only 1 in 750 deaths was due to terrorism, which is about 0.13% of all deaths. 
Other years, obviously, the numbers were much lower.107  One dimension of the subjective (or 
one could as easily say, social) character of security, then, is that it is determined to a very 
considerable extent by the significance or meaning that certain kind of bodily harm or death have 
for us, in a way that can be quite independent of even a dim knowledge of statistical probability 
or likelihood.108  Another subjective aspect of security is that it is a reflexive condition rather 
than a simple state that mirrors something outside. So, for example, the level of someone’s fear 
of being attacked does not simply rise and fall in accordance with a statistical barometer of the 
probability of being mugged. Rather, the level of fear I experience is as much constitutive of my 
insecurity as it is a reflection of it.109 That’s why it feels appropriate to place scare quotes around 
the idea of calculating an “objective” level of security – not because there cannot be in principle 
an objective calculation but because such calculations determine only a part of what it means to 
                                                
106 Waldron, J. (2011). "Safety and Security." Nebraska Law Review 85(2). and Pogge, T. (2008). "Making War on 
Terrorists - Reflections on Harming the Innocent." Journal of Political Philosophy 16(1): 1-25. 
107 this date was cited in Thomas Poggi, “Reflections on Killing the Innocent” 
108 I leave to the side here the much more difficult question of why this might be so, or whether it is rational or 
irrational.  
109 Waldron, “Safety and Security”; R.B.J. Walker, “The Subject of Security” in Krause, K. and M. C. Williams 
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feel secure or insecure. A third subjective aspect has to do with the sense in which “being 
secure” means something much more than having the knowledge that one happens to be out of 
danger at that particular moment in time. It includes the sense of being sure, having some 
certainty of one’s safety rather than simply discovering that it turned out that way. It also seems 
to include the ability to make dependable assumptions and orient one’s action in the future rather 
than knowledge of a particular moment in time.110  
All of these help explain the powerful and unstable ways in which security can greatly 
magnify certain kinds of risks and diminish or ignore others. This makes it difficult to use the 
concept of security to pin down to certain thresholds, as in the idea of effective sovereignty, 
which are then supposed to correspond categorically to one specific form of unlawful violence, 
but not others. Alongside these ‘subjective’ characteristics we can mention here the obviously 
political potential of security as a speech act, a way of framing not only particular events but also 
potentially a more general character of political and social life. Security in this sense is a political 
style and mode of rhetoric that works in nearly identical ways as the presidential “war talk” 
criticized by Ackerman: a means of mobilizing support or strengthening a coalition by 
emphasizing collectivity and struggle, announcing that ‘we’ face a security risk that calls for 
immediate, decisive measures, elevating an issue above the ordinary political fray, etc. Secondly, 
we saw that the subjective qualities of security make it difficult to translate into as a finite, 
determinate quantity in general. Along with the presence of security in rhetoric and political 
culture, its non-determinate qualities can have the political implication of security as the basis of 
a limitless demand. For a political discourse focused on security as an unqualified political good, 
every remaining form of insecurity will appear as an unqualified evil, and the more insecurity is 
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eliminated, the more intolerable the potential for insecurity will be. A politics of security as an 
unqualified good does not simply imply “the more security the better.” It implies, effectively, 
that “the more security we have, the more security we need.”  
The criticisms I have been making of Ackerman’s proposal can be summarized in terms 
of the basic thesis of this chapter: an effective response to the expansion and normalization of 
emergency powers must engage both the level of institutions and the level of discourse. Before 
the Next Attack is an invaluable contribution to the discussion of emergency institutions, and 
remains the most sophisticated proposal in the recent literature. While some critics have sought 
to identify Ackerman’s “blind spot” in constitutional or procedural terms,111 I’ve argued that the 
problem is elsewhere – his uncritical identification of insecurity with an emergency. Underlying 
this identification, which uncritically reflects some of the same pathologies of emergency politics 
that Ackerman seeks to prevent, is a deeper sense of crisis in the way that democratic 
representation and the separation of powers have evolved in 20th century US politics. Ackerman 
has a keen and sophisticated understanding of the shift in the locus of democratic representation 
from the legislature to the executive, and the corresponding diminution of Congress’ sense of its 
own institutional integrity and prerogatives as the center of gravity of the political system shifted 
toward the presidency. While in earlier works Ackerman was optimistic about the democratic 
potentials of this shift, more recent works have explored the darker side of plebiscitarian 
politics.112   
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one. Ackerman first explored the negative potentials of plebiscitarianism inAckerman, B. A. and ebrary Inc. (2005). 
The failure of the founding fathers Jefferson, Marshall, and the rise of presidential democracy. Cambridge, MA, 
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 The important point in this context is that this underlying concern about the growth of 
presidentialist democracy is first and foremost a product of ordinary politics, a product of long-
term trends and entrenched cycles that help shape the dynamics of political normalcy and periods 
emergency alike.113  In a response to his critics published in the Yale Law Journal, Ackerman 
clarifies this underlying motivation to address pathologies in the ordinary secular trends of 
presidentialism.114  Here Ackerman shifts his focus from the attempt to classify terrorism under 
the category of emergency rather than crime to the rhetorical strategies and incentives that push 
presidents to rely upon and extend the rhetoric of war as broadly as possible: “The Cold War. 
The War on Poverty. The War on Crime. The War on Drugs. The War on Terrorism… There is 
something about the presidency that loves war-talk.”115  Noting the powerful incentives 
presidents have to invoke the war paradigm, Ackerman explains that his goal is to “provide a 
new framework for controlling this presidential dynamic in its present [2004] boom cycle,” and 
to prevent “the rhetorical slide to war by creating a new framework… this is not a war but a state 
of emergency.”116  Confronting his critics, he summarizes their response and asks us to imagine it 
coming from a president in response to a terrorist attack: acknowledging that an absolute 
elimination of the possibility of future attacks is unrealistic, that in the long term the United 
States must address the root causes of rage and resentment in the Arab world, and that we must 
not violate our basic constitutional commitments in a futile pursuit of the illusion of total 
security. Ackerman calls this the strategy of “legalistic tough talk, and concludes that “while it 
                                                                                                                                                       
followed by the recently published Crisis of the Republic, which lays out an even grimmer scenario of the threat of 
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has substantial merit, how likely is it that future presidents will actually take this path?”117 This is 
an entirely different argument than the one about the inherent qualities of terrorism that make it 
inappropriate for the criminal justice paradigm. Moreover, the they even seem contradictory: 
here, Ackerman appears to acknowledge that terrorism may not actually be an emergency – the 
business as usual response has “substantial merit – but the objective status of terrorism is beside 
the point, since the aim of the emergency framework is to intervene in the cycle of plebiscitarian 
politics, placing new barriers to presidential war-talk by inserting the intermediary category of 
emergency, and triggering a reoccurring authorization requirement by escalating supermajorities 
– in other words, jolting congress back to life and stiffening its spine with external 
reinforcements until it reverses its retreat and begins recovering its institutional prerogatives 
from the executive.  
 This is an excellent framework for temporary emergency powers that maintain 
accountability and preserving a role for the separation of powers during a genuine emergency. 
The attempt to substitute inflated presidential war talk with legal emergency powers, however, is 
a misguided strategy that may well backfire. If plebiscitarianism and the expansion of the war 
paradigm to describe nearly any political initiative (poverty, crime, drugs, terror, etc.) are both 
the product of long-term trends and cyclical pathologies of ordinary politics, they should be 
diagnosed and confronted as such rather than repackaged as problems stemming from temporary 
emergencies such as terrorism. Such a solution, as I’ve argued, is just as likely to perpetuate the 
problem since it derives the definition of emergency from the cyclical moment of plebiscitarian 
expansion, “war talk” and executive unilateralism that it seeks to combat. In other words, if the 
rhetoric of war can be successfully extended to X, then the framework of emergency powers can 
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be a plausible alternative to war only by insisting that “X” is not really war but an emergency. A 
war on drugs could be disrupted by insisting that drugs are neither crime nor war but an 
emergency.  
 
The reflexive model of dualist emergency powers 
While Ackerman’s proposal contains several institutionally promising characteristics, his 
underlying conception of what constitutes an emergency perpetuates rather than amends some of 
the most troubling characteristics of recent security politics. His redefinition of an emergency 
around an expansive conception of security reproduces a central feature of the war on terror 
whose excesses he opposes: the elevation of security and public reassurance into a political goal 
and justification for state power that trumps all others, and the erosion of the fundamental liberal 
constitutionalist separation between war and crime. While Ackerman’s emergency constitution 
would constrain presidents within institutional limitations, the drastic expansion of the meaning 
of emergency could contribute to the fusion of emergency powers into ordinary aspects of 
governance. Dualist institutional designs should aim at separating the norm and the exception; 
Ackerman unintentionally replicates some of the post-9/11 blurring of these two categories.  
 Fortunately, some of the major institutional characteristics of Ackerman’s model point 
the way forward. If unacknowledged and unexamined assumptions about security drive the 
expansion and entrenchment of emergency powers, then a fundamental desideratum of 
emergency institutions should be to encourage and precipitate public reflection and debate on 
those assumptions. They should encourage, in other words, reflexivity rather than unexamined 
realism concerning the question of what constitutes an emergency. If Ackerman’s realist 
assumptions about security, terrorism and emergency impede this reflexivity, other features of 
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his institutional model nevertheless could be excellent devices for encouraging it. In particular, 
the idea of the supermajoritarian escalator, which lies at the core of his proposal, exemplifies the 
potential for institutions to promote and sustain reflexivity, triggering critical public deliberation 
at key moments, and sheltering it against countervailing tendencies of executive unilateralism 
and entrenched prerogatives. By forcing the executive to periodically return to Congress and 
make an explicit public case of the necessity of renewing emergency measures, the escalator 
could help focus debate on the meaning and viability of the claims to necessity, exposing these 
claims to public scrutiny. Even more importantly, by framing the process in terms of the 
separation of powers and the interaction of public representations, the procedure imposes a 
public characteron the justifications, shifting away from the secrecy- and expertise-based 
discourses of national security bureaucracies and into the light of day of the public sphere. Only 
in this realm of a critically engaged, deliberative public can reflexivity take place. Third, the 
increased supermajority burden required by the escalating authorizations works, as Ackerman 
points out, to provide political cover to minority parties and civil libertarians, forcing the 
executive to speak to the largest coalition possible and therefore address and take seriously 
minoritarian views.118 Each of these three aspects are crucial for encouraging and sustaining the 
reflexivity required to prevent entrenchment of emergency prerogatives and the normalization of 
emergency powers.  
Ultimately, dualist theorists are justified in dismissing the critique of Schmittian 
exceptionalists that the “exception,” by it very nature, cannot be contained or anticipated by legal 
procedures. This critique, as Andrew Arato points out, conflates procedure and substance: this or 
that emergency may well be unforeseeable in terms of substance, but the legal procedures and 
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forms of authorization for emergency powers can, in spite of this, very well be established in 
advance.119  
The flipside of this dualist procedural argument, which seems to follow logically from 
Arato’s point, is that if procedures in this context are substance neutral, then we must also 
acknowledge that procedures are powerless to objectively fix the meaning of an emergency in a 
way that prevents the possibility of abuse. The task of making judgments about the meaning and 
scope of emergencies, the content of basic rights, and the legitimacy of the state’s “reassurance” 
activities cannot be secured by institutions alone; it is a role that can only be played by a critical 
and vigilant public sphere. Well-designed institutions such as Ackerman’s super majoritarian 
escalator can help to open and preserve a space for reflexivity and the public sphere, but they 
cannot replace it.    
Thus, apart from its prominence in the current literature, Ackerman’s proposal is 
especially interesting and merits sustained attention for three major reasons. First, because it 
presents the most sophisticated and creative example of dualist institutional design in the US 
context. Indeed, apart from its other merits, I’ve argued here that Ackerman’s proposal is an 
excellent example of how institutional procedures can promote and enhance the desiderata of 
publicity and reflexivity in emergency judgments. Secondly, and conversely, Ackerman provides 
a striking example of how even the most sophisticated and refined institutional design cannot be 
immune to counterproductive outcomes if it uncritically adopts and fails to reflect upon the 
underlying conception of what constitutes an emergency in the first place. Third, this 
combination of sophisticated institutional design together with a set of problematic assumptions 
concerning security and emergencies illuminates the problems and shortcomings of the realist 
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approach to emergency powers. I defined realist at the outset of this chapter as the view that 
identifying an emergency is simply a matter of correctly recognizing an external, factual state of 
affairs. As I’ve argued, however, the view that the categories of “crime,” “war,” and 
“emergency” objectively correspond to certain kinds of activity such that we can definitely say, 
as Ackerman wants to do, that terrorism is by definition not crime, is both intellectually futile 















Chapter II: Arenas of Emergency Politics: Reason of State, Representation 




The guiding questions of this dissertation are: how are quotidian political events distinguished 
from emergencies? What is the vision of political “normalcy” in reference to which a state of 
exception can be declared, and the legitimate ends of exceptional, emergency powers can be 
identified? What is the role of these background conceptions in shaping the political outcomes 
associated with emergency powers? In the introduction I argued that these questions push 
beyond the two predominant approaches in the contemporary literature: the first was the “naïve 
realist” view that emergencies have a self-evident, objective character, and identifying an event 
as an “emergency” is a straightforward matter of accurate perception. The second was the 
decisionist or “deconstructive” view, which argues that emergencies can never be identified as a 
factual state of affairs, but rather are defined as the result of a valid legal procedure for declaring 
a state of emergency, or by a sovereign decision on the exception. Neither of these approaches, I 
argued, can provide us with an adequate account of the politics of emergencies, by which I mean 
the contested arena of political judgments about the nature of a given threat, and identity and 
value of what is to be preserved.  
We saw, for example, how despite the inconsistencies in Carl Schmitt’s different 
accounts of emergency powers, they all can be read as shifting attempts to intervene in the same 
underlying crisis of the classic European sovereign state. Seen from this perspective, Schmitt’s 
favored mode of expressing his core ideas in stark antitheses – commissarial versus sovereign 
dictatorship, decision on the exception versus legal normativity, friends versus enemies, 
democratic identity versus parliamentary discussion, etc. – are designed to reveal and vivify the 
fundamental fault lines and antinomies underlying the pluralist Rechtstaat. Each of these 
antitheses attempts to cut through what he saw as the heterogeneous accommodations and 
ambivalences of the liberal democratic state, and locate the precise junctures where coexisting 
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antagonisms have intensified into a point of total opposition and fundamental decision. Each of 
these antitheses, in other words, presses toward a moment where the state can be revealed as an 
autonomous actor, distinguishing itself from all other social spheres and groupings and 
identifying on its own terms the enemies threatening its existence.  
This chapter sketches an alternative account of the modern state as a source of emergency 
politics. Whereas Schmitt’s explored the exception as a medium for dissolving political 
contention and judgment in the moment of absolute decision, I shall focus on three internal 
tensions within the concept of the modern state, each of which establishes an arena of emergency 
powers. Hence, in response to Schmitt’s hopes that the exception would jolt the state into 
regaining the qualities of homogeneity and concrete unity, my aim is to emphasize the 
“essentially contested” quality of emergencies as political judgments, drawing from the terms of 
ordinary as well as exceptional moments of political life. Rather than present a single definition, 
I approach “the state” as a palimpsest, a text composed of layers of writing inscribed upon one 
another. The task of interpreting a palimpsest is not to arrive at a single, self-consistent, uniform 
meaning but to preserve the multiplicity of the layers composing the whole. Palimpsest 
interpretation is the delicate art of applying various solvents or exegetical techniques in order to 
illuminate earlier, more fragmented and obscure textual layers without destroying the legibility 
of the surface.120 Fortunately, we can benefit from an important body of scholarship in 
renaissance and early-modern political thought that has focused on exactly these ongoing 
redefinitions and multiple layers of meaning embedded in our political lexicon.121 Building on 
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this literature, I shall analyze three examples of how these multiple layers of meaning persist in 
the form of three broad “tensions” embedded in the concept of the modern state: first, self-
preservation and collective freedom, second, representation and political unity, and third, 
individual security. Each of these tensions gives rise to a specific ‘arena’ of the politics of 
emergencies, in the sense that it determines how an emergency is identified, and defines the 
identity and value of what is being preserved. Moreover, at the same time it also provides the 
terms for contesting and criticizing these designations. These three themes are meant to be 
illustrative rather than exhaustive. I do not want to suggest that every political emergency can be 
reduced to the three themes I focus on here. At the same time, within each these examples we 
can detect a pattern of how emergencies are declared and debated that recur persistently, 
assuming different forms in different contexts, and continue to shape emergency politics in the 
present.  
The reason for turning to these historical sketches follows directly from my argument that 
theories of emergency powers must be broadened to include the conceptual background and 
political construction of emergencies In this chapter, I want to give substance to this idea by 
looking at the examples of self-preservation, political unity, and security as internal tensions in 
the modern state. The first example refers to the state as a means of defending collective liberty 
against its enemies; the second, to the state as the expression of the political unity of a people; 
and the third, to state as a guarantor of individual security. I have stated that the tension 
constituting each of these arenas is internal to the conceptual underpinnings of the modern state. 
By “internal” I mean, first, that each tension marks a persistent continuity within the concept the 
state, from which we can trace a pattern across different iterations and permutations as times and 
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contexts change. Although it is of course not inconceivable that the meaning of “the state” may 
evolve at some point so that these tensions are no longer important or relevant characteristics, I 
claim that the tensions discussed here mark broad continuities between the early modern period 
and the present, although of course we can identify significant change alongside this continuity. 
Secondly, “internal tension” points to the way in which the meaning of “the state” encompasses 
both a particular principle of legitimacy, and at the same time the critique of that principle. In 
other words, the tensions are internal because they involve principles that justify both the use of 
emergency powers as a legitimate act to preserve the state and the criticism of emergency 
powers as an illegitimate form of state power.   
In other words, the terminology of tension suggests contestation, in which justification 
and critique are continually in play. Rather than a theoretical contradiction that can be resolved 
with finality, I use the terminology of “tension” and “arena” to suggest a productive tension that 
demonstrates the essentially contested and irreducibly political nature of the definition of an 
emergency. These arenas are neither static nor reconfigured at different periods whole-clothe. 
Rather, at least in the case of the three tensions analyzed here, they form broad thematic 
continuities across time, within which ideological innovation and changing responses to new 
contexts can be identified. Thus, at a synoptic level we can identify continuity in normative 
structures, rhetorical themes and conceptual patterns that recur, even as they are impacted and 
transformed by changing political circumstances, up to our own present. Finally, while I describe 
these arenas separately for analytical and heuristic reasons, they are of course not hermetically 
sealed but continually interact, condition on another and overlap in real life.  
In each of these three examples, I will single out various attempts to deny, eliminate or 
ultimately resolve these tensions and show how these attempts rests on a unsuccessful 
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depoliticizing strategy of permanently removing a strand of the state from the domain of political 
contestation and revision. In contrast to these strategies, I suggest that a better task for political 
theory would be to emphasize the irreducibly political and contested character of particular 
instances of emergency powers by unearthing their conceptual assumptions, rhetorical strategies 
and normative justifications to critical scrutiny.  
I. Preserving a Free State: collective liberty and raison d’état  
 
Però, come di sopra si dice, viene ad avere, lo stato libero e che di nuovo surge, partigiani inimici, e non 
partigiani amici … E chi prende a governare una moltitudine, o per via di libertà o per via di principato, e 
non si assicura di coloro che a quell'ordine nuovo sono inimici, fa uno stato di poca vita.122 
       -- Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.16 
 
“Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be too 
strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”123 This question, 
posed by Abraham Lincoln in the first weeks of the Civil War, is quoted by Clinton Rossiter in 
the opening of his classic study of emergency powers, Constitutional Dictatorship. It neatly 
encapsulates a tension in the modern republican state and a core symbolic arena of conceptions 
of emergency powers and the republican institution of dictatorship in particular: the tension 
between collective liberty and raison d’état. I refer to this as a tension, because it is not just a 
matter of two independent, conflicting principles (liberty versus strong government) but two 
internally related principles, justified by reference to the other, and at the same time carry the 
potential to undermine one another other. The justification of a strong government is to protect 
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liberty; weakening government in the name of liberty may endanger liberty itself, and at the 
same time strong government threatens liberty. As Rossiter describes it, constitutional 
dictatorship “is an inevitable and dangerous thing, and must be thoroughly understood and 
controlled by any free people who are compelled to resort to it in defense of their freedom.”124 In 
this section, I first focus on Machiavelli to illustrate how the tension between collective liberty 
and raison d’état is embedded in the emergence of the modern conception of the state in the late 
renaissance. I next sketch the way it has functioned as a symbolic arena for the development of 
competing theories of dictatorship and internal emergency powers. Finally, I point to some 
examples where the same tension arises at the boundary between domestic politics and foreign 
affairs.  
 
Renaissance Origins: Politics and the Art of Statecraft 
The renaissance origins of the modern state reflect two contradictory poles: one the one hand, the 
state or “status” of republican liberty referred to the structure of collective virtue making possible 
self-rule and a free way of life. On the other hand, “reason of state” referred to the state as the 
site of a new kind of instrumental “reason” defined by the coordinates of power and strategy. 
The former was civic, intrinsically normative and referred to collective liberty; the latter was 
non-civic, normatively skeptical, and referred to the autonomy of the prince as a solitary actor. 
The name that has come to stand for this dualism, of course, is Machiavelli. The Florentine’s 
dual status as an intensely committed proponent of republican liberty and a theorist of reason of 
state constituted an interpretative controversy that has persisted up to this day, namely: how to 
synthesize the republican partisan and the advisor to princes? 
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In one of the most important recent contributions to resolving this puzzle, Maurizio Viroli 
acknowledged Machiavelli’s importance as an innovator of raison d’état, while at the same time 
defending his position within the classic neo-Roman tradition of civic republicanism. For Viroli, 
the key to the puzzle I mentioned above lies in semantics. The subject matter of the The Prince 
concerns the means by which a new prince can hold his state and overcome his enemies in order 
to consolidate and enlarge his power. Famously, these means include those rejected as immoral 
by the Christian and humanist tradition. In other words, The Prince is concerned with l’arte dello 
stato – the art of preserving and strengthening the ruler’s state, in which the key criteria are 
power and self-preservation rather than moral righteousness, justice or form of government. 
However, Viroli places great emphasis on the fact that Machiavelli never uses the word politico 
or its equivalents in that work.125 When Machiavelli refers to politics in his republican writings, it 
is clear that he does not have in mind the strategic art of statecraft separated from morality. 
Politics,Viroli points out, for Machiavelli still referred to the “classic” meaning of the term 
within the Ciceronian republican tradition. Politics “only meant the art of good government and, 
more generally, the art of preserving a city – understood as a community of individuals living 
together in justice.”126  By sharply distinguishing between the civic normative structure of 
politics and the strategic and instrumental structure of reason of state, Viroli’s interpretation 
acknowledges Machiavelli’s contribution to the latter while still claiming Machiavelli as a 
theorist of republican politics for the neo-Roman, Ciceronian tradition that rejected the 
instrumental world of reason of state.  
 Viroli’s solution of separation and bifurcation, however, fails to capture one of 
Machiavelli’s most important and challenging themes: his repeated insistence on the inextricable 
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and internal relationship between raison d’état and the civic normative structure of republican 
politics itself.127 In order to see this relationship, and its deep resonances throughout the modern 
republican tradition, we have to relocate Viroli’s politics/reason of state contrast within the 
distinctively secular temporal and spatial orders of the modern state as an institutional agent 
standing apart from the society it governs.128 In this section, I use the common framework of the 
state to explore the tensions and interrelations between politics as both an instrumental 
“economy of violence” and as participation in rule among civic equals by linking both sides 
more closely with the idea of the state. The simple contrast between politics and statecraft, or (in 
more recent terms) Arendtian vs. Weberian  conceptions of the political as separate and 
independent fails to capture the multiple, tense and dynamic interrelations between the two 
conceptions as they co-exist in the history of the idea of the state. This section briefly sketches 
the origins of this tension in the state and references some moments in its subsequent history as 
one important arena for understanding emergency powers.  
Historians of republican political thought have shown that, in its classical and early 
renaissance variants, civic republicanism had no clear concept of an apparatus of political rule 
that exited independently from the social class or personal ruler who occupied those 
institutions.129 Machiavelli provides a striking example of the origins of this new way of thinking 
about the state. At several points in The Prince, Machiavelli at times breaks with the pattern of 
                                                
127 Indeed, Machiavelli’s claim about the interrelations between reason of state and republican politics seem to be 
what distinguish him from his classical sources; the distinction Viroli draws in Machiavelli seems to reflect a clear 
contrast in Cicero himself between justice within the republic and utilitas in relation to rival communities. See for 
instance, Cicero, M. T., M. T. Griffin, et al. (1991). On duties. Cambridge England ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press., I.vii. For a discussion of the influence of Cicero in 18th century reason of state theory, see Miller, 
P. N. (1994). Defining the common good : empire, religion, and philosophy in eighteenth-century Britain. 
Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
128 Indeed, in linking the modern state with a secular temporal horizon, I am loosely following the path breaking 
work of two recent Machiavelli scholars, each of whom analyzed one of the two dimensions I am trying ,  bring 
together here: J.G.A. Pocock (time) and Quentin Skinner (the state).  
129 The two classic works here are The Machiavellian Moment and Foundations of Modern Political Thought vol. I.  
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using lo stato in reference to the personal dominion under a prince’s control, and makes clear 
that he means to describe the unified institutions of government and coercive powers 
independent of the individuals who control them. Reflecting the idea that states have a past and a 
future of their own, independent of the prince that happens to hold them, Machiavelli refers to 
stati having their own unique foundations, cu stoms and laws.130 The state, existing in a secular 
political temporality proper to it, can now be described as an independent agent, with a realm of 
affairs of state that can be analyzed formally and abstractly.131 The link between secular political 
time and the beginnings of a concept of the state as an independent institutional agent is even 
clearer in the Discourses (although, as in The Prince, these new usages of lo stato occur amongst 
more frequent references to stati in the more traditional sense). For example, the comparison 
between perfect and imperfect foundings, which frames the central argument of Book I, 
unambiguously refer to Rome and Sparta as stati that have outlasted their founders by hundreds 
of years.132 This allows Machiavelli to link various public offices and institutional powers, 
distinct from the individuals who occupy and employ them, to an impersonal source of unified 
agency called “the state.”133 In a later discussion of corruption, he distinguishes even more 
explicitly between the power held by individual Roman magistrates and the authority of the laws 
                                                
130 Prince, ch. 21 Here I follow the arguments of Burkhardt, 23;Cassirer, E. and C. W. Hendel (1946). The myth of 
the state. New Haven, Yale University Press., 133-7; and especially Skinner, Q. and ebrary Inc. (2002). Visions of 
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132 I.2 and I.6. Skinner, 384. 
133 One example of this is the discussion in I.7 of the important role played by institutions of public accusation in 
maintaining a free state: “For those in a city who are responsible for guarding its liberty, there is no authority more 
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some magristrate or councel, when they perpetrate an act against the free state. (A coloro che in una città sono 
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accusare i cittadini al popolo, o a qualunque magistrato o consiglio, quando peccassono in alcuna cosa contro allo 
stato libero.) Discorsi, I.7.  
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and institutions in virtue of which they exercised power, and defines the latter as “the order of 
the government or, rather, of lo stato.”134  
This conceptual distinction between officeholders and the state arose in conjunction with 
a distinctive conception of political time, an awareness of a temporal order and a history that is 
proper to the political realm, analyzed by J.G.A. Pocock. Pocock’s notion of secular political 
time helps to emphasize the crucial temporal dimension of the idea of the state as an institutional 
locus of political power and rule with its own past and its own future that are distinct from 
whichever individual or social group who happens to occupy them at the moment. In Pocock’s 
account, the late-renaissance idea of a secular political temporality broke with the temporal 
immanence of the Greek and Roman cyclical framework,135 in which a change of constitution, 
ruling group, and state directly overlapped with one another, and the medieval teleological 
framework in which the essence of political rule was doubly constituted by a hierarchical 
structure of duties and obligations, and teleologically situated within higher cosmic and divine 
orders.136 In contrast, the autonomous institutions of political power could begin to be conceived 
independently of the officeholders at any particular moment in time only by locating the political 
realm in a distinctive temporal order of its own. Hence, the modern state corresponds to a 
modern conception of secular, political time – and a corresponding sphere of ongoing discussion 
and contestation over what should be done in the interests of the public good – distinct from the 
eternity of sacred time and the immanence of present time.137  
                                                
134 1.16 also quoted in Skinner, 385. 
135 Aristotle, Polybius 
136 Augustine, Aquinas (see discussion of Aquinas in Skinner, Foundations vol. I, 372]. The teleological, pre-
modern concept of the state is visible in the reference to the “state” in the Digest of Roman law, which stated that 
“Since all law is established for the sake of human beings, we first need to consider the status [or state] of such 
persons before we consider anything else.” Quoted in Skinner, Visions vol. II, 369. 
137 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 49-83; Loader, I. and N. Walker (2007). Civilizing security. Cambridge, 
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86 
Hence, we can combine the late renaissance conception of the state as a depersonalized 
institutional agent together with Pocock’s analysis of the conceptual shifts made possible by the 
idea of secular political time in order to clarify and refine Pocock’s implied suggestion that 
secular political time constitutes an internal relationship between republican civic norms and 
instrumental raison d’état.  At the foundations of the famous fortuna/virtù couplet is a response 
to a key consequence of the secular, temporal emancipation of the political realm from the 
stabilizing forces of custom, tradition, or eschatology: the potentially destructive, dynamic 
elements of the contingent, the accidental, and the unexpected now play a central role in politics. 
Anthropologically, this occurs because an increased emphasis on secular human capacity and 
virtù at the same time highlight the unpredictable and never fully controllable power of fortuna 
to bestow or deny her gifts upon men. More importantly for our purposes, the centrality of 
contingency and fortune also has a deep sociological dimension. The basis of authority in civic 
republicanism core was not unbroken tradition or custom, nor divine grace, but the collective 
self-governing activity of the citizenry. The particular virtue it required was not piety, noblesse 
oblige or obedience, but the capacity to engage in collective, secular political decision-making 
and rule for the common good. Yet, as Machiavelli was intensely aware, these republican virtues 
were neither natural, nor given by history but were the product of a vivere civile – a fragile set of 
civic practices of participation and action held together by a social structure which made such 
“virtuous” practices possible. The republic both presupposed a civic consciousness and 
constituted an institutional structure that cultivated it.  
The secularized, non-teleological conception of political time that made possible modern 
republicanism’s restoration of the dignity and autonomy of the political realm, and the 
depersonalized conception of the state that accompanied it, came with soberingly high stakes. 
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The price of a life of civic activity among equals is an unprecedented vulnerability to fortune. A 
republic capable of sustaining such a life was not only a free state but a state of “well ordered” 
institutions capable of contending against its unique vulnerability to fortune: all republics (even 
Rome) are born in contingent and particularistic secular time, and die in secular time.138 
Machiavelli in particular was fond of contrasting the quasi-divine status of mythical founders to 
the wholly contingent and secular foundations of cities like Rome and Florence, which originated 
not in miracles but in accidenti.139 Moreover, this awareness of temporal contingency was 
intensified by his fisrt-hand observation of early-modern state formation, in which weak and 
vulnerable states were simply dismantled and swallowed up by larger and more powerful 
competitors, altogether disappearing from history. The republic’s existence in secular, contingent 
time also placed it in an unstable and dangerous set of spatial relations: since it had a beginning 
and an end in contingent, secular time, the republic, like any other state, had to fend for itself in 
an inter-state spatial order populated by other predatory and hostile political actors with their 
own fully secular and instrumental strategies.140 Hence, when he reproduces classical theories of 
recurrent regime cycles, Machiavelli tended to abort the cycle at a weak moment, remarking that 
such a disorganized city will quickly be conquered and incorporated by some more powerful 
neighbor.141  
In all of these arguments, Machiavelli emphasizes the radically contingent and fraught 
temporal and spatial orders in which the republican as a state finds itself. In other words, the 
republic inhabits precisely the same radically delegitimized condition as the central protagonist 
of The Prince. There, Machiavelli analyzed the condition of the new prince who, having 
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shattered the stabilizing effects of custom and tradition, is exposed to the raw contingency of 
fortune, which decouples political virtù from any stable basis in moral virtues. Similarly, from 
the argument we have been tracing in the Discourses Machiavelli concludes that the virtue 
necessary to preserve free states as states is defined by a different set of imperatives than moral 
or spiritual virtue, and at extreme moments may even sharply contradict with them. Republican 
virtù may require, in some circumstances, acts which are necessary for the city even at the price 
of one’s soul.142 Republican virtù requires that citizens are prepared to “kill the sons of Brutus” if 
necessary, and unflinchingly destroy those who would bring down the republic. In contrast, Piero 
Soderini, who Machiavelli describes as “wise and good,” is nevertheless condemned for his 
failure to prevent Florence’s loss of liberty. Soderini did not act against the enemies of the 
republic because he flinched from violating moral virtues and feared that “in order vigorously to 
attack his opponents and to crush his adversaries, he needed to seize extralegal authority and to 
use the laws to destroy equality among the citizens.” Lacking virtù, “through his inability to 
emulate Brutus, he lost both his position and his reputation, a loss in which his city shared.”143 
Likewise, Machiavelli concludes that the hostile and predatory world of international affairs 
make pacifist isolationism unsustainable, concluding that the “Roman method” of internal 
participation and external expansion and domination of other cities “must be followed, and not 
that of the other [more pacific] states.”144 Thus, even the internal organization of republican civic 
life is determined by the “necessities” of external statecraft, war and dominion, even at the price 
                                                
142 “when the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either 
rto justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious. On the contrary, every 
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preserve the freedom of one’s country.” Ibid., III.41 
143 ibid., III.3. That Machiavelli’s own experience of the vita activa was another casualty of this loss is left 
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of destroying other independent rival republics.145 Machiavelli expresses this troubling line of 
continuity between “tyranny” and “a free state” in the following observation: “Anyone who sets 
up a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, anyone who introduces self-government [uno stato libero] 
and does not kill the sons of Brutus, cannot expect to survive long.”146 The location of the state in 
a delegitimized and radically contingent word that decouples virtù from stable moral virtues is a 
common political axis shared by otherwise incommensurate political forms and projects.   
This means that the clear-cut separation between republican politics and princely 
statecraft posited by Viroli is explicitly and directly rejected by Machiavelli. The focal point of 
both politics and statecraft is the free republican state preserving itself in contingent, tumultuous 
political time. Political freedom and civic virtues of equality and participation are vulnerable to 
internal and external enemies. Sustaining these goods does not just depend upon republican civic 
norms but also upon non-civic statecraft, violence directed against external and, if necessary, 
internal enemies. Whatever its form of government, the state finds itself within a strategic 
economy of violence. Freedom, in this tradition, means non-domination, participation and the 
rule of law for citizens,147 and at the same time requires a sufficient centralization of power and 
autonomous political agency to prevent external attack and internal subversion.  
If we step back into the Ciceronian framework still favored by Viroli, we might say that 
Machiavelli’s demonstration that the (modern) republic was as much a state as any principality, 
and hence that both were located within the same secularized political time and space, was 
nothing short of a Copernican turn in politics. It decentered the classical natural regime cycle and 
the Christian universal monarchy into a plurality of particularist states with their own intentions 
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and strategies, split political virtù into two interlinked but irreducable orientations toward 
strategy and normativity, locating politics as well as statecraft simultaneously within an economy 
of violence and an economy of virtue. Machiavelli, moreover, illustrated this tension with an 
elaborate rhetorical demonstration, at the heart of Book I, that contingently founded, socially 
discordant republics have no choice but incline toward empire and expansion abroad. It is 
precisely the imperatives of preserving the inclusive, broadly participatory vision of collective 
liberty that necessitates embracing raison d’état.  
This paradoxical intertwining of collective liberty and raison d’état within the structure of 
the modern state traverses much of the subsequent republican tradition. It is a central theme, for 
instance, in the debates over parliamentary military organization during the English Civil War, 
where both critics and defenders of reason of state draw alike from republican principles, again 
illustrating the internal relationship between these conflicting principles.  
Interestingly, this history overlaps to a striking degree with the history of perhaps the 
preeminent emergency institution in politics: the dictatorship. The history of the modern, as 
opposed to classical, dictatorship straddles the tension between various articulations of the 
project of collective liberty – or, after the French Revolution, popular sovereignty – and the 
imperatives of political order and organized violence that were to be the temporary bearer of that 
project. In this trajectory, emergency overlaps with revolution, and emergency powers are 
exercised for the sake of a future order rather than the status quo ante.148 As Schmitt observed, 
there is strong evidence that Marx and perhaps even Lenin still understood the temporary 
emergency “dictatorship” of the proletariat in the transitional since of sovereign dictatorship.149  
                                                
148 Schmitt famously calls this type of emergency powers “sovereign dictatorship,” and identifies it with the 
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At The same time, the republican framework of “commissarial dictatorship” continued to 
be articulated through the tension between raison d’état and collective liberty in a wide variety of 
forms. The justification of dictatorship has the potential of inviting its own critique, since the 
means to preserve collective liberty can at the same time be questioned as a potential threat to 
collective liberty. In this section, I will contrast two different conceptions of how republican 
dictatorship as a domestic institution should to resolve the tension between liberty and reason of 
state. The first, drawn from Machiavelli himself, is depicted as an institutional form that 
translates external reason of state into the political life of the republic, exposing reason of state to 
the political contestation and popular participation that characterize democratic political life in 
general. In contrast to this, I discuss Rousseau’s depiction of dictatorship, which transforms the 
internal tension into a stark antithesis that isolates reason of state from popular participation, and 
prevents it from becoming the object of ordinary, republican politics.    
 
Politics of the Exception and the Position of Dictatorship 
Machiavelli’s conception of dictatorship draws from his view of republican institutions 
generally. First, he held that there was a reciprocal relationship between virtue and institutions. 
Good institutions channel popular passions and actions in a way that prevents the elite from 
usurping power, but at the same time prevent antagonism from becoming outright civil war. 
Good institutions prevent corruption, but since institutions are only channels for political action 
and desires, they presuppose broad participation in politics, and have no value without it.150 The 
same institutions which made Rome great “would not be good in a corrupted state” with 
apathetic or disinterested citizens.151 Secondly, he depicted the institutions that make up a stato 
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libero as distinct from the authority of all magistrates who govern through them. While laws and 
specific magistrates could shift in response to emergencies, the institutional order itself was able 
to remain unchanged. Hence, emergency powers did not undermine the republican institutions 
themselves because emergences did not exempted from the agonistic popular participation that 
animated political life generally. This participatory citizenry is what prevented the city’s 
institutions from being undermined by ambitious elites using emergency powers for their own 
ends. The institutions of the republic, in turn, continued through a variety of emergencies to 
channel popular desires and conflict in a positive civic direction. Through this self-reinforcing 
process, reason of state and dangerous emergencies could appear within the civic life of the 
republic without rupturing or suspending its operations.    
Third, Machiavelli warned that only totally corrupt and hopelessly disordered republics 
should risk allowing extra-institutional, or “extraordinary” [straordinario] means to defend 
themselves. Such extra-institution means are without exception extremely dangerous and highly 
unlikely to succeed.152 Most importantly, they can only be achieved by a one person; a prince. 
Hence, extraordinary means always involve breaking the ultimate authority of the people in a 
republic. The problem is not only legal or institutional rupture in the formal sense but that the 
state, even if temporarily, is held by one single person, and not ‘the public as a whole.’ 
Extraordinary measures require “the use of force and an appeal to arms, and, before doing 
anything, to become a prince in the state, so that one can dispose it as one sees fit.”153 In a well 
functioning republic, then, the means to deal with contingency are ordinary ones that leave the 
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basic institutions and the popular authority intact.154 The superiority of the multitude over a 
prince, Machiavelli argued, was that the best means of mediating the tension between collective 
liberty and reason of state was through the process of elucidation and collective judgment 
through ongoing agonism and conflict.  Thus, in “when it had to obey dictators or consuls in the 
public interest, it did so.”155 On the other hand, when the claims of reason of state became threats 
to collective freedom, the multitude could  “take action against some powerful person… or 
others who sought to oppress them.” 156 
Thus, the first striking characteristic of Machiavelli’s description of dictatorship is that it 
always takes shape in the context of political struggles and interests, but that – when it operates 
well – helps channel those conflicts in a way that preserves liberty. But it is entirely at play in the 
class politics of the city, never above them. For example, Machiavelli recounts the experience of 
Marcus Menenius, a plebian dictator, who was authorized by the people to investigate members 
of the nobility “who, moved by ambition, had sought to obtain the consulship and other posts in 
the city by other than accepted methods [modi straordinari].”157 The nobility interpreted the 
authorization of the dictator as a direct attack on them, and in response disseminated the calumny 
that it was plebs who “having neither blood nor virtue on which to rely” used irregular means to 
get office, and attacked the appointment of Menenius on these grounds. In response, Menenius 
resigned, submitted his actions to judgment of the people and was acquitted.158 Another example 
is the dictator (unnamed by Machiavelli) appointed in response to accusations by Manlius about 
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private appropriation of public funds intended to enraged the plebs and cause popular unrest.159 
The Senate appointed a dictator to investigate the situation and restrain Manlius. The dictator and 
Manlius “confronted one another, the dictator surrounded by the nobles and Manlius surrounded 
by plebeians.” Manlius was asked to verify his accusations, and when he refused “the dictator 
sent him to prison.”160 Hence, far from being outside or beyond politics, dictatorship is 
thoroughly caught up in and defined by the agonism and conflict that characterize political life as 
a whole. 
 Thus, to summarize the picture of the dictatorship that emerges from the Discourses, 
Machiavelli describes dictatorship as one of a series of Roman institutions that functioned to 
mediate reason of state and potentially destructive contingencies into the internal life of the 
republic. These institutions in various ways enabled the state respond to dangerous threats 
without disrupting the participatory and agonistic dynamics that preserved collective liberty. 
Dictatorship is an institution for responding to particular category of contingency: namely, 
“accidenti istraordinari,” extraordinary contingencies. It is useful because normally republican 
institutions are “slow in functioning,” whereas the dictator in an accidenti istraordinari 
concentrates authority for a short time  “without consultation” and could punish without appeal. 
A key point is that the dictator responds to an extraordinary situation, but it is an ordinary 
institution; it responds to extraordinary events in a “vie ordinarie;” in an ordinary way. Indeed, 
republics that lack a dictatorship will be forced to respond to extraordinary events “per vie 
istraordinarie,” thus compounding the danger by violating their own institutions. 
This background in Machiavelli’s more general theory of republican institutions provides 
a framework for understanding Machiavelli’s most detailed analysis of Dictatorship, in Book I 





Chapter 43 of the Discourses. He begins by criticizing the view held “by some Roman writers” 
who argue that dictatorship was the cause that eventually led to tyranny in Rome. These 
unnamed critics contend that without the dictatorship, “Caesar would not have succeeded under 
any other public title in making his tyranny look honest and above board.”161 The problem of 
with this view is that it was not the “name nor the rank of the dictator that made Rome servile, 
but the loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the length of [Caesar’s] rule.”162 
In other words, the problem was not the institution of dictatorship at all – if the public title of 
dictator hadn’t existed, Caesar would have found another title. Instead, in Caesar’s hands the 
institution was used in an extraordinary rather than ordinary way because it ceased to be 
constrained by the authority of the citizens. As we’ve seen in the previous section, the reciprocal 
relationship between virtue and institutions also implies that once citizens become corrupt and no 
longer zealously defend the common good, the same institutions that promoted virtue can under 
corrupt conditions become disastrous – as the extraordinary dictatorships of Caesar and Sulla 
demonstrate. Machiavelli’s point here is that before corruption set in, dictatorship was a 
commendable institution only on the condition that authority was in the hands of the people, and 
they actively defended that authority against usurpation – this is what makes it “ordinary.” 
Blaming Caesar’s tyranny on the institution is not only a causal error, then, but backhandedly 
denies the authority of the citizenry. 163 This point is amplified in Machiavelli’s argument for the 
superiority of the masses [la moltitudine] over the prince. In Rome, we see that the Roman 
popular classes “neither ‘arrogantly dominate nor servilely obey.’”164 Instead, in an uncorrupt 
republic, the masses can be trusted to uphold the common interest. When the masses needed to 
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“take action against some powerful person… or others who sought to oppress them” they do so, 
vigorously defending their freedom.165 By the same token, the masses can only judge when 
dictators are in fact acting for the common good: “when it [la moltitudine] had to obey dictators 
or consuls in the public interest, it did so.”166 Machiavelli’s defense of dictatorship, in other 
words, rests on the authority of the multitude to keep it in check, and the judgment of the 
multitude to appraise when obeying the dictator is in the public interest. Hence, Machiavelli 
points out that the abuse the dictatorship requires conditions “impossible for him to acquire” in 
an uncorrupt republic.167 In addition to these informal, but crucial, informal restraints, there are 
also several institutional restraints on the dictatorship: (i)“the dictator was appointed for a limited 
time;” (ii) “only for the purpose of dealing solely with such matters as had led the appointment;” 
and (iii) he “could do nothing to diminish the constitutional position of the government 
[diminuzione dello stato].” The translation of stato here is somewhat misleading; he does not 
mean “state” in the modern sense as the abstract seat of sovereignty, but as the concrete status or 
holding of a free people; i.e. the “state” of the ‘sovereign’ Roman people. Thus, the dictator 
cannot “take away the authority vested in the senate or in the people” because the Roman ‘state’ 
belongs to them, not to the dictator.168 Machiavelli’s different understanding of the word state 
clarifies his emphasis on the importance of ordinary institutions for dealing with emergencies. 
Not only is the “vie istraordinarie” unstable, it necessarily depends on “the virtue of some one 
person who is then living, not the virtue of the public as a whole.”169 Overall, then, we could say 
that dictatorship here is firmly rooted in the “collective liberty” pole of this tension, and engages 
                                                
165 ibid. The example Machiavelli gives was “Manlius, of the Ten;” i.e. the general sentenced by the anonymous 
dictator discussed above.  Manlius was convicted and exiled, demonstrating for Machiavelli that the plebs can place 
the common good above their own suspicion for the nobles.  
166 Ibid. 
167 ibid. 
168 ibid. On the meaning of the state in the republican tradition, see Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. II, final 
chapter. 
169 Ibid., 1.17 
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the reason of state pole by “civilizing,” it e.g. translating it into a means of extending civic 
discourse and the preservative function of political agonism, even to experiences of urgent 
emergency.  
 
Dictatorship as exception 
Machiavelli’s constant emphasis on the politics of emergency powers is especially striking 
because it is in sharp contrast to dominant tendency in subsequent discussions of dictatorship as 
a republican emergency institution. Rousseau’s discussion of dictatorship in The Social Contract 
provides an illuminating example.170 On the one hand, Rousseau was enough of a Machiavellian 
to see the self-preservation of the state as an absolute precondition for the possibility of 
collective liberty. He observes that 
 
in such a case [of dangerous crisis] the general will is not in doubt, it is obvious that the people’s foremost 
intention is that the State not perish.171 
 
Why is the general will not in doubt? Rousseau’s thought here, characteristically subtle despite 
its brevity, seems to be the following: The existence of the state is a necessary condition of 
possibility for the general will. The general will cannot possibly will its own destruction, or will 
                                                
170 A keen awareness of the tension between raison d’état and collective liberty can be seen throughout Rousseau’s 
works, as, for instance, in his eloquent statement of the dilemma in Considerations on the Government of Poland: 
“Brave Poles, beware, beware lest for wanting to be too well, you only make your situation worse. In thinking about 
what you want to acquire, do not forget what you might lose. Correct the abuses of your constitution, if it is possible 
to do so; but do not despise the constitution that made you what you are.” 178. His critique of Saint Pierre’s Project 
for Perpetual Peace illustrates both the importance of the problem for his, and his pessimism that it can be overcome. 
Intriguingly, Rousseau seems to have attempted to square this circle and leave behind the Machiavellian framework 
that embeds raison d’état in the modern state. There is a brief reference in Emile to Rousseau’s attempted solution, 
but he seems to have abandoned the effort and destroyed this work. For an interesting discussion, seeTuck, R. 
(1999). The rights of war and peace : political thought and the international order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford 
England, New York : Oxford University Press., 206-7. 
171 The Social Contract, IV.6 
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that it does not will. Therefore, when the state is threatened with destruction, we know 
necessarily that the general will authorizes whatever measures are necessary to defend the state. 
If the means necessary to defend the state require suspending the “inflexibility” of the laws and 
deliberative procedures, then the general will necessary authorizes that these ordinary legal 
constraints be suspended. Rousseau’s emphasis that the general will “not in doubt” seems to 
indicate that authorization to suspend the law in such crises can be deduced as a logical 
necessity, without the assembly actually having to declare its will in fact. In this way Rousseau 
integrates the dictatorship into his theory of popular sovereignty. 
 On the other hand, Rousseau is keenly aware of the dangers that this priority of the state’s 
right to self-preservation pose to the institutions of collective freedom, and, stresses three 
important limitations that are definitive of this tradition of emergency powers. First, “only the 
greatest dangers” when “the salvation of the fatherland is at stake” can justify the suspension of 
the laws. Secondly, “it is important that [the Dictatorship’s] duration be fixed to a very brief term 
which can never be extended.” If the power of the dictatorship is maintained beyond this brief 
period (Rousseau suggests six months), it will invariably become “tyrannical or vain.” Thirdly, 
the separation of powers is suspended but not abolished. Indeed, in the case of less severe 
emergencies that require only a suspension of the structure of the government, the appropriate 
model is not the dictatorship but the “consecrated formula” by which the Roman Senate 
empowered the Consuls with emergency authority. Since for Rousseau the government is always 
conceived as an executive magistrate delegated by the sovereign, this does not require 
suspending the laws themselves but only the means of administering them. Only when the 
emergency is so severe that the state’s preservation requires suspending the laws themselves, a 
dictator is named and the Sovereign authority is provisionally suspended for the duration of the 
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emergency. In this period, the dictator has the unconstrained executive powers but no legislative 
ones; “he can do everything, except make laws.  
 Interestingly, Rousseau does not seem especially concerned with what, for author 
theorists of dictatorship, was a core question – the distinction between the authority to declare 
emergencies and the authority vested with emergency powers. His description of how the 
dictator is nominated intentionally leaves the identity of the agent doing the nominating 
unspecified: in the case that the laws are an obstacle to preserving the state, “alors on nomme un 
chef suprême qui fasse taire toutes les lois” (Gourevitch’s English translation captures this 
ambiguity by using the passive voice: “a supreme chief is named…”).172 
While he doesn’t quite make this explicit, his logical deductive authorization of 
dictatorship by the general will and his description of dictatorship seem to suggest that he 
envisions both the declaration of the emergency and the dictatorship itself to be forms of 
executive authority. Much more important for Rousseau is to insist that the sovereign authority, 
while suspended, is not “abolished.” The dictator is emphatically a delegated commissioner 
acting a the behest – even if only as a logical postulation – of the popular sovereign. Thus, the 
dictator can “do everything, except make laws.” Even more importantly, he may “dominate” the 
legislative power, but he cannot represent it. This is crucial for Rousseau, since, as we shall see 
in more detail in the next section, he identified sovereignty with the will, and therefore rejected 
the possibility of representation of the legislative power as usurpation.173 A final characteristic of 
Rousseau’s discussion that is somewhat surprising, especially in comparison to his apparent lack 
of concern with the nominating agent, is his strong concern that dictatorship remain an 
                                                
172 ibid., IV.6. Later in the chapter, Rousseau again leaves the identity of the nominating agent unclear: “whatever 
may be the manner in which this important commission is conferred, it is important that its duration be fixed to a 
very brief term…”   
173 ibid., II.1 
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exceptional and extraordinary institution that is used only infrequently, in moments of the 
greatest possible importance. He condemns the Roman practice of conferring a dictator for 
performing public rituals, ceremonies and other formalities in addition to overcoming an 
existential crisis. While most early modern commentators on the dictatorship tended to criticize 
the danger of overusing the office, which could lead to abuse, Rousseau’s concern is the 
opposite: “it is not the danger that it might be abused but the danger that it might be debased 
which prompts me to object to the indiscriminate use of this supreme magistracy.” Thus, 
Rousseau condemns the appointment of dictators for trivial or ceremonial reasons, which lead to 
it being regarded as a “vain title.” Conversely and for the same reason, he criticizes the Senate’s 
failure to nominate a dictator during the Catiline conspiracy, a supreme crisis that would have 
merited the exceptional office.  
What unites both Rousseau’s disinterest in the problem of the nominating agency, and the 
peculiar concerns about debasement and disuse, is his underlying expectation that dictatorship 
must remain an extraordinary institution above and outside of politics. His logical postulation 
that the general will always wills a dictator to save the state from destruction actually obscures 
the fundamental political question of how such a circumstance is identified, what degree of 
probability or risk is a threshold, and who is qualified to participate in such decisions. The brisk 
references to self-preservation and immanent peril present an image of incontestability and 
definitiveness that obfuscate the fact that even the most severe emergencies involve political 
judgments, calculations of risk and probability, and the weighing possible alternatives in light of 
collective commitments. These are the features of emergency politics, and the assumptions of 
incontestable necessity depoliticizes the emergency institution of dictatorship. This is especially 
clear from Rousseau’s anxiety that the various ritual and ceremonial functions of dictatorship 
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will “debase” the institution and deprive it of its exalted status beyond the competitions for honor 
and status and accompany the designation of more quotidian political offices. The same 
reasoning underlies Rousseau’s criticism of the senatus consultum ultimum in the late Republic; 
Rousseau suggests the Cicero avoided having a dictator appointed to put down the Catiline 
conspiracy because he wanted to be sure he received the honor and glory of that commission 
himself. Once again, Rousseau’s aversion is to degrading the special prestige and honor of the 
emergency magistrate by investing it with the motivations and ambitions that accompany the 
ordinary political struggles for office and power. Both illustrate the danger in Rousseau’s eyes of 
infecting the pristinely exceptional status of dictatorship, which corresponds directly to the 
supra-political principle of the right to self-preservation, with the conflicts and interests that 
characterize ordinary politics.        
 
Defining Self Preservation 
Both Machiavelli and Rousseau, then, regarded dictatorship as a means of coping with the 
tension between collective liberty and self-preservation. They do so, however, in very different 
ways. Machiavelli conceived of dictatorship as an institutional means of extending the agonistic 
political life of the city to continue even during serious emergencies, subjecting judgments of 
necessity to the multiplicity of political interests and positions and depicting even the dictatorial 
exercise of emergency power as an object of popular contestation and negotiation. Rousseau 
takes the opposite approach and radically separates exceptional dictatorship and popular self-
rule, insulating emergency politics from popular political judgment and locating the exceptional 
means to self-preservation in the rarified, supra-political space of the exception.  
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What conclusions can we draw from this contrast? I argued in the previous chapter that 
the language of self-preservation often presents an illusory certainty about the identity of the 
“self” that is being preserved, and the means that are “necessary” for its preservation. Rousseau’s 
strategy of strictly delimiting collective freedom and self-preservation into the respective spheres 
of norm and exception requires this illusory certainty, and is designed in turn to maintain it. Such 
a strategy cannot avoid the grim possibility that Rousseau himself may have glimpsed, of the 
general will a priori authorizing emergency powers that it cannot examine, in which the 
assembly is dominated and silenced by emergency magistrates in the name of its own 
preservation. In contrast, Machiavelli’s solution is not to eliminate or permanently resolve the 
tension between liberty and self-preservation but to accept it as a permanent condition of 
republican politics, and to channel it institutionally into a politics of disclosure and public 










But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the 




       
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chapters 26, 31. 
 
 
Sovereignty, which is initially only the universal thought of this ideality, can exist only as subjectivity which is 
certain of itself, and as the will’s abstract – and to that extent ungrounded – self-determination in which the 
ultimate decision is vested. This is the individual aspect of the state as such, and it is in this respect alone that 
the state itself is one. 
 
      G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right §279.174 
 
 
This section focuses on the tension between two different conceptions of representation and the 
unity of the state: on the one hand, the depersonalized, juridical concept of “the state” unified 
symbolically by representation; on the other hand, the state as a substantive, pre-juridical entity 
whose unity is constituted by something more concrete and existential than representation as a 
symbolic or juridical fiction.175 These two different conceptions, and the different forms of 
representation they entail, have persisted since the 17th century in an often tense and dynamic co-
existence, combining, recombining and adopting themselves to changing constitutional and 
political configurations. As I will show, they constitute another important arena of emergency 
politics, establishing the terms through which emergencies are defined and debated. In particular, 
I shall focus on how this conceptual tension gives rise to the close link between emergencies as 
plebiscitarianism, decisionism and representation as incarnation. As in the previous section, I 
draw from early modern sources in order to show how this structural tension within the modern 
                                                
174 Ed. by Wood and Trans. by Nisbet, 316-7. 
175 This formulation, as we shall see, draws upon Carl Schmitt’s discussion in Constitutional Theory 
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concept of the state, and indicate some of the major patterns in which this tension persists and 
becomes an arena for emergency politics. 
 As we’ve already seen, when the term “the state,” begin to be used regularly in political 
contexts from the 14th century, they referred to the political status or standing of political 
rulers.176 In addition to the personal status of principalities, “the state” was also used in this 
period to describe the political status or standing of a group or body of people, such as, for 
instance, the orders of the Etats generaux consisting in the three principle states or estates in the 
kingdom. According to Quentin Skinner, the first important semantic innovation in “the state” 
occurred with renaissance republican authors, who begin to use “the state” to “refer not merely to 
bodies of people over whom sovereigns held power, but also to the bearer of sovereignty 
itself.”177 So for example, a republic could be characterized as a status popularis, in which the 
citizen body rules itself and therefore lives in a “free state” or a state of liberty. The ambiguity is 
that “state” here refers to the citizen body both in the more traditional status or standing, and in 
the more modern sense of the bearer of sovereignty. The modern republican association of state 
with sovereignty was a further step taken by radical English republicans writers in the mid-17th 
century. Authors such as Henry Parker expressed the idea that that the body of the people is 
always the true bearer of sovereignty by arguing that, “since the people can in turn be said to 
comprise all the different estates of a commonwealth, and hence amount to ‘the whole state,’ one 
can speak of sovereignty as a property of the state.”178 Hence, the first modern meaning of “the 
state” belongs to the republican tradition of popular sovereignty, according to which the state as 
the bearer of sovereign power is equivalent to the body of the people or community as a whole.179 
                                                
176 Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. II 
177 Skinner, “How we acquired,” 4. 
178 Ibid., 5.  
179Ibid., 11.  
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 The second, subsequently dominant conception of the state owes itself to the most 
formidable opponent of those 17th century republicans: Thomas Hobbes. In Skinner’s persuasive 
account, Hobbes’ central preoccupation as a political theorist was to discredit theories of 
republican liberty.180 One of his strategies was to undermine the republican idea that the true 
bearer of sovereignty is the body of the people by depicting a “natural” condition of humankind 
as a multitude of isolated, atomistic, vulnerable and violent individuals. In other words, there is 
no such thing as the body of the people without first being represented. This occurs, and the 
“Multitude of men are made One Person,” when they agree to authorize an individual or 
assembly to act as their sovereign representative.181 It is only the act of being represented by the 
sovereign that makes the multitude into a single entity, and brings this legal or juridical “person” 
into existence.   
By adopting this argument Hobbes meant to undermine the coherence of the republican 
idea of the body of the people as the bearer of sovereignty. Yet, in making the monarch (or 
assembly) a representative of legal personhood, Hobbes also broke with the traditional royalist 
identification of the king with the sovereign. For Hobbes, the king is a mere occupant of the 
“office of the sovereign representative,” chosen to “bear the person” of the multitude for their 
own safety and welfare. Thus in Hobbes account, sovereignty belongs neither to the king nor the 
people. The subject of sovereignty is not any natural person, but the “COMMON-WEALTH, or 
STATE,” that is, the juridical, artificial person that unifies the multitude when each individual 
covenants to be represented by it.182 In other words, as Skinner’s interpretation makes clear, for 
                                                
180 Skinner, Q. (1996). Reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 




Hobbes the state or commonwealth is nothing but a legal relation, a juridical device that allows 
the sovereign representative to speak and act in the name of an artificial unity of the multitude.183 
What is the effect of this rather strange and intricate bit of argumentation? One effect we 
have already seen: the concept of the state as an artificial person represented by the sovereign 
was intended to permanently discredit the republican idea that the body of the people could be 
the bearer of sovereignty, as well as traditional paternalist or theological foundations of 
absolutism. A second consequence of Hobbes’ juridical theory of the state is that, by 
transforming the state into a form of the relationship between sovereignty and subjects, Hobbes 
radically disembodies and depersonalizes all political authority, even that of the “natural” person 
of the monarch. In spite of Hobbes’ vociferous antipathy toward republicanism, we can see why 
he became the target of so many of his more traditional royalist contemporaries. Sovereignty can 
no longer be attached to the singular person or “natural body” of the king, but is transformed and 
depersonalized into an office. As Hobbes puts it, “I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of 
the Seat of Power,” and entitles his analysis of the powers of sovereignty “The Office of the 
Sovereign Representative.”184 Indeed, while he made no secret of his preference for monarchy, 
Hobbes consistently acknowledged that the office of sovereignty can be filled by an assembly 
just as consistently as by a monarch.185  
Paradoxically, the fact that the state, rather than the person of the sovereign, is the “seat” 
of sovereignty, and therefore the “natural” person of sovereignty is a mere representative, means 
that sovereigns are no longer the proprietors of their sovereignty.186 Rather, they occupy an office 
                                                
183 ibid., ch. 26 
184 Hobbes, Epistle Dedicatory, chap. 30 respectively.  
185 indeed, many interpret his Leviathan as an attempt to convince fellow royalists that the civil war had been lost 
and that they owed allegiance to the now-sovereign parliament. See chap. 21, pgs. 153-4 and “A review, and 
Conclusion,” pg. 484-5 especially. 
186 Loughlin, “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty,” in Walker, N. (2003). Sovereignty in transition. Oxford, Hart., 65. 
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and are charged with the duties of that office.187 When the sovereign fulfills the duties of his 
office, the actions he performs should properly be seen as on behalf of the person he represents – 
namely, the state – rather than his own natural person.188 In this respect, by grounding the unity 
and public nature of the modern state in the representative device of fictive juridical personhood, 
Hobbes grounded the central institution of political modernity – the state – on an oddly de-
substantialized and ethereal fiction.189 The radically formalist and essentially empty structure of 
Hobbes’ state or commonwealth is simply a reflection of the structure of Hobbesian 
representation. Thus by defining the sovereign as not only a mere “representative” but as the 
representative of a legal fiction no less, Hobbes would appear to be grounding monarchical 
power on exceedingly thin and legalistic foundations. In fact, the opposite is true, for two crucial 
reasons, First, the inability of the de-substantialized, juridical body to “doe any thing” on its 
own190 is paradoxically the source of the absolute power of the sovereign. Precisely because the 
Person the sovereign represents is a legal fiction, the mere name of a unidirectional relation of 
authority between sovereign and subjects, this requires that the sovereign is absolutely 
unrestricted in his capacity to speak and act on the state’s behalf. Like all other purely artificial 
persons the state is incapable of acting or authorizing on its own behalf, but nevertheless is an 
                                                
187 Hobbes, Leviathani, Ch. 30. Admittedly, so long as the commonwealth is not dissolved, in fulfilling those duties 
the sovereign is accountable only “to God… and to none but him,” at least on the level of formal rights and duties 
(231). Momentarily stepping back from his normative analysis of rights and duties, Hobbes admits in a wearier, 
realist tone that the “Negligent government of Princes [is naturally punished with] Rebellion; and Rebellion, with 
Slaughter.” (ch. 31, pg. 254). 
188 Hobbes defines “Civill Law,” for example, as the command of the “Persona civitatis, the purpose of the 
Common-wealth,” or state. Chap. 26, pg. 183. For Hobbes’ distinction between the sovereign representative and the 
“natural person” of the individual occupying that office, see Chap. 23, 166; chap. 24, 173-4. Interestingly, we can 
glimpse here Hobbes’ reformulation and demystification of the medieval juridical theme of the “king’s two bodies,” 
famously analyzed by Ernst Kantorowicz. 
189 David Runciman, “The concept of the state: the sovereignty of a fiction,” inSkinner, Q. and B. Stråth (2003). 




“actual” person that can be represented and to whom action can be attributed.191 Existing only 
by virtue of being represented, the state can only speak through the mouth of the sovereign, and 
can only act through his agency. The Person of the state or Leviathan fictively represents the 
multitude as a unity, and the sovereign has the unique right to actually represent the state, the 
unity of the entire social body.  
Secondly, this curiously double structure of representation is a source of actual absolute 
power only insofar as Hobbes can ensure that the commonwealth is “more than Consent, or 
Corcord; it is a reall Unitie.”192 As we’ve seen, however, Hobbes’ radically formalist account of 
representation eliminated any material basis in shared traditions, custom, belief or other sources 
of homogeneity. This legal fiction of a public without a physically present people, eerily 
represented in the famous title page engraving of the immense body of the commonwealth, made 
of the individual bodies of the subjects, towering over an empty, depopulated city. How could 
such a construction be more than an ephemera? In fact, Hobbes secures a source for a permanent 
“reall Unitie” of the commonwealth by transforming the natural condition outside the boundaries 
of the commonwealth into a kind of permanent state of exception, ever-present just beyond the 
state’s borders and beyond the limits of its authority. Inverting the customary identification of 
peace rather than war as the normal condition, Hobbes’ account of the “natural condition of 
mankind” as an unending war of all against all literally posits the exception as the ever-present, 
immanent condition that continuously provides “real” unity to the commonwealth.193 The state of 
nature as an undifferentiated state of exception creates an equally “undifferentiated” normalcy, 
                                                
191 The first three are from Leviathan ch. 16, the last is from Hobbes example in De Homine of the theatrical persona 
of Agamemnon, which is understood to be “impersonated” by the natural person of the actor onstage, so that the 
actor’s actions are both “truly” and “by fiction” taken to be the actions of the character or persona of Agamemnon. 
De Homine, XV, 1. For two contrasting interpretations, see Pitkin, 28 and Skinner, Visions vol. II, 193. 
192 Chap. 30, pg. 232. 
193 See for example, 128. Schmitt, interestingly, negatively characterizes Hobbes’ sovereign as a permanent 
dictatorship is La Dictatur, 39. 
  
109 
thus from the point of view of the subject dissolving all possible valuations and gradations 
between regime types into a single question: am I safer obeying the sovereign, or at war with 
him?194 Just as importantly, the identity of the commonwealth itself is constituted by the 
exceptional right to self-presentation in an ongoing state of war, since the commonwealth is 
simply a personification and unification all the judgments about the means to self-preservation 
that each of its members possessed. Its homogeneity is constituted by the decision of each 
individual to authorize to be represented by the commonwealth  and “acknowledge himselfe to 
be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those 
things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie.”195 Thus, Hobbes bolsters his otherwise 
remarkably thin and formalistic basis for absolute sovereignty by constituting the unity of the 
commonwealth through a permanent state of exception.  
Ironically, some subsequent theories of popular sovereignty would retain the basic 
structure of Hobbes’ framework, while attempting to repopulate the empty city of the Leviathan 
frontispiece by making the city coincide with the body of the sovereign itself. The shift from 
absolute to popular sovereignty, and from formal to substantive homogeneity, transformed but 
did not eliminate the problem of the exception.  
 
Rousseauian immanence: from the representation to the identity pole 
A striking example of Hobbes’ paradoxical influence on subsequent theories of popular 
sovereignty can be seen in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Interestingly, Carl Schmitt 
                                                
194 Of course, Hobbes does provide some prudential grounds for favoring monarchy. But these are only relevant 
from the perspective of the observer, i.e. the philosopher or advisor. The point of view that most preoccupied 
Hobbes, however, was that of the individual deciding whether to obey, and Hobbes construction of this perspective 
rigorously excludes any possible evaluative judgment about the nature of “normalcy” – if a state of normalcy exists, 
it is always rational to enter it, i.e. to obey the sovereign.  
195 Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. 17. 
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selected Hobbes and Rousseau as representatives of the two contrasting principles of constituting 
political unity as a state form. For Schmitt, every state form concretely expresses “the status of 
political unity” of a people.196 He identifies Hobbesian representation and Rousseauian identity 
as two ideal-typical “poles” of how the political unity of a people can be achieved. While 
Schmitt regarded these two authors as paradigmatic opposites, it is striking that Rousseau, 
despite his frequent polemics against Hobbes, Rousseau adopts almost wholesale Hobbes’ 
juridical conception of the relationship between sovereignty and the state.  
The (non-trivial) difference, of course, is that Rousseau transforms Hobbes’ monarchical 
absolutism into a radical theory of republican popular sovereignty, in which the only legitimate 
sovereign is the physically assembled people themselves.197 Consequently - with total 
consistency with Hobbes – Rousseau must radically separate representation from sovereignty, 
and relocate in the relationship between the sovereign and its executive magistrates. Rousseau, in 
other words, accomplishes a rather astonishing feat of maintaining both the Hobbesian and 
earlier republican definitions of the state in a single juridical republican theory. Out of a 
multitude of “hommes épars,” the “unity” created by the social contract is one in which the 
natural and artificial body (“corps moral et collectif”) overlap directly onto one another. Thus, 
the name for this “personne publique” is “Etat quand il est passif,” and “Souverain quand il est 
actif[.]” The state, then, becomes both (in Rousseau’s terms) the “body of people as the bearer of 
                                                
196 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 239. 
197 Rousseau, Social Contract Book I, chap. 6: “Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance 
sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie 
indivisible du tout. 
     A l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulière de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association produit un corps moral 
et collectif composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son 
moi commun, sa vie et sa volonté. Cette personne publique qui se forme ainsi par l'union de toutes les autres prenait 
autrefois le nom de Cité, et prend maintenant celui de République ou de corps politique, lequel est appelé par ses 
membres Etat quand il est passif, Souverain quand il est actif, Puissance en le comparant à ses semblables. A l'égard 
des associés ils prennent collectivement le nom de Peuple, et s'appellent en particulier citoyens comme participants à 
l'autorité souveraine, et sujets comme soumis aux lois de l'Etat. Mais ces termes se confondent souvent et se 
prennent l'un pour l'autre; il suffit de les savoir distinguer quand ils sont employés dans toute leur précision.” 
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sovereign power” and (in Hobbes’s words) the “purely fictional Person whom the figure of the 
sovereign bodies forth.”198  
How can such an identity be possible? Rousseau’s solution enabled him to occupy what 
Hobbes called “the office of the sovereign representative” with the totality of every individual 
will, unified into a single, supreme general will. In contrast to the “will of all” or the sum of all 
particular wills, the general will expresses the will of the body politic as a unity and totality.199 
As such, it shares with Hobbes’ absolute sovereign the fact that it is the source of law and cannot 
be bound by any prior law;200 that it is incapable of being wrong;201 and that it can be neither 
divided nor alienated.202 Since the general will itself constitutes the only possible criteria and 
yardstick for the popular sovereign, it acknowledges no limitations to its own authority. It “can 
only be represented by itself,” and “by the mere fact that it is, is always everything it ought to 
be.”203  
Rousseau’s achievement in holding on to both the republican and juridical conceptions of 
the state, and making Hobbesian sovereignty popular, came at a very high political price; not 
only abolishing representation from legislation but, also excising all interests, associations, and 
deliberation from the citizen body,204 and thirdly, requiring a political form that allowed for the 
direct physical presence of all citizens – the city state – that already by the mid-18th century was 
located increasingly on the margins of history.205 Moreover, despite its omnipotence within its 
own proper sphere, Rousseau’s solution of basing popular sovereignty on substantive identity in 
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place of symbolic representation was a remarkably fragile and tenuous artifice. The unity of the 
general will, constituted by the common point of intersection of all individual wills, requires that 
each citizen must deliberate, alone, from the position of total equality and reciprocity. 
Rousseau’s idealism did not lie in his overestimation of the capacity of individual citizens to 
immediate intuit the common good.206 On the contrary, he is highly attentive to the tendency of 
individuals to error and mistake their own private interest for the common good. But the people 
may form factions, become corrupt, fragmented or apathetic.207 Conversely, the executive 
magistrates may attempt to marginalize, silence or prevent the sovereign from regularly 
assembling and exercising its proper will. All of these introduce forms of meditation into the 
immediate identity between state and sovereign, signaling the silencing of the general will, the 
onset of corruption or usurpation, leading to the death of the body politic.208 
Rousseau advances two different kinds of solutions to maintain the immanent identity 
between state and sovereign. The first are procedural and institutional; for instance, the assembly 
is restricted to passing only abstract and general laws framed by an executive magistrate,209, in 
order to prevent factionalism deliberation is be forbidden, etc.210 The second type of solutions 
Rousseau advocates are moral and ideological rather than institutional and procedural. Thus 
Rousseau speaks of the most important of all category of laws, those that are engraved in the 
hearts of citizens and substitute the force of habit for that of authority211 and advocates a civil 
religion channeling worship and the sacred into civic ends. This “divine civil or positive right” 
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fosters the ethical bases of sociability, patriotism, citizenship and reverence for the law and the 
patrie.212  
 Hence after setting out the structure of popular sovereignty as identity in Book I, much of 
the remainder of The Social Contract is dedicated to identifying the various threats to this 
identity and unity, and exploring both institutional and “moral” means for maintaining it. The 
importance Rousseau assigns to this task, and his untempered pessimism that even the best and 
most well-ordered state will eventually perish,213 both suggest a disquieting possibility that the 
gap or persistence of mediations between the state and the sovereign may well be permanent and 
ineradicable. In this case the normativity of the volonté générale risks becoming inverted: a 
postulated status of absolute unity and identity serves only to highlight a gap between a condition 
of right and the means required for the realization of that condition. The failure to synthesize 
force and right appears from the perspective of state unity and identity as an aberrant exception 
requiring extraordinary measures – even if this gap is factually closer to an ordinary rather than 
extraordinary condition. This seems to be what Koselleck has in mind when he observes that for 
Rousseau “the absolute general will that recognizes no exception is alone the exception.”214 In 
other words, the imminent identity of Rousseau’s popular sovereign is both absolute, unbounded 
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and at the same time extremely frail, and its affinity with states of exception resides in precicely 
this combination of omnipotence and fragility. Hannah Arendt made a similar observation in On 
Revolution, when she pointed to Rousseau’s observation that two different interests will unite 
themselves together when confronted by a third that is equally opposed to both. “Politically 
speaking,” Arendt argues, Rousseau “presupposed the existence and relied upon the unifying 
power of the common national enemy. Only in the presence of the enemy can such a thing as la 
nation une et individible, the ideal of French and of all other nationalism, come to pass.”215 
Perhaps detecting the strong Rousseauian strain in Carl Schmitt, Arendt finishes the thought 
observing that “national unity can assert itself only in foreign affairs, under circumstances of, at 
least, potential hostility.”216  
 
The dialectic of identity and representation 
As we’ve seen, the absolute character of Hobbes’ formal symbolic representation effectively 
dissolves any meaningful distinction between norm and exception. Hobbesian representation 
means authorizing to the sovereign all rights to judge what constitutes a danger to the members 
of the commonwealth.217 The sovereign, existing in an external state of nature vis-à-vis other 
sovereigns, represented all subjects’ judgments about friends and enemies, norm and exception, 
and the means required for self-preservation. But since formal symbolic representation was a 
means of depoliticization and neutralization of ideological and moral passions, at the same time 
it was a kind of “normalization” of the exception. Juridical representation as authorization 
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dismissed, in a single stroke, the voluminous 17th century legal debates over the proper scope and 
boundaries of the sovereign prerogative that inhered in the person of the King.218 Hobbes was 
free to ignore the elaborate ancient constitutionalist framework distinguishing between law-
governed jurisdictio and the extra-legal gubernaculum within which the king’s discretion was 
supreme.219 In their place he offered an elegantly simple solution: the state is the juridical person 
to whom all actions by the sovereign or public officials are attributable. Juridical representation 
is what grants all official actions – from the sovereign to the lowest public official or soldier – 
the force of law; i.e. their legal authority and claim to obedience derive from the fact that all such 
actions are attributable to the person of the state, and hence, are “owned” by the individual 
members of that state.220 Thus Hans Kelsen’s remark that, like King Midas, everything the law 
touches turns to law, can be applied equally to Hobbes’ theory of juridical representation: 
everything attributable to the state has force of law.221  
I’ve argued that, adopting Hobbes’ definitions of state and sovereignty, Rousseau 
replaces juridical representation and legal-rational legitimacy with immanent identity and 
democratic legitimacy. Whereas Hobbes offered an implausibly meager and thin account of the 
bonds holding together the commonwealth, Rousseau required an extraordinarily thick and 
cohesive unity in order to even approach the radically immanent identity required by his concept 
of popular sovereignty. Despite his discussion of a large array of institutional and ethical means 
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to maintain this unity, Rousseau remained evidently anxious about the difficulty of the task.222 
While the pure theories of Hobbes and Rousseau may have been equally unlikely to be fully 
realized in practice, they were unrealizable in importantly different ways. Hobbesian formalist 
representation and legal-rational legitimacy could be maintained as a kind of juridical structure 
of the unity of the state even as the sociological unity was practically derived from other, more 
substantive traditional or ethical sources. Even if it factually misconstrued the unity of the state, 
Hobbes’ theory could be maintained as a minimalist juridical structure with relatively little 
tension.223  In contrast, the unrealizability of Rousseau’s “maximalist” theory of political unity 
could not be practically harmonized in the same way as Hobbes’ minimalist one. Whereas 
Hobbes’ absolutist representation effectively banished the exception, Rousseau’s postulation of 
unity as immanent identity promises to unite force and droit while in practice constituting an 
irresolvable gap between them. At the same time, the postulated unity that would restore the 
rightful legal order authorizes the measures of force necessary to bring about its own existence. 
On this interpretation, unity as imminent identity, if taken seriously, approximates the structure 
of the state of exception itself, as the space between the normativity of the legal order and the 
measures necessary to realize that normative order.224  
 
The anatomy of plebiscitarianism: Schmitt and Marx 
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So far, we’ve seen that what Schmitt identified as the two “poles” – identity and representation – 
are not simply opposite ways of constituting the state as a unity. They are also closely linked in 
their underlying conceptual architecture: while they represent opposite normative valuations, 
they share basic definitions of the state, sovereignty and representation itself.  
We’ve also seen the very different ways in which the politics of emergencies appear in 
two conceptions. The project of Hobbesian representation is to eliminate the historically 
explosive politics of emergencies by monopolizing judgment in the sovereign, and dissolving 
exceptional powers such as the prerogative into the ordinary legal authority of the absolutist 
state. In contrast to this, Rousseau’s foundation of unity in absolute identity, and the wide-
ranging administrative and social means for achieving this extraordinarily powerful yet fragile 
social identity, set the stage for a new kind of state of exception. I want to briefly sketch an 
trajectory that emerges from this tension - plebiscitarianism and emergencies, by comparing the 
analyses of this phenomenon by Carl Schmitt and Karl Marx. As we shall see, while in many 
respects their interpretations are strikingly similar, they lead to opposite evaluations both of 
plebiscitarianism itself, and of the representative legislature as a potential site for the translation 
of social conflict into democratic politics.  
 
 
 One important consequence of Schmitt’s idea, discussed in the previous chapter, of the 
constitution in the “absolute” sense is that it logically implied a distinct conception of emergency 
powers that can be constitutionally valid even if they are not authorized or even prohibited by 
particular constitutional statutes. By identifying the constitution with a concrete decision by the 
unified constituent power, Schmitt could simultaneously argue that the constitution is inviolable 
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and that constitutional laws may be suspended and even violated in a state of exception.225 For 
example, Schmitt’s interpretation of Art. 48 of the Weimar constitution held that it authorizes the 
president to ‘temporarily” violate constitutionally enshrined basic rights without “imping[ing] on 
the fundamental political decisions and the substance of the constitution.” Indeed, the president’s 
emergency powers stand  
 
precisely in service of this constitution’s preservation and creation. Therefore, it would be nonsensical to 
render every single constitutional law inviolable because the constitution is inviolable and to see in every 
single constitutional provision an insurmountable obstacle to the protection of the constitution in general. 
That meant in practice nothing other than placing the individual statute above the entirety of the political 
form of existence and to twist the meaning and purpose of the state of exception into its opposite.226 
 
Hence on Schmitt’s account emergency powers can be both unlimited by constitutional law and 
consistent with – indeed, required by – the inviolability of the constitution itself. In a sense, his 
discovery of the plebiscitary president allowed Schmitt to integrate the two contrasting theories 
of emergencies powers discussed the previous chapter. Of course, Schmitt’s later theory is closer 
in implication to the Political Theology position insofar as he never returned to the Dictatorship 
view that emergency powers could be reconciled with the Rechsstaat. But unlike Political 
Theology, his later theory relocated a more capacious view of emergency powers within the 
positive constitution, now distinguished from constitutional laws, and separated it at least 
theoretically from the constituent power itself – a distinction that the Political Theology 
formulation seems explicitly designed to undermine. In Constitution Theory (1928) and even 
more explicitly in Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931) and Legality and Legitimacy (1932), Schmitt 
                                                




continues to explore and refine the consequences of his theory of presidential emergency powers, 
acting as “commissioner” of the positive constitutional “decision” even if in violation of 
constitutional laws and provisions. To see how this works we need to return to Schmitt’s idea of 
the two “poles” of political unity with which I began this chapter, and take a closer look at 
Schmitt’s theory of representation itself. 
 Schmitt defines the Rechstssaat as a “mixed” constitution, because it simultaneously 
implies the constitution of a state, but itself “contains no state form.”227 As a limit to state power, 
the Rechstssaat is conceptually incomplete; it presupposes something outside itself, namely, the 
state. as we’ve seen, for Schmitt the state refers to the concrete existence of a political unity, the 
status of a people politically unified and existing as a single entity, which can be organized in 
different forms such as monarchy, aristocracy, etc. Schmitt identifies two principles or 
“structural elements” that statehood must presuppose in order for a people to exist as a political 
unity capable of action and decision. First, a relatively homogenous, self-present people can exist 
as a political unity on its own, through “unmediated self-identity.”228 In other words, the people 
constitute a unity without mediation, through their own direct self-presence. Secondly, among 
people who are not directly self-present in actual identity, political unity must be achieved 
through representation. 
 At the same time, pace Hobbes there can also be no state without some element of 
identity. Schmitt’s “absolute” concept of the constitution requires that the people constituting the 
state cannot be a pure juridification or legal fiction; they must in some way be “existing and 
present” in the public sphere.229 By “public” Schmitt appears to mean only the quality of 
commonality or generality among all members of the state, in contrast to private or economic 
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representation which can be secret and refer only to particular individuals. The entire people 
must be represented as a unity, an existential whole. The existential dimension refers to the fact 
that, as a minimum, the unity cannot be normative or hypothetical but must be concretely distinct 
from a mere aggregation or natural group that happens to live together.230  
We can now see more clearly why Schmitt referred to the parliamentary Rechstssaat as a 
mixed constitution, incomplete in itself: it does not contain the concept of the political unity of 
the people. Schmitt can use this idea to give greater theoretical precision to his argument in The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy; parliament could only claim to represent the political unity 
of the people under a historically contingent set of circumstances that tacitly presupposed an 
aristocratic state form that provided the sociological conditions for Burkean virtual 
representation. The expansion of suffrage, mass parties and the interpenetration of state and 
society have all undermined the ability of parliament to operate as a public representation of the 
whole. The expansion of democracy and the party system imposes the democratic identity 
principle on parliamentary representation, transforming parliamentarians into delegates 
represented distinct economic who engage in private deal-making with one another. “As soon as 
the conviction establishes itself that what occurs publicly in the context of the parliamentary 
activity has become only an empty formality and that the true decisions fall outside of this public 
sphere, parliament… is just not any longer the representative of the political unity of the 
people.”231 
 If parliamentary elections correspond to an aristocratic and liberal rather than democratic 
state form, and if the advent of mass democracy undermines parliament’s claims to publicity, 
what institutional form best embodies the democratic identity principle in modern nation states? 
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For Schmitt, it is not parliamentary elections but plebiscites, in which “the question presented is 
answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’” directly by the people, where “the principle of identity is realized to the 
fullest.”232 In contrast to the weakened, ailing, indecisive and unprincipled parliament, the 
president appears to possess the ideal qualities for public representation in Schmitt’s sense. 
Before the emergence of bourgeois parliamentarism, the monarch was the preeminent non-
democratic representative of the unity of the state. Happily, Schmitt tells us, the “position of the 
President is based on the monarchical element” translated into a republican form.233 Hence, since 
the president is one – as opposed to the antagonistic and pluralized assembly of parliament, this 
puts the president is the best position to embody the representative pole of political unity. 
Moreover, “there were also ideas of a direct democracy at work in the introduction of the 
presidential system.”234 Unlike the assemblage of parliamentarians who represent this or that 
interest, party or social class, the “President is elected by the entire German people,” thus giving 
him a direct plebiscitary appeal to the identity principle of political unity. Hence the president is 
superior to parliament in both identity and representation dimensions of political unity, which 
are together expressed in the plebiscitarian character of presidential elections. “The President, by 
contrast [to the “shifting and unreliable coalition” in parliament] has the confidence of the entire 
people not mediated by the medium of a parliament splintered into parties. This confidence, 
rather, is directly united in his person.”235  
Schmitt’s insistence on the incomplete character of the Rechtsstaat had deep 
consequences. It must presuppose something outside itself: the state. Schmitt argued that the 
president is the only institution within the Rechtsstaat containing both structural elements of the 
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state. Since the Weimar constitution contains contradictory provisions and attempts to sidestep 
the question of a sovereign decision by the constitution power, the president – wielding 
emergency powers through Article 48 and backed by popular acclamation – is the exclusive and 
unique agent capable of declaring which parts of the constitution are the inviolable result of a 
decision of the constituent power, and which are incoherent, contradictory and dispensable.236  
As the crises afflicting the Weimar republic deepened, Schmitt increasingly emphasized this link 
between presidentialism, plebiscitary legitimacy and emergencies, culminating in his Legality 
and Legitimacy (1932). There, Schmitt argues that presidential emergency powers provided a 
constitutional means for empowering the president over a dysfunctional parliament; since the 
parliament has itself undermined the distinction between laws and decrees, presidential decrees 
may play the role of laws.237 Emergency plebiscitary presidentialism is the only remaining means 
to cut through the legality/legitimacy knot and the irreconcilable duality of the constitution’s 
commitment to both liberalism and democracy. If the demos participate democratically through 
the parliamentary party system, their interests will be represented by parties that at best result in 
pluralistic deadlock rather than popular unity and at worst splinter into outright enemies of the 
constitution itself. However, if the demos simply acclaims presidential emergency powers, it can 
be extraordinarily represented, embodied, materialized as an efficient active unity in the person 
of the president: “For the extraordinary lawmaker of Article 48 [i.e. the president legislating 
through emergency powers], the distinction between statute and statutory application, legislative 
and executive, is neither legally nor factually an obstacle. The extraordinary lawmaker combines 
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both in his person.”238 Having concluded that parliament has forsaken its claim to be an organ of 
the democratic general will, Schmitt turned to the president, governing exclusively through 
emergency powers, as the privileged organ of democratic legitimacy through the plebiscitary 
principle of symbolically incarnating the popular sovereign.239 In this way, emergency powers 
have come full circle from a conservative institution to restore the constitutional status quo ante, 
to the mechanism for overthrowing the constitutional order in a full-fledged Caesarist coup 
d’état. 
It is remarkable how closely Schmitt’s argument for plebiscitarian emergency powers 
tracks Marx’s famous analysis of the same phenomenon in 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
Schmitt evidently followed Marx in locating the roots of plebiscitarianism in the modern state 
itself, of diagnosing the conditions of social and ideological conflict that prevent the legislature 
from being both democratic and a unified organ representing the general will, and in arguing that 
parliamentary norms of transparency and discussion under universal suffrage lead it to reflect 
social conflict and threaten to politicize the non-political social order. Unlike Schmitt, however, 
Marx sees the democratic legitimacy of parliament in its capacity to represent the people as 
concrete, conflicted groups within civil society. It’s value for Marx was in its potential to 
transform previously non-political, merely “social” questions into politics through the 
mechanism of agonistic representation. In contrast, he diagnosed plebiscitary representation of 
the president as a mode of depoliticization and passivity. Reconstructing these elements in 
Marx’s account can provide a powerful contrast between democratic and plebiscitary 
representation.    
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First, the constitutional of the Third Repuboic divided power between a legislative assembly and 
a president, each popularly elected. Marx interprets the loci of tension in the constitution – 
ultimately inhering in the tension between legislative and executive power – as a reflection of the 
constitution’s contradictory origins in the February uprising, and the brutal repression of the 
defeated June insurrection under Cavaignac’s “commissarial dictatorship.” Hence the 
constitution embodied both the republican declaration of universal suffrage and the legislature as 
an organ expressing the national will, and the bedrock of military force and violence in the 
service of the protecting the social order.240 This contradictory commitment to both liberty and 
security emerged not only in its system of rights, but also in its structure of power. “Like 
Achilles,” the constitution was “vulnerable in one point, not in the heel, but in the head, or rather 
in the two heads in which it would up – the Legislative Assembly, on the one hand, the President, 
on the other.”241 Both branches are to be elected through universal suffrage, but the constitutional 
grants superiority to the legislature in that it can remove the president constitutionally, whereas 
the president has no such constitutional power. 242 
 The legal enshrined advantage of the Assembly, however, is in fact a dangerous 
weakness that sets up legality and legitimacy in direct antagonism. The president’s weaker legal 
powers are balanced by his extra-legal strength. Not only does the president have unique control 
of the executive branch including all the sources of patronage, administrative control and, 
crucially, the armed forces. Compounding this material inequality is a further symbolic 
inequality between the assembly and president in their ability to represent the Nation.  
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constitution here abrogates itself once more by having the President elected by all Frenchmen through 
direct suffrage. While the votes of France are split up among the seven hundred and fifty members of the 
National Assembly, they are here, on the contrary, concentrated on a single individual. While each separate 
representative of the people represents only this or that party, this or that town, this or that bridgehead, or 
even only the mere necessity of electing someone as the seven hundred and fiftieth, without examining too 
closely either the cause or the man, he is the elect of the nation and the act of his election is the trump that 
the sovereign people plays once every four years. The elected National Assembly stands in a metaphysical 
relation, but the elected President in a personal relation, to the nation. The National Assembly, indeed, 
exhibits in its individual representatives the manifold aspects of the national spirit, but in the President this 
national spirit finds its incarnation. As against the Assembly, he possesses a sort of divine right; he is 
President by the grace of the people.243 
 
In interpreting this passage it’s useful to keep in mind Marx’s earlier critique of political 
theology in “On the Jewish Question.” In that essay, Marx argued that the emancipation of the 
secular liberal state from civil society should be seen as “the political realization of 
Christianity.”244  The universal, abstract principles of the liberal state at the same time sever the 
state from concrete realm of social existence, and define all concrete particularity as non-
political. Likewise, Marx seems to regard the very idea of the “unity” of the Nation as a 
“spiritualized” abstraction that can only be presented by obscuring and repressing the material, 
concrete sources of conflict and division from political expression.245 Interestingly, parliament 
plays a much interesting role, as a potential forum for the politicization of social conflicts , than 
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Marx every supposed in “On the Jewish Question.” In fact, both inter- and intra- class conflict 
appear almost immediately as partisan divisions within parliament, undermining its claims to 
mediate social plurality and represent the unified general will.  
With this in mind, we can specify more concretely the nature of plebiscitary legitimacy. 
Whereas social and ideological divisions of the electorate reemerge in the assembly, the singular 
figure of the president can incarnate the abstract unity of the nation in his own person. The 
nation, in terms of “On the Jewish Question,” can precisely be characterized as a transcendent, 
theological form. The “divine right” of the president, his legitimacy to rule “by grace of the 
people,” then, is a form of institutionalized political theology at a time when the legitimacy of 
the monarch was irrevocably stripped of any corresponding claims to transcendent authority. The 
mechanism of universal suffrage, in conjunction with the president’s control over the executive 
forces of the state, work together to give a unified, personal, material form to this political-
theological relationship. Marx traces the progressive abandonment of the Assembly’s claim to 
represent the Nation, not in its metaphysical unity but in its actual socially conflicted and divided 
state alongside its progressive disavowal of the institutions of state power to the president, from 
the Montagne’s abandoning of the June insurrection, to the shift in loyalty of the national guard, 
to the last nail in the republic’s coffin, the abolition of unrestricted suffrage by the party of 
order.246 With this last measure, the Assembly erased its last sources of democratic legitimacy, 
confirming the fact that “it had transformed itself from the freely elected representatives of the 
people into the usurpatory parliament of a class; it acknowledged once more that it had itself cut 
in two the muscles which connected the parliamentary head with the body of the nation.”247 As 
these passages suggest, the Assembly may have some chance at counteracting the president’s 
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plebiscitary legitimacy by abandoning the abstraction of the unified nation and representing the 
ideological and social plurality of the actual society in all of its contradictory forms. By 
abandoning these, the legislature deprived itself of any democratic legitimacy with which it 
could counter-act that of the president and is forced to fall back upon legality as its sole source of 
legitimacy. By contrast, the more the Assembly is reduced to unsightly squabbling and legalistic 
maneuvers, the more the President’s political-theological incarnation of national unity is 
reinforced. The va-banque stakes of the separation of powers become clear in this structure: 
without democratic legitimacy claims of its own, the Assembly’s weapons against the executive 
are reduced to the legalistic counter-majoritarianism expressed in the Amendment rule248 and its 
ability to constitutionally remove the President.249 Both of these, of course, involve an inferior 
source of legitimacy removing a superior source; an unlikely prospect. Meanwhile, the President, 
faced with legal limitations to his term, has clear incentives to marshal the superior legitimacy 
and physical power at his disposal against its formal, legal restrictions. Hence Marx shows that 
Bonaparte employed plebiscitarian tactics of countering the legalist procedures of the Assembly 
by appealing over its heads directly to the “unorganized popular masses” against their 
parliamentary representatives.250 
 
Plebiscitarianism and Emergency Institutions  
The strong links between plebiscitarianism leadership, popular sovereignty and emergencies are 
a core theme of the recent emergency powers literature, particularly in Bruce Ackerman’s work 
on extra-constitutional change and popular sovereignty. Ackerman’s intention in his magesterial 
We the People was both a historical interpretation of processes of extra-legal constitutional 
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change, and a normative reconstruction of these moments as instantiations of popular 
sovereignty and the democratic constituent power. But as Ackerman acknowledges, albeit briefly 
and in passing, the three great moments of the constituent power he identifies – the Founding, 
Reconstruction and the New Deal –also include the most dramatic instances of emergency 
powers and plebiscitarian leadership.251 In effect, alongside Ackerman’s optimistic narrative of 
dualist democracy, one can reconstruct a darker counter-story of how emergencies give rise to 
plebiscitarian leaders, and strengthen their ability to overpower constitutional limitations and 
institutional oppositions, and claiming electoral mandates to personify the unified nation as an 
unbounded constituent power. Neither of these stories, of course, is complete on its own, but in 
subsequent works Ackerman gave increasing attention to the second counter-narrative that went 
almost completely unmentioned in We the People. After exploring the rise of the plebiscitarian 
presidency in The Failures of the Founding Father, Ackerman turned his attention exclusively to 
the pathological form of plebiscitarianism that arises in response to emergencies. In Before the 
Next Attack, Ackerman proposes a sophisticated institutional framework that would legally 
authorize special emergency powers to the executive after an emergency declaration by the 
legislature, and would make executive emergency powers subject to a “counter-majoritarian 
escalator” of regular legislative re-authorizations requiring larger and larger supermajorities.252   
 Ackerman’s more general argument is that enshrining emergency powers within the 
constitution, giving them legal authorization and subjecting them to the separation of powers are 
                                                
251 One might exclude the Founding from this characterization; it certainly incorporated a strong argument about the 
existence of a dire emergency, but since it was explicitly a project to establish a new constitution rather than restore 
an old one, it does not straightforwardly conform to the commissarial model of emergency powers. And while one 
can certainly identify plebiscitarian dimensions of the Framer’s project – especially in James Wilson’s theories of 
the constituent power – the ratification/convention model was importantly distinct from the extraordinary 
representatives of the nation and sovereign assembly developed just a few years later in the French Revolution. See 
Andrew Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, Legitimacy.   
252 Ackerman, Before the Next Attack 
  
129 
the best way to defuse the extra-legal and authoritarian temptations that go along with the 
plebiscitarian legitimacy presidents enjoy during wars and emergencies.  
 
There is something about the presidency that loves war-talk. Even at its most metaphorical, martial rhetoric 
allows the President to invoke his special mystique as Commander in Chief, calling the public to sacrifice 
greatly for the good of the nation. Perhaps the clarion call to pseudo-war is just the thing the President 
needs to ram an initiative through a reluctant Congress. Perhaps it provides rhetorical cover for unilateral 
actions of questionable legality… The Emergency Constitution aims to provide a new framework for 
controlling this presidential dynamic in its present boom cycle.253  
 
Ensnaring the president within a legally authorized emergency provisions and procedures will 
help block the plebiscitarian rhetoric of war, personification and extra-legalism. 
 One of Ackerman’s main antagonists in this debate is Oren Gross, who proposes a model 
of emergency powers that stands in diametrical opposition to Ackerman’s constitutional solution. 
Marshalling a great deal of evidence from the constitutional histories of a variety of countries, 
Gross argues that the “assumption of separation” that underlies views such as Ackerman’s that 
emergency powers can be constitutionalized yet safely contained and delimited within watertight 
provisions is untenable in practice. The history of constitutionalized emergency provisions, 
according to Gross, suggests that the illusion of separation breaks down as extraordinary powers 
become authorized and therefore normalized, and politicians become increasingly tempted to 
resort to them as instruments of ordinary governance.254 For Gross, the best model for preventing 
the normalization and routine use of emergency powers is to deprive them of any constitutional 
authorization and insist that they remain strictly extra-legal. In his view, if an executive judges 
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that some extraordinary emergency requires measures that are ordinarily illegal, she should do 
what she deems necessary, frankly acknowledge the illegality of her actions, and submit to the ex 
post judgment of other institutions or to the public at large to determine whether the illegal 
actions were legitimate or not.255      
 Gross’ “extra-legal measures model” has been roundly criticized for overlooking 
precisely the plebiscitarian dynamic that Ackerman is concerned with.256 Gross and others 
sharing his view have responded by reemphasizing concerns that legally authorized emergency 
powers lead to acclimating and accustomizing a population to emergency rule, and so the debate 
continues. Rather than supporting one side over the other, the approach I have taken of sketching 
these “arenas” of emergency politics allows us to identify and clarify a common set of problems 
shared by both sides.  The internal tension between the identity and representation poles of the 
modern state creates an elective affinity between external “emergency” threats and the 
plebiscitarian mode of constituting the political unity of the people. This is the arena out of 
which this debate emerges. Gross, rightly, is concerned with the way in which the impersonal, 
public character of institutions and offices of the state allow them to be exercised in a way that 
undermines substantive ends such as democracy and the rule of law.257 His proposal turns to the 
clear, harsh light of extra-legality as a way of saving substantive political judgment about 
emergency powers from the diversions legal formalism and focusing it on the substantive 
problem of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the emergency measures. For him, the impersonal 
juridical pole of the state on its own is dangerously susceptible to accretions of discretionary 
power. Ackerman, attentive to the combustible potential of plebiscitarian crisis leadership to 
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claim to embody the identity of the sovereign people, wants to proceduralize, desubstantialize 
and depersonalize the holder of emergency powers.  
 Hence while the Ackerman/Gross debate is generally cast in the antithetical terms of 
legality vs. extra-legality, in another sense it could be redescribed as responding to two different 
pathologies of emergency powers that are both inscribed within this key tension of democracy 
and the modern state. Underlying the question ‘should emergency powers be located inside or 
outside the constitution?’ is a common concern about the twin pathologies of formalization of 
discretionary emergency power and the personalization of discretionary emergency power. This 
perspective helps move beyond the oddly truncated conception shared by Gross and Ackerman 
of institutions and the rule of law oddly abstracted from the dynamics of democratic politics. 
Such a perspective shifts the theoretical focus from an exclusive concern with 
constitutional forms and procedures to the mutually constitutive interrelations between 
constitutional forms and the extra-institutional dynamics of legitimacy, will-formation and 
judgment within the political unity constituted by the state. From the same perspective we can 
also move beyond Ackerman’s blunt factual assertion of the ubiquity of plebiscitarianism and 
presidential “war talk” and probe more deeply into the political dynamics that allow this 
expansion of plebiscitarian emergency rhetoric to dominate recent political discourse. Expanding 
the frame from institutional design tout court to the interaction between institutions and the 
political forces that animate and shape them can yield a more effective theoretical framework for 
interpreting – rather than just presupposing – the sources of emergency institutional pathologies 
such as legislative acquiescence, judicial accommodation and popular passivity in the face of 
presidential “war talk.” In chapter 6 of this dissertation I will take up this question in detail and 
argue that the recent expansion of presidential war talk represents a distinctive form of 
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plebiscitarianism that is unacknowledged, and hence unresolved, in Ackerman’s proposal. For 
now, though, I only want to suggest the way in which a more capacious framework can help 
move beyond the limitations of the legality/extra-legality debate and allow us to see the function 




III. Security of and against the State 
 
 
La liberté politique, dans un citoyen, est cette tranquillité d'esprit qui provient de l'opinion que chacun a 
de sa sûreté; et, pour qu'on ait cette liberté, il faut que le gouvernement soit tel qu'un citoyen ne puisse 
pas craindre un autre citoyen. 
       --Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois XI.6 
 
 
While the first two tensions I have identified derived from early modern republicanism and 
developed through the intertwining strands of modern democratic and republican politics, the 
third tension regarding security and the modern state can associated more directly with the liberal 
tradition. It derives from a core basis of the legitimacy of the modern state in its capacity to 
provide individual security. At the same time, the means with which the state provides security 
may also pose a threat to individual security. Or, to restate the tension in a different way, “Rights 
are rights against the state; the state makes rights possible.”258 This tension is distinct from the 
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issue in section one of liberty and raison d’état, since that section concerned the state’s capacity 
to preserve the collective liberty of a self-governing community, whereas here I want to focus on 
the state’s relation to the security of the individual as an arena for emergency politics. The 
obvious starting point for this theme is Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, as we’ve seen, adopts a 
radically individualist perspective, grounding the legitimacy of the state in the authorization of 
each subject to be represented by the sovereign, for the sake of his security.259 But the theoretical 
premise of Hobbes’ argument derives from his nominalist skepticism; for Hobbes, neither truth 
nor goodness derive from any “essence” in the world but are purely conventional.260 Truth is a 
product of language, and the good is determined by my desires and aversions. Without the 
authority of the sovereign representative to declare and impose common definitions, we cannot 
possibly arrive at any common understanding of, say, stable expectations for future action 
coordination or shared ethical norms, and hence, life will be nasty, brutish, short. Nominalism, 
however, provides a deeper theoretical basis for the primacy of security. If the good is simply a 
product of individual desires and aversions, and if desires and aversions differ from individual to 
individual, no substantive idea of the good can provide a basis for universal consensus, since 
these by definition refer back to what is good for particular individuals.  
Hobbes’ ethical nominalism does, however, provide a basis for a minimalist, 
“deontological” basis of universal consent that transcends the possibility of conflict and 
disagreement. If the condition of possibility for any individuals’ particular conception of the 
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good is their own desires, and therefore the preservation of each individual’s own life, then this 
logical priority of self-preservation for each individual necessarily constitutes a universal 
principle of reason, or, as Hobbes calls it, the first natural law.261 From this it also follows that 
there is an equally universal “blameless liberty,” or natural right, to the same. Hobbes’ state 
presupposes not only the priority of security, but grounds this priority outside any possible 
political contestation caused by our epistemic diversity. By showing that each individual’s desire 
is the condition of possibility for any imaginable external good, and individual death therefore 
negates that good, Hobbes  portrays a political and ethical universe in which the very idea of 
something worth dying for is a logical absurdity.262 This argument, along with the dramatization 
of civil war in the state of nature, was likely to have appealed to a European readership 
traumatized by the political violence of the Wars of Religion and especially the English Civil 
War.  Hence by acknowledging pervasive political disagreement and incorporating it into his 
skeptical, atomistic epistemology, the priority of security plays a powerfully depoliticizing role, 
establishing itself as a uniquely uncontestable foundational principle. It is only on the basis of 
this deontological principle can all individuals, no matter what their substantive conception of 
the good, rationally allow themselves to be represented by the sovereign, on the condition that 
everyone else does also. Then the first prong of Hobbes’ nominalist individualism, requiring the 
artificial person of the state for the possibility of unity, works in conjunction with the second 
prong, placing security at the foundation of the political relationship expressed by the state.  In 
this sense, security promises to offer an uncontested baseline, a principle for grounding the 
political that, as a universal law of nature, also transcends politics. Indeed, so committed was 
Hobbes to this supra-political principle that he was willing to acknowledge it as the limit of the 
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sovereign’s absolute authority. Since the means to preserve one’s life from immanent threat 
cannot be alienated, subjects have no obligation to obey commands of the sovereign that will 
lead to immediate death, nor is there any obligation to sovereign’s who have lost their capacity to 
provide basic security.263  
 Whereas the artificial person of the state, as we saw above, provided both an epochal 
reformulation and an oddly ethereal and fragile foundation for the unity of the state, Hobbesian 
security provided both a basis for and an inexhaustible source of critique of the absolutist state. 
Whatever the validity of Hobbes’ deductive argument for absolute sovereignty, the privatized, 
fearful, self-interest seeking individual he theorized proved to be a more disloyal than Hobbes 
imagined, equally inclined to regard the state as a threat to rather than guarantor of his security. 
As John Locke memorably put it:  
 
for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such [an absolutist] state, against the violence and 
oppression of this absolute ruler? … Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, 
laws, and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler he ought to be absolute, and is 
above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. 
… as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one 
should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, 
increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they 
take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats, or foxes; but are content, nay think it 
safety, to be devoured by lions.264 
 
Locke’s objection is a familiar one, even in recent debates, but it is important to see that Locke is 
not simply correcting a theoretical error on Hobbes’ part but participating in an ongoing 
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articulation and negotiation of a central tension in modern statehood: the legitimacy of the state 
in Locke’s Second Treatise, after all, is to a large extent grounded on its ability to provide 
security to persons and property.265 And as his discussion of Federative and Prerogative power 
illustrates, Locke was acutely aware of the necessary limitations imposed by the state system 
itself on his general principle that coercive power of the state rests on rational consent.266    
 Perhaps no one was as sensitive to the complex tension of security’s inscription in the 
modern state than the Baron de Montesquieu. Montesquieu, famously, defined liberty as “that 
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security,” which, as 
Montesquieu makes clear and at length, requires both the unity of coercive state power and its 
constitutional limitation and division.267 Absolute tranquility as an end in itself is characteristic of 
despotism, not constitutionalism.268 At the same time, in the same chapter devoted to the English 
constitution as a model, Montesquieu approvingly cites emergency powers that ensure that the 
state capable of providing individual security can provide for its own security as well. As 
Montesquieu relates, when parliament detected a “secret conspiracy” threatening the state, it 
revoke the trial rights of those suspected and authorize the arrest and detain them without trial, so 
the citizens “ne perdraient leur liberté pour un temps que pour la conserver pour toujours.”269 
Emergency powers, as Hume also argued, may be necessary for individual security, but can just 
as easily threaten them. Benjamin Constant argued emphatically for the futility of emergency 
powers as a means of protecting individual security.  
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legitimacy of the state.  






When a regular government resorts to arbitrary measures, it sacrifices the very aim of its existence to the means 
which it adopts to preserve this. Why do we wish authority to repress those who attack our properties our liberty, our 
life? Because we want to be assured of their enjoyment. But if our fortune may be destroyed, our liberty threatened, 
our life disturbed by arbitrary power, what good shall we derive from the protection of authority?270 
  
This double-edge of security illustrates the third constitutive tension within the modern 
state whose roots we saw Hobbes’ deduction of security as the single uncontested point of 
agreement amongst conflicting political ideologies. Security, as Ian Loader and Neil Walker put 
it, is both a problem for and a problem of the state.271 In other words, if the raison d’être of the 
state is to provide security for individuals, this leads to the concentration of coercive power and 
the evisceration of limits to that power, and therefore to the creation of the state as a threat as 
well as a guarantor of individual security. With Locke and Montesquieu, we arrive at a 
recognizable theory of emergency powers as institutional mediations of this tension. I will return 
to this dimension in the second section, but for now it is sufficient to state the obvious point that 
emergency powers hardly resolved the dialectic of security and the state but provided a further 
institutional locus for articulating it.  
 
Security as Baseline 
As we’ve seen, the roots of security as an apolitical or uncontested baseline can be traced all the 
way back to Hobbes. As we’ve seen, Hobbes thought that the security of each individual’s life 
constituted a unique baseline of universal rational consent beneath the sound and fury of 
conflicting political passions, ideals and rhetoric. Security constitutes a non-political foundation 
of politics; an uncontestable Archimedean point upon which a political superstructure can be 
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built, allowing individuals to chase after their own individual goods in the spaces of negative 
freedom carved out by positive law. Similarly, the “balancing” theorists such as Posner and 
Vermeule see the quantification of security theory in utility theory as a rational, non-”subjective” 
way of arriving at an optimal degree of security through formal modeling. There too, the idea is 
that optimal balance of liberty and security does not presuppose any particular substantial idea of 
the good – liberty leaves the individual free to pursue her own particular goods, and security 
ensures that she will be physically unharmed and unthreatened in doing so, no more.272 While the 
particular “balance” arrived at by Posner and Vermeule make them more openly sympathetic 
with Schmitt than many contemporary liberals, we’ve seen that the idea of a balance between 
liberty and security is, far from endogenous to the liberal tradition, one of its core elements. 
Liberalism distinguished itself from Hobbesian absolutism through its commitment to 
harmonizing the freedom of each with the equal freedom of everyone else. But this end 
absolutely presupposed state power, not only in the sense of instantiating a condition of “Right” 
or lawfulness, but also in the more elementary sense that security from violations of one’s person 
and property is an absolute precondition for individual autonomy and political freedom. The 
liberal state, in all its variations, must be both a sovereign guarantor of security and a guarantor 
of freedom. One way in which liberals faced this dilemma is through the framework of 
balance,273 and in this sense the utility maximizers are following squarely in the footsteps of 
Hume and Bentham by engaging in this quintessential liberal endeavor.  
At the same time, the discomfort with the idea of a balance has equally deep roots in the 
concept of the liberal state. One such root lies in the elements of the social contract tradition that, 
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by grounding all political authority on a generalization of the rational will, conceive of an 
internal relationship between legitimate authority, reason and liberty that excludes any trade-offs 
or compromises on the priority of rational freedom under law.274 This perspective of the priority 
or special status of liberty – expressed in a variety of contemporary frameworks such as “rights 
as trumps,” “lexical priority,” “side constraints,” etc. – sees the prospect of trading away liberty 
for some other social gains as destructive of the rational foundation of legitimate authority, and 
rejects the utilitarian aggregative basis of the balancing theory as itself an illiberal violation of 
the principles of political and civic equality, and so on.275 
Judith Shklar provides another example of security as an uncontested baseline. Her defense 
of liberalism explicitly eschews all moral perfectionist and comprehensive foundationalism as at 
best distracting and inconclusive and at worst offering utopian visions of a “new man” or 
“human emancipation” that fuelled the worst of the twentieth century’s excesses.276 Shklar 
admonishes such authors that, by reasoning abstractly from first principles regardless of their 
practical import, they display a contempt for ordinary experience and actual political conditions 
and dangers faced by actual individuals, many of whom cannot be presumed to accept the first 
principles and expectations of radical political change entailed by the foundationalists.277  In 
contrast, the liberalism of fear “does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all 
political agents should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum, which all of us 
know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very 
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fear of fear itself.”278 Unlike comprehensive rational principles, fear expresses a more intimate 
and genuinely shared abhorrence of cruelty and suffering, a foundation based not on abstract 
theory but “on common and immediate experiences” and “undeniable actualities” of real men 
and women.279 
 
Fear is “a first principle, an act of moral intuition based on ample observation, on which liberalism can be 
built, especially at present. Because the fear of systematic cruelty is so universal, moral claims based its 
prohibition have an immediate appeal and can gain recognition without much argument.”280 
 
The liberalism of fear, then, focuses on our security against the ever-present possibility of cruelty 
that is implied in the very existence of the state. Shklar is no anarchist or libertarian: the coercive 
apparatus of the state is indubitably necessary to protect the weak against the domination of the 
powerful. And for this very reason, “given the inevitability of that inequality of military, police, 
and persuasive power which is called government, there is evidently always much to be afraid 
of.”281 Focused on “damage control” rather than abstract ideals, liberalism should focus on 
maintaining our security from the state by zealously limiting, restricting and scrutinizing the 
necessary evil of state power. 
 As the passages quoted above show, security as fear is also Shklar’s attempt to ground 
liberalism in an immediately shared, self-evident and intuitive principle that can be elevated and 
generalized above the political fray of conflicting theoretical, ideological and rhetorical appeals. 
In this respect, like Hobbes and Posner, Shklar’s security as fear sees in security a principle 
insulated from political contestation, offering a supra-political foundation for politics. And it is 
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precisely at this level where her project seems most questionable. It is far from clear whether the 
affective, experiential intuition of fear provides as stable and coherent a basis for reviving a 
liberalism that Shklar saw had emerged from the tumultuous 1960s as vulnerable and discredited.  
In fact, security as the fear of cruelty is considerably more mutable and polyvalent than 
Shklar assumed. More importantly, she was wrong to regard the moral intuition of our 
abhorrence to cruelty as a supra-political Archimedean point of agreement transcending rhetoric 
or contestation.  The subsequent history of the liberalism of fear illustrates both of these 
erroneous assumptions. Writing at the end of the Cold War, Shklar reasonably assumed that the 
focus of security as fear would be security from the state’s capacity for cruelty and abuse. As 
Corey Robins points out, as waves of ethnic cleansing and genocide entered political 
consciousness after the cold war, Shklarian liberals began to identify the collapse of state power 
rather than its aggrandizement as the principle source subjecting the weak to cruelty, violence 
and terror. The specter of “state failure” rather than state success became the summum malum of 
the defenders of security of the weak against fear of cruelty and violence. Self-identified liberals 
of fear such as Michael Ignatieff and Samantha Powers defended an ironically state-aggrandizing 
form of military humanism on explicitly Shklarian, cosmopolitan grounds of security as fear.282   
On the other hand, the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe in the 2000s propelled 
another ironic inversion of security as fear. While the political threat represented by groups such 
as Al Qaeda remain much in debate, such attacks were certainly sufficient to instill fear, as an 
“undeniable actuality,” of being victimized by the intentional, “cruel” violence in a terrorist 
attack in the “common and immediate experiences” of millions of people, especially in the 
United States. In this case too, the undeniable experience of fear and abhorrence of the attack’s 
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cruelty led to an inversion of Shklar’s security against the state; the state again became the agent 
of security against fear, and legitimated its aggrandizement through fear. 
The point of these examples is not, of course, that Shklar’s argument leads inevitably to these 
permutations (it doesn’t), or that Shklar herself would have endorsed them. The point is simply 
that Shklar was mistaken to regard fear of cruelty as an immediately available, uncontested 
baseline that unilaterally led to the kinds of political concerns she wished to combat. On the 
contrary, humanitarian intervention and the War on Terror both demonstrate that security as fear 
is an arena of political contestation and saturated with rhetoric through and through, and is 
essentially polyvalent in terms of the political outcomes it supports. Shklar’s dystopian 
skepticism and her emphasis on protecting the weak from cruelty were supposed to ground a 
baseline political morality apart from the pervasive disagreement and deep uncertainty about 
more positive political ideals. But like Posner and Hobbes, Shklar’s attempt to depoliticize 
security by detaching it from its role in any positive normative vision merely opens security to 
politicization as an end in itself, fueling a kind of security politics that can easily undermine 
rather than reinforce Shklar’s liberal commitments.  
 
Democratic Security? 
According to John Dewey’s quixotic strand of “radical liberal democracy,” one of traditional 
liberalisms greatest failures was its insufficient attention to the interrelation between liberty 
and security.283Among these critics was John Dewey, who wrote in his 1937 essay “The 
Future of Democracy,” 
                                                
283 The link between security and liberty was insisted upon by many of the most reformist public intellectuals of the 
time. As John A. Ryan, an important Catholic public intellectual and New Dealer, put it, “Our democracy finds 




Whether or not security and liberty are incompatible for the individual is a question that depends upon the 
definition of the terms “security” and “freedom.” As general terms, they seem to be too vague and 
ambiguous to permit of intelligent consideration. If “security” is limited to economic safety, it certainly is 
incompatible with the kind of laissez-faire freedom that has developed in modern highly industrialized 
countries. If freedom is combined with a reasonable amount of equality and security is taken to mean 
cultural and moral security and also material safety, I do not think that security is compatible with anything 
but freedom.284 
 
In Liberalism and Social Action, published two years earlier, Dewey diagnosed the crisis of 
liberalism stemming from the emptiness of formal political rights and its inability to incorporate 
“the social conditions of freedom.” “Today,” Dewey wrote, liberty must be redefined and 
expanded to include “liberation from material insecurity and from the coercions and repressions 
that prevent multitudes from participation in the vast cultural resources that are at hand.”285 As a 
result of the failure of liberals to do this, liberalism was left defenseless to combat or even 
diagnose the way in which the pervasive insecurity created by industrial capitalism was 
undermining its own core values, namely “liberty, the development of the inherent capacities of 
individuals made possible through liberty, and the central role of free intelligence in inquiry, 
discussion and expression.”286 
We’ve seen from our discussion of Toqueville a pathological tendency of security to 
dominating political discourse and atomize the terms by which it is experienced. One potential 
                                                                                                                                                       
his influence, the Church reversed its antipathy to state intervention and demanded a government guarantee of 
continuous employment and “a decent livelihood and adequate security” for all.quoted in Foner, 196 
284 Dewey, “The Future of Democracy,” Dewey: The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston and John McDermott. 
(Southern Illinois University Press, 1987). vol. XI, 532.  
285 Dewey, J. (1935). Liberalism and social action. New York,, G. P. Putnam's sons. 
  
286 Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, vol. XI, 25 
  
144 
way of combating this tendency is to reengage the broader and more capacious political valiancy 
of security itself. In this sense, Dewey’s thoughts on security may be a vitally relevant during the 
War on Terror  that the material deprivation, impersonal domination and stifling of individual 
agency and creativity that stem from economic and social inequalities can be considered at least 
as important sources of insecurity as fear of a terrorist attack. This is not to suggest the two 
sources of insecurity are interchangeable, or equivalent. Rather, the intersubjective nature of 
security implies that the most politically urgent sources and definitions of insecurity are bound 
up with the articulation of a common social identity and the construction of a set of political 
priorities and objectives. The rhetorical potency of different conceptions of security derives from 
this collective aspect; security as an intersubjective experience implies that we are commonly 
threatened by terrorist attacks or crime or economic instability. This is the reason why efforts to 
point to out that individuals are statistically more likely to die in a traffic accident than in a 
terrorist attacks fail to resonate. It may be true, but we are not collectively made insecure by 
traffic accidents, whereas we are by terrorist attacks. Security threats, as we’ve seen, are not bare 
statistical probabilities but are constituted through the formation of a collective identity and the 
articulation of a political project. This may be one reason for the fact that certain kinds of death 
or injury at the hands of certain assailants – whether it is the state or terrorists – are so much 
more politically relevant than others, even if they are overwhelmingly less frequent, because they 
resonate with political identities and attachments at various levels of depth. Hence, “changing the 
subject” of security is not a matter of weighing the lower threat of being blown up in a terrorist 
attack vs. the greater threat of losing my job. It involves arguing at the level in which a particular 
concept of security expresses fundamental political projects, normative commitments and shared 
identity within a broad and unfocused field of risk and uncertainty.  
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At the level of identity, another pathology of security politics involves the propensity of 
shaping and channeling this identity-constituting dimension into ascriptive forms of militarism 
and nationalism that identifies the specter of alien and foreign terrorist as the chief enemy of our 
security. But as Dewey’s discussion shows, the identity constituting dimension of security are 
not necessarily constrained to nationalism and chauvinism; Dewey’s case was an attempt to 
construct a broader and more inclusive democratic public by focusing on the insecurity of 
irrational and unconstrained market forces that obstruct individual autonomy through fear, 
uncertainty and deprivation.      
Far from a simple reshuffling of statistical probabilities of risk, “changing the subject” of 
security is analogous to, and probably just as difficult and unpredictable as, any other major 
ideological shift and realignment. On a more immediate and modest level however, attempts to 
expand, question and redefine the meaning of security still play an important political role in 
maintaining a degree of contestability and reflexivity in security, even if they fall far short of a 
hegemonic realignment. An interesting recent example of this in the US was the immigrant rights 
protests in April of 2006, culminating in May 1 when millions of people participated in rallies, 
boycotts, and strikes to demand legal equality. The mobilization had the effect of bursting into a 
monotone political discourse that had been dominated by discussions of terrorism, national and 
domestic security for the previous 5 years.  
Of course, the movement failed even to achieve the moderate immigration reform then 
contemplated by Congress, and certainly failed in a larger sense to transform the dominant 
conception of security in on fell swoop. But, by highlighting a totally different condition of 
insecurity imposed on undocumented immigrants into the public sphere, the movement arguably 
had a significant opening effect on public discourse, vividly highlighting the limitations of an 
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idea of political membership centered around security from terrorism. By forcing a set of 
political claims to inclusiveness and strongly at odds with the prevailing discourse of security, 
this movement and others like it likely played an important role in defusing and displacing the 
the emergency climate. At that time, much of the political argument remained within the narrow 
terms of the same discourse of security as the one promoted by the Bush administration itself 
rather than introducing a genuinely fresh set of political projects and concerns. The immigrant 
rights movement, on the other hand, changed the subject altogether. Of course, any causal claims 
of the movement’s impact, of course, must remain at a purely speculative level. But it did 
undeniably manage temporarily disrupt a security discourse that was still showing expansive and 
self-reinforcing tendencies, revealing a political culture that remained resistant to the 









































War, Crime and Emergency Powers: Modern Constitutionalism and its 
Boundaries 
 
Constitutionalism and the Two Faces of Sovereignty 
In this chapter, I will show how the models of emergency powers, such as dictatorship or the 
prerogative, that we have inherited from modern political thought presupposed a broader 
political structure that comprehended the major characteristics of the period roughly between the 
mid-seventeenth and the late nineteenth centuries: the formation of the modern state and the 
inter-state system, the differentiation and juridical formalization of the domains of crime and 
war, the development of constitutionalism and the period of European colonization and empire 
building. Unlike their ancient, feudal and renaissance predecessors and namesakes, modern 
theories of emergency powers were born alongside these developments, and play an important 
role in the larger theoretical structure and political imaginary following the formation of the 
modern state and modern constitutionalism.  
My argument is that the function, scope and justification of modern theories of 
emergencies powers is constituted by the place they occupy within a broader conceptual 
architecture of the modern state, based on a categorical distinction between an internal space of 
peace and juridical order inside individual states, and an external space modeled on the state of 
nature existing between individual states. I will argue that the theories of emergency powers 
developed in this period presuppose this inside/outside division, and that their purpose, 
justification and scope derive from it. Emergency powers played a key role in maintaining the 
boundaries and divisions that characterized this conceptual architecture. They marked out a third, 
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intermediary category of temporary breakdowns in the internal domestic order that fell short of a 
full-scale dissolution of political authority, or a state of war between two collectivities. In other 
words, emergency powers designated the coercive powers of the state that were neither crime, 
nor war, neither an external condition between two states, nor an internal application of criminal 
justice against an individual miscreant. Rather, such temporary breakdowns of internal order had 
a separate status that avoided destabilizing the entire juridical edifice: neither war nor crime but 
emergencies. Pre-modern legal categories and institutions – chiefly, prerogative and dictatorship 
– were reformulated through this new architecture as emergency powers: exceptional institutions 
that were strong enough to overcome a temporary emergency, but regulated and limited to 
restoring the existing order rather than undermining it or creating a new one.  
In the second place, in addition to this constitutionalist role of emergency powers, we can 
identify a second spatial category that emerged in conjunction with modern constitutionalism. 
This second category, which I will call dominion, corresponds on the one hand to the persistence 
of strains of pre-constitutionalist paternalistic rule over segments of the internal population, and 
on the other hand to the state’s powers in non-European space of territorial appropriation and 
imperial rule. In this case, the spatial configuration that is maintained is not on the boundaries 
between the internal domestic versus the external interstate order. Rather, it is on the boundaries 
between recognized legal subjects with a juridical status designating agency and certain rights on 
the one hand, versus populations that are excluded from any recognized legal status, or occupy a 
legal status of non-agency, as dependents rather than rights-bearers. Like emergency powers, the 
forms of what I am calling dominion are exceptional institutions and juridical categories whose 
function is to maintain the fundamental spatial boundaries and divisions between inside and 
outside, crime and war, upon which constitutionalism depended. Although some of the 
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institutions and forms of emergency powers overlapped with those of dominion, they are 
conceptually distinct in that the purpose of the former is to separate exceptional governmental 
power from personified sovereignty, whereas the former refer to the absolute, discretionary 
powers of personified sovereignty directed against individual subjects and populations rather 
than other sovereign persons.  
 Hence, my argument will be that modern institutional models of emergency powers 
cannot be isolated from a three-part structure that distinguishes the paradigms of crime, war, 
emergencies and dominion. It was only within this structure, within the internal juridical space 
and in contrast to the paradigms of both crime and war, that a “liberal” or constitutional theory of 
emergency powers was possible. For this reason my focus in this chapter will not be exclusively 
on the institutions of prerogative and dictatorship but on the role these institutions play in the 
broader conceptual architecture of the constitutional state, and on their relationship to the 
paradigms of crime, war and dominion. It will be on how the justificatory logic and theoretical 
coherence of a constitutional or liberal theory of emergency powers depended upon its place 
within this larger conceptual architecture.  
This has important consequences for the argument of this dissertation as a whole. 
Looking ahead briefly, when we turn to the twentieth century US in the second half of the 
dissertation, we shall see that this conceptual architecture underwent profound transformations. 
After 1945, the US no longer declared war in a constitutional sense, but instead engaged in a 
series of executive led international police actions. In the same time, the category of crime was 
judicially extended to include individual enemy combatants, in a process that excluded several 
essential attributes of the traditional crime paradigm. In the same process, emergency powers 
were expanded as a more general category to cover the new, grey area created by the shift and 
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overlap in the boundaries of war and crime. This more recent expansion of emergency powers 
beyond its former boundaries has been widely noted and lamented by recent scholars, but few 
have highlighted the simultaneous transformations in the paradigms of crime and war that have 
accompanied it, and have consequently left its normative and political consequences within the 
justificatory architecture of liberalism in a broader sense untheorized. This is of course the task 
of later chapters. Here, our task is to reconstruct the development and internal logic of that 
justificatory architecture of war, crime and emergency powers in its classic form.  
 This chapter is organized is four sections. In the first section, I present an ideal typical 
framework of the modern state, and subsequent theories of constitutionalism as they developed 
in the 17th and 18th centuries. I show how the axial inside/outside distinction provided the basis 
for the distinction between war and crime, and disaggregated the internal and external faces of 
sovereignty. This distinction between necessarily personified external sovereignty and 
depersonified internal sovereignty allowed opponents of absolutism to depict the internal powers 
of the state as disaggregated, delegated and subject to the rule of law. The second section shows 
how modern theories of emergency powers emerged from within this framework, and assumed 
served an important role within the overall conceptual and justificatory architecture of modern 
constitutionalism, by distinguishing even “emergency” raptures of internal rule of law from the 
external face of unified, unlimited sovereignty. Unlike an unlimited sovereign decision, 
emergency powers were exceptions to ordinary legality but nevertheless were delegated forms of 
power, and subject to legal authorization and limitation. In the third section, I develop this thesis 
in more detail by taking examining two institutional “archetypes” of modern emergency powers 
– dictatorship, and the prerogative. Focusing on the examples of Rousseau (dictatorship) and 
Locke (prerogative), I show how both authors incorporated these institutions into the structure of 
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their theories as a whole, in the process breaking with earlier, premodern understandings of 
dictatorship and prerogative and transforming them into distinctively modern, constitutional 
theories of emergency powers. Finally, in the fourth section, I return to the international spatial 
order of the modern state from the perspective of European colonial expansion and empire. 
While constitutionalism and emergency powers solved the problem of the internal “state of 
exception,” and the system of equal sovereign personhood stabilized it in the external interstate 
order, the delimitation of a space of unlimited land appropriation and dominion outside of 
Europe preserved a “state of exception,” distinct from emergency powers, within the structure of 
external sovereignty.    
 
I. theoretical architecture: crime, war and the inside/outside distinction 
Constitutional emergency powers, like modern constitutionalism, both presuppose and emerge in 
response to modern state-building and the absolutist theory of state sovereignty. In very broad 
outline, the creation of the modern absolutist state was a vehicle of secularization and territorial 
unification, paving the way for the new juridical doctrines of absolute, unified sovereignty. First, 
this process broke the overlapping imperial and papal claims to political authority, secularizing 
political power and distributing it among a multiplicity of individual state actors, each supreme 
within an exclusive territory. Secondly, it created a single unified jurisdiction within each 
territory by expropriating the means of administration from the independent nobility and by 
subjecting all particular orders, privileges and estates to a superior, centralized legislative 
authority.287 Third, it neutralized creedal conflict and overlapping secular and sacred authorities 
                                                
287 The classic account is Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Weber, M. (1994). Weber : political writings. 
Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. For various dimensions of this process, see Heinz H. F. Eulau, 
“The Depersonalization of the Concept of Sovereignty,” Journal of Politics 4, no. 1 (1942); Poggi, G. (1978). The 
development of the modern state : a sociological introduction. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. 
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by giving to each sovereign power the authority to determine its own religion doctrine within its 
borders, demarking a sphere of public authority and pushing belief into the inner domain of the 
individual conscience.288 Fourth, by separating the individual criminal from the collective enemy, 
disassociating punishment from vengeance and by giving the state an exclusive monopoly upon 
the determination and punishment of criminal guilt, it cauterized creedal and familial blood feuds 
and 
created a secular, de-politicized paradigm of criminal justice in which guilt is strictly 
individualized, privatized, and disassociated from membership or the inner domain of belief. 
Finally, conflict between collectivities was expunged from the internal territorial order of the 
commonwealth and relocated in the space between unified political communities, represented 
externally as formally equal sovereign persons. This international “state of nature” replaced any 
papal or imperial basis for justa causa, and made the decision to go to war a matter of each 
individual public person’s right to interpret and executive natural law.289   
The categorical distinction that serves as a foundation for this edifice is the opposition – 
familiar to us from early social contract theory – between an internal condition of a law-
governed and unified juridical order, and an external condition of formally equal individual 
                                                
288 This account is of course a retrospective one. The concept of toleration, in particular, was not articulated in its 
clearest form until the end of the 17th century, most famously in Baruch de Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus (1670), Pierre Bayle's Commentaire Philosophique (1686) and John Locke’s “Letter Concerning 
Toleration” (1689). However, the concept of the sanctity of the individual conscience in distinction to the ‘public’ 
sphere regulated by law, is present much earlier and is the innovation of absolutism rather than liberalism. For 
instance, in Luther’s “Freedom of a Christian Man.” It’s also an important upshot of Thomas Hobbes’ argument for 
subjecting all ecclesiastical authority to the sovereign, that no citizen could be obligated to anything that was not a 
means (according to the judgment of the sovereign) for self-preservation. Hobbes clearly regarded this doctrine as a 
major limitation to the powers of church authorities over individual conscience, and implied a doctrine of toleration. 
See Leviathan ch. 42 and ch. 47. For a discussion, see Tuck, R. (1993). Philosophy and government, 1572-1651. 
Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press., 329-335; Koselleck, Critique and 
Crisis, 48-50.    
289Schmitt, C. and G. L. Ulmen (2003). The nomos of the earth in the international law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum. New York, Telos Press.; Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace; Koskenniemi, M. and ebrary Inc. (2002). 
The gentle civilizer of nations the rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960. Cambridge, UK ; New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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persons, each interpreting and executing natural law as they see fit, without any commonly 
acknowledged superior. While variations of this contrast were expressed theoretically in the 
hypothetical “contractual” origins of the state, the image of the state of nature, and its contrast to 
internal order of political society, actually corresponded to a reality that was not just hypothetical 
or conjectural but embodied in experience and practice: the external relations between individual 
states.290 As Reinhart Koselleck summarizes, 
 
The termination of religious civil wars meant the development of vigorous sovereign authorities which 
would in turn proceed to solve the ecclesiastical problems, in in its own way. It also led to the strict 
formation of States on a unified plane. By virtue of absolute sovereignty, each State’s interior was clearly 
delimited against the interiors of its neighbours. The conscience of a sovereign was absolutely free, but his 
jurisdiction was confined to the inner space of the State he represented. The State itself thus became a 
persona moralis confronting other States likewise conceived as personae morales…without submitting like 
men qua citizens to any common, institutionalized higher authority.291 
 
The spatial and functional separation of external and internal orders into a categorical 
contrast was accomplished by modern natural rights theory in the following century. 
Drawing on and amplifying the innovations of Grotius, Thomas Hobbes rearticulated the 
Machiavellian skepticism about the ability of moral precepts to determine the arts of 
statecraft, and projected this view about independent states unto the behavior of independent 
individuals in a hypothetical state of nature.292 As Norberto Bobbio has argued, 
 
                                                
290 Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, “Introduction” 
291 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 43 
292 Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, ch. 1. 
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Hobbes’s political system is based on a great dichotomy, which is extremely simple and clear. There is a 
state of nature, in which human beings live without positive laws to force them to reciprocal respect. And 
there is civil society, in which there exists a common power which forces them, against their will, to 
comply with the laws necessary to ensure peaceful cohabitation. The former is a state of constant and 
universal war. The latter is a state of permanent peace.293 
 
Inside the commonwealth, a system of general, coercive laws is imposed on all subjects, creating 
a uniform juridical space for legal subjects wherein they are free to follow their arbitrary wills 
and preferences within the domain of non-prohibited conduct established by the laws. Outside 
the commonwealth, the condition Hobbes famously described as “the natural condition of 
mankind” in the Leviathan persists. While Hobbes’ state of nature is sometimes read as a 
hypothetical, theoretical construction, Hobbes in fact makes clear that it reflects an empirically 
existing condition between states. In the famous chapter 13 of the Leviathan, after sketching a 
stylized “natural condition” of individuals Hobbes emphasizes that even if this “natural 
condition” cannot be established historically, it nevertheless depicts the real, ongoing condition 
of the state of nature as it exists between states:  
 
in all times, Kings, and Perons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall 
jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on 
one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall 
Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War.294 
                                                
293 Bobbio, N. (1993). Thomas Hobbes and the natural law tradition. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., 197. 
294 Ch. 13, 90. And later: “Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that 
Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of 
Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety 
of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring his own safety. And the same Law, that dictateth to 
men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the 
same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being 




The overriding right to self-preservation enjoyed by the individual into the state of nature carries 
over to each individual state vis-à-vis every other individual state in the international state of 
nature. This fundamental distinction between inner and outer cuts through a broad swath of 
modern theories of the state, creating a common conceptual field within which absolutist and 
constitutionalist, monarchical and republican authors developed their own variations and 
arguments upon these common theoretical coordinates.  
Summarizing this general framework following the peace of Westphalia, Carl Schmitt 
referred to it as a historically specific spatial order of international law, or the jus publicum 
Europaeum. For Schmitt the spatial order of international law that emerged in the 16th and 17th 
centuries broke sharply with the theological and moral universalism of the respublica Christiana, 
which asserted the Church’s authority in the law of peoples and determined the principles of just 
wars of aggression as well as defense. The new international order, reflecting the state of nature 
theories I’ve outlined here, abandoned the morally binding determinations of warfare and 
suspended the principle of justa causa. In its place it asserted the principle of equal sovereignty 
of European states enjoying immunity from moral or theological condemnation.  
Schmitt has depicted the de-moralization of warfare we observed in the Hobbesian 
tradition as a great achievement of European civilization. “Given this juridical formalization, a 
rationalization and humanization – a bracketing – of war was achieved for 200 years.”295 In this 
period, a public enemy was the status of a recognized opponent in war, in which two sovereign 
states pursue their right by force in accordance with the mutually observed norms of civilized 
warfare. In the jus publicum Europaeum, the public enemy was not a criminal to be punished or 
                                                
295 Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth, 121. 
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a evildoer to be annihilated, but a legitimate opponent possessing formally equal rights to go to 
war, make treaties and pursue land-claims outside the European spatial order.296 This 
achievement was inseparable from the formal equality of sovereign personhood. “The principle 
of the juridical equality of states made it impossible to discriminate between a state that pursues 
a just war and one that pursues an unjust war. This would make one sovereign a judge over 
another,”297 and thus, as Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Rousseau and Kant all recognize, follows 
logically from the condition of the state of nature, in which no superior judge exists to arbitrate 
disputes among equals.298  
 
Retributive Justice vs. Right of Self-Preservation 
This fundamental ordering distinction between inside and outside made possible the 
formalization of two different sets of criteria and paradigms for the state’s use of coercive power, 
which I will call retributive justice and the right to self-preservation. The former applies to the 
state’s internal coercive powers, and the latter to external powers. The centrality of the right to 
self-preservation in the external space among states derives not only from the absence of any 
commonly recognized superior, but also from the manifest impossibility of ensuring uniform 
interpretation of moral or theological precepts among different actors. Moreover, even without 
this problem, the unreliability of sanction-less moral norms to consistently restrain action was 
widely recognized.299 This recognition of the weakness or indeterminacy of moral norms in 
international space, along with the overcoming of creedal conflict, led to a thinning of justa 
                                                
296 Ibid.,, part III, chap. 1.  
297 Ibid.,,167. 
298 Ibid. 147 
299 Locke, and to some extent Pufendorf and Montesquieu, are somewhat exceptional here, allowing a stronger 
degree of consistency in moral norms in the state of nature than the more radically minimalist theorists like 
Grotious, Hobbes or Rousseau.  
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causa into a kind of minimalist point of common convergence: the reciprocal recognition of the 
equal right of each to exist as a sovereign state, and the corollary right to the means it judges 
necessary to preserve its sovereign independence and territorial exclusivity, including the jus 
belli or right to declare war.300 This bracketing of justice or morality in war flowed from the 
recognition of formal sovereign equality and, as Vattel observes, the “parfaite égalité de droits 
entre les nations, san regard à la justice intrinsèque de leur conduite, dont il appartient pas aux 
autres de juger définitivement.”301  
Underlying this external minimalism is the view that justice requires a commonly recognized 
superior authority to legislate, judge and enforce commonly binding norms. In other words, 
justice is applicable only to the internal condition of domestic political order. As Hobbes puts it, 
outside the boundaries of the domestic order, there can be no justice, crimes or criminals since 
  
the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is 
no place of Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and 
cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention.302  
 
 
Thus, while any substantial norms of justice or criminality where suspended in the external space 
between states, the unification of the juridical order inside the state made possible the 
development of a condition of political Right and the paradigm of criminal justice that would 
become central features of constitutional theory as well as its absolutist precedessors. 
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The Crime Paradigm 
Hobbes stressed the relationship between the strictly individual and depoliticized character of 
crime, and its exclusive location inside the juridical space of the commonwealth. In contrast to 
sin, Hobbes stipulates that crime must refer to a distinct act “whereof one man may accuse 
another” rather than “meer Intentions.”303 Moreover, while one may sin against natural law, 
crime requires the violation of a positive law enacted by the sovereign, so “that the Civill Law 
ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no 
place of Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, 
and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention.” Similarly, punishment refers only to the 
“evil inflicted by publique Authority” on the individual judged by the sovereign to have 
committed a crime.304 Punishment is categorically distinguished from forms of private 
“hostility,” such as revenge: “the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour” inflicted in 
order to make subjects “better disposed to obedience.”305  
Whereas only loyal subject are capable of crime, and hence of being punished, those who 
do not recognize the authority of the laws are “enemies,” who are legitimately the objects of 
hostilities rather than punishment.  
 
Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they 
were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and 
professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done 
them, must be taken as acts of Hostility.” Such enemies most obviously include other states, but can also 
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include foreign individuals and rebellious subjects that “in denying subjection… denyes such Punishment as by 
the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Commonwealth.306 
 
With such enemies, we leave the juridically constituted space of the commonwealth altogether 
and enter the state of nature and war, wherein the law of nature is replaced by the law of 
nations.307 As Hobbes makes clear in the famous Chapter XII of the Leviathan, the state of nature 
persists “in all times” in the relations among various sovereign persons, even though it is left 
behind within each individual state.308 
While subsequent constitutional theorists revised Hobbes’ absolutist underpinnings, they did 
not substantially alter the juridical framework upon which Hobbes built his theory, and the 
categorical distinctions between internal and external, crime and war. Locke, employing the 
contractarian framework against absolutism, nevertheless maintains the strict distinction between 
the state of nature and civil society. In place of Hobbes’ theory of impersonated action, Locke 
identifies the commonwealth with the creation of a sovereign community that entrusts the 
individual right to execute natural law to a common, neutral, legally constituted judge.309 The 
neutral and impartial stipulation of crime and determination of punishment are possible only 
within political society: 
                                                
306 ibid., 216 
307 Hobbes makes this equivalence explicit in De Cive: “the precepts [of the law of nature and the right of nations] is 
the same: but because commonwealths once instituted take on the personal qualities of men, what we call a natural 
law in speaking of the duties of individual men is called the right of Nations, when applied to whole 
commonwealths, peoples or nations.” Quoted in Tuck, 129. 
308 “in all times, Kings, and Perons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall 
jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one 
another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon 
their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there 
does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.” Ibid., 90. 
309 “And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with 
authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the 
commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number 
of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.” 




And thus all private judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be 
Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties; and by men having Authority 
from the Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides all the differences that may happen between 
any Members of that society, concerning any matter of right; and punishes those Offences, which any 
Member hath committed against the Society, with such penalties as the Law has established: whereby it is 
easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together (para. 87).   
 
Even more than Hobbes, Locke places great emphasis on the persistence of the state of nature in 
all circumstances in which no commonly accepted, neutral judge is available. Indeed, this forms 
the basis of one of Locke’s main attacks on absolutism, which in his terms is not a civil condition 
at all but by definition in the state of nature. At the same time, Locke gives even more emphasis 
than Hobbes to the persistence of the state of nature in the relations between and among states. 
Lacking a neutral judge, the law of nations is nothing more than non-positive natural law, which 
each commonwealth like each independent person is free to interpret and executive individually, 
necessarily judging in their own case.310  
Without discounting important differences among various authors and traditions, we can 
point to a threefold distinction within this general framework between crime, enmity, and 
emergency. Crime, as we have seen, is an individual violation of positive law. Both the process 
of ascertaining individual guilt and punishment by public coercive power, are thoroughly 
constituted by public law. Will-based theories of punishment tend to stress the dimension of re-
instantiating the condition of right, and forcing the citizen to be free.311 Common-law theories 
equally emphasized the publicly and legally constituted nature of crime by emphasizing the 
                                                
310 Locke also argues that each individual (and hence, state) is also free to punish what it sees as transgressions of 
the law of nature, even if they themselves are not affected…. 
311 Rousseau, Kant, Hegel. 
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procedural preconditions for the valid determination of guilt in the form of legal rights of a 
defendant.312 In this tradition, the rights of habeas corpus and trial by jury and other procedural 
rules were definitive and constitutive of the theoretical meaning of crime. Without these features, 
the category of crime was inapplicable. 
 
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Internal from External Sovereignty 
By the mid- to late 17th century, opponents of absolutism achieved a new theoretical synthesis, 
rearticulating theories of the separation of powers and rule of law through the conceptual 
foundations of the modern state laid by their absolutist antagonists such as Thomas Hobbes. The 
axial distinction we saw in Hobbes between inside and outside was reproduced in almost 
identical terms by modern constitutional theorists. John Locke, for example – in many respects 
diametrically opposed to Hobbes – asserts that “all Princes and Rulers of Independent 
Governments all through the World, are in a State of Nature” with respect to one another.313 
Locke, as much as Hobbes, rested his theory on a fundamental spatial contrast between inside 
and outside, between 
  
those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal 
to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society 
one with another: but those who have no such common appeal… are still in the state of nature, 
each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner.314 
 
                                                
312 This applied before 19th century utilitarianism, of course. 
313 Second Treatise, § 14, 276. Again, much later in the text, Locke repeatedly makes the analogy between the 
theoretical construction of individuals in the state of nature, and the really existing fact of states in a state of nature 
even more explicit: “For example, I in the state of Nature (and all Commonwealths are in the state of Nature with 
another)…,” §183, 390. And in the following paragraph: “…Men in the state of Nature (as all Princes and 
Governments are in reference to one another)…,” § 184, 392. 
314 Ibid., §87 
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 Moreover, an avowedly non-absolutist, constitutional author such as Blackstone, writing a 
century and a half later, argued in almost identical terms that offenses against the law of nations 
fall outside the paradigm of criminal justice, since 
 
offences against this law [of nations] are principally incident to whole states or nations, in which case 
recourse can only be had to war; which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such infractions of public 
faith as are committed by one independent people against another: neither state having any superior 
jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice.315  
 
Kant, of course, had very different hopes for a future international order, but it is noteworthy that 
Kant’s entire argument for a world federation of states derived from a nearly identical 
assessment of the inapplicability of norms of justice in the external condition between sovereign 
states. Indeed, for Kant the reason why it is an unconditional moral duty for individuals in a 
lawless condition to submit to any sovereign authority whatsoever is the same as the reason for 
working toward a future world federation: 
 
It is not experience from which we learn of the maxim of violence in human beings and of their malevolent 
tendency to attack one another before external legislation endowed with power appears, thus it is not some 
deed that makes coercion through public law necessary. On the contrary, however well disposed and law-
abiding human being might be, it still lies a prior in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not 
rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, peoples and states 
can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right 
and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this.316  
 
                                                
315 Blackstone, Commentaries 314 (ed. Cooley, 1884). 
316 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” Section II, §44, in Practical Philosophy, 455-6. Also quoted in Tuck, Rights of 
War and Peace, 207-8. 
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Despite sharing these structural foundations, three fundamental ways in which constitutionalism 
broke with absolutism are worth emphasizing here. First, constitutionalist writers rejected 
Hobbes’ contention that the unity of the state must be represented by a single, unified sovereign 
person such as the monarch or assembly. This amounted to the claim that the totality of 
sovereign power must inhere in a single agent or “organ,” under which everything else is 
subordinate, and formed a key plank of the absolutist attack on older conceptions of mixed 
government that claimed to both limit the powers of the monarch, and in some cases furnished 
theories of legitimate resistance and even tyrannicide. Constitutionalist authors such as John 
Locke deflected this not by abandoning unified sovereignty for the older mixed government 
theory, but by severing the link between unified sovereign as the source of all political authority, 
on the one hand, and the institutions and offices of government. All institutions of domestic rule, 
including the primary legislative and executive powers, are conceived as exercising various 
forms of limited, delegated power rather than possessing sovereignty as such. Rather than 
inhering in a representative, sovereignty is held by the community as a whole, expressed as the 
unity of the people or “body politic” within a territory.317 Thus, shifting sovereignty from the 
personal locus of a representative to the unity of the political community as a whole made it 
possible to conceive of a unified, hierarchical, supreme juridical order, while at the same time 
asserting that all positive political institutions within the state are both limited in scope and are 
not absolute even within their proper sphere of activity. In other words, it made the separation of 
powers once more consistent with modern sovereignty.  
Secondly, unlike earlier conceptions of the mixed constitution, the conditions of 
territorial exclusivity and the separation of the state from society elevated the “rule of law” from 
                                                
317 Locke, Second Treatise, § 88, 324-5. 
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a particularistic network of rights and privileges to a single, wholistic framework that applied 
comprehensively to all forms of power within the territory and uniformly to every legal subject 
within the commonwealth. Finally, unlike earlier legal restrictions, modern constitutionalism 
does not modify or limit existing power holders but constitutes the conditions for legitimate 
political power as such. These express the idea that law, and only law creates the condition for 
legitimate political rule. Rulers do not preexist the rules that apply to them. The constitution 
itself establishes legitimate political power. Ordinary law arises from the government and 
uniformly binds every individual in society. And constitutional law arises from the people 
collectively, and uniformly binds every member of government. 
 Thirdly, these two major premises of modern constitutionalism – the separation of 
powers and the rule of law – do not involve a rejection of modern state sovereignty but on the 
contrary, presuppose the modern state and unified sovereignty. Legal supremacy requires not 
only the unity of the juridical order but also territorial exclusivity (legal comprehensiveness), the 
privatization of society (legal uniformity), the monopoly of legitimate coercion (the object of 
constitutional law) and the people as a political unit (the source of constitutional authority).318 
Constitutionalism, then, presupposes state sovereignty, but rejects the contention of absolutism 
that sovereignty must be represented or personified in a single agent or institution of domestic 
political rule. Another way of expressing the same point is that constitutionalism presupposes 
unified external sovereignty from the perspective of the international order, but it rejects unified 
internal sovereignty from the perspective of domestic political rule.319 How can external 
sovereign equality be maintained within internal supremacy? Drawing from from Carré de 
Malberg, Arato and Cohen helpfully clarify the issue by distinguishing between “organ” 
                                                
318 Grimm, D. (2010). "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" European Law Journal 1(3). 
  
319 Jean Cohen, “Sovereignty: Contemporary Transformations,” Raison publique, 5 (2006), 37. 
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sovereignty, in which a single agent or institution possesses all sovereign competences, and 
“state” sovereignty, in which sovereignty is united externally, while internally sovereign powers 
are disaggregated through the seperation of powers and limited by constitutional law.320  
The two faces of “state” sovereignty – externally unified and personified and internally 
disaggregated and pluralized – neatly captures the presuppositions of modern constitutionalist 
authors such as Locke, Montesquieu and Kant as well as the American Federalists. It provides an 
elegant theoretical solution to an otherwise insurmountable problem for the claim that 
constitutional law establishes the conditions for legitimate political power, or in other words that 
the rule of law amounts to the abolition of [unified] sovereignty within the body politic…”321 
Yet, as Arato and Cohen suggest, and as these constitutionalist writers were probably aware, this 
neat distinction between internal and external is more easily accomplished in theory than in 
political practice. While internal sovereignty may be disembodied, it is more difficult to avoid 
the, albeit temporary, embodiment or “personification” of external sovereignty in whatever agent 
is empowered with the task of representing the state outwardly to other states, in its unified 
capacity as a sovereign person. It is the legal supremacy of the domestic constitution that makes 
the separation of powers and institutional checks and balances coherent, allowing a 
differentiation into circumscribed legislative, executive and judicial functions. But this 
supremacy of course ends at the state’s territorial boundaries, and it would seem to follow 
necessarily that some “organ” must assume the task of representing the unified competences of 
external sovereignty without being subject to the internal limitations entailed by domestic 
constitutionalism. This theoretical question raised a host of institutional difficulties and 
                                                
320 Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, “Banishing the Sovereign? Internal and External Sovereignty in Arendt,” 
Constellations 16, no. 2 (2009): 309. 
321 The phrase is Hannah Arendt’s, but my discussion here draws from Arato and Cohen’s analysis of it in 
“Banishing the Sovereign?”    
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challenges. An even larger problem, however, is the issue of how the competences of external 
sovereignty can be maintained externally but sealed off entirely from the internal realm, and 
prevented from showing up inside the commonwealth.322 I want to suggest that constitutional 
theories of emergency powers were developed as important means to resolve precisely this 
problem of ensuring that the boundary between internal and external sovereignty is maintained, 
even in exceptional, emergency situations that would otherwise lead to the breakdown of this 
boundary. 
 
II. Taming the Exception: Constitutional Theories of Emergency Powers 
Keeping in mind our 17th and 18th century context, among the fundamental “marks” of external 
sovereignty are the right to self-preservation, and the exclusive rights to judge the means 
necessarily to enjoy this right, hence the self-interpretation of treaties and other conventions of 
the law of nations, and the inalienability of the jus belli. The problem this poses to the separation 
model is that many if not all of the means to self-preservation have internal, domestic 
consequences. Most obviously, even declaring a conventional, “limited” war can impose great 
hardship on the domestic population. From a constitutional perspective, the means to self-
preservation may include the state’s ability to extract sufficient resources for war, or its powers 
to maintain standing armies or impose obligatory military service on its citizens. All of these 
means, however, can very well – and historically did – run afoul with internal constitutional 
limitations on the power and scope of the executive branch.323 Beyond the scope of ordinary 
                                                
322 Arato and Cohen, “Banishing the Sovereign.” 
323 A classic example, at the heart of English constitutional struggles in the mid 17th century, was the famous Ship 
Money Case, in which Charles I imposed a maritime tax without parliamentary consent on the inland counties of 
England. The Crown claimed the prerogative power to impose extraordinary taxation when the king determined a 
situation of extreme danger and immanent threat to the realm. The Crown’s Writ of May 22, 1637 citied the 
immanent threats presented by “certain thieves, pirates, and sea-robbers, as well as Turks, enemies of Christianity, 
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limited war, the possibilities of invasion, domestic insurrection or a breakdown of internal order 
and political authority pose more severe challenges to the inside/outside dichotomy. A 
succesionist movement, for instance, or a domestic insurrection clearly pose fundamental 
challenges to the state’s right to self-preservation, but all of the relevant means to defend this 
sovereign right would fall within the state’s territorial boundaries, in the realm where sovereignty 
has been disaggregated and pluralized. All of these cases would seem to break the duality 
accomplished by “state” sovereignty in two irreconciliable pieces, requiring either the 
renunciation of statehood and external sovereign equality altogether, or allowing the “external” 
face of organ sovereignty to rear its ugly head domestically. In either case, the precondition of 
constitutionalism collapses along with the internal/external distinction.  
In light of this severe problem, how can the separation of the two faces of sovereignty be 
maintained?  My claim at this juncture is that many early modern constitutional writers were 
aware of the gravity of this problem, and that many turned to institutions of emergency powers 
as a key solution to it. We are now in a position to elaborate my earlier statement that 
constitutional theories of emergency powers served as an intermediary category between crime 
and war, between unified external sovereignty and internally separated sovereign powers, 
working to maintain the distinction between the two and prevent the collapse of the structural 
edifice of constitutionalism that this distinction maintained. Stated broadly, my argument is that 
                                                                                                                                                       
and others confederated together.” Quoted in Armitage, D. (2000). The ideological origins of the British Empire. 
Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press., 116. The case seems to have made a deep impression on 
Thomas Hobbes, who would subsequently refer to the dispute in later writings as an example of the disastrous 
political consequences produced by the ideologies of constitutionalism and mixed government. See Tuck, Politics 
and Government, CITE. Opponents of the Crown denounced the policy as an invasion on the property rights of 
Englishmen, on the false and illegitimate pretenses of sovereign necessity against external enemies. As claimed, for 
example, by Edmund Waller in his speech against Sir Edward Crawly. See also Henry Parker, The Case of Ship 
Money Briefly Discoursed. Such critics rejected the Royalist postulation of a “necessary connection between the 
empire of the seas and the liberty of Englishmen, especially when that liberty was defined as security of property, 
the nation’s naval defense provided the expedient for extraordinary fiscal exactions, and the maritime definition of 
the realm depended on the extent of prerogative power.” Armitage, 118. 
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models of emergency powers provide a framework in which internal, domestic manifestations of 
unified external sovereignty can appear as extraordinary, exceptional but nevertheless law-
governed forms of emergency powers. The bedrock criteria for emergency powers are when the 
means to the state’s right to self-preservation intrude upon the internal, law-governed domestic 
space of constitutionalism and disaggregated sovereignty. The powers involved at this general 
level could range from temporary grants of taxation or spending powers of the executive to raise 
armies, to the violation of individual property rights to secure public order, to the wholesale 
suspension of core constitutional protections such as habeas corpus. The scope of circumstances 
to which they could apply is extremely broad, ranging from the domestic imperatives to ordinary 
warfare, natural disasters, riots, rebellions, etc.  Despite this broad scope, the category of 
emergencies is coherent by virtue of the constitutional position it occupies, not its specific nature 
or causes. Emergencies in this sense are temporary disruptions in the internal order of a 
commonwealth that fell short of the general dissolution of state sovereignty, but nevertheless 
require some internal manifestation of external unified sovereignty. In other words, they 
corresponded to the discretionary rights sovereignty inside the body politic, not in wars but in 
emergencies. Institutions and legal categories such as dictatorship, prerogative and martial law 
were all taken up and transformed in the 17th and 18th centuries as ways of conceptualizing the 
temporary discretionary power necessary to deal with urgent threats and temporary disruptions of 
effective internal sovereignty that are consistent with the rule of law. It is in this sense that I 
suggested that we can think of emergency powers as a twin of modern constitutionalism.  
This claim will certainly seem controversial. After all, medieval legal discussions of 
utilitas publica, status regni all concern the circumstances under which violating positive law for 
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the sake of the common good would accord with reason and justice.324 And of course, the Roman 
Republic itself is the source of what is often regarded as the most important template of all 
institutions of emergency powers: the dictatorship.325 The phrase “government of law” derives 
from Livy, not the moderns, and legality was no less important in medieval cannon law.326 The 
distinctiveness of modern emergency powers lies in the dual significance of the conception of 
contingency and raison d’état and the theory of unified sovereignty, both discussed at length in 
the previous chapter. On the one hand, we saw that the artificiality of political order, and the 
importance of contingency, unpredictability and primacy of self-preservation outside the 
juridico-political order created a permanent tension between “force” and “right” within the 
modern state. In terms of a state of exception, this tension is expressed by the space between the 
structure of normative validity, and the factual conditions under which that normative structure 
can become actual.327 This space is the proper locus of emergency powers, which therefore 
reflect an instrumental, means/ends justificatory logic by nature. One the other hand, we also saw 
the development, in its monarchical and popular forms, of a theory of unified sovereignty as the 
supreme source of law. The modern conception of the sovereign law-giver transformed the 
classical understanding of political institutions: in the modern conception, all institutions apart 
                                                
324 See Gaines Post’s excellent discussion in Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, chap. 5; see also Ernst 
Kantorowicz, “Pro patria mori in Medieval Political Thought.” 
325 Schmitt; Rossiter, etc. Many critics of modern emergency powers seem to agree: see Kalyvas, A. (2007). "The 
Tyranny of Dictatorship." Political Theory 35(4). Some scholars have referred to ancient Greek institutions as either 
precursors of or, for Kalyvas, alternatives to, the dictatorship. But there seems to be little questions that the 
dictatorship was the most institutionally elaborated of such institutions in the ancient worlds. For the opposite claim, 
however, see Agamben, State of Exception. 
326 Livy, 2.1.1. 
327 Thus, Wilfred Nippel has argued that the Roman had no conception of mixed government in the modern sense as 
a set of “normative ideas of a necessary differentiation of governmental functions.” For Polybius, for example, the 
distinguishing characteristic of the mixed constitution it gave the natural order of different social classes a political 
expression, transforming the instability of the simple composites of government by the one, the few or the many into 
a stable, self-correcting complex composite of the mixed constitution. Nipple, “Ancient and modern republicanism,” 
in Franklin, J. H. (1978). John Locke and the theory of sovereignty : mixed monarchy and the right of resistance in 




from sovereignty itself were created through delegation and commission by the sovereign; all 
such institutions possessed the right to exercise power within the bounds of their commission by 
virtue of an authorization by the sovereign. This was true not only of Hobbes’ absolutist or 
Rousseau’s radical republican theories but equally true of constitutional theories of the 
separation of powers. These were based either on a theory of constituent popular sovereignty, 
which all constituted powers are delegations of the people, or an internal depersonalization and 
constitutionalization of sovereignty, in which sovereignty becomes identified with the totality of 
the legal order.328  
Thus, whereas absolutist theories had no special need for emergency powers since the 
sovereign legislature was also a positive agent represented by the monarch, constitutionalist 
theories, having banished unified sovereignty from any institutional embodiment, required an 
extraordinary commission, distinct from sovereignty itself, to occupy the gap between legal 
norms and their means of realization.329 Both absolutist and constitutional theories, however, 
shape a common definition of both the exception and of emergency powers that is not present in 
the ancient or medieval theories. Absolutist theorists such as Bodin, Hobbes and Spinoza all 
affirm that laws should be general and stable, oriented toward the wellbeing of the subjects and 
not arbitrary or capricious. The sovereign, however, is the sole and exclusive judge of when the 
state’s right to self-preservation requires an exception to these norms, and what the measures 
required in the exception will be.330 Constitutional theories of emergency powers, on the other 
                                                
328 i.e., in terms of the theories discussed here, the Lockean or the Blackstonian and Montesquieuian solutions, 
respectively.  
329 Likewise, a measure of Hobbes’ originality and radical break from more traditional theories of absolutism is the 
remarkable fact that he was so unconcerned with the prerogative that he does not appear to have even bothered to 
mention it in any of his major works. As far as I can tell, he is unique in this among anyone writing about the 
English civil war in this period. 
330Bodin, J. and J. H. Franklin (1992). On sovereignty : four chapters from the six books of the commonwealth. 
Cambridge England ; New York, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992. 
Bodin argues that, in spite of the extraordinary power wielded by these officeholders, “we may conclude that neither 
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hand, separated both the decision on the exception and the measures taken therein from 
sovereignty itself, and proposed different institutional solutions for delegated commissioned 
agents to exercise extraordinary but temporary and restrained power in the exception.  
In spite of this important difference, however, there is an equally important similarity that 
differentiates the modern theories from their predecessors. Following from the theory of unified 
sovereignty, both absolutist and constitutional theorists define emergency powers in the same 
way: as a delegated and commissioned institution whose power, and the limits imposed upon it, 
derive from a sovereign authorization. Hence, Bodin, Hobbes and Spinoza each define 
dictatorship by distinguishing it conceptually from sovereignty, which is precisely the central 
distinction made by constitutional theories of emergency powers in Locke, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, etc.  
For absolutist theories, the norm of non-discretionary rule through legal and institutional 
continuity was self-imposed and self-enforced, so that the sovereign was accountable to no one 
but God. Within this framework, the importance and significance of the exception, and the 
degree to which emergency magistrates like the dictator were attractive, varied in accordance to 
the emphasis on the sovereign’s self-binding. Hobbes, characteristically occupying an extreme 
position, comes close to dissolving even the coherence of the terms with which norm and 
exception could be theoretically distinguished, and therefore unlike Bodin and Spinoza has little 
to say about the value of emergency magistrates.331 In contrast, for constitutionalism the legal 
and non-arbitrary character of rulers was the very condition of legitimate political power inside 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Roman dictator…nor the regents in kingdoms, nor any other commissioner or magistrate who had absolute 
power for a limited time to dispose of the affairs of the commonwealth, had sovereignty.” pg. 2. On Hobbes and the 
Ship Money case, see Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 313. 
331 Of course this is not to say that Hobbes advocated arbitrary, discretionary rule over legal and institutional 
continuity. But his concern with dissolving any basis on which the sovereign could be criticized was so intense that 
he was willing to bite the bullet and acknowledge that his theory left nothing to say about the matter.      
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the commonwealth. Thus, the distinction between the exception – the space between legal norms 
and the condition of their realization opened by the priority of self-preservation – was categorical 
and qualitative rather than contextual and quantitative. Moreover, for the same reason, 
emergency powers were not optional but necessary. Discretionary power during emergencies 
required a special, exceptional commission, and a constitutional if not always statutorily legal 
form. If the danger to self-preservation was so severe that it required a non-delegated and non-
commissioned form of rule, this meant that the internal juridical condition had dissolved 
altogether and a state of war had emerged within the former boundaries of the commonwealth.  
Thus, constitutionalism narrowed the absolutist notion of an exception into a more 
circumscribed and contained theory of an emergency. Like the exception, an emergency requires 
some sort of extraordinary response. But in distinction to the exception, an emergency do not 
require rupturing the separation between sovereignty and delegated powers. Emergencies, unlike 
exceptions, can be overcome by forms of extraordinary power that nevertheless maintain the 
distinction between sovereignty and the institutions and agents controlling the coercive powers 
of the state. Emergencies, in other words, imply emergency powers, not absolutist sovereignty.   
Hence, although the term entered political discourse slowly from the 17th to 19th centuries and 
was not used by any of the authors considered here,332 we could say that emergencies themselves 
were products of modern constitutionalism. In other words, the category of political events that 
are by definition unexpected, exceptional, temporary in duration, and pose an urgent threat 
emerged only in relation to a conception of legitimate political power that is by definition 
                                                
332 Harrington seems to be the first I have come across who uses the term “emergency” in reference to dictatorship 
or any equivalent institution. Although the (as far as I know) historical uniqueness of Harrington’s terminology also 
suggests the possibility that he was using the term in a more traditional sense, and its appearance in his discussion of 
dictatorship may have been coincidental. See, Harrington, J. and J. G. A. Pocock (1992). The commonwealth of 




authorized by general laws whose normativity is a product of purely human rather than 
theological or traditional sources. Unlike scholastic discussions of similar problems, emergencies 
in the modern sense reflected an idea of contingency that resisted synthesis within a 
hierarchically ordered universe of nature and divine higher law. And since they presupposed a 
problem that could only exist under the assumptions that all constituted power must be legally 
authorized, modern conceptions of both “emergencies” and emergency powers were in this sense 





An institutional typology of emergency powers 
That is, from the premise that we cannot substantively anticipate all potential “exceptions” to a 
system of norms, it concludes that we cannot formally anticipate such exceptions through 
procedures that are triggered by them. This distinction between procedure and substance is a key 
premise of emergency powers. The dynamics of such procedures, of course, vary according to 
different models of emergency powers. The most elementary procedural distinction, and one of 
the key areas of debate in the current literature, is between models of emergency powers deriving 
from the civil law tradition of republican dictatorship, and those deriving from the common law 
tradition of executive prerogative. As we shall see in the following section, these traditions are 
quite a bit more heterogeneous than the simple typology suggests. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
establish a basic typology at the outset between three institutional models of emergency powers: 
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dictatorship, extra-legal prerogative and constitutional prerogative. We can distinguish these 
models by the following characteristics: 
• Legal status. Emergency powers can be authorized by a constitutional provision and/or 
a statute passed by the legislature granting temporary extraordinary authority. Or that 
authority may be exercised without any explicit authorization. Or it can be a temporary, 
extraordinary use of authority authorized by the ordinary constitutional powers of the 
executive. 
• Mode of investiture. How is extraordinary authority granted to the agent possessing 
emergency powers, or (this amounts to the same thing), is the institution which 
declares the emergency the same as the institution empowered to act in an emergency? 
In the “hetero-investiture” model, the legislature must declare an emergency that 
invests an executive agent – either the ordinary chief executive or a special magistrate 
– with special emergency powers. In the “auto-investiture” model, the same agent – 
most likely the ordinary chief executive – both declares the emergency and is 
authorized to use special emergency powers.333  
• Mode of regulation. How are emergency powers regulated, controlled or reviewed by 
ordinary authorities? The hetero-investiture model imposes “upstream” controls by 
lodging the power to declare an emergency and/or designate the official possessing 
emergency powers in different hands. Modes of “downstream” regulation empower 
other agents to review the use of emergency powers, either through judicial review, 
legislative acts of indemnification or popular controls of reelection or revolt.      
                                                
333 I take the slightly awkward terms of “hetero-investiture” and “auto-investiture” from Pasquino and Ferejohn, 
“The Law of the Exception.” 
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• Legitimate means. The extraordinary means included in emergency powers may be 
procedurally limited in advance (for instance, citizens may only be detained without 
trial but not punished, or the emergency official may not legislate), determined by 
ordinary constitutional powers, or left to the prudence of the agent possessing 
emergency authority 
• Legitimate ends. Limitations may be imposed by the purposes for which emergency 
powers are granted. For example, emergency powers may be restricted only to the end 
of restoring the status quo ante, or only actions that promote the public good, or the 
ends authorized by the ordinary constitutional authority granted to the agent acting in 







III. Prerogative as Emergency Power 
 
The extra-legal prerogative 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed dictatorship as an institutional model of emergency powers, 
focusing on Rousseau and Machiavelli. Here I want to turn to an institution that has been 
especially important in a common-law context has its origins in the royal prerogative. Like the 
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dictatorship, the origins of the prerogative can be traced to the Roman republic.334 Whereas the 
dictatorship, at least until the end of the 18th century was virtually synonymous with a non-
sovereign emergency magistrate, the constitutional history of the prerogative overlaps only 
partially with the category. Moreover, its history is closely intertwined with the complex political 
theological origins of the concept of absolute sovereignty itself. The medieval origins of the 
royal prerogative in England derive from the granting of plena potestas of the communal estates 
in a royal assembly. In the 13th century, under the influence of Roman law and doctrines of 
utilitas, jurists argued that in a case of necessity or public utility that touched both king and 
kingdom, status regis et regni – usually in the context of a “just war” or invasion – all the 
various feudal representatives of the realm must give their assent in such assemblies to the 
measures required by the king in defense of the realm. In distinction to ‘courts ordinary,’ the 
king was said to appear in these extraordinary royal assemblies, or later prerogative courts, “in 
the fullness of his prerogative.”335 In this way prerogative was closely associated with what 
Kantorowicz referred to as the king’s “body politic,” expressing jurisdiction over the unity of his 
realm as “his royal Estate and Dignity.”336 
Charles McIlwain has traced the subsequent development of the extraordinary or 
exceptional dimension of the prerogative in the dualism between the realms of gubernaculum 
and jurisdictio expressed by Bracton and other medieval legal scholars.337 In jurisdictio, “there 
are bounds to the king’s discretion established by a law that is positive and coercive, and a royal 
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act beyond these bounds is ultra vires.”338 Within gubernaculum, the king’s prerogative over his 
realm is not subject to any such limitations; all royal restrictions are necessarily self-restrictions 
and can be legally dispensed with, since the king “has no peer, much less a superior” and is 
accountable only to God.339 In the conflicts that followed the succession of James I and his heirs, 
the boundaries between these domains became an arena of the explosive conflict between 
monarchy and parliament, and were at the center of both 17th century revolutions.   
It comes as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, that John Locke – writing at a time when 
the powerful absolutist and theological-political resonances of the prerogative remained very 
much alive and vivid – appears to fully endorse the legitimacy of the prerogative in his radically 
anti-absolutist polemic, The Second Treatise on Government. Indeed, the chapter Locke devotes 
to the prerogative appears to be such an anomaly that traditional Locke scholarship 
overwhelmingly passed it over in silence, whereas the attention it received in the emergency 
powers literature was often badly distorted and out of context. Within the context of the 
constitutional debates over the prerogative that raged throughout the 1680s, however, it is easy to 
identify what is distinctive about Locke’s discussion. The terms of the debate between royalists 
and parliamentarians were not qualitatively different from the dualism identified by McIlwain: 
even ardent parliamentarians attacked the crown on the grounds that it had exceeded the 
legitimate bounds within which the prerogative could be exercised.340 But they did not question 
its political-theological foundations that directly associated the prerogative with the regal person 
of the king. In other words, royalists and parliamentarians alike shared the assumption that the 
prerogative inhered intrinsically in the person of the king and that within its proper scope it was 
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supreme; their debate – which was an extremely high stakes one – was limited to the boundaries 
established by the ancient constitution.  
Locke made clean break with these assumptions.341 Although he clearly has an English 
constitutional monarch in mind, he refers only to the “executive,” which is defined, like every 
other branch of the government, as a strictly delegated power, entrusted by the people for the 
sake of certain determinate ends. This shift from the two bodies inhering in the crown to the 
delegated authority of the executive is one of Locke’s most radical moves: it permanently severs 
the king’s two bodies, relocating the body politic to the united community, which does not itself 
govern but rather is the source of authority for any legitimate form of government whatsoever.  
The individual executive, therefore, becomes no more than a public office-holder, serving at the 
pleasure of the superior authority of the legislature, whose own authority is conditionally 
entrusted to it by the united power of the community. The executive’s prerogative, like all 
constituted political powers, is strictly a commissioned power. This theory of entrusted or 
commissioned powers has the important consequence of defining legitimate constituted powers 
teleologically, in terms of the ends for which executive and legislative powers were entrusted in 
the first place – namely, to act as fair and neutral judges, respect individual property rights and to 
serve the common good. This teleological criterion characterizes all political institutions of the 
government, and it defines the prerogative no less than any other. Thus, while Locke defines the 
prerogative as the executive’s power to act “where the law was silent, and sometimes too against 
the direct Letter of the Law,” he repeatedly emphasized the function and purpose of the 
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commission: the legitimate prerogative does not signify any sort of extra-legal action, but only 
when that action is necessary for the promotion of the public good, the ultimate judge of which is 
the people themselves.342 Hence prerogative, for the first time, could be regarded as a 
commission in this functional sense as well.  
As the source of this delegated power, the united community retains the inalienable right 
to judge whether those ends are being promoted, and therefore, determine for itself when rulers 
are no longer legitimate officeholders but tyrants and usurpers that must be opposed by 
violence.343 Extra-legal action that is contrary to the private good – as Locke’s parliamentarian 
allies claimed of Charles II and James II – was therefore not a prerogative power at all but 
tyranny, triggering the right to resist. There are essentially two steps that Locke envisions to 
control improper or illegitimate use of the prerogative, the first institutional and the second extra-
institutional. First, if the legislative power, once assembled, judges an extra-legal action of the 
executive as contrary to the common good and the legitimate ends of government, the judgment 
of the assembled legislature, not that of the executive, is authoritative.344 Secondly, in the event 
that a dispute arises between the branches and the executive refuses to assemble the legislature, 
the result is the same as if the legislature itself exceeds its authority. In either case, the 
fundamental purpose of government to act as a neutral authoritative judge between disputants is 
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no longer fulfilled, and in the absence of any rightful, neutral judge on earth, the people have no 
remedy but to “appeal to Heaven” and take up arms against their oppressors.345 This move allows 
Locke appropriate the most powerful weapon in the arsenal his royalist opponents – the 
prerogative itself – as yet another argument for the legitimacy of resistance against Stewart 
absolutism.346  
But Locke’s redefinition had another decisive consequence that transcended its 
immediate political context. For the first time, Locke makes the prerogative into a 
straightforward institution of emergency powers.347 In stripping the political-theological character 
of the prerogative that made it inhere to the person of the king, Locke defines it functionally, in 
terms of the purpose it serves rather than the sovereign jurisdiction it expresses. In this newly 
disenchanted form, its justification now lies in the special purpose it can serve within a 
constitutional system of rule through general, “promulgated, standing laws” and not 
“extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions.”348 The supremacy of general and abstract 
laws ironically also highlighted the role of flux, contingency and unforeseeable particulars in 
political life. In the paragraph leading up to his first definition of the prerogative, he observes the 
“things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing remains in the same state,” which can 
easily overwhelm and undermine unchanging constitutional rules and procedures.349 These are 
the circumstances were the prerogative plays a necessary role. 
The function of the prerogative, then, is in this sense a creation of the imperative that 
political power must be expressed through general laws and constitutional procedures. For 
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Locke, constitutionalism is constitutive of the epistemic, temporal and self-preservation 
dimensions of emergencies:  
 
For since in some Governments the Law-making Power is not always in being, and is usually too 
numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is impossible to 
fresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessitities, that may concern the public; … 
therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice, which the Laws do not 
prescribe [provided it is necessary for the common good].350 
 
The idea is a very familiar one. Laws, in order to constitute a space of juridical freedom for all 
legal subjects, must be abstract, general and relatively unchanging. The purpose of the state or 
political community as a whole, however, is not just the legal order considered narrowly, but the 
overall public security and common good expressed in it. Securing these ends sometimes 
requires responding to the occasional contingent and unpredictable situation that cannot be 
anticipated by general laws, or that emerges too quickly for the ordinary procedures of 
constitutional government. This disjuncture points to a space between the ends of government – 
securing the rights, liberty and wellbeing of the political community – and the means of 
government, expressed through the separation of powers, limited legislative supremacy over the 
executive and the requirement of standing and general laws. Locke redefines prerogative to fill 
this gap.  We should be cautious to avoid the mistaken assumption made by many interpreters 
that Locke had in mind only moments of drastic danger and existential crisis.351 Most of the 
                                                
350 Ibid., ¶ 160 
351 seeCorwin, E. S. and L. W. Koenig (1956). The Presidency today. New York,, New York University Press., 
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship;Mansfield, H. C. (1993). Taming the prince : the ambivalence of modern 
executive power. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.; Gross, Law in Times of Crisis; Fatovic, Outside the 




examples Locke gives are considerably more mundane and refer only to the epistemic and 
temporal criteria without self-preservation. This suggests that Locke seems to have envisioned 
the prerogative as an ordinary administrative as well as an emergency institution in the full 
sense.352 In both cases, however, the teleological criteria is the same, as is the threat of revolution 
in response to serious abuses.353  
 While Locke explicitly states that the prerogative may be used outside and even against 
the law, I would nevertheless suggest that the prerogative is constitutionalist in a broad sense, 
rather than operating in some legal vacuum or black hole. We’ve already seen three reasons why 
Locke’s prerogative cannot be assimilated to the Schmittean decisionist sovereign: first, because 
it is a commissioned power constituted by the terms of its commission; second, because it is a 
power of an office, explicitly detached from the person or agent who exercises it, and third, 
because the validity of the prerogative remains subject to the judgment of the community for 
whose sake it is authorized, and who decides in the last instance whether it is a legitimate 
prerogative or an illegal act of tyranny. To these we can add a fourth reason: prerogative is 
exercised in an environment in which legality does not consist exclusively or even primarily in 
positive, statutory laws. In contrast to the radical natural law minimalism of Hobbes or Kant, for 
Locke the content of natural law is relatively thick, yielding a deeper convergence on moral and 
legal principles among any community of rational individuals. Thus, natural law persists after the 
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exit from the state of nature and permeates political society, serving as a standard for all 
members of the community with which all activities of political rulers must harmonize.354 Just as 
the duty of the legislature is to interpret and translate the content of natural law into more 
concrete conditions, so the executive, in executing the laws of parliament, is equally executing 
the law of nature. Hence, if an existing law happens to contradict the law of nature, the executive 
is acting fully within his lawful authority if he disregards or alters it, allowing the legislature to 
reassume its proper role. From a legal positivist perspective, salus populi suprema lex may 
indeed sound analogous to a legal break, but it is legitimate to assume that Locke understood 
suprema lex literally: prerogative may be in abeyance of statutory law but not of law as such. 
Nor was the idea of the public good as supreme law a synonym for the will of the executive; 
Locke’s entire theory rests on the fundamental conviction that there is an underlying source of 
legality more fundamental than positive law, and that this source is available and knowable to 
every rational being, and therefore that the executive’s interpretation of natural law is neither 
exclusive nor supreme.  
 
Banishing sovereignty? 
I’ve argued that Locke attempted to disassociate the institution of the prerogative from 
personified sovereignty as fully as possible by redescribing it as a delegated and circumscribed 
commission, restricted to the purposes for which it was created and subject to the superior ex-
post judgment of the legislative branch and, in the extreme case, the community itself. In all of 
these respects, his theory of prerogative reflects Locke’s more general commitment to banishing 
sovereignty from within the commonwealth altogether. Indeed, Locke even scrupulously avoids 




using the word sovereignty throughout the Second Treatise. However, we should not conclude 
from this linguistic avoidance that Locke dismissed the practical problem of external sovereign 
personhood, nor should we imagine that he was quite as successful in seamlessly exiling 
sovereignty to the external sphere as his language suggested. Locke’s attempts to subdue these 
difficulties arise especially in relation to the executive, resulting in the Second Treatise’s peculiar 
and rather strained distinction between executive, federative and prerogative power.   
What is puzzling is that the executive, the federative and prerogative power are all 
“united,” for Locke, in the same person – the constitutional monarch. The distinction is not 
among different institutions or organs, but among functions of the same institution or, 
effectively, of the same single monarch. The executive power is introduced shortly after Locke 
declares the legislature the “supreme power of the common wealth,” entrusted by the community 
with the united force of the commonwealth, and the exclusive right to legislate for it. The 
executive is described as wholly subordinate and inferior to the legislature. Even in those 
systems, like England, in which law-making requires the consent of the executive along with the 
legislature, the executive alone should be properly regarded as subordinate to the corporate body 
of king-in-parliament which makes law.355  Even allowing that such a monarch, without any 
superior legislative branch, may be regarded as supreme within the government, Locke sharply 
insists that not only are the constitutional laws of the commonwealth fully binding on him, more 
fundamentally constitutional laws are constitutive of the office of the executive or monarch in 
the first place.  
 
But yet it is to be observed, that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as 
supreme legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; 
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allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to 
obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law… But 
when he quits this representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, 
and is but a single private person without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the 
members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society. 
 
The monarch is an office, constituted by law. The moment the executive begins to act beyond his 
legal authorization, he ceases to exercise legitimate political power, and forsakes any claims to 
obedience from the members of the community.  
 In the same passage, however, Locke writes that as a “public person,” whose voice is the 
voice of the law and whose will is the will of the public, he “is to be considered as the image, 
phantom, or representative of the common-wealth.” Locke’s repeated references to 
“representation” here appear to have more in common with Hobbes than with the theory of 
mixed government, and do appear to acknowledge a formal embodiment role, albeit a limited 
one, for the monarch.  While this remains only a suggestion for executive power, it constitutes 
the essence of federative power. Whereas executive power is entrusted to executive the laws 
passed by the legislature within the commonwealth, the federative power represents and acts for 
the unity of the commonwealth externally, vis-à-vis other states.  
 
for though in a common-wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and 
as such as governed by the laws of the society; in reference to the rest of Mankind, [the members of a 
commonwealth] make one Body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the State of Nature 
with the rest of Mankind. Hence it is, that the Controversies that happen between any Many of the Society 
with those that are out of it, are managed by the publick; and an injury done to a Member of their Body, 
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engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this Consideration, the whole Community is one 
Body in the State of Nature, in respect of all other States or Persons out of its Community.    
 
The federative power, then, “contains” the classic powers of external sovereignty: “the power of 
war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities 
without the common-wealth.” These characteristics of external unified sovereignty adhere in the 
person who represents the community as a political unity or “one body” vis-à-vis other sovereign 
persons. Locke explicitly contrasts the legally determined relations of each individual member of 
the commonwealth with one another, versus the unregulated external relations among sovereign 
collectivities. While the former is volunarist and contractual, reflecting the rational consent and 
legal self-determination of all citizens, the latter is in the state of nature, undetermined by 
positive law, and non-voluntarist or contractual from the perspective of the individual subject. 
For exactly this reason Locke states that the power of the external representative of the 
commonwealth is not political but “natural, because it is that which answers to the Power every 
Man naturally had before he entred into Society,” i.e. the natural rights to self-preservation and 
punishment of crimes against natural law held by each individual in the state of nature.356  
As a natural rather than a political power, it is radically different from any internal power 
of government in that it is neither delegated nor legally constituted, as are the internal legislative 
and executive powers.357  Moreover, in contrast to the superior power of the legislature, it is not 
bound by promulgated and standing laws but based on discretion and prudence, unencumbered 
by general laws. In even greater contrast to the internal executive, which is explicitly inferior and 
has no will of its own, the federative power possesses its own will and judgment to interpret the 
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law of nature in all matters outside the commonwealth.358  Thus, in a somewhat astonishing 
passage, Locke observes that  
 
though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, 
yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so 
must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the 
public good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well 
enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, 
and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this 




Especially considering Locke’s elaborate and thorough redefinition and subordination of the 
internal prerogative, this frank acceptance of unconstrained sovereign discretion in external 
affairs is startling. After struggling mightily against any appearance of personified sovereignty 
internally, Locke appears to have bit the bullet and accepted the full consequences of unified 
external sovereignty. Indeed, he appears to show his disapprobation only by remaining consistent 
in his refusal to apply the term sovereignty to his description. Thus, after listing the classic 
“marks” of external sovereignty – the rights of war and peace, leagues, alliences and treaty-
                                                
358 The inadequacy of depending upon any interpretation of the law of nature alone, without additional positive 
juridical safeguards, is of course the very reason why civil power is constituted in the first place: “The Legislative, 
or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a power to Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to 
dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris’d Judges. 
For the Law of Nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of Men, they who through 
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making with other sovereign states, etc. – Locke courtly asserts that these powers “may be called 
federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.” 
 Few readers, from the 18th century to the present,360  have been convinced by Locke’s 
repeated insistence that these powers, though possessed by a single person, “be really distinct in 
themselves.” Why did Locke insist on such an awkward and seemingly nebulous distinction of 
functions rather than institutions? One possible reason is suggested by our theme in this chapter: 
Locke’s entire constitutionalist project rested upon his ability to distinguish sovereignty from any 
particular domestic institutional embodiment, and therefore to maintain the watertight distinction 
between the internal and external faces of sovereignty. If we adopt Locke’s functionalist 
perspective, this distinction really does make theoretical sense. Executive power has the function 
of faithfully executing the laws passed by the supreme power of the legislature. It is a delegated, 
limited power based on trust and rational consent. As we’ve seen, the federative power is 
discretionary and unregulated rather than law-governed and accountable. It substitutes 
Hobbesian representation and embodiment for Lockean entrusted delegation and consent. While 
of fundamental importance for any member of a commonwealth, Locke does not seem to regard 
it as accountable to the community and hence, it falls outside the relations of political trust and 
judgment that constitute the relations between the government and citizens. Thus, in terms of 
powers themselves, the executive and the federative are indeed quite distinct. Moreover, whereas 
some interpreters have assimilated the prerogative to the federative, Locke seems clear that he 
regards the prerogative as a power of the executive only, and not of the federative. Again, 
adopting the functionalist rather than institutionalist perspective, this too makes sense. The 
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prerogative by definition is an exceptional, emergency power. It refers to circumstances that are 
unforeseen by general and abstract laws, in which the ordinarily law-governed executive, who 
has no will of his own, must substitute his own discretion for the law in a particular case, when 
the common good requires it. The federative, in contrast, has full discretionary powers already, 
unconstrained by any positive law, and therefore has no need of emergency powers such as the 
prerogative that temporarily suspend the requirement of legal authorization. 
 
The constitutional prerogative 
Locke’s functionalist strategy of disassociating the prerogative from any powers inhering in the 
person of the executive, and defining it in close proximity to the right to resist, does not seem to 
have gained much traction in post-1688 theories of the constitutional monarch. Its periodic 
reemergence in the republicanized monarch of the US presidency is another story, as we shall see 
in later chapters. While most 18th century English scholars distanced themselves, for obvious 
reasons, from Locke’s radicalism, subsequent 18th century accounts retained the role of the 
prerogative as a form of emergency powers in addition to the more ordinary administrative or 
discretionary powers it entailed. More authoritarian 18th century liberal philosophers such as 
Hume or jurists such as Blackstone reinstated the discretionary powers of the prerogative 
inherent in the king’s person as an ordinary feature of the English constitutional system. In this 
way, the prerogative continued to include a form of emergency powers necessary for responding 
to urgent, unforeseen crises. But by relocating it within the constitution, it ceased to be an 
exceptional power and became normalized. But this is not to say that either Hume or 
Blackstone’s prerogative marked a retreat to the absolutist position. Blackstone’s strategy, for 
example, of constitutionalizing the prerogative allows him to specify in much greater detail the 
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precise boundaries and limits within which the prerogative is supreme, in contrast to Locke’s 
open-ended and intrinsically unspecifiable criteria. 
Writing in the 1760s, Blackstone’s simultaneous commitment, on the one hand, for an 
unqualified assertion of the principles of the rule of law, and on the other, for a unmistakable 
degree of discretionary executive authority lodged in the person of the monarch. These 
seemingly contradictory commitments are made to coexist through a subtle legal strategy of 
maintaining the political-theological constitutional forms of the royal prerogative, while at the 
same time emptying their absolutist political content through an array of methods of legal 
disenchantment and depersonification.  
Reflecting the redefinition of the common law through the natural right tradition we have been 
discussing, Blackstone begins the Commentaries by distinguish civil or municipal law from the 
unwritten natural law imperfectly knowable by reason, and the law of nations consisting of 
mutual compacts and natural law. In contrast to these first two, Blackstone defines municipal – 
or positive – law as “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, 
commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”361 Thus, sovereignty, or the supreme 
power in a state, is exclusive locus of lawmaking authority.362 Blackstone effectively 
incorporates the Hobbesian and Lockean definitions of crime through his differentiation, within 
the category of crime, between mala in se and mala prohibita.   
Hence, the state’s right to punish mala in se is depicted in openly Lockean terms: 
 
The right of the temporal legislature to inflict discretionary penalties for crimes against the law of nature, 
which in a state of nature is vested in all mankind, is in a state of society transferred from individuals to the 
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sovereign power, whereby men are prevented from being judges in their own causes, an evil which civil 
government was intended to remedy. Whatever power, therefore, individuals had of punishing offences 
against the law of nature, is now vested in the magistrate alone, who bears the sword of justice by the 
consent of the whole community.363 
 
In addition, Blackstone also argued that the state may legitimately inflict coercive penalties for 
crimes that are “in themselves indifferent, and become either right or wrong, just or unjust” only 
by virtue of being declared so by a positive law.364 The state’s right in this case is established by 
the fact that “the law by which individuals suffer was made by [the subjects’] own consent, it 
being a part of the original contract into which they entered when first they engaged in 
society.”365 
 In either case, for Blackstone the supremacy of civil law, and therefore of the supreme 
legislative power, is constitutive of state and nationhood. After declaring this Hobbesian 
principle of a single, supreme sovereign power, Blackstone nevertheless assumes that it can be 
divided at least internally: in England, the supreme power in the kingdom “in whom the 
sovereign power of the state resides” is “divided into two branches; the one legislative, 
consisting of king, lords and commons, the other, executive, consisting of the king alone.”366 
When parliament is assembled, the three estates together constitute “the great corporation or 
body politic of the kingdom,” whose power and jurisdiction is “so transcendent and absolute that 
it cannot be confined either for causes or persons.”367 While the king is the “head” of this 
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367 i.e. like Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s sovereign, parliament’s power is both inherently legal, and necessarily unbound 
by law. 23-4. Blackstone, ibid., quoting Fortescue, asserts that parliament is “so high and mighty in its nature, that it 
may make law; and that which is law it may make no law; and the determination and knowledge of that privilege 
belongs to the lords or parliament, and not to the justices,” 25. 
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artificial body, he has no lawmaking powers on his own, and within parliament only possesses a 
negative, veto power.368 
 Turning to the powers of the crown, Blackwell seems to confirm the supremacy of 
parliament and the rule of law over the powers of the king: 
 
The principal duty of the king is to govern his people according to law. The power of kings should be 
neither free nor unlimited. This is not only consonant to the principles of nature, of liberty of reason, and of 
society, but has always been esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when 
prerogative was at the highest… The king is bound to execute these duties by the terms of the original 
contract between him and his people as couched in the coronation oath.369 
 
 
Despite this duty, Blackstone’s king bears little resemblance to the delegated and formally 
inferior executive powers in the republican theories of Locke and Rousseau. Like Locke, for 
Blackstone the king possesses prerogative powers, but these powers differ from Locke’s in two 
fundamental respects that are both summarized in Blackstone’s assertion that “The law ascribes 
to the king the attribute of sovereignty or pre-eminence.” The first fundamental difference, of 
course, is that whereas for Locke the king, like all constituted powers, is strictly delegated and 
possesses no rights to authority other than those conditionally entrusted to him by the 
community. The second fundamental difference, which is reflected in the careful phrasing of 
Blackstone’s sentence, is that the attribute of sovereignty is ascribed to the king by the law: the 
                                                
368 Ibid., The King’s negative rather than positive lawmaking power means that taken individually, “the crown has 
not any power of doing wrong, but merely of preventing wrong from being done,” 23. 
369 Ibid., 40-1. 
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king’s prerogative legally authorized and the attribute of sovereignty it expresses has a wholly 
legal character.  
These fundamental differences have a number of important consequences. First, we saw 
how Locke’s teleological definition of the prerogative detached it from the king’s royal person 
and even his public office, making the status of “prerogative” – and hence the legitimacy of the 
king’s actions – wholly contingent upon whether they are orientated toward the public good 
(judged ultimately by the people themselves). In contrast, Blackstone states that the king 
possesses the prerogative “in right of his regal dignity,” making prerogatives “rooted in and 
spring from the king’s political person” either directly or incidentally.370 The king’s legal 
attribute of sovereign preeminence means that he has no legal superiors, and therefore no court 
can have jurisdiction over him. For this reason, in diametrical contrast to Locke, all actions 
within his legal sovereignty must be regarded as rightful, irrespective of the purposes for which 
they are used. Hence, Blackstone can assert that because no court can have jurisdiction over him, 
“the person of the king is sacred though his measures be tyrannical,” that he is incapable of 
misusing his powers or committing a wrong (though his ministers may be found culpable), that 
he can have “no stain or corruption of blood,” and so on.371  
The second consequence is that the legal character of the prerogative allows Blackstone 
to specify in much greater detail the precise boundaries and limits within which the prerogative 
is supreme. Locke functionally redefined the prerogative as a mechanism for supplementing the 
inability of general laws to foresee and apply itself to sudden and exceptional events. As a means 
for dealing with irreducible particulars, the concrete boundaries of the prerogative were by nature 
open-ended, contingent and difficult to specify in advance. In contrast, Blackstone can refine and 
                                                
370 Prerogatives directly related to the king’s political person are exclusive, unshared powers, whereas those that are 
indirectly related are exceptions to general rules that apply to everyone but the king. Ibid., 41. 
371 Ibid., 42 
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predetermine the precise boundaries of the prerogative by tracing the contours of the law’s 
attribution of preeminence upon which it is dependent.372 In many cases, Blackstone appears to 
be employing the legal character of the prerogative to subtly differentiate king’s formal from his 
actual powers, normalizing and restraining the latter while transforming the former into inactive 
juridical presuppositions, or even symbols for the supremacy of the law itself. Hence, he hails the 
king as the fountain of justice, “not the spring, but the reservoir, from whence right and equity 
are conducted” to all his subjects; all public offenses in the kingdom are immediately offences 
against his person, and therefore is legally ubiquitous, ever present in all his courts, and so on. 
The practical consequence of all this is much more modest: the king is formally named plaintiff 
in all criminal prosecutions, though he is exempted from the (physically impossible) obligation 
having to show up in court.373 Likewise, the king enjoys the exclusive prerogative of issuing 
proclamations that are binding on any subject. However, these turn out to be binding only 
“where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones, but only enforce 
the execution of such laws as are already in being.” Even more shrewdly, Blackstone declares 
that while “the supposition of the law is” that the king is personally incapable of wrongdoing, 
this means that his powers can only be abused through “the advice of evil counselors, or 
ministers,” who can be punished and held accountable by parliament.374 In these and other 
                                                
372 So for example, the king “may reject bills make treaties, coin money, create peers, pardon offences as he pleases: 
unless where the constitution has expressly, or by evident consequence, laid down some exception or boundary,” or 
again, the king “is not bound by any act of parliament, unless he be named therein, except where such act is 
expressly made for the preservation of public rights and the suppression of public wrongs, and does not interfere 
with the established rights the crown,” etc., ibid., 42, 43. 
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being proclaimed in thunderous and awesome terms, lead straight to into a thicket of eye-glazingly mundane legal 
detail: In addition to being “generalissimo, or first in military command,” we learn that “The erection of beacons, 
lighthouses and sea marks, is also a branch of the royal prerogative, but which is usually vested by letters patent in 
the lord high admiral. By 8 Eliz. C. 13, a similar power is given to the corporation of the Trinity House (a),” etc.  
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chancellor will, upon petition, administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion.” 
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examples, the sovereignty and preeminence of the crown are carefully projected into a symbolic 
sphere in which their very preeminence becomes an obstacle to the ability of individual kings to 
employ their prerogatives for their own political advantage.    
The third major consequence of Blackstone’s strategy of normalizing and legalizing the 
prerogative is that it undermines the purpose, as well as the coherence, of Locke’s careful 
distinction between the ordinary federative powers that are inherent in the office, and 
extraordinary prerogatives of the executive that are defined functionally. Blackstone simply adds 
the representation of external sovereignty, and hence the powers of war and peace, another of the 
legal attributes of sovereignty enjoyed by the king. These powers are an important reminder that 
Blackstone’s monarch may be constitutional, but is very far from a merely symbolic head of 
state. The prerogatives of war and peace follow directly from principles  
 
held by all the writers on the law of nature and nations, that the right of making war, which by nature 
subsisted in every individual, is given up by all private persons that enter into society, and is vested in the 
sovereign power: and this right is given up, not only by individuals, but even by the entire body of people, 
that are under the dominion of a sovereign.375  
 
In these straightforwardly Grotian and Hobbesian terms, Blackstone asserts that 
 
With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or representative of his people… In the king, 
therefore, as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union a consistency, 
splendor, and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potentates; who would scruple to enter 
into any engagement, that must afterwards be revised and ratified by a popular assembly. What is done by 
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the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation: what is done without the 
king's concurrence is the act only of private men.376   
 
On these premises, Blackstone regarded it as obvious that unified sovereign personhood must be 
represented by a single person, and placing this representation in the hands of an assembly or 
collectivity would disqualify a nation even from recognition by other civilized nations.377 While 
Blackstone does not shy away from the consequences of this argument, it is important to 
emphasize that, nomenclature aside, Locke reached exactly the same conclusions in his 
discussion of federative power. Moreover, if Locke could imagine nothing short of the 
admittedly exceptional and infrequent threat of revolution to prevent abuses of the prerogative, 
his federative power is even more insulated from political accountability. Because it was 
exercised by a political power within the commonwealth, the exceptional character of Locke’s 
prerogative made it at least highly visible and exposed to public judgment. But avoiding a theory 
of sovereignty meant that he had to define the federative power as natural rather than political, 
and hence not even criticizable on the grounds of rational consent. Blackstone undoubtedly 
displays a more authoritarian and conservative temperament than the author of the Second 
Treatise, but including foreign and domestic powers of the prerogative together at least renders 
them equally visible as forms of political power. Moreover, it also allows Blackstone to 
cautiously assert the same legal measures of accountability to the external prerogatives as he 
applied to the internal ones. Thus, even in regard to the “great” prerogatives of war and peace, he 
again “hints” that 
 
                                                
376 ibid., 375 
377 “It is impossible that the individuals of a state in their collective capacity, can transact the affairs of that state 
with another community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting to their measures, and 
strength to the execution of their counsels,” ibid., 375. 
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lest this yet plenitude of authority should be abused to the detriment of the public, the constitution (as was 
hinted before) hath here interposed a check, by the means of parliamentary impeachment, for the 
punishment of such ministers as from criminal motives advise or conclude any treaty which shall 




Not only, therefore, does Blackstone collapse the Lockean Federative power back into the 
prerogative, he grants the prerogative a legal and constitutional status that indirectly subjects 
even external sovereignty to legal and political oversight. 
In what sense, then, is Blackstone’s prerogative a theory of emergency powers? Insofar as 
the upshot of his efforts is a move toward the integration of the royal prerogative into the 
ordinary constitutional system of near- parliamentary supremacy, the prerogative is less of a 
clear-cut example of emergency powers than including a power, discretionary executive within 
the normal constitutional framework. On the other hand, insofar as the prerogative still functions 
as a linchpin mediating the distinction between internal and external sovereignty, and the 
paradigms of crime and war, the claim to exceptional discretionary powers that are legally 
domesticated during ordinary times may become once again reactivated. In addition to the 
personification of external sovereignty, we’ve seen examples of how Blackstone maintains the 
possibility of reactivating exceptional remnants of the pre-1688 link between prerogative and 
personified sovereignty in cases of internal emergency.379   
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Thus, even as Blackstone subtly normalizes and transforms the remnants of personified 
sovereignty in the prerogative into symbols of the depersonified sovereignty of the legal order, at 
the same time, its constitutional powers are potentially in reserve in cases of disorder or turmoil 
that require an exceptional response. While the authoritarian dimension of the constitutionalized 
prerogative is unmistakable, Blackstone’s subtle strategy of depersonification when the 
discretionary powers of the executive are not required gives the prerogative a distinctively liberal 
rather than absolutist character. In other words, the constitutionalized prerogative is a species of 
emergency powers rather than exceptionalism.        
 
 
IV. Empire, Dominion and the Return of the Exception  
To state my thesis once more, constitutional theories of emergency powers help maintain the 
distinction between internal and external orders by providing an alternative, commissioned 
institution for the means of self-preservation inside the state. By distinguishing even exceptional 
internal powers from sovereignty, they aim to exclusively relegate the unified personification of 
sovereignty to the external sphere and banish all personifications or institutional embodiments of 
sovereignty from the internal life of the polity. How successful have the constitutional models of 
the prerogative been at this task?  
 Returning to Locke, I argued that his otherwise puzzling distinctions between executive, 
federative and prerogative powers, which he treats as separate and distinct powers even though 
all three belong to the same organ, are in fact reflections of the separate domains of internal, 
external, and emergency powers. Of course, even if we agree that it may be theoretically 
coherent in terms of function, it nevertheless raises a troubling question about its political 
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implications: can the formal distinction between functions that are “almost always united” in the 
same person serve as an adequate basis for preventing the practical fusion of internal and 
external sovereignty in the person in whom they are both vested? The person of the monarch 
exemplifies the potential of certain key institutions or powers to serve as a hinge between the 
internal and the external, conveying the prerogatives of unified sovereignty into domestic 
imperatives that claim priority over any normative restriction. Or, such institutions could act as a 
wedge between the internal and the external, expanding the jurisdiction of the realm of external 
discretion and contracting the realm of legally constrained and accountable government, so that 
the division between inside and outside is upheld at the price of the progressive colonization of 
the former by the latter. Or, to cite one more possibility, the mixture of external plenary power 
and internal restrictions in the same person could prove explosive, creating a constitutionally 
limited power, and linking that power together with the physical means and political incentives 
to violate its own limits.    
The dangers, then, are clear both in abstract and from the few generations of English 
constitutional history preceding the Second Treatise. Why did Locke accept an essentially 
Hobbesian account of the absoluteness of external sovereignty into his constitutional theory, at 
the price not only of removing external affairs entirely from political accountability, but also 
exposing his domestic constitutional project to such an unpredictable and explosive mixture, 






One possible answer to this question is that the absolutist assumptions built into Locke’s 
Federative power was a consequence of Locke’s explicit agreement with the Hobbesian account 
of external sovereignty and the law of nations, and Locke’s conscious rejection of the anti-
absolutist alternative accounts presented by some of Hobbes’ critics. Like Hobbes and in 
opposition to Hobbes’ critics, Locke was very keen to establish an account of external 
sovereignty consistent with the foreign policy of an aggressive, autonomous state, with the right 
to interpret the laws of nature for itself in justification of offensive war. Perhaps most 
importantly, Locke was strongly committed to an account of external sovereignty that included 
the right to seize uncultivated land, and denied jurisdiction to indigenous occupants of territory 
that had not been brought into private ownership. Such commitments, as Richard Tuck and 
others have argued, help explain Locke’s hostility toward the non-absolutist, legally constrained 
accounts of external sovereignty asserted by critics of Hobbes such as Samuel Pufendorf.380 At 
the core of Locke’s polemic toward Pufendort, I want to argue, is the link between absolute 
external sovereignty, land appropriation and imperial expansion. 
A brief contrast between Locke’s account and the alternative presented by Pufendorf can 
clarify Locke’s commitment to an aggressively unconstrained theory of external sovereignty, 
even at the price of having to resort to the peculiar executive/federative distinction we’ve been 
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analyzing. Pufendorf was a lifelong resident of several German states that, in the fragile wake of 
the treaty of Westphalia, had the most to lose from the aggressive, imperialist and expansionist 
politics championed by many English and Dutch authors of this period.381 In a series of subtle 
criticisms of Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf followed his opponents in modeling the theoretical 
state of nature on the practices of really existing states, but in contrast to them, he rejected their 
assertion of the primacy of self-interest and the right to self preservation, and argued for a state 
of nature characterized by a common, well-regulated moral norms, peaceful interaction and 
forms of social cooperation for peace and self-improvement. Significantly, he also set out a more 
fluid and gradated account of sovereignty, focusing on “irregular systems” such as federations, 
alliances, and mixed imperial forms such as those he was familiar with as a resident of the (then) 
German states of Saxony and Sweden. In consequence, Pufendorf derived a stronger account of 
natural sociability, and a correspondingly weaker account of the autonomy of sovereign 
individuals, than his English opponents. The distinction between the state of nature and civil 
society was more fluid, entailing more normative constraints on the rights – including the rights 
to aggressive or punitive war – of individual states. Secondly, Pufendorf developed a “thick” 
conventionalist account of property that allowed him to recognize territory itself, including 
uncultivated territory, as a kind of dominion of a sovereign state, thereby undermining the 
prevailing justifications for colonialism that denied indigenous sovereignty over uncultivated 
territory. Thirdly, Pufendorf attacked the absolutist theory that one individual (or sovereign) in 
the state of nature may punish another for perceived violations of natural law. The right to punish 
was an important theoretical platform for expanding any individual state’s jus belli to include 
virtually whatever the punishing state deemed worthy of ‘punishment.’ Even more importantly, 
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the individual right to punish violations of natural law was an important justification for colonial 
enterprises of the English in particular, as Pufendorf somewhat sarcastically observed.  
Pufendorf, in other words, presented a non-absolutist alternative account of state 
sovereignty that stressed moral and legal constraints, cooperation and extended recognition to the 
sovereignty and dominion of indigenous Asians and Americans. How did Locke respond to 
Pufendorf’s theory? Early in the Second Treatise, Locke informs the reader of a principle which, 
although it “will seem a very strange Doctrine to some Men,” is nevertheless undeniably true: the 
natural right to punish in the state of nature.382  Locke is here reasserting the same natural right to 
punish that Pufendorf had criticized in Grotius and that had furnished European colonizers with 
so many opportunities for punishing non-Europeans for their breaches of the law of nations.383 
Pufendorf had argued that punishment logically entails that public prohibitions, with threat of 
sanctions, are well-known by all subjects before the act was committed. It also entails a relation 
between a commonly recognized judicial authority and a cognizant subject of that authority; 
punishment cannot occur between equals, where each is free to interpret unwritten rules as it sees 
fit.384 
In response, Locke asserts two reasons in support of the natural right to punish. First, 
anyone who breaks the law of nature declares their refusal to live by the rules of “reason and 
common equity” that serve as a guarantor for the mutual security of mankind as a whole. 
Therefore, such a declaration amounts to a “trespass against the whole [human] species,” and a 
threat to humanity’s collective safety. Confronted by this danger to humanity as a whole, every 
individual, “by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general,” may restrain or destroy such 
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enemies of humanity, or make examples of them in hopes of deterring other potential 
miscreants.385 Secondly, if there is not a natural right to punish, Locke asked, then “by what right 
[can] any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their 
country”? Taking aim at Pufendorf’s criticisms, Locke points out that any legislature has the 
right to punish a foreigner for breaking the law, without that foreigner ever having willingly 
entered into any relationship with the established authorities of the foreign country that would 
establish a duty for obedience, or justify using coercive sanctions in punishing him. In a 
remarkable substitution, Locke revealingly asserts that 
 
Those who have the Supream Power of making Laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the 
rest of the World, Men without Authority: And therefore if by the Law of Nature, every Man hath not a Power to 
punish Offences against it, as he soberly judges the Case to require, I see not how the Magistrates of any 
Community, can punish an Alien of another Country.386  
 
This natural right to punish, of course, is the power from which is derived that “power in every 
commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every 
man naturally had before he entered into society” – that is, precisely the terms Locke specifies 
for the federative power. We can now see why Locke locates this power, which we may call 
federative or unified external sovereignty, in every commonwealth. As the unification of the 
individual members of the commonwealth, it also represents the united power of each member’s 
natural “executive” right to punish violations of the laws of nature, now concentrated and 
projected outward in the state of nature between itself and all “other states or persons out of its 
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community.” Any perceived infractions by these outsiders, either as individuals or collectively, 
now “engages the whole in the reparation of it.”  
 We can now see more clearly what made the federative an absolute, despotic power for 
those over whom it was exercised. Its business is to direct the united executive powers of the 
commonwealth, for the twofold purposes of “management of the security and interests of the 
public” and punitive “reparation” of perceived injuries and violations of the laws of nature. Its 
two modes of action seem to be reason of state on the one hand, and punitive justice on the other. 
The reason of state element corresponds to the refocusing and narrowing of the universality of 
the individual right to punish into the collective interest and security of that commonwealth as a 
closed political unit vis-à-vis outsiders.387  Whereas inside the commonwealth a rational system 
of general and abstract laws mediates among individuals, and between rulers and ruled, as moral 
equals, the external federative power is necessarily discretionary and escapes regulation by 
general legal norms.388  The difference, Locke explains, is that internally,  
 
the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. 
But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs 
and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be 
managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the common-wealth. 
 
That is, the internal circulation of political power among members of the society is expressed 
through general, abstract laws. But the commonwealth’s power directed outward toward 
nonmembers cannot be anticipated, much less restrained, by any commonly agreed upon, 
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positive legal norms or regularities. While Pufendorf dismissed the idea of a natural right to 
punish under such conditions as a craven excuse for imperialism, Locke upheld the unrestrained 
discretion of the Federative power to identify violators of natural law who have “declared war 
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage 
beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security.”389  The idea defended here by Locke 
that European powers can and should punish the “wild savage beasts” who practice cannibalism, 
piracy, human sacrifice or kill settlers had, of course, been a core justification of European 
atrocities against indigenous Americans since the discovery of the New World.390  
In Locke’s terms, the government’s coercive power to punish a foreigner and the 
Federative power to punish a declared transgressor of natural law in the state of nature are both 
forms of despotic rather than political or paternal power. Whereas paternal paper is a form of 
temporary, benevolent tutelage, and political power arises solely from the rational consent and 
moral equality of those subject to it, despotic power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has 
over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases.” Despotic power, which can never be 
the result of a contract, must always be based on the defeated subject’s forfeiture of life itself, as 
a result of losing a ‘just’ war. Locke describes the person over whom despotic power is exercised 
as utterly inhuman, an enemy of humanity with whom no coexistence is possible.  
 
for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond 
whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that 
teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so 
revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their's, to be his rule of right, he renders 
himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution 
                                                
389 ibid., 11 
390 an equivalent argument had already been criticized by Vitoria 
  
207 
of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And 
thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not 
from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war continued…391 
 
In contrast to the reason of state element, directed by the skill and prudence of the discretionary 
federative power, Locke’s idea of despotic power actually seems to correspond to the “moral” 
universalist element of the federative, reflecting the originary universality of the natural right to 
punish in the state of nature.  
Despotic power vividly illustrates the gulf that separates the horrific nature of federative 
power, as the sheer imposition of an absolutely arbitrary, life and death discretion, from the 
normative ideal of rational consensus and trust that is embodied in political power. It also marks 
another moment in which Locke seems to explicitly reject a more pacific view held by 
Pufendorf, and occupy the opposite extreme. Locke was of course financially and 
administratively involved in the development of the colonial plantation society of Carolina, 
seemed to have approved of the transatlantic slave-trade on the grounds that it was the legitimate 
spoils of a just war waged, apparently, by the East Africa trading company. Once again, siding 
with the absolutist theory and opposing Pufendorf, Locke unflinchingly defends the non-
contractual, “Absolute, Arbitrary, Despotical Power” of the master over a slave taken in war. The 
master, says Locke, has “the power to kill [the slave], at any time,” and slavery derives not from 
any contract but from the fact that the master has the option to delay taking the slave’s life, “and 
may make use of him to his own service” in the meantime. Locke’s justification is that the slave, 
having committed “some act that deserves death,” forfeits his right to his own life, and hence the 
master “does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the 
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value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the 














The Law of Necessity: The Martial  Law Paradigm of Emergency Powers 
  
 
For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to BE king, and 
there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the 
conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is. 
  -- Thomas Paine, 1776393 
                                                





Those who established the Union were opposed rather to a strong government as against 
themselves than to a strong government in the abstract; indeed,… they constructed a government 
with full sovereign power, that is, with absolute and unlimited authority, as against other nations, 
and with qualified and restricted powers as against themselves, and the object of the restrictive 
clauses was the protection of those privileges and institutions which were dear to them as 
inheritors of Ango-Saxon civilization, and not the protection of other peoples and nations to whom 
these privileges and institutions were foreign and perhaps wholly unknown. 







Enmity, Crime and the Law of War: the “Classical Paradigm” of Emergency Powers  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that modern constitutionalism in the 17th and 18th centuries was 
able to separate the “exception” from constitutionalized emergency powers on the basis of a 
dualistic spatial order that emerged in that period. This spatial order entailed an axial distinction 
between the internal and external juridical domains, and at the same time distinguished the 
formal equality of sovereign personhood from mere inhabitants of non-European lands open to 
                                                                                                                                                       
393 Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” Thomas Paine: Political Writings, 28. 
394 George Canfield, “The Legal Position of the Indian,” American Law Review 15 (1881) 21, 25-6. Quoted in 
Cleveland, “Powers Inherent in Sovereignty,” 272. 
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colonial expansion and dominion. This chapter applies that general theoretical framework to the 
early American republic, focusing on the distinctive forms in which the categories of internal and 
external sovereignty, exception and constitutionalized emergency powers took shape in the US in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The early American republic emphatically inserted itself within the 
European framework and adopted its essential coordinates. It asserted formally equal rights of 
sovereign personhood, and claimed to inherit in full the imperial rights of “discovery” and 
“conquest” in the American colonies before Independence by the Crown. At the same time, it 
applied modern European constitutionalist framework to a set of unique conditions. First, 
rejecting the centralizing, modernizing tendencies of the reorganization of the British Empire in 
the latter half of the 18th century, American Independence reflected a deeply held ideology that 
linked republican self-rule to regional autonomy and a high degree of decentralization, granting 
geographically dispersed settler communities the rights to self-government over local affairs. An 
expansive Federal government was capable of threatening the rights of local self-rule as was the 
imperial metropole before Independence.395 Hence, even after the adoption of the centralizing 
Federal Constitution the US nevertheless remained committed to an extraordinary degree of 
decentralization and regional autonomy, amounting to, as Aristide Zolberg notes, “something 
other than a “state” in contemporaneous European usage.”396 Secondly, just as the colonial rights 
to regional self-governance limited imperial control over settlers but did not object to imperial 
authority over conquered native Americans and other “non-civilized” subjects, the early 
American republic explicitly claimed full imperial prerogative powers over these subject 
                                                
395 Greene, J. P. (1986). Peripheries and center : constitutional development in the extended polities of the British 
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788. Athens, University of Georgia Press. 
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populations.397 Hence, the US inherited a dualistic form of settler ideology that combined 
republican and imperial forms, sharply distinguishing between the rights enjoyed by members of 
the republican citizenry, and the subject status of “outside,” governed populations. While the 
former required an extreme degree of decentralized and limited Federal authority, the latter 
entailed an unlimited sovereign prerogative, exercised by the Federal government as a whole, 
directed outward against Native Americans, blacks and other colonized subjects.398  
This perspective helps emphasize the importance of a set of categories often overlooked 
or blended together in much of the academic literature on early US emergency powers. In 
particular, the dualistic structure of insiders and outsiders helps to illuminate two very different 
sets of criteria governing the internal application of emergency powers within the body politic, 
and the external imperial prerogative against outsiders that was inherited from the British Crown 
by the Federal government as a whole. I argue that the central category of internal emergency 
powers in this period was not the Lockean prerogative but martial law. The theory and practice 
of martial law in this context highlights a distinctively radical application of the 
constitutionalization of emergency powers discussed in Chapter 2. This radicalization involved 
uniquely stringent restrictions on emergency powers over citizens, but at the same time it also 
radicalized the dualistic framework that authorized permanent exceptional authority over subject 
populations.399  
As we shall see, martial law, as a criteria for internal emergency powers, is tightened in 
the American case to exclude any future threats to political institutions, no matter how dire. 
                                                
397 This part of my argument has benefitted above all from Rana, A. (2010). The two faces of American freedom. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.  
398 This formulation is derived from ibid.  
399 This portion of my argument draws from a number of excellent recent studies of racialized distinctions between 
citizen and subject in US constitutional development: Cleveland, S. H. (2002). "owers Inherent in Sovereignty: 
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Instead, emergency powers are justified only when effective political order is actually ruptured – 
in other words, the criterion is an actual condition or political state, not an expectation or 
calculation about the future. On the other hand, imperial categories of ‘discovery’ and ‘conquest’ 
established subject populations in a kind of permanent, spatially bounded state of exception in 
which a discretionary, exceptional sovereign power was exercised by the Federal government as 
a whole entirely outside of constitutional bounds.  
 
Internal and External Sovereignty in America 
The starting point here, as in the previous chapter, is the distinction between internal and external 
sovereignty. Hannah Arendt summarized an important component of a prevailing self-
understanding of this period when she proclaimed that the greatest American innovation in 
politics was “the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body politic of the republic.”400 
As Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato point out in a recent article, Arendt cannot be interpreted as 
asserting that the Americans abolished sovereignty altogether. Rather, internal sovereignty, 
“within the body politic,” was disaggregated and disembodied, whereas external sovereignty was 
preserved in the realm of international affairs.401   
We’ve seen in the previous chapter that despite their very different accounts of the prerogative, 
both Locke and Blackstone ultimately agree that unified external sovereignty must be personified 
                                                
400 Arendt, On Revolution, 153. In an 1870 essay, Henry Adams praised the US Constitution as “the most 
convincing and the most interesting experiment ever made in the laboratory of political science,” Adams explains 
that “Supreme, irresistible authority must exist somewhere in every government—was the European political belief; 
and England solved her problem by intrusting it to a representative assembly to be used according to the best 
judgment of the nation. America, on the other hand, asserted that the principle was not true; that no such supreme 
power need exist in a government; that in the American government none such should be allowed to exist, because 
absolute power in any form was inconsistent with freedom, and that the new government should start from the idea 
that the public liberties depended upon denying uncontrolled authority to the political system in its parts or in its 
whole.” John Adams, “The Session. 1869-1870,” in John Adams, Historical Essays (Charles Scribner’s Sons: New 
York, 1891), 367-8. 
401 Arato and Cohen, “Banishing the Sovereign?,” 307. 
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in the executive, and both, using quite different strategies, attempt to restrict personified 
sovereignty exclusively to the external realm, leaving sovereignty disaggregated and wholly 
constitutionalized internally. I argued that both Locke and Blackstone struggled to establish the 
means of bolstering the distinction between internal and extern sovereignty, and moreover were 
only able to maintain the distinction only with the help of the category of dominion. How did the 
US constitutional founders approach the dilemma of internal and external sovereignty? 
 Of course, the British assertion of the unified sovereignty of the Parliament over the 
entire empire as a whole had played a key role in the argument for independence.402 The doctrine 
of unified parliamentary sovereignty undermined the older decentralized imperial constitution 
that had allowed for settler independence and self-rule. Under parliamentary sovereignty, Anglo-
settlers saw themselves transformed from free British settlers into the subjects of the arbitrary 
sovereign will of the metrope. In a word, governed by the unified, unlimited sovereignty of 
parliament, colonists were reduced to the status of non-European colonized subjects – Native 
Americans, Indian Bengalis and even African slaves.403 Thus, among the “injuries and 
usurpations” cited in the Declaration of Independence, the Crown 
 
has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of 
our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished 
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. 
 
                                                
402Wood, G. S. and Institute of Early American History and Culture (Williamsburg Va.) (1998). The creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill, Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at 
Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press. 
T., 344-353. 
403 Rana, 80-1. 
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 The colonies, the Declaration continued, are now “Free and Independent States” enjoying 
“full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all 
other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do” – in other words, exactly those 
prerogatives that symbolized the Crown’s personification of unified external sovereignty. 
Unified sovereignty had reverted to the individual states; the confederation was regarded as a 
“league of friendship” or “council of nations” with “no real cession of dominion, no surrender or 
transfer of sovereignty to the national council.”404  The wave of state constitution making 
following independence boldly abolished any expression of unified internal sovereignty – 
imposing strict separation of powers, frequent elections, and an array of institutional checks on 
officeholders. Governors in particular were radically weakened, stripped of independence from 
legislatures and emphatically denied anything reminiscent of the Crown’s claim to embody 
sovereignty.405 Significantly, the classic prerogative powers that were held by the royally 
appointed governors were expressly transferred to the legislative assemblies, which were 
regarded not as institutional authorities in their own right but as repositories for the people at 
large, subject in some cases to recall and even dissolution by the people at large.406 In other 
words, the total abolition of any institutional expression of internal sovereignty went hand in 
hand with a politics of radically decentralized authority and locally autonomous self-rule. In 
some cases, this extended to preserving direct communal control over both the means of violence 
– popular militias – as well as supreme legal authority – extraparliamentary assemblies and 
conventions – independent of and even in opposition to legally constituted powers.407 
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 Persuaded that the radically decentralized structure of the confederation would lead to 
disaster, the delegates who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 sought to create a federal structure 
possessing unified external sovereignty, while at the same time avoiding any institutional 
personification of sovereignty – internally or externally. 
The distinctiveness of this effort becomes clear if we compare the marks of external 
sovereignty in the 1787 Constitution with the accounts from Locke and Blackstone  discussed in 
the previous chapter. As we saw, Locke’s Federative power entailed “the power of war and 
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without 
the commonwealth.” Blackstone included in the royal prerogative the power to make “war or 
peace,” to send and receive ambassadors, to make “a treaty with a foreign state, which shall 
irrevocably bind the nation”; to issue letters of marquee and reprisal, was “generalissimo, or first 
in military command,” enjoying “the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies.” For 
both Locke and Blackstone equally, these powers were exclusive to the executive, absolute, and 
unlimited within their sphere, e.g. external sovereignty. 
The 1787 constitution adopts Blackstone’s marks of external sovereignty nearly 
verbatim, but rather than unifying them in the person of the executive, the attributes of external 
sovereign personhood are disaggregated and distributed among the branches. The separation of 
powers, and checks and balances, are made to apply not only to internal but to external 
sovereignty as well. Thus, the powers to declare war, raise armies and navies, and issue letters of 
marquee and reprisal are held exclusively by Congress. Treaty making and appointment powers 
are shared between the president and the Senate. Of these, perhaps the most fundamental of these 
marks of sovereignty, the rights over declaring war and peace, were emphatically placed in the 
exclusive hands of Congress. Jefferson noted approvingly that “We have already given in 
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example one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose 
from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to 
pay.”408 The contrast with Blackstone, and even Locke – for whom the “power of war and peace” 
is lodged in the federative, which, unlike the executive, cannot be subjected to the rule of law 
and is necessary a purely discretionary power – is striking. Despite their alarm over “democratic 
tendencies” and their determination to construct unified external sovereignty, the framers placed 
the most basic of sovereign powers, the decision over war and peace, as an exclusive power of 
the legislature rather than the executive.  
Whereas the argument that external sovereignty itself has been disaggregated was made 
repeatedly in defending the president against charges of monarchism, the Federalist seems to 
assume that legislative and executive powers together can constitute unified external sovereign 
personhood. This point is made most clearly in papers 23, 41  and 42 –which have mistakenly 
been interpreted as referring to the president alone, whereas they clearly refer to external powers 
of the union as a whole. 23 makes clear that the external powers of the “union” amount to 
nothing less than unified sovereignty: 
 
These powers [essential to the common defense] ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT 
IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL 
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS 
WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. The circumstances that endanger the 
safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed 
on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the 
possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same 
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councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense. 
 
Moreover, Hamilton draws from the earlier argument that statehood must be redefined from the 
sovereignty of the collective body of the citizenry to the monopoly of the means of violence409 in 
order to argue for the logical necessity of unified external sovereignty   
 
the moment it [i.e. the necessity of a federal state holding the legitimate means of violence] is 
decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that government ought to be clothed with all the 
powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the 
circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; 
unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a 
necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the 
defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any 
matter essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES. 
 
The sovereignty of the collective body of the citizenry necessarily presupposes the 
external sovereignty of the state as the monopoly of the means of legitimate violence. Having 
deduced the necessity of unified state sovereignty, the paper ends by arguing that the anti-
Federalists are utterly confused in attacking this; the real question requiring “the most vigilant 
and careful attention” is not the existence of state sovereignty but ensuring “that it be modeled in 
such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers.” Madison makes a 
very similar argument for externally unbounded sovereignty in no. 41, while strenuously arguing 
that internally the federal authority will neither be unified nor unlimited, but strictly 
                                                
409 The same paper makes an even clearer association of the “federal government” with Weber’s famous definition 
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circumscribed to matters between the states. And as nos. 25 and 26 argue, some standing army is 
required in order to minimally qualify as an adequate state, but the solution here too is to follow, 
and improve upon, on the British model. Congress as a whole – with the full inclusion of the 
most democratic branch – will be responsible for providing for the standing Army. Moreover, 
state militias will be maintained and authority over them will be shared by the federal and state 
governments. Hence the faces of internal and external statehood were sharply distinguished and 
by fragmenting the control over military authority. 
As Rana summarizes, Madisonian republicanism “tied an energetic federal government to 
the external project of empire building, a project that presupposed an unlimited imperial power 
deriving from British royal prerogative. Aggressive federal activity thus became synonymous 
with the internal application of a coercive authority properly applied only to those outside the 
bounds of social inclusion, such as natives and blacks. Under these circumstances, any internal 
appearance of the dreaded imperial prerogative was viewed as a dangerous threat to liberty and 
an attempt to reduce free settlers to the condition of heathens or savages – by treating free 
citizens as if they were colonial subjects. 
 
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous terms, 
and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according 
to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and 
conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we 
familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every citizen is one of this people and 
a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the 
class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this 
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people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are 
not…410 
 
We can focus our inquiry into the categories of emergency powers and the state of exception, 
then, by asking: to whom and under what conditions can the protections guaranteed to all 
“persons” under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses be suspended or denied?  The 
distinction between emergency powers and the state of exception indicates two broad domains of 
this question. The state of exception refers to those entirely outside the political body referred to 
by Taney, and hence subject to the extra-constitutional, fully discretionary power of external 
sovereignty. Emergency powers, on the other hand, pertains to circumstances in which the rights 
accorded to full citizens, or non-citizen “persons” recognized by the Constitution, can be 
constitutionally suspended or altered while remaining without the limits of enumerated power.  
 
The War Paradigm 
The paradigm of war could constitute a state of exception, in which due process rights of citizens 
and persons could be replaced entirely by the customary laws of war between enemy 
belligerents. While this possibility was widely acknowledged throughout the antebellum period, 
the clearest examples of its application occurred during the Civil War. The Prize Cases (1862), 
for example, concerned a number of privately owned vessels seized by the Union from Southern 
ports as prize under the laws of war. The owners of the vessels did not dispute the legitimacy of 
prize and booty under the laws of war. They argued, however, that the insurrection at the time 
was a limited “emergency” but did not qualify as a full scale state of exception between 
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sovereign belligerents. The president was authorized to use limited and temporary emergency 
powers against specified leaders of the secession, but all other citizens and persons remained 
presumptively loyal and in full enjoyment of their constitutional rights. “Insurrection is the act of 
individuals and not of a government or sovereignty,” and therefore remains fully within the 
“crime” paradigm. Limited emergency powers do not abridge the strict division between internal 
and external sovereignty; “the Constitution and Laws of the United States are still operative over 
persons in all the States for punishment as well as protection.”411   
 Justice Grier, writing for the majority, rejected this argument, asserting that the rebellion 
was no mere insurrection but a civil war. “When the regular course of justice is interrupted by 
revolution, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open.” In this 
condition, “civil war exists and hostilities may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those 
opposing the Government were foreign enemies invading the land.”412War does not require that 
both belligerents recognize one another’s sovereignty. What is decisive is that both parties claim 
rights as independent sovereigns, and since they “consider each other as enemies and 
acknowledge no common judge,” the belligerents necessarily rupture the internal juridical space 
of the constitution. War is defined as a state of exception in which “a nation prosecutes its right 
by force,” enjoying the jus belli sovereign right of prize and capture undiminished by internal 
constitutional constraints.413  
 The Prize Cases clearly articulates the theoretical framework that serves as a basis of the 
“classical paradigm” of emergency powers. First, it establishes the fundamental distinction 
between war and peace. War is a condition between two public enemies who prosecute their 
rights by force. Both parties claim sovereignty (even if they do not each recognize the other’s 
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claim) and recognize no “common superior judge between them.” Warfare is not a lawless void 
but is governed by the non-statutory laws of war, consisting of the customary law of jus belli, 
and the natural law of self-preservation. Because there is no common law, the belligerents claim 
their natural rights to execute the law of war – and therefore natural law – themselves. 
Belligerents are not criminals but public enemies subject to the laws and customs of war. Non-
combatants residing on enemy territory may not be deliberately killed,414 but they do not enjoy 
the same status as the state’s own citizens. Their property may be seized as a prize of war among 
other hardships, and they may even be incidentally killed. They are exposed to these hardships, 
not because they committed any crime or violated any law, but because they are members of an 
enemy collectivity. War implies a logic of collective responsibility.  
In contrast, peace is the condition of effective internal sovereignty, which exists when the 
regular course of justice is not interrupted, and courts are able to function normally. When 
internal sovereignty is not interrupted by invasion, Constitutional rights and limitations are fully 
in effect, and cannot be altered or suspended because of any exigency or interest of the state, no 
matter how urgent. The state may use its coercive power over individuals only in response to a 
crime, for which individual guilt must be proven according to the procedures regulating a 
criminal trial. If war implicates a logic of collective responsibility, crime presupposes the 
principle that guilt is individual.  
Finally, these two conditions are distinguished by very distinct ends. The end of warfare 
was the imposition of right by force, through the military defeat of the enemy. Hence holding 
prisoners of war is recognized as a legitimate measure by the laws and usages of war because it 
serves the end of military victory. Detaining the enemy’s soldiers is solely for the sake of 
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preventing them from returning to the battlefield, thus prisoners of war are held in preventative 
detention. They have not, however, committed any crime in fighting. Thus, according to the laws 
and usages of war, they cannot be tried, punished, interrogated, mistreated, etc. The end of the 
criminal paradigm – especially before the influence of utilitarian theories of crime – is the 
determination of individual guilt or innocence through the legally constituted procedures of a 
trial, and the re-instantiation of the rule of law through legally constituted punishment. All of 
this, of course, is incoherent without the jurisdiction of a neutral judge maintained by effective 
internal sovereignty.      
 
Sovereign Conquest and Imperial Subjects 
The contrast between the crime and war paradigms, therefore, presents a dualistic framework in 
which two distinct legal frameworks – the internal juridical space governed by the constitution, 
and the external space between sovereigns, governed by the law of nations and laws of war – 
each occupy their own exclusive sphere. This structure, of course, was a direct application of the 
fundamental principles of the jus publicum europaeum analyzed in the previous chapter. A 
second domain of unified external sovereignty, derived in large part from the same body of early 
modern natural rights theory, played perhaps an even more important role in constitutional 
theory of the early republic: the unlimited discretionary powers expressed in the sovereign rights 
of discovery, conquest and dominion. We saw in the previous chapter how the jus publicum 
europaeum was able to balance internal rule of law and external formal sovereign equality 
among European powers only by maintaining an exceptional space outside Europe of 
unrestricted territorial conquest and dominion. A similar structure – distinguishing between 
internal enumerated powers and external sovereign prerogative, between the rights accorded to 
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autonomous citizens and the discretionary governance of dependent subjects – was a core feature 
of antebellum American constitutional development and political thought.415 The mutual 
recognition of the laws of war (at least in theory) and formal sovereign equality among 
“civilized” powers confined war between states within an established, customary legal order. The 
sovereign control over occupied territories and indigenous subjects was, on the other hand, a 
more radically discretionary space, outside the dualistic orders of both crime and war. In a 
rapidly expanding republic, with an increasing number of non-citizen subjects as well as self-
governing settlers on its territories, the spatial differentiation of republican norm and imperial 
“state of exception” increasingly helped to define the constitutional trajectory of the republic. 
 One of the core issues around which this exceptional zone developed was the status of 
Native Americans. Two of the primary categories for theorizing this question were peculiarly 
Orwellian doctrines of “discovery” and “vacant territory” derived from early modern theories of 
the laws of nations.  The doctrine of discovery, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in a 1823  
opinion, granted “to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the 
natives and establishing settlements upon it.”416 As we saw in the previous chapter, this doctrine 
prevented conflict among European powers over territorial claims outside of Europe, thereby 
mediating between formal sovereign equality of the inter-European order and the unlimited 
“vacant” spaces of the New World. I argued that such mediating categories helped contain the 
exceptional space of unlimited land appropriation to the New World, and prevented it from 
infiltrating the legally bounded interstate order within Europe itself – the jus publicum 
europaeum.417  
                                                
415 Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom   
416 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 573. 
417 Carl Schmitt, Nomos, chapter 3.  
  
224 
Reviewing this history, Marshall notes that the claim of “discovery” meant that the 
“complete sovereignty” of the original indigenous inhabitants was “necessarily diminished” by 
the European discovering power’s exclusive rights over land acquisition. In addition to excluding 
relations with all other European powers, this “diminished” sovereignty meant that the degree of 
independence or autonomy granted to the Indian tribes was not fixed by the law of nations but 
was determined at the discretion of the discovering power. The British Crown, for instance, was 
free to treat Indians as independent sovereigns and purchase land from them by treaty, or it could 
deny their sovereignty altogether, acquire their land by conquest, govern them as a British 
subjects, or as a separate colonized population, or even eliminate their population from settled 
territory.418 This unlimited discretionary power involved the right to declare an exception to the 
laws of nations governing conquest. Marshall notes that the customs of civilization and the law 
of nations prescribe that conquered populations should be absorbed within the population of the 
victorious nation and accorded the same rights and status as the population as a whole. In 
America, however, the Crown’s determination that “tribes of Indians inhabiting this country 
were fierce savages” without property or industry made them “a people with whom it was 
impossible to mix,”419 and therefore suspended the law of conquest, creating an exceptional 
status for Indians as “in some respects as a dependent and in some respects as a distinct people 
occupying a country claimed by Great Britain…”420  
According to the organization of external sovereign personhood in the British 
Constitution, absolute title over all such “vacant lands” (meaning lands occupied by Indians) is 
“vested in the Crown, as representing the nation, and the exclusive power to grant them is 
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admitted to reside in the Crown as a branch of the royal prerogative.”421 With the Treaty of Paris, 
this absolute prerogative power over territories passed from the Crown to the independent United 
States as a whole. Thus, 
The United States, then, has unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its 
civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold and assert in themselves the title by which 
it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive 
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by conquest, and gave also 
a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow them to 
exercise.”422  
Thus, while internally the old imperial prerogative was formally abolished and all federal power 
was strictly limited to what was enumerated in the constitutional text, the unlimited imperial 
prerogative possessed by the Crown passed directly and undiminished to the unified powers of 
the federal government over non-citizens and territories. Moreover, the ideology of 
decentralized, agrarian republicanism not only required that these two faces of sovereignty be 
kept absolutely distinct; it also coupled them together by linking republican self-government to 
territorial expansion, conquest and continual imperial rule over subject populations.423 Of the 
members of the founding generation, this contradictory structure of republic and empire was 
embodied perhaps most clearly by the mercurial political imagination of Thomas Jefferson. In a 
letter to James Madison, speculating on the prospects of annexing Florida, Cuba, Mexico and 
Canada, Jefferson declares that “we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never 
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surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well 
calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.”424 
 
Between Crime and War: Martial Law and the Suspension of Habeas Corpus 
These categorical distinctions, of course, are neither anthropologically universal nor timeless 
logical postulates. They are principles that arose from the historical formation of the modern 
state and the development of constitutionalism. The distinction also clarifies the general 
problematic addressed in this chapter: what happens in circumstances when the internal 
conditions of sovereignty are disrupted, but fall short of an actual invasion triggering a state of 
war? How does the peace/war distinction deal with boundary cases in which internal sovereignty 
is temporarily impeded, without constituting a state of war? The most important category for 
addressing this question in the early American republic is not extralegal actions but martial law. 
Thomas Jefferson, in reference conspiracy to separate territories in the Southwest of the United 
States, expressed his alarm and frustration that the conspirators were able to manipulate civil 
laws to avoid prosecution. “I did wish to see these people get what they deserved;” Jefferson 
wrote, 
and under the maxim of the law itself, that inter arma silent leges, that in an encampment expecting daily 
attack from a powerful enemy, self-preservation is paramount to all law, I expected that instead of invoking 
the forms of the law to cover traitors, all good citizens would have concurred in securing them… There are 
extreme cases where the laws become inadequate even to their own preservation, and where the universal 
resource is a dictator, or martial law.425 
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Jefferson neatly summarizes the criteria for martial law, or the substitution of the will of the 
commander for the supremacy of laws. This can be justified only in a condition of extreme, 
existential danger, in which basic political order has been disrupted and where obeying ordinary 
legal restrictions would make self-preservation impossible.426    
Jefferson here is reflecting a fairly longstanding common law theory of defining martial 
law as a boundary category located at a precise division between the paradigms of crime and 
war. According to this theoretical tradition, martial law always referred – since the early Stuarts 
– to the category of war and an abeyance of ordinary legislative authority.427 Employed by the 
absolutist interpretation of royal prerogative, it was listed in the petition of right as one of the 
abuses of the Crown. After 1689 and the triumph of parliamentary sovereignty, martial law was 
confined exclusively to the realm of war and military law. Sir Matthew Hale declared in 1713 
that “in Truth and Reality it is not a Law, but something indulged rather than allowed as Law;” 
and confined it strictly to “Members of the Army, or those of the opposite Army, and never was 
so much indulged as intended to be (executed or) exercised upon others.”428 Indicating the 
principle of effective internal sovereignty we referred to earlier, Hale makes the contrast between 
martial law and the crime paradigm explicit: “the Exercise of Martial Law, whereby any Person 
should lose his Life or Member, or Liberty, may not be permitted in Time of Peace, when the 
King’s Courts are open for all Persons to receive Justice, according to the Laws of the Land.”429  
Martial law, therefore, reflects the theoretical model we have described, resting on the 
categorical dualisms of war and peace, crime and public enmity. In war, martial law was the 
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valid law of belligerents on both sides. Martial law was not, however, tied to an actually existing 
state of war but could be employed in any circumstance where ordinary courts could not 
function, i.e. where effective internal sovereignty has been temporarily disrupted. Martial law in 
this sense definitionally maps onto the theory of emergency powers I have proposed as the 
“classic paradigm” – a condition of temporary disruption or abeyance of the conditions of 
political order that make constitutional rights possible. There is an important distinction between 
the criteria of martial law model which characterized the classical paradigm, and even the most 
extreme terms like “self-preservation,” “dire threat,” “strict necessity,” etc. The latter, no matter 
how frightening and urgent, characterize probabilistic judgments about some anticipated 
condition. Martial law, on the other hand, represents an especially restrictive criteria for 
emergency powers because it refers to an actual state or condition rather than some calculation 
about what might occur in the future. Although there is some amount of variation in historical 
sources, the most consistent criterion for the validity of martial law until the late 19th century was 
the actual condition of disrupted internal sovereignty, measured by the physical ability of courts 
to open their doors and perform their business.430 Hence even Jefferson, in the letter quoted 
above, refers to ongoing conditions of political disorder in New Orleans, and the inability of 
ordinary criminal law to apprehend the treasonous individuals.431  
The fact that martial law referred to an actual condition rather than a future probable 
outcome was also the source of its theoretical coherence. Its jurisdiction categorically excluded 
civilians, and extended to “persons” only in the paradigmatic case where internal sovereignty has 
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been disrupted and ordinary courts cannot function. In other words, citizens in the sense of 
actually enjoying their constitutional rights were definitionally excluded from martial law, since 
if they have no access to courts, their positive status as rights bearing citizens of a particular 
sovereign state is in abeyance. For the same reason, although they are technically distinct, 
martial law is theoretically consistent with the suspension of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is 
paradigmatic of the rights enjoyed by citizens when charged with a crime. The condition for 
suspending these rights is identical to the condition for the extending the jurisdiction of martial 
law: when courts cannot open and function, when internal sovereignty has been disrupted.   
The historical precedents of martial law in the early American republic seem to confirm 
these strict limitations. During its first three decades, the US federal government dispatched 
troops to restore internal political order on six occasions; in all of these except one the paradigm 
of martial law was deliberately avoided: troops were under the exclusive orders of civil officials, 
and did no more than enforce ordinary laws.432 The Burr conspiracy was the single exception in 
this period, and its reception effectively confirmed the rule of scrupulously avoiding martial law 
in any but the most immediate necessity. General Wilkinson, who was dispatched to New 
Orleans to impose order, attempted repeatedly to persuade Jefferson and the Louisiana Governor 
to suspend habeas corpus and declare martial law. Both declined, arguing in the first case that 
only the legislature has that power, and in the second case that only the physical condition of a 
breakdown of political order, and not a mere decision of the executive, can authorize martial 
law.433 In the aftermath, Jefferson pressured Congress to pass new legislation criminalizing 
conspiracies similar to Burr’s. A lengthy Congressional debate over the legislation evinced a 
deep commitment toward maintaining the strictest possible restrictions over martial law. 
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Articulating a widely shared view, one representative declared that “Society will never submit 
life to the discretion of a military court, except under the most absolute and imperious necessity, 
in which a civil court cannot interfere, particularly during war.”434 This restrictive theory of 
martial law was confirmed again in cases stemming from the war of 1812.  
In 1814, citing the presence of the British Navy surrounding New Orleans, General 
Andrew Jackson placed the area under martial law. The initial declaration remained 
unchallenged: the physical presence within the territory of enemy forces with the intent and 
capacity for conquest is a paradigm case of the martial law theory. After the British Navy 
withdrew, however, Jackson maintained martial law over New Orleans for another four months, 
withdrawing it only when he received definitive news of the Treaty of Ghent.435 In the period 
after the attacking forces withdrew, Jackson’s decision was widely criticized and condemned, 
earning him a conviction of contempt of court and a $1000 fine at the hands of a Federal District 
Judge whose habeas corpus writ Jackson had earlier ignored.436 The basis of the contempt 
conviction, of course, was the strict criteria of martial law itself, which is valid “law” only in 
conditions where constituted judicial authority has broken down.   
 
Martial Law and the Outside of the Body Politic 
These rigid restrictions on martial law were carefully observed for the free British subjects in the 
American colonies.  However – consistently with this definition – martial law was often 
employed over colonized populations that were excluded from this status; in Ireland, the 
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Caribbean and other British colonies.437 Likewise, after independence, the early republic 
scrupulously maintained the absolute prohibition on the jurisdiction of martial law within the 
body politic when courts have opened their doors. Remarkably, martial law was never put into 
effect internally during the six separate rebellions that occurred in the first three decades after 
independence. During these rebellions, civilian courts continued to function in their midst, and 
the state militias were led by civilian authorities, and applied ordinary criminal law.438    
 However, as in the British case, these careful restrictions gave way in relation to those 
who were both non-citizens and outside the European spatial order governed by the non-statutory 
laws and customs of war. Some legal historians have identified the “old tradition of swift and 
discretionary justice” of martial law as the key foundation for the development of American 
slave law.439 While carefully avoided in the recognized states, martial law was more often 
declared in territories such as New Orleans and Florida. Moreover, the common-law natural right 
to self-defense was an accepted basis for violence against native Americans on the frontiers.440 
Here the issue was not the functioning of courts but the lack of a common authority between 
citizens and “savages.” In the Seminole War, Gen. Jackson was admonished for accusing two 
British subjects as spies and punishing them under martial law. The problem, according to the 
congressional report, was that he treated the British men as if they were Indians. According to 
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the report, the law of nations recognizes that “where the war is with a savage nation, which 
observes no rules, and never gives quarter, we may punish them in the persons of any of their 
people whom we may take, (these belonging to the number of the guilty,) and endeavor, by this 
rigorous proceeding, to force them to respect the laws of humanity; but wherever severity is not 
absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a duty.”441 Hence, the scrupulous limitations on martial 
law internally are entirely consistent with its jurisdiction externally. Martial law was employed 
with both European belligerents, who were treated according to the laws and customs of war, and 
“savages” – and, in the South, rebellious slaves – which constituted exceptions to jus belli.442 The 
distinctions between citizens, European or white public enemies and “savages” was once again 
emphasized during the civil war. Both the laws and customs of war and statutory codes required 
that captured Confederate soldiers be treated not as criminals but as prisoners of war; they could 
not be tried for any crime but could only be detained for the duration of the war. In the same 
period, Sioux Indians fought against settlers in Minnesota, although no war was formally 
declared and thus, no distinctions between combatants and non-combatants were observed. After 
the settlers’ victory, the Sioux remaining in custody were tried and sentenced to death en 
masse.443  
 Hence, the jurisdictional boundaries of martial law were constituted not only by the 
condition of internal sovereignty but also by the boundaries of membership in the body politic. 
The rigidity of these distinctions resulted in the strictly limited and exceptional status of 
emergency powers that Jules Lobel and others contrast favorably with subsequent developments. 
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This is certainly much truth to this contrast, but at the same time we must keep in mind the fact 
that this exclusive doctrine was held by a slaveholding and expansionist republic that exercised 
power over territory and inhabitants that were excluded entirely from the body politic. “Savages” 
and slaves were visible to the law only through the natural rights of necessity, and were under the 
permanent jurisdiction of martial law. The comparatively unique strictness of emergency powers 
in the early American republic was accompanied by an equally radical distinction between 
citizens who enjoyed their full constitutional rights under conditions that would elsewhere count 
as states of emergency, and non-citizens slaves and native groups who found themselves subject 
to something akin to a permanent state of exception.444 If anything, one might say that from the 
perspective of non-European non-citizens, this brief period resembles the radical condition of 
anormativity at the heart of the liberal system of legal norms famously described by Giorgio 
Agamben.445 However, while Agamben abstracts and universalizes this historically specific 
condition, I shall argue that pressures for democratic inclusion undermined the rigid distinctions 
of this constitutional model of emergency powers itself, giving way to a new, more inclusive, if 
ambivalent, order. In the next section, I will examine two important instances where these 
demands for inclusion raised a set of penumbral questions for which the martial law paradigm 
had no answer, and forced the development of a new, unarticulated distinction within the 
classical paradigm: the distinction between what I will call “sovereign” and “commissarial” 
forms of martial law.  
 
Martial Law and the Problem of Inclusion 
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Commissarial Martial Law and the Constituent Power 
The difficulty distinguishing between the powers exercising sovereign and commissarial 
dictatorship in different contexts. These cases do not arise from a straightforward constitutional 
rupture (as in, say, France in 1791) but from attempts at inclusion in the body politic of 
previously constitutionally excluded groups. As we shall see in this case, and even more 
dramatically in the next section, these episodes raised penumbral difficulties in the classical 
paradigm because the constitutionality of emergency powers hinged on the terms of membership 
in the body politic itself. While neither of these experiences were sufficient to overthrow the 
classical paradigm textually, in practice it became increasingly infused with contestation and 
anomaly, undermining its claim to impose immediate and incontestable criteria on the use of 
emergency powers. 
The relationship between the classical paradigm of emergency powers and those excluded from 
the body politic would reemerge in 1842, during the first declaration of martial law in the 
incorporated states. This instance is especially notable because martial law for the first time was 
given jurisdiction over white male citizens who were excluded from political rights, but not civil 
rights, during the Dorr rebellion.446  
Carl Schmitt’s distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship.447 For 
Schmitt, both types of dictatorship properly speaking refer to the temporary emergency powers 
exercised by commission; dictatorship is always a delegated rather than a sovereign power. 
Sovereign dictatorship is commissioned by the constituent power for the purposes of creating a 
new constitutional order. It is associated with the emergency powers exercised during the 
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revolutionary creation of a new constitution.448 I shall discuss this in depth when we turn to the 
Civil War. Commissarial dictatorship, the model relevant here, is a commission from the 
constituted power for the purposes of restoring the old constitutional order.449 In contrast to 
sovereign dictatorship, commissarial dictatorship is a conservative function, commissioned by 
the already existing but imperiled institutions, meant to overcome the emergency and restore the 
status quo ante.  
I shall leave aside the specifics of dictatorship – which largely belong to another, 
continental tradition – and refer to commissarial and sovereign emergency powers to distinguish 
between two types of commissions. The concept of commissarial emergency powers is apposite 
for the Dorr rebellion, in which martial law was justified as a commissarial emergency measure 
commissioned by the constituted power to restore effective internal sovereignty that had been 
disrupted by a new constituent power. What is distinctive about this case – aside from being the 
first judicial treatment of the problem of martial law450 – is that it highlights the emergence of 
this distinction for the first time as a problem. For all the safeguards of the classical paradigm, 
this instance demonstrates that it lacked criteria for distinguishing in a non-question begging 
manner between the status quo and the emergency.  
1842, Rhode Island was an aristocratic anomaly in the rapidly democratizing United 
States. The colonial charter of 1663 was still in effect, reserving power to an old landed and 
mercantile elite from the colonial era. The charter’s property restrictions disenfranchised well 
over half the adult male population, and severely malapportioned representation in favor of the 
older rural centers of power at the expense of the manufacturing centers where workers and Irish 
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immigrants were concentrated.451 Lagging behind the expansion of white male suffrage in every 
other state, the charter’s critics declared sarcastically that “all men are created equal, except in 
Rhode Island.”452  Convinced that their exclusion by the existing charter would be permanent, the 
the working class-based Rhode Island Suffrage Association announced that they were bypassing 
the charter’s authority altogether and convening a People’s Convention to draft a new 
constitution, in the name of the people’s constituent power. “If the sovereignty don’t reside in the 
people,” asked one member, “where in the hell does it reside?” The Convention produced a 
“People’s Constitution,” enshrining universal male suffrage, reapportioned the legislature. In an 
attempt to head off the crisis, the legislature called its own convention, which produced a 
“Freemen’s” constitution that incrementally expanded suffrage while leaving the state’s colonial 
power structure largely intact. The People’s Constitution won out overwhelmingly in popular 
ratification, while the charter’s more limited proposal was voted down. 
It is important to add that there was by this time nothing unusual about this assertion of 
the popular constituent power over the authority of state charters. The Rhode Island reformers 
were following a tradition since Independence of states that reformed their constitutions and 
expanded suffrage through informal “conventions” rather than formal amendments.453 By the 
1840s, Rhode Island was not only exceptional but the only state that had not undergone reform 
by convention. Hence, the question of which status quo ante was being preserved was far from 
clear – to the Rhode Island oligarchy, it was the constituted charter, to the Whig and Democratic 
popular opinion, it was the expansion of representation by using the informal but 70 year old 
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tradition of constitution-making by convention.454  
 After the People’s Constitution was ratified, the charter legislature responded by 
declaring the new government treasonous and began arresting the Dorrites, led by the Thomas 
Dorr, elected governor by the new constitution. Dorr fought back, gaining control of most of the 
local state militia. Finally, the charter Governor, unable to depend on the ordinary militia, 
declared martial law over the entire state, and commissioned federal troops to savagely suppress 
the movement by force. Luther, a Dorrite who was imprisoned under martial law, sued a military 
officer for breaking and entering, arguing that the charter under which the officer had acted had 
no legal force. Luther v. Borden, which mounted a direct legal challenge to martial law in the 
name of the constituent power of the people of Rhode Island, reached the Court in 1848.455  
 The majority was not persuaded by the argument that the new People’s Constitution was 
the only legally valid source of law in Rhode Island. At the same time, the declaration of martial 
law and commissarial emergency powers of the federal militia meant that the charter constitution 
was not in effect either. Instead, the court argued that a judicial determination of whether the 
constituted or constituent power was the source of law involved “political questions” that are by 
nature non-judiciable.456 Noting that federal troops were commissioned to crush the rebellion, 
and the charter government introduced a new constitution according to its own procedures, the 
Court acknowledge the legal authority of the constituted power, and by logical induction, its 
authority to declare martial law and commissarial emergency powers.457 Since the crime 
paradigm was disrupted and martial law was legitimately in place, Luther had no grounds to sue 
the military officer for breaking and entering.  
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 One might argue that the Court was remaining consistent with the theoretical basis of 
martial law and the meaning of effective internal sovereignty. The clash between the constituent 
power’s right to create a new constitution, and the constituted power’s rejection of that claim 
create a condition in which there is no common superior judge. In other words, judicially the 
Court can only recognize Rhode Island as a condition where internal sovereignty had been 
disrupted.458 Since the new constitution rejected the authority of any constituted state court, 
Rhode Island was by definition in a condition where no common, superior judicial authority 
existed. From this perspective, ordinary procedures of justice were disrupted, meeting the 
conditions for imposing martial law.  
Interpreted this way, the ‘political question’ doctrine effectively meant that the question 
of who could claim to represent the status quo ante and had authority to commission emergency 
powers could not be decided judicially but only politically. The court could only recognize the 
side that “won” the conflict, and rule accordingly. While this may be logically consistent, it is 
especially notable how this conclusion illustrates the ironic inversion of the classical paradigm’s 
rigid restrictions when the character of the emergency is determined by who is counted as part of 
the constitutionally defined body politic. In such circumstances, the extraordinarily strict 
limitations imposed by the martial law definition of emergency powers amount to little more 
than the more familiarly “realist” criteria of which side can impose order and defeat its 
opponents. When the lines between the included and the excluded were as clear and stable as the 
lines between war and peace, the paradigm could claim a remarkable degree of both internal 
theoretical consistency and constitutional protectiveness. The mounting constitutional pressures, 
however, exerted by democratization and demands for inclusion brought such “penumbral” cases 
                                                
458 ibid., 43 
  
239 
in the classical paradigm of emergency powers increasingly to the forefront.459  
 
Civil War and Reconstruction 
I want to briefly bring all of these threads together through an analysis of perhaps the most well 
known 19th century case dealing with emergency powers: ex parte Milligan (1866). Milligan’s 
frequently cited majority dictum is an eloquent restatement of the principles of the classical 
paradigm. Ironically, Milligan’s paradigmatic depiction could also be regarded as confirmation 
of Hegel’s  famous observation that the owl of Minerva only flies at dusk.460 In bringing together 
all of the strands I have discussed so far – executive prerogative, peace and war and the problem 
of exclusion – I shall argue that in spite of the self-confidence of its ringing endorsement, 
Milligan illustrates the increasing tension and contradictions encountered by the classical 
paradigm. While the decision is still valid precedent, I shall argue in section II that later 19th 
century attempts to formally adhere to Milligan brought the classic paradigm to a point of 
collapse. And in section III, we shall see how Quirin (1942) “updated” Milligan by empting it of 
any possible content it might have. For now, though, I want to briefly mention the tensions and 
contradictions surrounding the apparently unequivocal decision. 
 These tensions are already present at the outset of the Civil War. Lincoln’s actions in 
1861 have been often been interpreted as classic examples of constitutional dictatorship as well 
as “extralegal” prerogative.461 This is at least partially correct, but it overlooks an important 
distinction from these models that the Civil War brought to the outset. When the Confederacy 
initiated the war, Lincoln did not wait for Congress to assemble. He responded without Congress 
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by calling forth state militia, suspending habeas corpus in areas sympathetic to the South, and 
placed a blockade on Southern states, all war and emergency powers that are constitutionally 
reserved for Congress. When Chief Justice Taney ruled that Lincoln had no authority to suspend 
the writ and commanded that an individual being held must be tried or released, Lincoln flatly 
ignored the ruling.462 Unlike the examples we have previously been discussing with martial law, 
most scholars agree that these actions were facially unconstitutional by any conventional 
standard.463 They also appear to best meet the criteria of “necessity” and “self-preservation” cited 
by Lobel. Hence, we could regard these as examples of the prerogative in the sense I have 
defined the term.  
 Interestingly, however, when Lincoln defended his actions to a special session of 
Congress three months later, he did not directly invoke the Jeffersonian paradigm and frankly 
acknowledged illegality. Rather, he launched a vigorous constitutional defense of his actions 
stemming from his position as commander in chief and his oath to faithfully execute the laws. 
Only later in the speech does Lincoln refer the prerogative justification. “Whether strictly legal 
or not,” he asserts that his measures were justified by necessity and public demand. Moreover, he 
calls on Congress to immediately pass them into legislation, and adds that none of the measures 
exceeded the constitutional powers of Congress.464  Finally, Lincoln argued that  
 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of 
execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it 
been perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in 
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such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the 
innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws, 
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a 
case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed 
that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?465  
 
 
This passage appears to conform to the “extralegal model,” admitting that “one law,” “to a very 
limited extent” was violated, but only by necessity. In fact, Lincoln’s speech subtly incorporates 
the Jeffersonian justification within a very different understanding of constitutionalism itself. 
The result is to radically transform the earlier justification entirely. Lincoln’s address to 
Congress leaves no ambiguity as to what is being preserved: not the state or the social order but 
the Constitution. But it would be a mistake to identify the Constitution invoked by Lincoln 
directly with the constitutional text itself. At the moment of Lincoln’s speech, the interpretation 
of the constitution was more fundamentally contested, and carried higher stakes, than perhaps at 
any other period in American history. Lincoln’s own party had campaigned for office on the vow 
of overturning the legally binding if morally appalling Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court. 
However practically implausible the constitutional argument for secession may have been, it 
could claim a distinguished lineage of interpretation from John C. Calhoun, Andrew Jackson to 
Thomas Jefferson and even, arguably, James Madison. While this argument for “nullification” 
was always contested, the closest the constitutional text itself came to directly addressing the 
matter was the 10th Amendment, which appeared to place the secessionist case on firmer 
textualist ground. In any case, the argument that violating one law was necessary in order to save 




the constitutional as a whole actually begs the fundamental question of what the constitution as a 
“whole” is, and what it requires. The secessionist case was that it was a legally binding contract 
between independent sovereign states; by violating the terms of the contract, it is the federal 
government, acting in the name of the union of the “People,” that violated the terms of the 
contract and therefore dissolved the union. Lincoln’s understanding reverses this: the “People” 
forming a more perfect union is not a voluntary association but the historical and national bond 
of the Nation, inseparable from the constitution itself. If one “single law” threatens to destroy the 
People embodied in the constitution, then the constitution itself requires that the single law be 
violated to preserve the whole.466  
 The theoretical underpinnings of this idea of constitutionalized emergency powers 
incorporate late 18th century constitutional theories of the constituent power with a historical 
conception of the Nation that belongs to the moment of progressive liberal nationalism of the 
mid-19th century.467 For Lincoln, the People which constituted itself to form a more perfect Union 
cannot be reduced to a static legal contract. It is a Nation, a historical actuality and a process of 
self-realization that is progressively determined through the constitutional procedures the Nation 
gives itself. The Nation was not a creation of the text of the constitution itself but the common 
destiny set in motion by the Declaration of Independence and the War with Great Britain: “four 
score and seven years ago” does not refer to the ratification of the constitution in 1789 but to the 
declaration of an independent Nation in 1776.468 In this Republican, “nationalist” constitutional 
theory, individual constitutional provisions shift subtly to the margins, while the immanent 
                                                
466 See George Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution. In contrast, see Daniel Farber Lincoln’s Constitution,  
467 cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, chapters 1, 3. For a contrasting account, see Bendict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities, chap. 3.  
468 Gettysburg Address, 1863. “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new 
nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal… we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- 
and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” 
  
243 
principles set out in the Preamble and, especially, the Declaration of Independence occupy the 
center of the constitutional system. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln lays out this theory, 
arguing that the positive constitution may be transformed by convention or abolished by 
revolution. But only the Nation itself can do these things, it cannot reverse history and undo its 
own unity.469 The “common bonds of affection” uniting the people are a historical actuality, 
which gives the constitution its legitimacy and binding force.470As the Republican national 
platform of 1860 declared,  
The maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence and 
embodied in the Federal Constitution, “That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed,” is essential to the preservation of our Republican 
institutions; and that the Federal Constitution, the Rights of the States, and the Union of the 
States, must and shall be preserved.471 
In the context of the constitutional debate then raging around Dred Scott and secession, the 
notion that preserving the constitution amounted to defending the principle that “all men are 
created equal” was not in any sense conservative; it was revolutionary. The extraordinary powers 
                                                
469 “This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the 
existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary right to 
dismember or overthrow it. I can not be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of 
having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the 
rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the 
instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being 
afforded the people to act upon it.” First Inaugeral, 1861.  
470 Hence the famous closing words of the first inaugural: “We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be 
enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, 
stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will 
yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.” 
 
471 Quoted in Lazare, The Frozen Republic, 107-8. 
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such a theory would authorize could not in any straightforward sense restore the status quo ante 
of a nation “half slave and half free”; rather, it suggests that the founding principles of the 
Declaration can be preserved only by breaking through the constitutional deadlocks and 
compromises that prevent the realization of those principles and pervert them.  
Lincoln’s account of constitutionalized emergency powers, therefore, cannot be separated 
from the progressive nationalist vision that animated his constitutional theory in general. Unlike 
his more radically abolitionist colleagues, the emergency for Lincoln first and foremost was not 
slavery itself but the direct assault by secession on the historical union that is the precondition for 
the constitution. In such an extraordinary emergency, Lincoln’s violation of “one single law” to 
preserve the union is not only within constitutional authority, it is an absolute requirement of the 
Constitution.  Finally, immediately following the passage quoted above, Lincoln finalizes his 
break with the 18th century idea of “extralegal” emergency powers. After giving a constitutional 
justification of illegality, he concluded that “it was not believed that this question [of illegality] 
was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated.”472 Throughout the war, he repeated 
similar versions of this argument justifying the violation of one law in order to preserve all the 
laws, then suggesting, however ambivalently, that this logic provided legal authorization even 
for admitted case in which a single law was violated.473  
Lincoln’s argument, despite its ambiguities, is in some tension with the classical 
paradigm. Whereas the classical prerogative acted outside the constitution in order to preserve a 
                                                
472 Message to Congress, 1861. After Lincoln’s address, Attorney General Edward Bates submitted a lengthy 
argument for the constitutionality of Lincoln’s actions that went far beyond anything claimed by Lincoln, claiming 
inherent presidential war powers and in some ways prefiguring later 20th century theories of the plenary powers of 
the executive, at least during war. See Opinion of Attorney General Bates 74, 81 (1861). This is given extensive 
treatment in James Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln (1926).  
473 “I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the 
preservation of the institution, therefore the preservation of the nation… I could not feel that, to the best of my 
ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the 
wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together.” Quoted in Paludan, A Covenant with Death, 19-21. 
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rigid textual adherence to its boundaries, Lincoln’s much more capacious, nationalist 
constitutional theory gives priority to the historical “bonds of affection” of national destiny over 
any rigidly textualist limitations that contradict that basis. Moreover, it ties the normative 
essence of the constitution to an unending quest for a more perfect union through the progressive 
realization of equality and freedom through history. This did not mean that Lincoln prioritized 
the abolition of slavery of everything else. Famously, he did not.474 But it does mean that he was 
prepared to violate “one law” to transform the textualist impediments that were tearing apart the 
union by creating a new condition, rather than restoring an old one. Lincoln’s emergency powers 
was not limited to restoring the status quo ante but extended to the creation of a new, 
transformed status quo. If a return to the status quo meant returning to the textualist 
contradictions that created the crisis in the first place, Lincoln was prepared to use emergency 
powers to conserve the historical trajectory of the nation by transforming the constitutional 
contradictions that were textually frozen in place.  Of course, as it became increasingly clear that 
the union could only be saved by abolishing slavery, Lincoln did so by executive proclamation, 
moving even further across the blurred line between conservative and revolutionary emergency 
powers, or what following Carl Schmitt we have called commissarial and sovereign dictatorship.   
We have seen an example of commissarial emergency powers in the suppression of the Dorr 
rebellion in the previous section. For Schmitt, both commissarial and sovereign dictatorship are 
technically commissioned forms of emergency powers. Whereas commissarial dictatorship is 
commissioned by the constituted power, sovereign dictatorship is commissioned by the 
constituent power. And its purpose is to create a new constitutional order rather than preserve the 
old one.475 Whereas Schmitt suggested that the legitimacy of commissarial dictatorship is legality 
                                                
474 Quote first inaugeral again 
475 Schmitt, La Dictature, 147 
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itself (i.e., the legality of the constituted power), the source of legitimacy of sovereignty 
dictatorship is not legality but democratic popular sovereignty.476  
 
Reconstruction Congress between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship 
Lincoln’s own theory navigated with characteristic subtlety and ambivalence between the 
commissarial and sovereign models, combining elements of each but never unambiguously 
assuming the position of either. Many in the increasingly powerful radical wing of the 
Republican party, however, didn’t share this ambivalence. “For one, I don’t care a rag for ‘the 
Union as it was,” as one abolitionist Union soldier declared. “I want to fight for the Union better 
than it was.”477 Under the ideological leadership of the radical Republicans, it was Congress 
rather than the executive that placed itself in the revolutionary vanguard, struggling to act as a 
sovereign dictatorship. Thaddeus Stevens, the imposing Republican leader in the House, best 
embodied the quest to convert Congress into a revolutionary instrument of unconstrained 
sovereignty. In 1862, he declared of slaveholders: 
I would seize every foot of land, and every dollar of their property as our armies 
go along, and put it to the uses of the war, to the pay of our debts. I would plant 
the South with a military colony if I could not make them submit otherwise. I 
would sell their land to the soldiers of independence; I would send those soldiers 
there with arms in their hands to occupy the heritage of traitors, and build up 
there a land of free men and of freedom, which, fifty years hence, would swarm 
with its hundreds of millions without a slave upon its soil.478 
 
                                                
476 Arato, “Goodbye to Dictatorship?” 
477 113. 
478 Quoted in Lazare, 116. 
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Congress’ attempt to impose a radical reconstruction on the South after 1865 was an even more 
direct expression of the sovereign dictatorial model than its posture during the war. But the 
peculiarity of the American reconstruction was that Congress’ sovereign dictatorship continued 
to cloak itself in commissarial garb. While clearly engaging in an extraordinary attempt to 
fashion a radically new constitutional order, Congress’ attempted to do so in formally 
commissarial terms, creating a unique set of dynamics that were not captured by Schmitt’s clear-
cut distinctions. I shall return to these dynamics in reconstruction in a moment, but first I want to 
turn back to Milligan’s rejection of sovereign dictatorship and insistence on the classical model. I 
shall argue that this reversion to the classic martial law paradigm, however, was a paradoxical 
one that directly called into question the basic coordinates of that paradigm. The broader political 
context of the case effectively pitted the due process and equal protection rights claimed by 
white Southerners under the antebellum, slaveholding constitution against the attempt to extend 
those same rights to former slaves. The wider paradox of Milligan, therefore, is that its principled 
refusal to allow the suspension of the rights associated with the crime paradigm…  
In 1863, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the president to suspend habeas corpus 
“whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it.” The president empowered generals 
to declare martial law in several border states and detained individuals without charge, and 
numerous individuals were tried for violations of the laws of war by military tribunal.479 One 
such conviction reached the Supreme Court on appeal in 1866, after the war was over.480 Justice 
Davis, writing for the majority, ruled that the military tribunal that tried Milligan was 
                                                
479 There was great variation in the severity of military justice, depending on the general in charge of the region. In 
all cases, Lincoln insisted on reviewing all death penalty convictions, and commuted numerous sentences. See 
Stone, Perilous Times, chap. 2.  
480 In 1864 a military tribunal tried Lampan Milligan for sedition. At the time, the circuit court in Indianapolis was 
open and functioning. He was found guilty, and sentenced to death. By the time the sentence reached the president 
for review, the war was over and President Johnson approved the death sentence. Milligan asked the circuit court for 
a writ of habeas corpus, and the case was referred to the Supreme Court. 
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unauthorized, and that he should be released. The majority acknowledged that Congress 
possessed the authority to suspend habeas corpus in cases of war and insurrection, as it did in 
1863. Congress possesses this emergency power even where effective internal sovereignty is 
threatened but not actually disrupted.481 It also recognized that the purely military power to 
declare martial law “when war exists in a community and the courts and civil authorities are 
overthrown” and try offenses against the laws of war by military tribunals.482 But it sharply 
distinguished the emergency power to suspend habeas corpus from the military power to declare 
martial law and constitute military tribunals. The former only allows prisoners to be held, but it 
does not permit the military to try offenses under the laws of war. Hence, the tribunal that 
convicted Milligan in Indiana, where ordinary courts were open and functioning, had no 
jurisdiction under the constitution.  
 In ringing terms, the Justice Davis forcefully asserted the inviolability of the boundary 
between war and peace, enmity and crime. There is “No graver question,” he asserted, than the 
fundamental, ordering distinction between the paradigms of war and crime. 
 
[i]t is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according 
to law. The power of punishment is, alone through the means which the laws have provided for that 
purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment, no matter how great an offender 
the individual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or 
endangered its safety.483 
 
 
                                                
481 115 




The government lawyers argued that the military tribunal’s jurisdiction was established by “the 
laws and usages of war.” Miller rejected this as an impermissible blurring of the lines between 
war and peace. The laws of war “can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the 
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.”484 In 
other words, even if Congress had attempted to grant jurisdiction to the tribunal (which it had 
not),485 it had absolutely no power to do so.486 Martial law and military tribunals have absolutely 
no jurisdiction over civilians under any conditions, no matter how insecure, when effective 
internal sovereignty is in place, i.e. when ordinary courts can physically continue functioning.  
 The abeyance of internal sovereignty “must be actual and present; the invasion real” and 
courts must be physically in a state of incapacitation. “Martial law cannot arise from a threatened 
invasion” no matter how serious.487 If the line separating actual physical breakdown of internal 
sovereignty from the threat of breakdown were allowed to be blurred, this would allow the law 
of war positive validity within the body politic, effectively surrender the orienting distinction 
between war and peace.  
The decision’s most frequently quoted passage affirms the classical paradigm I have been 
describing in sweeping and eloquent terms: 
 
The constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, 
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
                                                
484 212 
485 The Court also argued that, not only had Congress not intended to give jurisdiction to military tribunals, but the 
procedures stipulated in the 1863 legislation had been violated in Milligan’s case. Among other irregularities, the 
tribunal violated the 1863 statute’s provision that lists of all prisoners held in states where ordinary courts were 
functioning were to be furnished to federal courts. If a grand jury did not indict, they were supposed to be released 
after 20 days. 
486 “in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations 
and redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offerce whatever of a citizen 




circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the 
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the exigencies of 
government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on 
which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted 
to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the 
great effort to throw off its just authority… When peace prevails, and the authority of the 
government is undisputed, there is no difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the 
ordinary modes of trial are never neglected, and no one wishes it otherwise; but if society is 
disturbed by civil commotion-if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law 
weakened, if not disregarded- these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of 
those entrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws.488  
 
There is no clearer statement of what I have called the “classical paradigm” of war and 
emergency powers. Yet, the actual political stakes of the decision were far from straightforward, 
cutting to the heart of the complex interplay between sovereign and commissarial dictatorship 
mentioned earlier. The jurisdiction of military tribunals was a burning issue in 1866. But they 
were not being used to try supporters of the ongoing Confederate war effort, which had already 
been decisively defeated the previous year. Rather, military tribunals were imposed in this period 
throughout the occupied South. Military jurisdiction in the South was often the only chance for 
southern blacks to get a fair trial, since local juries and state judges were not about to recognize 
the equal rights of former slaves.489 Milligan’s eloquent dictum was interpreted by both sides as 
an attempt to limit Congress’ power to shaping the meaning of the outcome of the Civil War, the 
                                                
488 Ex parte Milligan. 
489 The best discussion of the reaction to the opinion cal still be found in Earl Warren, The Supreme Court in the 
United States History, Vol. III, (1922), 149-90. 
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abolition of slavery.490 Discussions of Milligan in emergency powers literature overwhelmingly 
tend to overlook the actual politics of the emergency powers and military tribunals it directly 
affected, presenting a one-dimensional and oversimplified account of the theory expressed in the 
decision.491 The emergency military tribunals actually affected by the decision exceeded the 
straightforward crime/war distinction presented in the case. Instead they related directly to the 
unresolved question of what the post-war constitutional status quo would be, or how the very 
meaning of effective internal sovereignty and the unimpaired functioning of local courts was to 
be defined. Could civil courts be regarded as “open and functioning” when southern states 
passed legislation legally stripping blacks of any rights to access them? Did the abolition of 
slavery imply a new form of citizenship and national inclusion that would alter the structure of 
internal sovereignty itself, or was the creation of a de jure regime of racial hierarchy consistent 
with, and even required by, the terms of the classical paradigm? 
The fact that these penumbral questions do not register in the language of the opinion 
suggests that Milligan is less an exemplar of the classical paradigm than its owl of Minerva. The 
struggle it entered into was not the boundaries of the pre-War status quo ante but a constitutional 
struggle over the new, transformed order that had been created by the North’s military victory. 
How much must the sovereign dictator present itself in commissarial garb, and what concrete 
limitations do they impose? By 1866, the sovereign/commissarial agent was not the President but 
Congress, which struggled to maintain control over the reconstruction of the defeated South. 
At the time of Milligan, Congress was dominated by northern republicans committed to a 
thorough reorganization of the South’s social order. The question was whether Congress was a 
temporary a rump body which must limit itself to restoring the full representation of the states, or 
                                                
490 The following discussion of reconstruction is heavily indebted throughout to Daniel Kato, Constitutional 
Anarchy (PhD Dissertation, New School for Social Research). 
491 See, for example, Fisher, Irons, Cole, Dyzenhaus.  
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whether it could transform the conditions of state representation itself to reconstitute the terms on 
which the South could be represented.492 In other words, was the rump Congress a commissarial 
dictator prevented from transforming the status quo, or a sovereign dictator imposing an entirely 
new constitutional order? The meaning of the Civil War’s achievement of abolishing slavery, as 
well as the most radical political enfranchisement and subsequent disenfranchisement of a group 
of citizens in any constitutional democracy, hung in the balance.493  
The struggle related directly to the problems of rigid constitutionalism, emergency 
powers and boundaries of the body politic. The 13th Amendment abolished slavery, but did not 
establish citizenship for ex-slaves and it left suffrage restrictions entirely in the hands of states. 
Earlier that year, Congress passed the civil rights act over the president’s veto, authorizing 
military enforcement of blacks’ increasingly precarious civil rights. But this was achieved as a 
temporary exercise of emergency powers, not the creation of a new normalcy. Without 
constitutional entrenchment, the fragile status of equal citizenship would be rapidly undone, 
because after the emergency southern states would be free to strip ex-slaves of citizenship and 
deny them suffrage. The contours of this alternative were already clear when southern states 
passed the Black Codes in 1865-6, which legally codified the status of blacks as an inferior and 
dependent racial case, prevented from owning, renting or transferring property, engaging in 
skilled employment or seeking access to courts.494  
Moreover, whereas before the Civil War southern states were allowed to count each slave 
as 3/5ths of a person in apportioning representation in the House, the 13th Amendment allowed 
those states to count each ex-slave as a full person for apportionment in the House, even if they 
                                                
492 Bruce Ackerman calls this a “convention/congress,” whereas the plans of radical  
republican leaders such as Thaddeus Stevens more approximated what Carl Schmitt called “sovereign dictatorship.”  
493 Valelly, The Two Reconstructions, Preface.  
494 Forbath, “Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship,” 27. 
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were denied suffrage and equal civil rights. The bizarre irony was that under this scenario, 
southern white supremacy would enjoy an even more inflated overrepresentation in Congress 
than it did before the Civil War. Adding to the urgency, even in its temporarily purged form 
Congress’ plans for radical reconstruction encountered fierce opposition from more conservative 
forces from the other branches, as we’ve seen in Milligan. Much more formidable than the court 
was the opposition of President Johnson, who was alarmed at Congress’ “ill timed and uncalled 
for” plans to guarantee equal rights for blacks. Johnson justified his opposition by arguing that 
Congress had no right to impose its will on the South until the emergency measures were over 
and southern representation could return to Congress on its own terms. In other words, the rump 
Congress is strictly limited to a commissarial role. As these political struggles played out, 
conditions in the occupied South slipped increasingly out of control as white mobs attacks on 
blacks became commonplace, and groups such as the Ku Klux Klan stepped into the vacuum left 
by the disorder in national will.495  
Congress’ strategy was to transform itself from commissarial to sovereign dictator 
through a series of ingenious constitutional maneuvers. The 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery, 
had been passed only by installing a series of Southern minority state governments under 
military tutelage, which passed the amendment against the wishes of the majority of the white 
populations. The passage of the 14th Amendment was even more extraordinary. Under intense 
opposition from the president, Congress approved the amendment by simply ignoring the 
representatives from the former slave-owning states. The rump Congress then forced the 
Amendment through Article V procedures by instructed the southern states under military 
occupation that readmission to the Union would be conditional on their ratification of the 
                                                
495 Kato, Constitutional Anarchy; Ackerman, We the People vol. II; Lazare, The Frozen Republic, 125. 
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Amendment. Without submitting to the entrenchment of the transformed constitutional order, 
southern states would remain excluded and the emergency would continue.496 These 
extraordinarily convoluted procedures are the result of Congress’ intricate attempt to exercise the 
substance of a revolutionary sovereignty dictatorship within the form of a commissarial one.  
 For a period, especially after Congress’ sweeping electoral victory in 1866, the plan 
appeared to be working. Military control over the South was tightened: the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction was stripped (Congress’ outraged response to Milligan), and military tribunals took 
back jurisdiction when southern courts were demonstrably incapable of fair trials involving 
blacks. A new, bi-racial electoral democracy began to take shape in the south as avowedly 
disloyal, pro-confederate forces were purged from southern state legislatures and black voters 
constituted majorities in five states and near-majorities in many others. In a revolutionary 
transformation that rivals 1848 or 1917, blacks competed for and won elections in districts where 
they had been enslaved a decade earlier. In the regime of civil equality imposed on the South, the 
outlines of a new north/south racial coalition could be glimpsed.497  
Of course, in spite of these extraordinary constitutional maneuvers that allowed the de 
facto sovereign dictatorship, the other branches struggled to reassert control. Johnson, 
emboldened by his acquittal in his impeachment trial, counterattacked by  loosening the military 
grip on reconstruction enough for white supremacist southern forces to regain the upper hand. As 
the course of reconstruction faltered, the republicans’ retreated from their precarious 
constitutional position and began to acknowledge the new normality. Literacy tests and 
numerous other mechanisms for black disenfranchisement were left unprohibited by the 15th 
Amendment, and subsequent judicial interpretations of the 14th Amendment finished the process 
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This chapter has argued that the concept of martial law, rather than extralegal prerogative, was 
the central theoretical and constitutional framework for emergency powers in the early American 
republic. Focusing on martial law rather than prerogative has a number of advantages. First, it 
corresponds more directly to historical practices and avoids the definitional blurring of 
emergency powers with ordinary external war and presidential powers. Secondly, the framework 
of martial law illuminates the theoretical significance of emergency powers in relation to modern 
constitutional theory’s foundational opposition between the internal legal order and external state 
of war. We have seen that the early American paradigm of emergency powers derived its criteria 
and specificity directly from this conceptual opposition: emergency powers may be exercised 
only when a disruption of effective internal sovereignty is actually present. Finally, we’ve seen 
that the initial clarity and determinateness of the martial law paradigm became increasingly 
called into question when membership in the body politic – and therefore the status of 
constitutional status quo – could no longer be presupposed but was itself determined the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the emergency measures in question, leading to a vicious (or 
penumbral) constitutional circle. As we’ve seen in the Dorr Rebellion and Reconstruction, 
processes of democratic inclusion and incorporation in this period raised the “penumbral” issue 
of whether the emergency powers in question were sovereign or commissarial; a question the 
martial law paradigm could only answer by reference to the thoroughly “realist” criteria of which 
                                                
498 See the Slaughterhouse cases and especially U.S. v Cruikshank (1876). 
499 See Lazare, chap. 5; Valelly, chap. 6; Foner, chaps. 9, 11, 12. For a more optimistic interpretation, see Bruce 
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side won the conflict (Luther v. Borden), or by avoiding and obfuscating the issue altogether (ex 
parte Milligan).  
 As we shall see in Chapter IV, by the turn of the century, individual states regularly 
declared martial law in response to the fierce labor conflicts that characterized this period. But 
the regularity of these declarations of martial law, and the evident lack of any disruption of 
internal sovereignty, made the classical paradigm inapplicable. Rather than declare the 
emergency powers themselves unconstitutional, courts responded by abandoning the category of 
martial law and its accompanying criteria of effective internal sovereignty, and upheld the 
measures through a new theory of executive power, and a new criteria of emergency. Similarly, a 
series of early First Amendment cases during WWI employed a theory of “emergency” to help 
define the limitations and boundaries of the political public sphere, distinguishing between 
constitutionally protected speech, and criminal speech that poses a “clear and present danger” 
during an emergency. This new, explicit recognition of external “emergency” conditions allowed 
the courts to draw a line separating ordinary constitutional rights and the state’s coercive power 
without reference to effective internal sovereignty and the ability of courts to function. While 
formally and textually persisting in the legal code, martial law as a paradigm for adjudicating 
emergency powers was effectively finished. This intermediary, second paradigm of emergency 
powers, however, tied the concept of emergency to a clear a present danger to state institutions. 
The New Deal jurisprudence of the economic emergency will represent a further shift, 
substituting security for danger as a criterion for emergency powers.  
 It will be necessary to review these background conceptual transformations in order to 
adequately weigh the substantive charges that lie behind the formal textual continuity of 
emergency institutions that I referred to at the outset of this chapter. When martial law and 
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military tribunals were reintroduced at the end of WWII and in subsequent decades, they were 
decoupled from the black and white contrasts between war and peace, and enmity and crime, that 
characterized the paradigm described in this chapter. Instead, as we shall see, the post-WWII 
invocation of these categories replaced the category of war with police actions, and the criterion 
of effective internal sovereignty with that of security. These material constitutional shifts gave 
rise to an entirely new constellation that posed fundamental challenges to the theoretical 
architecture of constitutionalism itself: the status of unlawful enemy combatant threatened to 
fuse the categories of crime and enmity, and the international police powers of a global hegemon 
risked undermining the separation of powers internally and the fragile achievements of 
international law externally. Finally, the emergence of security as a novel category for linking 
the state to society posed new complications for the very dynamics of democratic legitimacy that 








Emergencies and Security in the New Deal 
 
Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, everything to which the law refers 
becomes law, i.e. something legally existing. The case of absolute nullity lies beyond the law.  
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--Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945.500 
 
 
Emergency measures imply that they are directed to meet an emergency, but the present world-
wide chaos in not a condition from which the world can emerge on a basis of assured and general 
prosperity, without fundamental changes in the economic systems of every major nation... 
 --John Dewey, “Superficial Treatment Must Fail,” 1933.501 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw an example of how the antebellum American constitutional order 
and political vocabularies helped to shape a remarkably restrictive, minimalist understanding of 
“emergency powers” and at the same time an unrestrained, maximalist “state of exception” 
organized around spatial rather than temporal lines. The fundamental distinction in that paradigm 
was not the extent of state power itself, but whether that power was exercised inside or outside 
the body politic, over independent citizens or dependent subjects. Accordingly, events that would 
unquestionably count as severe “emergencies” today – including even insurrection and invasion 
in some cases – were regarded as within the scope of constitutional “normality,” insufficient to 
justify even limited emergency powers. Conversely, we saw that even the most restrictive 
constitutional interpretations did not object to extra-constitutional prerogative power over 
imperial “subjects” – Indians, blacks and other groups excluded from the body politic – that 
amounted to a permanent state of sovereign exception. 
 The contrast between the 19th century emergency paradigm and that of the present 
illustrates the extent to which the categories of emergency and exception should not be regarded 
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as transparent representations of an independent reality, but rather as means through which a 
particular political reality is constructed and organized. Much of this chapter focuses on a 
relatively short period – chiefly, the constitutional struggle over the New Deal between 1934 and 
1937 – during which the political and constitutional meaning of norm and exception, ordinary 
and emergency powers, underwent dramatic transformation. This period, therefore, merits close 
examination for three main reasons. First, it provides a unique example of the politics of 
emergencies in formation. As we shall see, there was nothing natural or inevitable about the fact 
that the constitutional meaning of the New Deal would be determined on the field of emergency 
powers. The categorization of social and economic conditions as “emergencies,” and of the New 
Deal programs as “emergency powers” was sharply contested on both the left and the right in a 
broad public debate over the constitutional and democratic meaning of the reforms. We can see 
how intense political pressures and deep conflict actual reorganization of the constitutional space 
of normality and exceptionality, and the construction of a novel field of emergency politics.  
 Secondly, the new framework of emergency powers that emerged marked the definitive 
end of the older republican framework analyzed in the previous chapter. The new framework that 
bypassed the categorical distinctions and rigid oppositions described in the previous chapter, and 
drew instead from police powers and the idea of security to forge a new source of authority for 
emergency powers. The new doctrine entailed not only an expansive and fluctuating 
constitutional source of emergency “police” powers, it also reflected the displacement of the 
legislature and a new predominance of the executive as the center of gravity in the constitutional 
system. This gravitational shift marked out new subsidiary tasks for the other branches, in the 
form of delegative and accomodationalist politics, giving rise to a persistent anxiety over 
blurring law and politics. Finally, the formidable expansion of executive authority and discretion 
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provided a new template for plebiscitarianism as a mode of presidential leadership, and 
established a persistent affinity between emergency and presidential power. The idea that 
ordinary constitutional powers become more flexible, expansive and discretionary during 
“emergencies” turns out to be much more difficult to limit and have a greater tendency to 
become permanent, creating the dynamic of secular accretion of “emergency” power without 
emergencies.  
 The significance of this goes far beyond the brief period of constitutional struggle from 
which it emerged. As I shall argue in chapter 6, starting at the end of the Second World War and 
the beginning of the cold war, the basic parameters and judicial tests of the New Deal emergency 
doctrine were reapplied back to the realm of war, armed conflict and enmity. The older 
categorical dualisms between war and peace, the inside and outside the body politic were 
replaced by a flexible, expansive constitutional basis of emergency powers, a permissive 
delegation doctrine, and judicial balancing tests that were developed in relation to internal police 
and federal regulatory powers. In conjunction with the emergency of the discourse of national 
security, this period marked the end of formal legislative declarations of war, and the rise of 
international police powers of the president.  
 
   
I. Liberty, Security and Emergencies 
The experience of traumatic economic collapse and explosion of political unrest, amplified by 
the apparent collapse of liberalism on the European continent, all contributed to the sense that 
19th century liberalism was in crisis, and helped propel security both as a normative ideal and a 
political imperative to the forefront of American progressive thought, and ultimately, the New 
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Deal. It did so by elevating security as an ideal in itself, and at the same time as an essential 
precondition for and component of liberty. Eric Foner, in his history of freedom in American, 
concludes that “the New Deal recast the idea of freedom by linking it to the expanding power of 
the national state… [to provide] economic security.”502 
The centrality of security in this period was not an invention of the Roosevelt 
administration. Earlier progressive reformers had attempted, with patchwork success, to expand 
the responsibility of the state to include providing for citizens’ economic security since the 
beginning of the 20th century, and progressive intellectuals had been pointing to the links 
between freedom and security during this same period.503 Moreover, in the 1930s, the link 
between security and liberty was insisted upon by many of the most reformist public intellectuals 
of the time. As John A. Ryan, a Catholic social reformer and New Dealer, put it, “Our 
democracy finds itself… in a new age where not political freedom but social and industrial 
freedom is the most insistent cry.” Under his influence, the Church reversed its antipathy to state 
intervention and demanded a government guarantee of continuous employment and “a decent 
livelihood and adequate security” for all.504 Philosopher and public intellectual John Dewey 
diagnosed the crisis of liberalism as stemming from the emptiness of formal political rights and 
its inability to incorporate “the social conditions of freedom.” Dewey argued that liberty in the 
20th century can no longer refer to freedom of contract and independence from state intervention; 
rather it “signifies liberation from material insecurity and from the coercions and repressions that 
prevent multitudes from participation in the vast cultural resources that are at hand.”505 The 
political scientist and theorist Harold Laski, who became close to Roosevelt when teaching in the 
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United States in the 1930s, echoed this theme in his Liberty in the Modern State, arguing that 
liberty is rendered meaningless without economic security 
 
If [a man] is deprived of security… he becomes the prey of a mental and physical servitude incompatible 
with the very essence of liberty. Nevertheless, economic security is not liberty, though it is a condition 
without which liberty is never effective… Without economic security, liberty is not worth having.506 
 
Progressive economists and technocrats also attempted to push Roosevelt to the left with the 
theme of security, in works such as economist Abraham Epstein’s Insecurity: A Challenge to 
America and insurance analyst Max Rubinow’s The Quest for Security. Weekly magazines like 
The Nation and The New Republic were forums for such public intellectuals attempting to push 
the New Deal further to the left by arguing that Roosevelt’s measures were too moderate and 
piecemeal to overcome the deep sources of public insecurity.507  
Security took center stage in the new union struggles that emerged during the “golden 
age” of government/union partnership of the New Deal. In contrast to the important role of many 
communist organizers in this period, as well as the widespread but more spontaneous and 
uncoordinated labor and agricultural uprisings, this period saw the emergence of the CIO, which 
organized millions of workers in mass industry and unlike earlier union activism, energetically 
lobbied with the government to intervene in negotiations and secure social and economic rights. 
In the words of garment union leader Sidney Hillman, the overwhelming object of the labor 
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union was the “quest for security.”508 In short, among a broad range of intellectuals, political 
reformers and in the labor movement, by the early 1930s the crisis of laissez faire liberalism was 
summed up by its failure to give adequate emphasis to the state’s role in providing security to its 
citizens. This ascendance of security in the public sphere did not mean that it was a uniform 
concept. On the contrary, it represented a multilayered and loose convergence around the need to 
rethink the relationship between the state, society and the individual in the age of industrial 
capitalism.  
 
Security in the New Deal 
Even before taking office, Roosevelt faced criticism from the right for trampling individual 
liberty, and from the left, for failing to provide economic security to the millions of vulnerable 
citizens whose lives were ravaged by industrial greed and the imbalances of the unregulated 
market. His response, expressed in innumerable fireside chats and public addresses, was to adopt 
his opponents’ language on both flanks, championing security as a necessary precondition for 
liberty, a fundamental right of citizens, and a no less fundamental duty of any legitimate 
government.509  By 1934, Roosevelt made the theme of security central to his presidency, 
reiterating the goal of “general greater security” in nearly every speech. The theme of security 
provided Roosevelt a way to reclaim the ideal of freedom from his opponents on the right, and 
turn it back against them.  In contrast to the laissez-faire ideal of liberty “for the privileged few,” 
Roosevelt affirmed “that broader definition of Liberty under which we are moving forward to 
greater freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has ever known before in the 
                                                




history of America.”510 Likewise, in his second Inaugural Address, Roosevelt stressed security as 
a fundamental means that should be guaranteed to all: “We dedicated ourselves to the fulfillment 
of a vision—to speed the time when there would be for all the people that security and peace 
essential to the pursuit of happiness.”511 Other times, Roosevelt appeared to describe security as 
not only a means but as an end in itself: 
 
all the energies of government and business must be directed to increasing the national income, to putting 
more people into private jobs, to giving security and a feeling of security to all people in all walks of life.... 
You and I agree that security is our greatest need…Therefore, I am determined to do all in my power to 
help you attain that security and because I know that the people themselves have a deep conviction that 
secure prosperity of that kind cannot be a lasting one except on a basis of business fair dealing and a basis 
where all from the top to the bottom share in the prosperity. 
 
Roosevelt seems to have adopted the theme of security, then, from a range of progressive critics 
who questioned whether his administration was going far enough to address pervasive insecurity, 
and refashioned it as the basis for articulating a new social ideal and aim of government.512  
 
Police Powers and Republican Dualism 
In the previous chapter, I argued, against the tendency of many contemporary scholars 
influenced by Foucault to assimilate the anglo-American category of police powers to the 
continental models famously analyzed by Foucault, that police powers in the antebellum US 
developed along a very different path, and helped to articulate the spatial boundaries between the 
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community of self-governing citizens and a “state of exception” in which blacks, native 
Americans and other outsiders were subject to largely unlimited discretionary powers of external 
sovereignty. I argued that this distinctively racialized state of exception in the early American 
republic is easily obscured by an overly schematic application of the category of bio-power or 
governmentality. Increasingly in the mid-19th century, police powers were increasingly defined 
as a “conveyence” of the imperial prerogative of the Crown, which passed directly to the 
individual states after independence and, with the exception of the limited powers delegated to 
the Federal Government, was maintained by the individual states. Especially as the conflicts over 
slavery intensified in the mid-nineteenth century, Courts were inclined to draw on the archaic 
absolutist and even semi-feudal vestiges of “police” as a basis for the absolute prerogative of the 
individual states to regulate entry by slaves and free blacks. Hence while the concept of police in 
Britain and on the continent became a modernizing category that integrated administrative 
discretion and disciplinary powers within the framework of the ordinary legal order and 
constitutional norms, the US police powers doctrine developed backwards rather than forwards, 
breathing new life into the otherwise discarded doctrines of the absolutist royal prerogative, and 
even the essentially feudal Cokean rights of colonial “discovery” and the lordly dominion of the 
“parens patriae.”513  
The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments eliminated the fundamental tension 
that the police powers doctrine attempted to resolve – whether the states or the Nation had the 
power to decide on the boundaries between civic inclusion and exclusion. Rather than 
disappearing, however, police powers jurisprudence attained an even more central role in the 
post Reconstruction constitutional order than it had in the antebellum period. Beginning with the 
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Slaughter-House Cases (1873) and running all the way to the early New Deal, police powers 
once again articulated a form of republican dualism, and once again became a site of intense 
political and constitutional struggle.    
 While the central axis of this insider/outsider dualism was an ethnically or “culturally” 
defined idea of social membership – essentially, civilized Europeans versus non-European 
“savages – republican dualistic categories were also present even within the body of formal 
citizens, as we saw in the discussion of martial law and the constituent power in Rhode Island. 
Suffrage rights, for instance, were widely restricted among citizens on the basis of property 
qualifications, race and gender.514 The basis for these exclusions what not citizenship itself – no 
one, for instance, disputed the fact that women before the Nineteenth Amendment were citizens, 
despite lacking the right to vote. Rather, the basis for these exclusions was the republican 
conception of independence as a crucial prerequisite for participation in self-rule. Participation in 
self-government required a sufficient “stake in society,” i.e. being a stakeholder by property 
ownership, that established self-aware, independent membership in the community. Self-
government can only be entrusted, in the words of Henry Ireton, to “men freed from dependence 
upon others.”515 Political rights could not be entrusted to those who were economically or 
morally dependent on another, since such dependents could easily be controlled or manipulated 
by another.516 As Aziz Rana notes, these distinctions between “full” or active versus “passive” or 
dependent citizens went hand in hand with open immigration policies for Europeans possessing 
the capacity for active citizenship. As a result, European immigrants enjoyed suffrage rights and 
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settler land grants before naturalization, while women, blacks and other dependent citizens were 
excluded from such political and social rights. Formal citizenship, in fact, mattered much less 
than “real social membership” within the body of self-governing members of the body politic.517    
The fundamental distinction underlying cases such as New York v. Miln was not formal 
citizenship, but the distinction between those “civilized Europeans” on whose constant and 
steady migration the expansion of settler republicanism depended versus those who were held on 
racial, cultural or economic grounds to be ineligible for membership in the self-governing 
community.518 Thus, slave-owning states had both the unrestricted power and “solemn duty” to 
protect domestic tranquility through  “laws prohibiting free negroes from being introduced 
among slaves,”519 irrespective of whether blacks were citizens in another state.  
While the fourteenth amendment, by nationalizing citizenship, eliminated the 
fundamental problem earlier police powers theory attempted to result, the distinctions between 
active or “full” and passive citizenship intensified and took on renewed importance in the latter 
half of the 19th century. In this process, police powers remained central to the articulation and 
containment of this new form of republican dualism within the category of “formal” citizens. 
While the general definition of state police powers as the powers “to advance the safety, 
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happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare” remained roughly 
the same, the underlying structure differed in important ways from the antebellum Miln 
paradigm. According to Mark Tushnet, the prevailing legal understanding in the late ninteenth 
century regarded civil and political rights as “baseline” rights, though not necessarily universalist 
ones. These rights were “available to everyone who satisfied requirements of capacity, defined in 
terms of the ability to deliberate and choose rationally, and independence, defined as a person’s 
ability to come to conclusions without being unduly influenced by another who held economic 
power over the person.”520 Hence, denial of the right to vote to women was justified by the view 
that women’s moral and economic dependence deprived them of the requisite capacity for 
enjoying full political rights.521 Likewise, the physical and moral vulnerabilities specific to 
women meant that the freedom of contract of women laborers could be abridged in light of their 
inability to compete on equal terms with men in the free market. Unlike “baseline” civil and 
political rights, social rights did not enjoy constitutional protection. Recognition of social rights 
were in the jurisdiction of states’ discretionary police powers, but were valid insofar as they did 
not interfere with civil and political rights. For example, Plessy v. Ferguson famously held that 
state laws mandating racially segregated railways were valid uses of the state’s police powers, 
since riding in a railway car of one’s choice was merely a “social,” rather than a civil right, and 
therefore a matter of police discretion.522  
Thus, as police powers were reformulated to articulate social and economic distinctions 
within a more complex and diverse society, the antebellum foundation of police in absolute 
sovereignty and rights of conquest over outsiders shifted to a concept of paternalist governance 
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and administration over domestic dependents. By the 1890s, the broadly discretionary 
foundations of state police power “conveyed” from the royal prerogative disappeared as the 
Court began to apply substantive due process review to state legislation, preventing states’ 
regulatory police powers from invading the sphere of independent, autonomous citizens and 
restricting regulation to the sphere of “dependents” who lacked the capacities for full citizenship. 
Alongside this development, the absolute and unmediated distinction between civic members and 
(physically) excluded aliens was replaced by a distinction between a social space free of all 
government regulation and intrusion, and a domain of legitimate discretionary regulation to 
protect “health, safety and public morality.” The former sphere was a space of self-determining 
“active” citizens, participating in self-government and enjoying control over the conditions of 
their own productive labor in an unregulated free market. The latter applied to “passive” citizens 
whose dependent status rendered them incapable of full enjoyment of civil and political rights, 
and were therefore legitimate objects of the paternalistic guidance and supervision by the state.523 
 Like the antebellum conception of police powers, this one also served to demarcate a 
domain of constitutional “normalcy,” at the same time as it distinguished a sphere of exception. 
The ‘norm’ referred to a social sphere of free activity that enjoyed absolute constitutional 
protections against regulatory interference. The boundaries of this sphere were twofold. First, the 
concept of “capacity” presupposed by civil and political rights distinguished between 
“independent,” autonomous rights-bearers, and dependent subjects requiring regulatory 
supervision. Secondly, the distinction between “class legislation” and activity “affected with a 
public interest” required that any infringement on civil or political rights must be for the sake of 
the population as a whole, and not single out any particular class or group over others. Thus, 
                                                




even regulation of private contracts were considered valid exercises of state police powers if the 
private contract had third party affects, and if the regulation was in the interests of society as a 
whole rather than one or another contracting party. Thus, in the following examples the Court 
struck down state laws as illegitimate applications of the paternalist police powers to the sphere 
of full independent, white, male citizens. 
Thus, for example in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) the Court unanimously held that a 
Louisiana statute prohibiting Louisiana citizens and corporations from doing business with out of 
state insurance companies unconstitutionally deprives citizens of their liberty without due 
process of law. Justice Peckham explained that the meaning of “liberty” in the fourteenth 
amendment is not limited to “the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of 
his person.” It extends to “the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; 
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood 
by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all 
contracts” on equal terms in a free market with other independent citizens.524 Peckham stressed 
that this does not deny the state “the legitimate exercise of its police” powers, but such powers 
may not encroach upon the sphere of independent, self-directing citizens pursuing their 
livelihoods in an open market.525 Similarly, Justice Peckham’s famous majority opinion in 
Lochner v. New York (1905) held that a New York law limiting the daily working hours of 
bakers exceeded the scope of legitimate police powers. The legislation amounted to “an 
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference,” depriving the bakers of their 
constitutional rights to freely enter into contracts and control their own labor as they see fit.526 In 
view of bakers’ full autonomy, equal intelligence and capacity for asserting their rights on par 
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with other citizens, they could “care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, 
interfering with their independence of judgment and of action.” In other words, under the guise 
of the police powers, the New York statute was illegitimately reducing independent, white male 
citizens to the “dependent” status of women, children and other “wards of the state.” 
While preserving this “norm” of independent, self-governing citizens in control over the 
conditions of their own productive labor, a series of opinions acknowledged a domain of 
“exceptions,” where physical, social or intellectual deficiencies made some citizens incapable of 
independence, and rendered them dependent “wards of the state,” in need of paternalistic state 
supervision. Thus, while white, male laborers and proprietors nearly always occupied the space 
of constitutional normalcy, Indians, women, blacks, colonized foreign populations, and even 
menial laborers, were held as incapable of the full independence presupposed by civil and 
political rights, and whose exceptional status made them legitimate objects of state 
paternalism.527 For instance, Muller v. Oregon (1908) upheld Oregon state legislation regulating 
workday hours of women. While equivalent regulations had been struck down when applied to 
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men, legislation specifically limited to women was found to be within the legitimate scope of the 
police power. The difference from Lochner, according to the unanimous opinion, is that woman's 
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence ,” especially when the burdens of motherhood are upon her.” It is not 
only women’s inferiority to men, placing them in a permanent condition of dependency, that 
legitimates such exceptional paternalistic treatment. Additionally, since “healthy mothers are 
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public 
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race,” and therefore constitutes 
an exception to the general prohibition on police powers abridgements to the privileges and 




Strained normalcy: emergency and the breakdown of republican dualism 
It’s hard not to be struck by the glaring irony about this dualistic framework that permits 
legislation limiting the workday hours of miners as an “exceptional” abridgment of the rights of 
these minors, while preventing, in the name of “normal” constitutional protections, a host of 
other attempts to pass child labor, workplace safety, maximum working hours and other laws as 
illegitimate violations of the rights of those laborers. Today, Lochner is more often synonymous 
with hostility to workers’ rights and an infamously brittle form of laissez faire ideology rather 
than with principled judicial opposition to the state’s attempts to curtail rights in the name of 
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security.529 Indeed, by making clear that any attempt to enact comprehensive labor laws at the 
state or national level would be struck down, the aggressive counter-majoritarianism of the 
Lochner Court effectively excluded the growing number of industrial laborers from meaningful 
participation in electoral politics.530 In this sense, the dualistic framework of police powers not 
only excluded a category of dependent, “passive” citizens from the sphere of unabridged civil 
and political life, it also functioned to exclude the class of wage laborers that had emerged in an 
industrialized society from meaningful participation in political life.  
The basis for this exclusion was not the exceptional domain of “dependent” citizens but 
the juridical construction of the domain of constitutional normality. The language of “capacity” 
and independence underlying this constitutional normalcy has a rich history in republican “free 
labor” ideology, a tradition that stressed self-ownership and control over the conditions of one’s 
productive activity as crucial foundations for republican dignity and independence.531 This vision 
of independent, self-directing citizens freely disposing of their labor without arbitrary 
interference or state paternalism underlay the domain of constitutional normality. This 
conception of “normality” that underlay the constitutional order was modeled upon a pre-
industrial society of independent artisans, yeoman farmers and small proprietors. The problem 
was that by the turn of the century, the pre-industrial society that served as a model for the 
categories of constitutional normalcy had disappeared, and the application of those categories to 
a society shaped by mass industry and wage labor appeared inescapably arbitrary and capricious. 
As Morton Horowitz notes, 
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By representing the intellectual inquiry as one of deciding whether the challenged regulation was really 
within the police power and then limiting that category to standard common nuisances, judges traditionally 
had been able to avoid the charge that they were engaged in the political task of choosing which regulations 
to approve. But once the problems generated by industrial society undermined the ability of courts to 
continue to offer traditional definitions of the category of health, safety and morals, the inherently 
redistributive potential of the police power emerged with a vengeance.532 
 
As Horowitz suggests, the Court’s efforts to insist upon a categorical distinction between, say, 
the health of the worker and the conditions of industrial life appear increasingly flimsy and 
arbitrary. Hence, in order to find the workday regulations in Lochner to be an infringement on 
the free productive control of bakers over their labor, Peckham’s opinion had to imagine the 
conditions of bakery employees in quaintly pre-industrial terms of free labor artesian and self-
realization through meaningful work. Of course, the New York bakers were not independent 
proprietors or master artesians; they were wage laborers in brutal industrial conditions, employed 
in a sweat system in which owners slashed production costs by extracting as many hours as 
possible from laborers.533  Such conditions made the identification of productive control and 
meaningful work with freedom of contract nonsensical. As Rana notes, in this context “popularly 
enacted laws were part of efforts by laborers themselves to reclaim control over the conditions of 
work” rather than an imposition of paternalistic power reducing free laborers to the status of 
unfree dependents.534 And the more that this became apparent, the more the formalist 
construction of constitutional normalcy ceased to maintain the separation of law and politics and 
instead appeared as an openly and capriciously politicization of law.    
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This sense of skepticism, and even outright hostility toward the pretence of an 
autonomous domain of law distinct from politics became a major component in the development 
of legal realism. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, an important forerunner of realism, bluntly 
dismissed the conceptual premises of legal formalism, noting in his Lochner Dissent that 
“general propositions do not decide concrete cases.” Holmes believed that the formalist account 
of legal reasoning only encouraged judges to overlook or deny the actual considerations that 
guided their concrete decisions. Since decisions will be guided by “social considerations” no 
matter what, judges who fail to recognize this “simply leave the very ground and foundation of 
judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.” The Lochner dissent again put this more bluntly: 
“The 14th Amendment,” Holmes wrote, “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.”535  
Acknowledging the unavoidably political dimension of all judicial rulings, Holmes 
argued, meant that judges should be guided by two main political considerations: first, judges 
should take into account the “considerations of social advantage” and the policy outcomes the 
ruling will have upon society. Secondly, Courts should give deference to the “right of the 
majority to embody their opinions in law.”536 Holmes argued that in cases where the “dominant 
public opinions” are clear on a certain policy, abstract judicial axioms should give way to the 
preferences represented by the legislature, within broad limits. Those limits cannot be stated 
axiomatically and categorically, but are defined by when “a rational and fair man necessarily 
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”537 Developed primarily in dissents, this 
view of judicial deference guided by public opinion and policy considerations and limited by the 
“reasonable man” standard became an important basis for legal realism.  
                                                
535 Lochner. 
536 Ibid. 
537 “Lochner,” dissent.  
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In addition to the doctrine of legislative deference, Holmes provided a second legal realist 
basis for overcoming the rigid categories of formalism: expanded administrative powers in an 
“emergency.” Unlike the legislative deference doctrine, which was confined to Holmes’ 
dissenting opinions like Lochner, Holmes’ emergency framework was set out in a series of 
opinions during WWI in which a majority of Justices joined Holmes. These cases mark an 
important departure from the dualist paradigms of both martial law and police powers and, while 
they relied upon the crucial backdrop of a declared state of war, they eschew the rigidly dualist 
categories of a spatialized state of exception defined by the categorical distinctions of police 
powers and martial law. Instead these cases suggest a flexible framework of constitutional 
powers over society as a whole that expands or contracts in scope depending on the severity of 
the external emergency. In contrast to the categorical criteria defining the suspension of habeas 
corpus, or the legitimate domain of police powers, Holmes makes not pretence to define in 
advance the formal criteria of an emergency. is left crucially undefined in advance. Thus, Wilson 
v. New, for example, upheld temporary legislation to fix hour and wage guarantees to prevent a 
general strike by railway workers during World War I.538  The Court rejected the railway 
companies’ argument, based upon the older martial law paradigm, that  
 
the situation was one of emergency, and that emergency cannot be made the source of power (citing Ex 
parte Milligan).The proposition begs the question, since, although an emergency may not call into life a 
power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living 
power already enjoyed.539 
 
The “emergency,” in other words, cannot create any wholly new powers apart from the powers 
                                                
538 Wilson v. New (1917). In this case Holmes joined the majority decision written by Chief Justice While. 
539 Wilson v. New, 348. See also Block v. Hirsh (1921), 
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to regulate interstate commerce that already exist. But the special emergency circumstances – the 
paralysis of the national railway networks during wartime – do alter the scope of the legitimate 
means implied by the existing regulatory powers. The emergency conditions have temporarily 
given the private contractual relations in the railroad industry an aspect of a “public business,” 
subject to national regulation in the public interest.540 Unlike the martial law paradigm, then, this 
emergency doctrine does not rest on the bright line, per se rules prescribed by the conditions of 
effective sovereignty, and it does not permit powers that would be categorically proscribed 
within those boundaries. It refers to the shifting scope of ordinarily existing constitutional 
powers, and defines the boundaries of the means implied by those powers by reference to the 
extraordinary conditions that change the conditions of their exercise. A further consequence of 
the emergency doctrine is that it emphasizes the provisional, temporary nature character of the 
increased scope: once the emergency has passed, the powers involved contract to their ordinary 
scope. As the majority repeatedly stresses in Wilson v. New, the wage fixing legislation was 
temporary, not permanent.541   
   
II. Police, Emergencies and the New Deal: Creating a New Emergency Doctrine, 1934-1937 
We now turn to the creation of a new theory of emergency powers that emerged from the 
intensely conflictual politics of the early New Deal. It may seem odd to focus attention on this 
period from the perspective of emergency powers. We often think of New Deal constitutional 
politics from the perspective of federalism, or the regulatory powers of Congress, or, from the 
influential work of Bruce Ackerman, as an instance of democratic constitution making and extra-
                                                
540 347 
541 The fixing of the wage standard was “not permanent, but temporary, leaving the employers and employees free as 
to the subject of wages to govern their relations by their own agreements after the specified time,” 345-6. And again, 
“This was not a permanent fixing, but, in the nature of things, a temporary one which left the will of the employers 
and employees to control at the end of the period if their dispute had then ceased,” 357-8. 
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legal constitutional change. It is appears infrequently, if at all, in recent constitutional scholarship 
of emergency powers.542 This is unsurprising, since many of the fundamental issues at the fore of 
contemporary emergency powers – such as executive war powers, military tribunals and 
detention, freedom of speech – are entirely absent from the New Deal context. Inversely, many 
of the most prominent constitutional conflicts of the New Deal period – the administrative 
powers of the Federal government, contract abridgment, delegation to administrative 
bureaucracies and the like – appear as elements of ordinary, long term, normal politics, 
appearing in debates over the scope of constitutional normalcy, without reference to any 
exceptional, emergency conditions.  
 Nevertheless, scholars interested in constitutional emergency powers have much to gain 
from analyzing New Deal constitutional politics as emergency powers. The centrality of the 
framework of emergency powers  in the constitutional politics of this period was recognized, and 
fiercely contested, by observers at the time. More importantly, the emergency powers debates 
from this period is important for our purposes, because from them we can see the creation of a 
genuinely novel doctrine of emergency powers that integrates Holmes tentative suggestions 
during WWI together with the category of police powers as it had developed in the Lochner 
constitutional order. This new doctrine of emergency powers marks a critical departure from the 
theme of republican dualism that has characterized the various examples of emergencies and 
states of exception we have been discussion above and in chapter four. The framework of 
“police” emergencies was detached from any explicit reference to war, sovereignty or dualistic 
conceptions of citizenship, and became a vehicle for integrated a new, inclusive and non-
dualistic politics into the constitutional order. While the emergency doctrine, on the one hand, 
                                                
542 This is not true of the classic discussions of emergency powers from the 1940s and 50s, such as Rossiter, Corwin 
and Friedrich, for evident reasons of historical proximity. A few contemporary exceptions: …  
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was a part of the fundamental achievement of overcoming the theme of exclusive republican 
dualism, at the same time it helped to lay the foundations for a more flexible, expansive and 
difficult to limit framework of emergency powers that has characterized emergency powers in 
the US in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries.  
 
Police Powers and the Road to Blasdell 
In its initial New Deal decisions, the Court upheld a number of limited programs, but it chose not 
to do so on the grounds of deference outlined by Holmes. Instead, it chose the more ambiguous 
path of reinterpreting the category of emergency powers, and reapplying it from conditions of 
war to an economic emergency. Adopting the deference doctrine in 1933 would have allowed the 
Court to uphold the New Deal experiments while avoiding the problem of unconstitutionality 
and the task of shifting the scope of emergency powers to include economic emergencies. 
Further, it would have framed the New Deal programs in a substantially different light, as a 
reflection of the legitimate will of the democratic majority to transform the relationship between 
the state and society, not as a temporary extraordinary measure to restore the status quo, but as 
the future-oriented decision taken in a representative democracy.  
 
Recall the previous discussion of the three potential stances the Court could adopt toward the 
New Deal: categorical rejection, deference to public opinion, or the emergency doctrine. From 
the outset, the only safe prediction was that deference was unlikely. But it was far from clear at 
the outset that any accommodation would be made, or that a redefinition of emergency powers 
would be the means of doing so. The possibility of explicitly treating the Great Depression as an 
emergency analogous to war first emerged in a 1932 dissent in a case involving an Oklahoma 
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state law regulating the ice business. The majority, unaffected by the extraordinary conditions 
and reasoning along familiar Lochner lines, struck down the law as a violation of substantive due 
process.  Justice Brandeis’ dissent, however, gives a clearer sign of the choices and possibilities 
facing the Court in the years to come. Brandeis’ first argument retreads the familiar lines of 
Holmes’ deference doctrine we saw earlier, protesting against the Court’s adherence to outdated 
categorical rules that constrict the state’s police power to the artificially narrow realm of 
nuisance abatement.543  
 The dissent also includes a second, much shorter argument that, unlike the first, recasts 
this older debate in new terms. Near the end of the dissent, Brandeis states that 
 
The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency more serious than war. Misery is 
widespread, in a time, not of scarcity, but of overabundance. The long-continued depression has brought 
unprecedented unemployment, a catastrophic fall in commodity prices, and a volume of economic losses 
which threatens our financial institutions. Some people believe that the existing conditions threaten even 
the stability of the capitalistic system.544 
 
In this context, Brandeis cites rent control cases from World War I, which – significantly – were 
emergency measures during wartime but involved only domestic regulatory and police powers, 
without any direct relation to the war powers themselves.545  The suggestion is clear: the Court 
should treat the catastrophic insecurity of US society analogously to emergency powers in 
wartime, authorizing extraordinary measures that would require stricter scrutiny in less dire 
                                                
543 New State Ice Co., dissent, 302. Substantive, categorical limitations to the police power, such as the majority’s 
distinction between a private business and a business affected with a public interest, are arbitrary and “rest on a 
historical error.” The proper object of regulatory police powers is the social body as a whole, and are subject only to 
the pragmatic “reasonable man” test proposed by Holmes.   
544 Ibid., 306-7. 
545 306, citing Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921) and Block v. Hirsh (1921).  
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circumstances. The analogy is left unexplored, however, leaving it unclear whether Brandeis 
intended emergency powers as an alternative justification or as an additional, incidental support 
for the longstanding argument for deference.   
 By 1934, Brandeis’ emergency analogy migrated from an isolated dissent to a new 
majority coalition of progressives and moderate conservatives led by Chief Justice Hughes.546 
Hughes adopted the emergency doctrine as his own, expanding it from an unexplored suggestion 
to a bold new framework that synthesized emergency and police powers together for the first 
time into a single doctrine. Blaisdell concerned state legislation attempting to prevent 
foreclosures, an issue in which popular outrage was especially acute. Threatened by a 
devastating wave of foreclosures, Minnesota farmers rioted in rural areas of the state before 
descending on the state capital demanding a means of saving their farms from bankers. The 
state’s governor, a liberal New Dealer impatient with the slow pace of reform, announced “I 
shall declare martial law. A lot of people who are now fighting the [relief] measures because 
they happen to possess considerable wealth will be brought in by the provost guard. They will be 
obliged to give up more than they are giving up now.”547 The actual response was less drastic: the 
Minnesota legislature passed a mortgage relief law extending the dates of redemption beyond the 
dates specified in individual mortgage contracts. Making explicit reference to the crisis, the law 
was made to expire in March 1935 or after the depression lifted, whichever came first. The 
Minnesota State Supreme Court had upheld the legislation; after a long empirical discussion of 
                                                
546 In the period between 1934 and 1937, the justices can be roughly broken down into three groups: the three 
“progressive” coalition of Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo; the “conservative” coalition of Sutherland, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds and Butler; and the “centrists” of Hughes and Roberts.   
547 quoted in Hulsebosch, 1988. 
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the gravity of the economic emergency, it concluded that the depression was severe enough to 
“call[] for the exercise of the police power to grant relief.”548  
The Supreme Court, adopting the state court’s emergency rational, upheld the law. 
Hughes’ majority opinion refines the more general association of an emergency with state 
necessity into a new framework, which I will call the emergency doctrine, sanctioning the 
expansion of police and regulatory powers into domains of contractual liberty as temporary 
emergency responses to a condition of extreme insecurity and social disorder. In a frequently 
quoted passage Hughes asserts that the constitutionality of the state’s police power to alter 
contracts during a state of emergency hinges on “the relation of emergency to constitutional 
power.” 
 
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or 
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. [Yet] While emergency does 
not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.549 
 
As we saw in Wilson v. New, doctrine of constitutional continuity between normal and 
exceptional powers contrasts sharply with the martial law paradigm analyzed in the previous 
chapter. For the older paradigm, martial law was not an augmentation or expansion of any 
ordinary constitutional power. It was “not law proper” but a “law of necessity,” permissible only 
when the conditions of internal sovereignty that made constitutional powers possible in the first 
place had broken down. The relationship between martial law and war was direct and immediate. 
The “right” to use force in war and in martial law derived from the rights of self-preservation 
                                                
548 State Court Majority, quoted in SC majority, 420 
549 ibid., 425-7 
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that inhered in sovereignty, rather than from any delegated constitutional power. Also like war, 
martial law was an explicit departure from the crime paradigm and its attendant constitutional 
rights. Further, the departure was justified by the extraordinary non-justiciable nature of both 
circumstances: in war, because there was no superior tribunal between two sovereigns, and in 
martial law because the legitimate, constituted tribunals are incapable of functioning.  
 The emergency doctrine from Wilson v. New and other WWI cases departed from this 
pattern. But while these cases referred to delegated, ordinary constitutional powers, the 
expansion of regulatory powers into emergency powers critically depended on the fact of 
ongoing war. The existence of declared war, and therefore the relevance of the sovereign right of 
self-preservation that war implied, was the basis for the Court’s judgment that rent control or 
railroad working conditions were temporarily and exceptionally “afflicted with the public 
interest.” In martial law, the relevance of sovereignty and the war paradigm was immediate. In 
the WWI emergency doctrine, it was one step removed, mediated by the enumerated 
constitutional source of the regulatory emergency powers. But reference to war and sovereign 
self-preservation were still necessary and essential for the ordinary/emergency, 
normal/exceptional distinction.  
 This is the novelty of Justice Hughes’ majority opinion in Blaisdell. For the first time, the 
sovereign right of self-preservation that served as the foundation of all previous justifications of 
emergency powers has disappeared. Emergency powers, after Blaisdell, may be based 
exclusively on enumerated constitutional powers and the police power alone. This shift has 
fundamental implications for the source of emergency powers and their legitimate object (1), for 
the definition of the emergency conditions that justify emergency powers (2), and for the 




(1) Source and object: police power as the sovereign right to ensure social security  
The distinction between the regulatory powers enumerated in the constitution and the police 
power is extremely important to the new emergency doctrine. Police power, as we have seen, 
retains in the common law an implicit reference to the rights that inhere in sovereignty – not the 
rights of self-defense, but the rights of regulation and prospective “household management.” 
Uncoupled from war, emergency powers will now be founded upon the non-enumerated rights of 
sovereignty implied in the police powers to ensure the security and welfare of society as a whole.     
The core of Hughes’ opinion rests on the sovereign rights of the state’s police power to 
ensure safety and security for the social order.550  In addition to retaining the power to modify 
remedies for the enforcement of contracts,  
 
the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people… the reservation 
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The 
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue 
of which contractual relations are worthwhile -- a government which retains adequate authority to secure 
the peace and good order of society.551 
 
In other words, the state’s police power, like the right of self-preservation of the war paradigm, is 
not an exclusively enumerated power; it also derives from the prerequisites of sovereignty itself, 
as a necessary condition of possibility of all constitutionally enumerated powers. Hence, 
analogizing from eminent domain, Hughes argues that this “necessary authority of the state” to 
modify contracts if the wellbeing of society requires it is implicitly and necessarily a part of 
                                                
550 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934), 430.  
551 Ibid., 434-5. 
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every contract.552 As a precondition for all contractual activity, the state’s “continuing and 
dominant protective power” over society necessarily has priority over the terms of any particular 
contract that interferes with this power. This “necessary precondition” justification is in fact 
structurally identical to the justification we saw earlier for martial law, following from the 
necessary condition of the state’s right to self-preservation. The necessary condition in this case, 
however, is not the independence and physical integrity of the state and its sovereignty vis-à-vis 
other states but the government’s ability to maintain “peace and good order of society,” on which 
all contractual relations depend.      
 
(2) nature of the emergency 
While police powers and earlier martial law share this basis in non-enumerated attributes of 
sovereignty, only martial law was a form of emergency power. Unlike the decidedly 
extraordinary and circumscribed events like invasion or insurrection, the police powers to 
maintain security and good social order in the precedents cited by Hughes are a continual and 
ongoing part of governance, an ordinary rather than emergency power. Hence, rather than 
drawing clear and bright lines around them, Hughes stresses the need to “harmonize” the 
constitutional rights embodied in the prohibitions of the contract clause with “the necessary 
residuum of state power” expressed through the police powers to ensure society’s security and 
welfare.553 How can police powers become the basis of explicitly emergency powers? 
                                                
552 Citing Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn (1897), “But into all contracts, whether made between States 
and individuals, or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the literal terms of the 
contract itself; they are superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations or of 
the community to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and 
recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could 
add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as 
conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur,” ibid., 435-6. 
553 Ibid., 435, my italics. 
  
286 
As always, the definition of the emergency is never independent of the particular 
conception of “normality” in question. We’ve seen how by the late 19th century the only 
legitimate interference with freedom of property and contract under the police powers required 
the motive and direct effect of regulating the public morals, health or safety of society.554 The 
Court struck down numerous attempts at social legislation – as in the case of Lochner itself – as 
“under pretence of regulation” and not “real” exercises of the police power.555 Only these narrow 
categories were thought to fall outside the blanket prohibition of the contract clause. 
Hughes responds by shifting the question from the narrow, per se categories of legitimate 
police activity to the conditions under which interference with contracts is nevertheless 
“consistent with the spirit and purpose” of contractual rights. The question, he argues, is not 
whether a regulation is “really” about morality, health or safety irrespective of the circumstances.  
The question is whether the interference is actually required by the degree of danger to public 
welfare and safety. In other words, the scope of the police power cannot be fixed abstractly 
beforehand within narrow categories. The boundaries of the state’s reserve power to protect the 
community, Hughes argues, fluctuate, sometimes radically, depending on the changing external 
conditions and dangers. Emergency conditions, in other words, authorize emergency police 
powers that would be unconstitutional in ordinary times. The insecurity created by the economic 
emergency transformed broader than ordinary measures, including a temporary modification of 
mortgage contracts, into constitutionally authorized forms of regulation for the duration of the 
emergency. Police powers became emergency powers 
                                                
554 See Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations and Christopher Tiedemann, A Treatise on the Limitations of 
Police Power in the United States (1886) both in American Legal History ed. Hall, Finkelman, Ely.  
555 Lochner. In Blaiswell, the dissent argued along these lines: the fact that the Minnesota statute was temporary and 
for a public purpose, did not make it a legitimate use of the police powers, because it was not directly for the sake of 
public morals, health or safety, 439. 
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Blaisdell’s context-bound approach rejected the determination of clear, black-and-white 
rules about what constitutes an emergency and what doesn’t. The flexibility of the model 
suggested a sliding-scale, case-by-case test in which “normal” and “emergency” conditions 
would at best represent two poles on a spectrum rather than a threshold separating normal and 
emergency conditions. Along these lines, the opinion observes that the growth of social and 
economic complexity have magnified the importance of protecting “the organization of society” 
and “the economic structure” as a vital public interest. These transformations have made the 
social and economic order “upon which the good of all depends” into a legitimate object “of the 
essential reserved power of the States to protect the security of their peoples.”556  
At the same time, however, the opinion insists that the power to modify contracts is not 
an ordinary but a temporary emergency power brought on by exceptional conditions. Hughes 
analogizes the needs of society in “a great public calamity” such as an earthquake or flood to the 
“urgent public need demanding such relief [that] is produced by other and economic causes.”557 
He also cites the WWI emergency cases as removing “whatever doubt there may have been” that 
during an emergency the state may modify contracts. These analogies suggest less of a sliding 
scale than a categorical distinction between norm and exception, between temporary emergency 
infringement and normal contractual rights, even though his context-bound framework has 
undermined the basis of such a categorical distinction. 
 
(3) limitations on emergency powers 
Hughes does not acknowledge this tension between the “exceptional” analogies of war and 
natural catastrophe and the more ordinary means of regulating a complex modern economy.  
                                                
556 Ibid., 442-3. 
557 Ibid., 440. 
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Without entering into specifics, he concludes that economic conditions were sufficiently 
disrupted that “an emergency existed in Minnesota,” justifying the temporary measures taken in 
the statute.558 Despite the incongruities, here we can see a clear advantage to casting enhanced 
regulatory powers on the emergency powers model. Temporary emergencies powers, unlike 
longstanding and forward looking reforms, are authorized only for the sake of restoring the 
constitutional status quo, and expire once the emergency is past.  
Hughes stresses three important forms of limitation on the new emergency powers. First, 
even without providing bright-line criteria for what constitutes an emergency, Hughes is careful 
to stress that the claim that an emergency exists will be subject to continual scrutiny by the 
Court: “It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the exigency still exists upon which the 
continued operation of the law depends.”559 Despite the flexible continuum of constitutional 
powers, the notion of emergency still seems to imply a binary status. Secondly, the emergency 
doctrine imposes strict time limitations, ensuring that emergency expansions of the police power 
do not substitute themselves for a new norm. Hughes makes clear that the Minnesota statute 
could be upheld because of its temporary and provisional nature, expiring either in 1935, or after 
the cessation of the economic emergency, whichever came first.  Once again, clear limits are 
asserted without clarifying what those limits are and how they can be ascertained. Third, Hughes 
emphasizes substantive limits as well, derived from the Court’s task of “harmonizing” the 
fluctuating reserve power of the state with the constitutional limitation of the power. This means 
that the reserve power cannot be construed to destroy the limitation; any temporary adjustment of 
the limitation must be consistent with its “spirit and purpose,” and narrowly tailored to its 
                                                
558 Ibid., 444. 
559 Ibid., 442 
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legitimate end of protecting society.560 Here too, the apparent continuity with the Lochner 
constitutional order belies deeper ambiguities. The “spirit and purpose” of the previous limits 
were to designate an economic space of private liberty, protected from state regulation. But if 
that economic space of normalcy is at the same time, as Hughes asserts, regarded as dependent 
on the “continual protective power” of the state, then the spirit and purpose of the limitations 
cannot be regarded as external to police power itself.  
Despite these deeper amibiguities, Hughes’ majority opinion in W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, 
released two months after Blaisedell, provided an opportunity to demonstrate that the emergency 
doctrine could be grounds for overturning as well as upholding state reforms.  Striking down an 
Arkansas law exempting insurance awards, Hughes explained that unlike the Minnesota 
mortgage law, the insurance legislation was “not limited to the emergency and set up no 
conditions apposite to emergency relief.”561 In other words, relief legislation must explicitly 
conform to the emergency doctrine and announce its temporary and provisional status. In the 
same period, the majority once again upheld a New York State milk industry regulation as a 
valid exercise of the state’s police powers to prevent disorder in the economic system and the 
community at large.  
 
The emergency powers strategy in Blaisdell and Worthen both split the previous 
conservative majority on 5-4 lines. The incredulous objections of the Blaisdell dissent make clear 
just how novel the majority’s reformulation of the emergency doctrine through police powers 
appeared. Rejecting the majorities attempt to uncouple emergency powers from their traditional 
                                                
560 Hence, the police power of Minnesota can temporarily delay foreclosure dates (altering the remedies of the 
contract in order to meet an urgent social need), but it could not permanently prevent foreclosure, or forgive the 
remainder of the debt owed (abolishing the remedy altogether, or altering the obligations of the contract). Ibid., 439. 
561 W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, quoted in “New Deal,” 1991. 
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locus in the martial law paradigm, the dissent flatly denied that an economic crisis, however 
severe, constitutes an ‘emergency’ in any way analogous to “the emergency of war” in 
accordance with the martial law paradigm. Economic and social misery, Sutherland argues, may 
be described as an emergency, but that changes nothing whatsoever about the categorical 
prohibitions imposed by the constitution on state action. The contract clause “does not 
contemplate that an emergency shall furnish an occasion for softening the restriction or making it 
any the less a restriction upon state action in that contingency than it is under strictly normal 
conditions”.562 In both cases the dissents cited Milligan, emphasizing the rigid boundaries of the 
martial law paradigm to reject Blaisdell’s analogy to “peace and good order of society.”563 In a 
lucid passage, the dissent honed in on the failure of the new emergency doctrine to provide 
criteria for what constituted an emergency of public security: 
 
What circumstances give force to an "emergency" statute? In how much of the State must they obtain? 
Everywhere, or will a single county suffice? How many farmers must have been impoverished or 
threatened violence to create a crisis of sufficient gravity? If, three days after this act became effective, 
another "very grievous murrain" had descended, and half of the cattle had died, would the emergency then 
have ended, also, the prescribed rates? … To these questions, we have no answers. When emergency gives 
potency, its subsidence must disempower; but no test for its presence or absence has been offered.564 
 
In one sense, Blaisdell’s reformulation of the emergency doctrine prevailed over the conservative 
dissent in that it successfully establishes the terms with which the Court will engage with the 
                                                
562 Sutherland Dissent, Blaisdell, 473 
563 “The exigency is of the kind which inevitably arises when one set of men continue to produce more than all 
others can buy. The distressing result to the producer followed his ill-advised, but voluntary, efforts. Similar 
situations occur in almost every business. If here we have an emergency sufficient to empower the Legislature to fix 
sales prices, then, whenever there is too much or too little of an essential thing -- whether of milk or grain or pork or 
coal or shoes or clothes -- constitutional provisions may be declared inoperative, and the "anarchy and despotism" 
prefigured in Milligan's case are at the door,” ibid., 551. 
564 Ibid., 548. 
  
291 
constitutional questions raised by the New Deal programs. In another respect, however, Hughes 
struggled for the next four years to provide satisfactory answers to the questions raised by the 
Worthens dissent. The fact that the doctrine provided a basis for striking down legislation as well 
as upholding it was clear testimony to Hughes conviction that clear limits existed. But it fell 
short of satisfying the demand for a generalizable test for determining the presence or absence of 
an emergency. The problem of identifying criteria for a domestic economic emergency would be 
resolved, in 1937, by giving the search altogether, along with the idea of a return to a still valid 
status quo ante. Just as we saw in the previous chapter how the martial law paradigm was 
transformed during Reconstruction in an ambivalent attempt to enact permanent constitutional 
change under the guise of storing the constitutional status quo, here too we shall see the 
processes of informal constitutional transformation mediated through a putatively “conservative” 
doctrine of emergency powers.  
 
Which status quo? A new emergency and a new norm 
Recall, then, the three basic options facing the Court in 1934. The first option would have been 
to follow the path set out in the dissents, cling to Lochner principles, and categorically invalidate 
down all attempts to reform the existent laissez faire structure relating state and society. 
Secondly, it could have abandoned Lochner and taken up Holmesian deference, engaging with 
the regulatory programs as a series of legitimate democratic decisions on fundamental reforms 
for the future.  These options present a radically forced choice between judicial deference that 
abandoned the premises of the Lochner era, or a judicial obstruction in the face of overwhelming 
popular majorities and the real possibility of a breakdown of social order. It’s not hard to see 
why the Court would be keen to avoid this forced choice by instead effectively declaring an 
  
292 
“emergency” in the security and welfare of society, and casting the reformist legislation as a new 
species of emergency powers deriving from the sovereign protective power over society. This 
strategy, and Hughes new doctrine of emergency powers accomplished a three-fold goal. First, it 
was able to avoid adopting a categorically obstructionist position, which would have been 
catastrophic for its own legitimacy if not for the country as a whole. Secondly, it could 
accommodate some of the new reforms as temporary exceptional measures while simultaneously 
affirming the integrity of the status quo ante. Finally, it reserved for itself the authority to decide 
the scope and extent of the new powers, preserving its own power to shape the outcomes even as 
it masked its own partial retreat.  
At this point, we can again refer to Bruce Ackerman’s account of constitutional change as an 
informal procedural instantiation of the democratic constituent power as a useful contrast to the 
account I am suggesting here. My account converges with Ackerman’s in interpreting the New 
Deal, like Reconstruction, as an informal constitutional transformation located between the two 
poles of legal continuity and revolutionary rupture. While Ackerman argues that these instances 
of constitutional change evinced an unambiguously democratic character, the focus here on 
emergency powers as a means of reorienting the identity of the constitutional to be restored 
suggests that the democratic elements celebrated by Ackerman coexisted with an account of 
emergency powers that was distinct from, and even in opposition to Ackerman’s theme of 
popular sovereignty. My claim here is not at all that the emergency and police powers doctrines 
were somehow definitive of the broader public meaning of New Deal constitutionalism. Rather, 
focusing on the role of emergency and police powers in the construction of the post-New Deal 
constitutional order qualifies rather than negates Ackerman’s account. First, the extent to which 
democratic constitutional change was accomplished through formally non-democratic categories 
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of emergency powers is a reminder that even with Ackerman’s multistep process of 
constitutional politics the sovereign will of We the People is always a more or less fluid and 
protean basis of legitimacy, not a concrete political agent capable of representing itself. 
Secondly, highlighting the role of emergency powers in informal constitutional change provides 
a striking illustration of the way in which the categories of norm and exception can become an 
arena for political contestation and redefinitions which subsequently become embedded, lose 
their contested status and shape new forms of emergency politics that had little to do with the 
original redefinition. We can get a clearer sense of the contested status of the new emergency 
doctrine by looking at the way it was interpreted outside the Court.   
While the new emergency doctrine was welcomed generally by progressives eager for the 
reforms to move ahead, some greeted the new emergency doctrine with enthusiasm, while others 
questions whether the doctrine provided sufficiently solid constitutional grounds for the new 
regulations.565 In an extremely incisive 1934 analysis, Jane Perry Clark noted the judiciary’s 
hostility to the deep institutional reforms proposed in recent years. “If,” however, “changes in the 
economic and legal structure of the country are based on the existence of a widespread 
emergency, these frightened verbalists may be soothed by the implication of a mere temporary 
aberration from the sacred tablets of the law.”566 For Clark, the evasiveness and arbitrary quality 
of the “dubious emergency doctrine” – in which the Court has been satisfied that an emergency 
exists in some circumstances, and denied its existence in others without reference to any fixed set 
of criteria in either case – is not accidental but structural. Since “the [emergency] doctrine is of 
necessity vague and amorphous,” Clark expresses his hope that the Court will drop the fiction of 
                                                
565 For an excellent discussion, see Murphy, P. L. (1971). The Constitution in crisis times, 1918-1969. New York,, 
Harper & Row; Belknap, “The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine” and Hulsebosch, “The New Deal 
Court: Emergence of a New Reason.” See also, Scheiber, “Property Rights versus ‘Public Necessity.’” 
566 Clark, 268. 
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a temporary emergency altogether and affirm the programs for what they are: forward looking, 
legitimate “experimentation[s] in economic control by government” in response to urgent 
problems stemming from the ordinary conditions of industrial capitalism.567 Clark’s critique 
echoed the discomfort of other more radical progressives with the framework of “emergency 
powers” invoked by the New Deal. Pointedly referring to the Depression as a “crisis” rather than 
an “emergency,” John Dewey noted the propensity of the “emergency” framework to obscure the 
fundamental political questions about democratic participation raised by the reformist agenda. 
The “emergency” framework, Dewey noted, only prepares for quickly resurrecting oligarchic 
privileges, under the guise of a “return to normalcy.”568  
 
Roosevelt’s measures were fine in an emergency; we gladly and patriotically supported them. But the 
emergency has passed. Government must now take its hands off business and allow the innate energy and 
wisdom of the leaders of business to conduct their affairs in their own wise and successful way – the truly 
“American” way. The plea will of course be tremendously reinforced by the officially temporary character 
of the methods… [President Roosevelt] can, if he chooses, claim credit for the temporary nature of the 
emergency measures and take the lead in declaring that now they have been so successful that they have 
accomplished their purpose.569 
  
Many others, however, were enthusiastic about the doctrine, sometimes for contradictory 
reasons. Moderate conservatives endorsed it as a way to accommodate some of the reforms while 
retaining judicial control over the process and refusing sanction to any permanent constitutional 
                                                
567 282-3. 
568 Dewey, “Imperative Need: a New Radical Party,” in John Dewey: the Later Works, vol. 9, 78 (quotation marks in 
the original). 
569 Ibid. elsewhere, Dewey shrewdly responded to the Emergency  that the situation called for comprehensive 
reform, and that “making the President a banking dictator in a crisis is not a solution – it is merely a postponement 
of the inevitable remaking of our profiteering banking system.” Dewey, “The Banking Crisis,” vol. 9, 255.  
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change.570 But many progressives also celebrated the new emergency powers for exactly the 
opposite reason, as heralding a new age of constitutional flexibility and pragmatism. Writing 
shortly after Blaisdell, John Fitzimmons praised the radical constitutional shift entailed by the 
new emergency doctrine and emphasized its unprecedented novelty in the realm of police 
powers, contrasting the “classic coldness” of the old paradigm with the “humanism” of Hughes’ 
flexible emergency powers.571 In a final flourish, he predicts that the Constitution, reinvigorated 
by the new emergency doctrine, will enjoy a “fresh and green old age” comparable to Virgil’s 
description of the Roman gods.572  
One of the most interesting accounts of Blaisdell’s significance for informal 
constitutional change was published in the same year by John Dunham. Dunham, the executive 
editor of the Commercial Law Journal and a legal progressive, went even further than 
Fitzimmons in hailing a new emergency constitution. Dunham argued that the flexibility of the 
new emergency doctrine provided a means of recognizing that “[i]ndividual right and individual 
justice give way to the demands of social justice, and precedent may become merely persuasive 
instead of controlling,” while at the same time avoiding outright constitutional rupture.573 By 
expanding emergency powers to the police power, the Court reversed the priority of individual 
liberty of contract over security, and elevated the security of society to the level of a 
constitutional principle. According to Dunham, the decision endorsed the principle that “when a 
                                                
570 First example, Parker, “Is the Constitution Passing?”; Handler, “The National Industrial Recovery 
Administration,” American Bar Association Journal 19 (1933). 
571 Fitzsimmons, “Constitutionality of Emergency Legislation, Kansas City Law Review 2 (1934): 72-3. 
572 75. 
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statute enlarges the security of the masses, even though at the expense of the few, it should not 
be held repugnant to the constitution as depriving the few of any liberty or right.”574 
For Dunham, the flexibility and expansiveness of the new emergency doctrine is its most 
promising feature, allowing constitutional change through the judiciary to an extent that may 
make Article Five and formal constitutional amendments superfluous.  The framework of 
emergencies allows the Court to detect in the constitution hidden reservoirs of inherent power  
 
which may spring into action or be resurrected when occasion requires. An emergency creates use for the 
power, which, though never employed before, is actually contained in the constitution. With this theory, 
amendments become practically unnecessary, and our legislatures possess a broad power which may be 
sustained by the courts of last resort…575 
 
In his enthusiasm, Dunham doesn’t appear to take notice of the contradiction pointed out by 
Clark: the purpose of the emergency doctrine was the exact opposite of a de facto constitutional 
amendment. It emphasized the temporary and provisional character of the new legislation, and 
affirmed the continuing validity of the old constitutional order. This, indeed, was almost 
certainly why Hughes chose the emergency doctrine in the first place over Brandeis’ more 
straightforwardly progressivist, deferential framework.  
In the short term, Dunham’s hopes for the emergency doctrine were almost surely 
disappointed, at least in the period between 1934 and 1937. From a broader horizon of 
constitutional development, however, he was remarkably prescient. His analysis contained a 
                                                
574 180. More ominously, speaking of the duty of the Courts to restore the feeling of “in the mind of the common 
man” in order to “silence the rumblings and allay the fears created by the agitator… Those who destroy the 
confidence of our people, who shake the faith of the common man in the safety of our institutions, and in the 
stability and justice of our courts, are no less traitors than they who aid the enemy in war,” 180.  
575 Dunham, 182. My italics 
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penetrating insight about the long-term implications of the emergency doctrine that would only 
become fully apparent after 1937. Dunham saw clearly that the emergency doctrine’s derivation 
of extraordinary emergency powers from ordinary constitutional sources, and its inability to 
provide any criteria for the emergency conditions that amplify those powers, effectively 
relativized any fixed distinction between a temporary exception and a permanent normality. In 
effect, his enthusiasm and the conservatives’ anathema shared the same source: once 
emancipated from its confines in the war paradigm, emergency powers for the sake of security 
are resistant to any fixed set of limitations, and in principle amount to substantive constitutional 
transformation within formal constitutional continuity.  
In addition to the analyses of Dunham and other interpreters in 1934, we can point to a 
further radical implication of Blaisdell’s emergency doctrine, which may not have been apparent 
to contemporaries. Identifying social and economic insecurity as an emergency capable of 
shifting the scope of constitutional powers and rights may have been motivated by an earnest 
desire to use emergency powers to return to the Lochner status quo as quickly as possible. 
Nevertheless, such a structure was at the same time logically consistent with using emergency 
powers to abandon the Lochner status quo ante for good. The reason is that for the Lochner 
status quo, economic emergencies are part of constitutional normality; they cannot create or 
expand any powers that do not exist ordinarily as well. A Blaisdell emergency is already a norm 
under Lochner; there is nothing to restore. The new forms of emergency powers Blaisdell called 
forth, therefore, could no longer be contained as means to the end of returning the status quo 
ante. From the perspective of the status quo ante, there was no emergency and the expanded 
police powers were unconstitutional. From the perspective of the new emergency powers, 
“returning” to the status quo ante would not signify an end to the emergency; the only 
  
298 
meaningful end for the new emergency powers would be to secure a new norm, not the old one. 
The Court’s recognition of insecurity as an emergency was already, if only implicitly, a rupture 
with the status quo they wished to uphold.  
In 1934, the rupture was only latent, and understandably it did not appear obvious to most 
observers. If economic prosperity had returned that year, it is likely that the contradiction would 
have remained at the level of an abstract logical possibility.576 Instead, the economic emergency 
intensified, as did the popular determination to uses the national government to alleviate its worst 
effects and overcome it. For the next three years, the Court attempted, with increasing strain, to 
maintain the emergency doctrine as a model of “commissarial dictatorship” – a temporary, 
limited means to return to the status quo ante. By the 1937 switch in time, however, Dunham’s 
vision prevailed, in a two-fold respect. First, as Bruce Ackerman has argued, the decisions 
amounted to the culmination of an informal amendment process, synthesizing the new 
“emergency” regulatory powers as permanent features of the new constitutional order. Secondly, 
in contrast to Ackerman’s democratic interpretation of the process, the 1937 opinions maintained 
the source of authority for the new regulative powers provided by the emergency doctrine. The 
difference was that the “switch” cases simply abandoned the emergency doctrine’s unsuccessful 
attempts to maintain consistent limitations of time and scope on the emergency powers. The 
basis of the informal amendments were closer to Dunham’s vision of emergency powers 
becoming permanent than to Ackerman’s reconstruction of the voice of the People. Dunham 
                                                
576 Nevertheless, Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell seems to suggest a similar argument. The dissent cites at great 
length historical evidence purporting to show that the Constitution was drafted amidst widespread foreclosure 
comparable to that of 1934. For Sutherland, the fact that the contract clause was drafted in these conditions proves 
that it was meant to forbid impairment of contracts without exception, no matter how severe the foreclosure crisis. 
From this he concludes that the majority’s emergency doctrine “constitutes an effort to overthrow the constitutional 
provision by an appeal to facts and circumstances identical with those which brought it into existence. With due 
regard for the processes of logical thinking, it legitimately cannot be urged that conditions which produced the rule 
may now be invoked to destroy it” (473).  The accuracy of Sutherland’s constitutional history aside, he is right to 
worry that Blaisdell’s emergency powers to combat foreclosure cannot be expected to return to a status quo ante that 
was indifferent to widespread foreclosure.  
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argued that freedom of contract must be made compatible with “the security of the masses,” and 
that the judiciary’s duty was to play a leading role in “restoring a sense of economic security in 
the mind of the common man.” The reasons he gives are the increased socio-economic 
complexity of modern society, and the need to silence “agitators” who take advantage of 
insecurity to “shake the faith of the common man” in the justice and stability of basic 
institutions. They have nothing to do with the right of the common man or the “masses” to 
articulate their own needs and priorities and express them as part of a democratic majority.577 
Before we turn to these developments, however, we first have to see how the contours of the new 
emergency doctrine were determined in the period between 1934 and 1937. 
 
Determining the New Emergency Doctrine 
Blaisdell, W.B. Worthen, and Nebbia together established the emergency doctrine as a basis for 
expanding state police powers while at the same time asserting limits in time and scope to that 
expansion. The doctrine remained untested, however, at the level of the national government. 
Despite some passing dictum in Nebbia suggesting that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit 
the federal government from providing for the general welfare, it was unclear how the 
emergency doctrine would apply to the restrictions of the commerce clause and the conservative 
view that the federal government lacked independent police powers.578 Taking note of the 
Court’s stance, a host of new regulatory statutes on the national as well as state level began to 
include emergency declarations in their preambles, along with sometimes lengthy descriptions of 
the dire conditions requiring relief. In the meantime, lower courts attempted to apply and clarify 
the new emergency doctrine to the problem of interstate commerce, within uneven results. Some 
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justices, citing the language of the Blaisdell majority, nevertheless reverted in substance to the 
conservative dissent and refused to regard economic conditions, no matter how dire, as an 
emergency that changed intrastate to interstate commerce.579 Other courts, citing the same 
opinion, suggested that the economic emergency effectively gave all commerce an interstate 
character.580 The absence of clear standards imposed by the emergency doctrine produced 
confusion and unpredictability throughout the judiciary.  
 In 1935, the Court decided a series of cases involving aspects of NIRA, the legislative 
centerpiece of the early New Deal, upholding some parts of the legislation but striking down 
many of its central provisions. Unlike the 1934 cases, these involved national regulatory powers 
rather than state police powers. The cases together amount to a declaration that while the 
emergency doctrine may permit a limited range of temporary, provisional emergency measures, 
it is not a green light for abandoning the central priorities of the Lochner order. As Hughes wrote 
in Schechter,  
 
Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of 
power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument 
necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional 
authority… [The] powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who 
act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or 
different power is necessary.581 
 
Schechter, in other words, acknowledges the emergency doctrine’s claim that emergencies do not 
create new powers but can magnify the occasions for exercising existing powers, while at the 
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same time asserting ultimate judicial control over the precise extent of the power at any given 
time.582  
 Despite this firm assertion of constitutional limits, the problems encountered at the state 
level recurred even more severely at the national level: by striking down statutes under the 
emergency doctrine, the Court demonstrated that the doctrine entails some definite limits, but it 
found itself unable to articulate a consistent rule identifying exactly where those limits are. I 
shall give a very cursory overview of this attempt to define the limits imposed by the emergency 
doctrine on national regulatory power by highlighting three separate dimensions: (1), separation 
of powers (2) and permanence (3). 
 
 
(1) divided internal sovereignty  
While the emergency doctrine provided greater flexibility for state regulations or national control 
over currency, it was much more resistant to New Deal attempts to redraw the fundamental 
boundary around a domain of economic life within states that is categorically free from national 
regulation, regardless of emergency conditions. Hence, Schechter concedes that “extraordinary 
conditions” may furnish a broader scope of national regulatory power over commerce, but such 
emergency powers may not abolish the distinction between “direct and indirect effects” on 
interstate commerce. Even the “grave emergency” of the depression is not enough to place 
                                                
582 The government in this case had argued that the economic crisis urgently required national coordination of 
(amongst other things), wage standards within a host of various industries. Even if the industry itself is within a 
single state, the emergency economic conditions created clear national interconnections between other industries in 
other states, placing ordinarily isolated commerce within a emergency “current” of interstate commerce and thereby 
falling under Congress’ regulatory power. The urgency and complexity of the crisis also required broad delegations 
of legislative authority to the discretion of the executive. Schechter’s counsel took the opposite approach and urged 
the Court to reject the emergency doctrine itself, arguing that economic crises cannot influence constitutional 




Schechter’s poultry operation in a “current or stream” of interstate commerce. On such an 
expansive interpretation, “the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the 
people,” pushing national authority “to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction” between 
local and national activity.583   
 
(2) separation of powers 
A second area where the Court insisted on limitations within the emergency doctrine concerned 
delegations of legislative authority to the discretion of the executive or to private groups without 
providing clear standards, guidelines and limitations.584 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan struck 
down a NIRA provision that had authorized broad discretionary regulatory power to the 
executive. This was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, since it applied no 
standards to limit or guide the executive’s discretion.585 Significantly, the Court acknowledged 
precedents of earlier standardless delegations to the executive, but argued that the dangers of war 
and hostile foreign powers made those delegations legitimate.586 Schechter applies the same 
analysis, reiterating the formal limitation and applying it to delegations to private companies as 
well.587 
                                                
583 Schechter, 194. See also Retirement Bd. V. Alton R.R. Co. (1935) and Carter v. Carter Coal (1936). 
584 Interestingly, in Panama the Court cites a series of late 18th and early 19th century delegations that did authorize 
broad, standardless executive discretion, but distinguished the economic emergency from these earlier precedents 
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585 Panama, 418-20. 
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587 would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial 
associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the 
rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be 
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of 
their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible 
aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to 
our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.” Schechter, 537. 
Carter Coal also invalidated delegations of legislative power, this time to partially private “trade or industrial 




(3) Temporal limitations: provisionality 
The Court also struck down Congress’ attempt to relieve the extraordinary wave of foreclosures 
that was sweeping hundreds of thousands of farmers from their homes.588 Accepting the 
government’s contention that Blaisdell is the controlling precedent and that the issue falls within 
the emergency doctrine, the Court nevertheless found that the law exceeded the legitimate 
emergency powers that could have provided a reasonable remedy.589  Unlike the provisional and 
temporary character of Minnesota statute in Blaisdell, the five year duration of the national law 
was deemed too long for the brief emergency provision that would have been authorized. 
Similarly, the following summer the Court struck down a New York State minimum wage law 
for women, arguing that the law violated the time and breadth limitations required by legitimate 
emergency powers, concluding that “the Act is not to meet an emergency; it discloses a 
permanent policy.”590  
 
Toward 1937: the breakdown of the emergency paradigm 
These clarify the boundaries of the new emergency doctrine were not particularly successful. The 
limited expansion of the commerce clause through the emergency doctrine proved even more 
troublesome. In the Lochner era, the distinction between inter- and intrastate commerce was held 
to be a matter of categorical, formal rules, unaltered by external conditions; this inflexible 
approach at least made it easier for judges to represent their activity as the non-political 
                                                                                                                                                       
industry; whatever agreement the different private groups reached among themselves acquired force of law through 
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identification and application of per se legal rules. As the growth of a national, industrial 
economy increasingly made distinctions between “intra- and infra-state” and “direct and indirect 
affect” less plausible, judicial decisions increasingly appeared as driven by ideology rather than 
legal reasoning, and judges found it more and more difficult to maintain the separation between 
law and politics. The emergency doctrine rescued the Court from the trap of politicization by 
abandoning the categorical approach and acknowledging the dynamic nature of society. By the 
same stroke, it plunged the Court into the even more hazardous task of determining the degree to 
which an emergency strengthens the “flows” or “streams” that linked an activity to interstate 
commerce, or judging whether those flows would be too “faint,” obscure and “broken by cross 
currents” when analyzed in relations to a set of highly complex and debated socio-economic 
conditions.  For critics, these aquatic metaphors did little to mask the arbitrary and ad hoc 
character of the decisions and the court’s failure to clarify a consistent standard from case to 
case. The entire approach succeeded in further undermining rather than bolstering the separation 
between politics and law, exposing the Court and the entire constitutional order to charges of 
ideological obstructionism and usurpation.  
 Delegation, too, proved difficult to contain once the emergency doctrine replaced general 
rules for flexible guidelines. The emergency doctrine preserved the assumption that the Lochner 
status quo ante remained valid law, and therefore regarded all regulatory reforms as temporary 
“emergency” measures, temporarily required by the economic emergency. The Lochner order 
rested on the assumption that abstract, general rules can determine concrete cases. The 
emergency doctrine effectively declared that in an emergency, the concrete case itself determines 
the scope of the general rule, and the judicial activity in an emergency must proceed from the 
particular to the general rather as well as from the general to the particular. This was the essence 
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of Hughes idea of “fluctuating” powers. If an “emergency” is by definition a condition in which 
the particular circumstances determine the scope of the general rule, it then became difficult to 
maintain the hierarchy of general norm/particular application that undergirds the Lochner order’s 
assumptions about the separation of powers. This in turn poses a challenge to the delegation 
doctrine, particularly the basis for the delegation doctrine’s premise that general statutory 
language must provide determinate limitations to administrative discretion.591 In this case as well, 
indeterminacy, initially conceived as a strategy for depoliticizing law, leads the Court directly 
into the role of a political actor.  
 Finally, after the resounding electoral victories 1934, the Court’s insistence that 
emergency measures be provisional and time limited appeared less like prudent oversight and 
more like an increasingly desperate form of wishful thinking. After the 1934 mandate, and even 
more so after the 1936 landslide victory, New Dealers unhesitatingly spoke in the language of 
democratic renewal, fundamental reform and constitutional revision, not that of temporary and 
provisional emergency measures. After the 1936 elections, “political opposition to the New Deal 
was virtually wiped out.”592 Moreover, the deepening of the recession and the scope of the 
national reform made the assumptions about temporary “relief” measures look out of touch with 
reality. By this time, it was exceedingly difficult to deny that the depression was a structural 
condition resulting from an array of deep economic forces that required a systematic response. If 
the “emergency” was long-term or even permanent, it was equally obvious that the New Deal 
legislation was not predominantly temporary relief measures aimed at alleviating symptoms; 
much of it was long-term or permanent fundamental reform, aimed at the structural causes of the 
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depression through a transformation in the relationship between the state and society.593 These 
conclusions were reached not only by progressives but also by large numbers of moderates and 
even considerateness. Ogden Mills, Secretary of Commerce under President Hoover, gloomily 
acknowledged that “so intricate and pervasive are [the reform legislation’s] potentialities in the 
reorganization of the habits of men and of economic and governmental relationships that one 
may speculate upon the facility of readjustment at the close of any particular period of time.”594 
 All of these difficulties – its inability to determine consistent criteria for the scope, 
breadth or duration of emergency powers, its difficulties with the problem of indeterminacy and 
the status quo ante, the embarrassing gap between its fictive rationale and socio-economic and 
political realities – all contributed to the collapse of the emergency doctrine as a plausible 
judicial framework for the New Deal.  
 
III. The New Deal Constitution: Dualist Democracy or Permanent Emergency? 
 
Did the Court, as Ackerman’s interpretation would suggest, abandon the anti-democratic 
premises of the preceding three years together with the emergency doctrine? The question is 
relevant since, as we’ve seen, part of the attraction of the emergency doctrine in the first place 
was that it appeared to offer a way of avoiding the “higher lawmaking” ambitions of the New 
Deal reforms. Ackerman is certainly justified in arguing that Roosevelt and other important New 
Dealers had been speaking in a self-conscious discourse of constitutional renewal, if not dualist 
democracy. But the judicial synthesis component of the argument is lacking. Unfortunately, the 
cases themselves offer no evidence of the fundamental message Ackerman wants to claim for 
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 If they were not confirmations of an episode of popular constitution making, what was 
the nature of the “switch” announced in NLRB and West Coast? Once again, focusing on the 
framework of emergency powers yields a different account of the levels of continuity and break 
than other major interpretations. What were the continuities? First, in both cases, the Court 
upheld the legislation in question on the basis of the same theory of constitutional powers 
identified by the emergency doctrine. In NLRB, it is Congress’ regulatory power under the 
commerce clause, and in West Coast, it is the state’s police power over safety and welfare. 
Secondly, the relationship between the constitutional authority of the power, and the legitimate 
ends of the legislation was also carried over from Blaisewell and the emergency doctrine. In 
NLRB the “immediate” and “catastrophic” consequences of industrial strife on the flow of 
interstate commerce are sufficiently grave to extend the regulatory powers granted by the 
commerce clause to the domain of labor relations. And in West Coast, the especially vulnerable 
status of women laborers to economic exploitation, in light of the “alarming” and “unparalleled 
demands for relief” caused by the depression on the public are sufficient to make the contractual 
terms of women workers a legitimate object of the state’s police powers.595  
 Although the scope of these powers are extended beyond some of the earlier emergency 
doctrine rulings, neither of these cases departs from the Blaisdell framework for expanding 
ordinary powers granted by the constitution to meet new social needs of increased regulation. In 
this respect, the new framework is strikingly reminiscent of the old framework. Where, then, 
does the switch occur? The difference is that NLRB and West Coast Hotel abandon the three year 
attempt under the emergency doctrine to impose consistent time and breadth limitations to the 
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new regulatory powers. The switch cases maintain the doctrine’s enhanced regulatory powers, 
and the increased recognition of society as a vital object of regulation. But the Court’s prevailing 
fiction that the expanded regulation was a temporary expedient for the sake of returning to the 
constitutional norm of laissez faire dropped away. In practical terms, the switch in time consists 
in the Court’s decision that the emergency powers have become permanent, and the emergency 
has become the new norm.  
 This formulation will undoubtedly seem objectionable. While Ackerman may have read 
too much dualist democracy into the switch cases, characterizing them as an authorization of 
permanent emergency powers goes much too far in the opposite direction, depriving the Court’s 
deference to the elected branches of any democratic content. Two main qualifications are in 
order. First, we have to keep in mind that the “emergency powers” made permanent here were 
largely of the Court’s own making, devised in order to accommodate some of the relief 
legislation without acknowledging a departure from the Lochner order. The emergency powers 
of Blaisdell are, literally, regulatory powers of the legislature by another name – although I shall 
argue in a moment that the path by which these powers were constitutionalized is nevertheless 
important. A second, related, qualification is that the juridical designation of the New Deal 
programs – before and after the switch – does not determine their significance in other spheres. 
The political significance of a relief program in the relationship between a representative and his 
constituents, or in the public sphere, or in the historical imagination cannot be reduced to its 
judicial designation as an “emergency measure” or a “police power.”  With these two provisos in 
mind, we can still refer to the switch as the normalization of emergency powers over society on 
the level of what Ackerman refers to as the “constitutional meaning” of the new synthesis 
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created by the Court.596 Why does this constitutional meaning matter?  
 For our purposes, it matters in the most general sense because it helps embed a new, post-
New Deal constitutional relationship between state power, individual rights and the security of 
society. This constitutional framework, partly shaped by the process I have been describing, will 
play a fundamental role in shaping the course of other, non-economic forms of emergency 
powers. Before turning to that argument, I want to suggest one way that it mattered for the social 
legacy of the New Deal itself.   
 One of the reasons for resisting Ackerman’s normative reconstruction of the switch in 
time is that it obscures the meaningful historical possibilities of a more democratic constitutional 
legacy of the New Deal. One the deep currents running throughout the constitutional aspirations 
of this period that falls out of Ackerman’s account is the theme of what I will call, following 
William Forbath, “social citizenship.” The proposal of social citizenship resonates through 
countless speeches, address and fireside chats of Roosevelt and other progressive New Dealers, 
and formed an important link between the administration and labor and social movements 
outside the Democratic party. It underlay many of Roosevelt’s central themes such as “a second 
Bill of Rights,” the Four Freedoms and his frequent support for “a right to work.”597 
 A core feature of the New Deal conception of social citizenship is that it is a discourse 
explicitly based on rights, expressing the idea that decent work, a decent livelihood, social 
provisions and a degree of economic independence and democracy should be available to all 
citizens.598 Legal historian Gray Pope has argued that this theme of the New Deal drew from a 
rich, unacknowledged history of interpreting the 13th and 14th Amendments as a source for social 
and economic as well as civil rights. The centrality of rights in the New Deal concept of social 
                                                
596 Ackerman, Transformations, 343.  
597 Foner, Story of American Freedom… 
598 Forbath, “Constitutional Change and the Politics of History,” 1925. 
  
310 
citizenship was in sharp contrast with the Court’s framework of expanded regulatory and 
protective powers. Social citizenship proposals sought to extend the equal protection of 
individual civil and political rights to include a domain of social and economic conditions 
relevant for the exercise of civil and political freedom. Breaking with the Lochner order’s rigid 
priority of fixed private rights over democratic law-making, the social citizenship proposals 
expressed a dynamic “system of rights” that linked public and private autonomy together in a 
more robustly democratic vision of liberal constitutionalism.599 As Eric Foner suggests, it was a 
theme that referred not only to the New Deal as a major reform in the government’s role to 
provide welfare and coordinate the national economy, but also to the dramatic forms of 
democratic inclusion and the expansion of citizenship the New Deal achieved. 
 In contrast, as we saw earlier the common law basis of police powers is in and of itself 
both neither democratic nor liberal but absolutist and explicitly paternalistic. Modern police 
powers still retain an imprint of their patriarchal common-law heritage expressed in Blackstone’s 
definition as the sovereign’s “oeconomical” dominion over his realm conceived as a private 
household.  They describe the state’s “protective” power over social collectivities or society as a 
whole for managerial, regulative or preventative purposes. Hence, police powers generally imply 
a degree of hierarchical governance, discretion, and disciplinary sanctions for prospective 
regulatory purposes.  
 Of course, I should stress that the term in American law is for the most part synonymous 
with ordinary administrative powers that are perfectly compatible with, and to some extent 
required by, constitutional democracy.600 It is nevertheless true that the common-law origins of 
                                                
599 See Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in Habermas, J., C. Cronin, et al. (1998). The 
inclusion of the other studies in political theory. Cambridge, Mass., MIT PRess. 
600 I must to be careful to avoid two mistakes often committed in the recent police powers literature: first, the 
temptation of using the semantic polyvalence of the word police as evidence of a causal or logical relationship 
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the police power in relations of hierarchy, non-reciprocal rights and duties and social dependence 
make it potentially even more resistant to “democratization” than other, more neutral forms of 
administrative power. These origins are evident even in West Coast Hotel, which notes that the 
health, safety and welfare concerns that authorize the police powers are especially relevant in the 
case of women, “in whose protection the state has a special interest.”601 Hughes approvingly cites 
the Court’s earlier finding that    
 
"woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence," and that her physical wellbeing "becomes an object of public interest and care in 
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." We emphasized the need of protecting women against 
oppression despite her possession of contractual rights. 
 
Of course one could object that neither this embarrassingly outdated dictum nor the arcane legal 
title of “police powers” make any difference at all to the effects of the decision and the precedent 
it establishes. The significance of the case is that the Court deferred to the democratically elected 
state legislature, making the technical continuity with the emergency doctrine irrelevant. This 
objection is valid, but only in a very limited sense. The legal categories used by the Court cannot 
determine the significance of the political outcomes outside a narrowly legal domain. It is not 
true, however, that the continuities with the emergency doctrine are political irrelevant. On the 
contrary, the failure of the synthesis cases to repudiate the emergency doctrine was deeply 
consequential.  
                                                                                                                                                       
between very different things. Secondly, of extracting an especially exotic, archaic meaning associated with “police 
power” from hundreds or even thousands of years ago as evidence of an ominous “secret” or “hidden” meaning in 
the present. See Dubber, M. D. and M. Valverde (2008). Police and the liberal state. Stanford, Calif., Stanford 
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601 West Coast, 394. 
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 The consequences become clearer by comparing the regulatory powers approach derived 
emergency doctrine with the alternative of deriving social citizenship on the basis of rights set 
out in the 13th and 14th Amendment. This rights-based approach is not an imaginary, hypothetical 
alternative, but was the constitutional vision developed by labor, social movements and by some 
progressive intellectuals, and played a vivid role in the core constitutional debates of the 
period.602 As William Forbath points out, in the months preceding the NLRB case,  
 
the lawmakers and the president argued not simply that Congress had the power under the Constitution, 
rightly understood or amended, to regulate agriculture, industry, and labor. They argued that citizens had 
fundamental economic and social rights under the Constitution, rightly understood or amended; and  
Congress, therefore, had the duty to exercise its power to govern economic and social life in a way that 
sought to secure those rights.603 
 
 In other words, the rights based approach binds the increased regulatory power to the expansion 
and evolution of the basic content of the rights of citizens, expressed through the democratic 
process. In contrast to Ackerman’s narrative, in which the 1936 campaign and electoral mandate 
represented a constitutional choice for expanded national regulatory powers, the foundation of 
New Deal constitutional politics was a new conception of social citizenship, demanding a 
recognition of new rights, and new rights-bearers that provided the democratic character to the 
new expanded national powers.604 We can imagine a “dualist democratic” switch in time, in 
which the 13th and 14th Amendments, rather than the federal commerce or the state police power, 
become the basis for the constitutional status of the rights of labor to collective bargaining and 
                                                
602 SeeForbath, W. (1999). "Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship." Michigan Law Review 98(1).; Pope, “Labor’s 
Constitution of Freedom.” 
603 Forbath, “New Deal Constitution in Exile,” 176. 
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the rights of individual workers to a living wage.605 In this scenario, the continuity with the older 
order would have been the immanent democratic and social dimensions of the rights enshrined in 
the Reconstruction Amendments, and the rupture would have been only with the Lochner 
Court’s distorted reduction of “due process” to the inviolability of property. In other words, the 
moment of rupture would have been to recognize the centrality of democratic interpretation and 
articulation in the system of rights, without rejecting the principles of rational autonomy and the 
prohibition of forced dependency that underlay the Lochner supremacy of “freedom of contract.” 
On this interpretation, the New Deal language of “a second Bill of Rights” and “industrial 
democracy” did not imply the abolition of these principles but, on the contrary, their openness to 











Chapter VI: National Security and the Emergency Constitution 
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Blaiswell’s combination of inherent and flexible temporary emergency powers and the police 
power was not, however, laid to rest in 1937. Outside the sphere of economic regulation it 
persisted, and indeed as I shall argue, formed the basis of the “emergency constitution” that has 
helped shape emergency powers until the present. The foundations for the modern emergency 
constitution were established during World War II. The edifice itself, however, emerged in the 
years following 1945, in the midst of two crucial developments that helped open an enormous 
gap into which emergency police powers would expand.  
 The first major development was a shift away from the binary contrast we saw in chapter 
four between peace and war as distinct, mutually exclusive conditions. The successor to this is 
the notion of international police action, which replaces the stark, binary contrast with a broad, 
intermediate grey area designating both actual uses of military force the ongoing, prospective 
readiness to do so.606 Indeed, after 1945 there have been no formal Congressional declarations of 
war. Subsequently, the separation of powers in executive-led armed conflicts has itself become a 
grey zone, consisting in a variety of different authorization models and distinctions in the degree 
of the use of force. This transformation involved more than the separation of powers.607 It also 
had the potential of effecting the distinctions between the paradigms of crime and war, and 
ultimately on the axial separation between the juridical spaces of internal and external 
sovereignty itself. Amid intense Cold War mobilization and profound worries of a new age of the 
“garrison state” and atomic warfare,608 the emergency police powers doctrine was shifted into the 
space vacated by the war paradigm, providing constitutional continuity and flexibility in the 
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transition from isolationist republic to global superpower.609     
 The second, corresponding, development was a fundamental transformation in the 
understanding of emergency that was completed in the shift form the martial law model of self-
preservation to the concept of national security. The term national security, virtually unknown 
before the 1940s, ascended in a few short years after 1945 to constitute its own field of social 
scientific knowledge, and played a central role in public discourse about domestic and 
international politics that roughly tracked the paradigmatic shift from war to police actions.610 
The concept of national security reformulated the identity of the “self” involved in the state’s 
right to self-preservation.  Unlike the early modern natural law conception, national security 
implied productive powers necessary to create and maintain a positive vision of an international 
order.611 It replaced the skeletal forms of sovereign equality and reciprocity with a differentiated 
and complex order of “international society” existing simultaneously in multiple social, 
economic and ideological as well as political dimensions. Like domestic police powers, national 
security involved a mixture of consensual and coercive means that was not fixed in advance but 
fluctuated in response to particular conditions and circumstances. And just as the criteria of 
“social security” created fundamental challenges to the clear temporal and spatial limitations of 
“commissarial” emergency powers, national security would prove to be even more formidably 
resistant to limitation.  
 Before describing the structural complexities introduced by national security in the 
emergency constitution, I want to look first at the early foundations of this structure in the 
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Second World War. The first section, describing the military tribunals used to try German 
saboteurs, analyzes the blurring of the crime and war paradigms in the novel category of 
“unlawful belligerency” that emerges from that episode. The second section discusses the 
reinterpretation of war powers through the Blaiswell doctrine of emergency police powers that 
framed the constitutional understanding of the Japanese internment.  
 
Effective Sovereignty in Action: The Security Function and the Nazi Saboteurs Trial 
The case involved eight German saboteurs who landed on beaches in Long Island and Florida in 
1942.612 The men were recruited and trained to infiltrate the United States and blow up selected 
targets, but the plan went awry and one of the men turned himself in to the FBI, who quickly 
rounded up the others. Initially, the FBI assumed that the group would be tried in civilian courts. 
But to avoid making public how easily the saboteurs infiltrated the borders, as well as the 
administrations embarrassing incompetence in detecting the men, FDR decided to use military 
tribunals and prohibit any appeals to civil courts.613 Additionally, the Administration had little 
confidence that civilian courts could deliver the politically desired outcome. The statute on 
sabotage only carried a maximum penalty of thirty years, and since the men had not actually 
committed any acts, it appeared highly unlikely that the government could convict. The 
government could have tried the men for conspiracy, but conspiracy carried a maximum penalty 
of three years, hardly suitable for the propagandizing purposes of the cases.614 A military tribunal 
could avoid disclosures embarrassing for the government, and it could swiftly deliver the death 
                                                
612 My summary draws from the fascinating account in Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial: Military Tribunals 
and American Law. (University Press of Kansas: 2005). 
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subsequently reported that the saboteurs were immediately apprehended on arrival, hence the administration’s 
concern about a public trial. See Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, 40.  
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penalties desired by the administration.  
 The president issued a proclamation on July 2 1942, creating the military tribunal to try 
the saboteurs “in accordance with the laws of war.”615 This reference to the laws of war rather 
than the Articles of War, is interesting. The Articles of War refer to the group of statutes, first 
enacted by the continental congress, but substantially updated and revised by Congress in the 
1910s and 20s, which established the system of military justice and court marshal.  The laws of 
war are not statutory at all but refer to the “laws of nations,” the unwritten of practices and 
customs that modern natural right theorists such as Grotius and Hobbes associated with the laws 
of nature among states.616 They are also the unwritten “laws” that are enforced under the martial 
law paradigm by the will of the general, as we saw in Chapter four. The consequence was highly 
significant. A violation of the Articles of War would have been tried by courts marshal, for 
which there were highly regulated criminal procedures that imposes due process and evidentiary 
standards generally equivalent to those of civil courts. Violation of the customary laws of war do 
not need to be defined by any statute at all, but can be “interpreted” by the president. Moreover, 
they do not require a courts marshal but can be tried in a military tribunal established by the 
executive, free to pick and choose the trial procedures and evidentiary standards at will.617 
The proclamation stated that anyone owing allegiance to a belligerent nation who enters 
the United States “shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals,” 
and denied access to civil courts. In other words, resorting to the laws of war rather than any 
statute allowed the president to informally and materially suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
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solely for the eight saboteurs, without requiring any formal, public suspension, as had occurred 
during the Civil War. In contrast to the martial law model, the order created military tribunals 
without any internal disruption of sovereignty (there was no question of the ability of ordinary 
courts to open their doors and function). Indeed, the motivation for the tribunal was exactly the 
contrary of proclaiming a disruption of internal order. The paradigm of criminal justice was 
suspended because the administration was eager to keep the government’s ineptitude in 
apprehending the men from became public. Hence the administration made the total secrecy of 
the proceedings a top priority, for reasons of national security. In fact, internal correspondence 
between Roosevelt and Attorney General Biddle demonstrate that the actual reason for the 
tribunal’s secrecy was that their anxiety that a public trial would reveal that the administration 
had lied to obscure its incompetence.618 The purpose of the tribunal was to maintain the image of 
the state’s total control over the territory and maintain public security, and the legal instruments 
of the trial was the creation of a new, ad hoc exception to that transformed the eight men from 
accused criminals to enemy belligerents.  
The Supreme Court accepted an application for a writ of habeas corpus from the 
sabateur’s military lawyer and upheld the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. The full opinion, 
issued three months later, effectively replaces the axial distinction between effective and 
disrupted conditions of internal sovereignty cited in Milligan with a different distinction, 
between lawful and unlawful enemy combatants.619  Lawful combatants are subject to 
preventative detention for the duration of the war, to prevent them from returning to the 
battlefield. But they can only be detained; they cannot be prosecuted because they have not 
committed a crime. They are public enemies, but they not are criminals. Thus, the status of 
                                                
618 Fisher, Military Tribunals, 101.  
619 Ex parte Quirin, 91 
  
319 
prisoner of war does not imply law violation and criminality, only a state of declared 
belligerency. Unlawful combatants are subject to preventative detention, but “in addition they are 
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency 
unlawful.”620 In other words, the unlawful combatant is both criminal and belligerent. As a legal 
category, it represents the complete fusion of the paradigms crime and war – the separation and 
distinction of which, I argued in Chapter 3, was a fundamental prerequisite of the modern 
constitutional order.  
 
War Powers as Police Powers: Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
Although Korematsu is often regarded as a classic – if lamentable – “war powers” case, I want to 
show that, like Quirin, its apparent congruence with the 19th century paradigm of war powers 
obscures a thoroughgoing transformation. The constitutionality of the Japanese internment rests 
on three features that were alien to the earlier war paradigm: the flexible emergency 
constitutionalism of Blaiswell, the model of police powers applied to the national government, 
and the considerations of security as a yardstick for the extent of constitutionally sanctioned 
power. In addition, like Quirin the Japanese Internment cases are paradigmatic instances of 
effective sovereignty emergencies. Just as the decision to suspend the criminal justice model and 
create a military tribunal was driven by concerns about public opinion rather than any military 
necessity, so too the determinations of military necessity claimed for Japanese internment were 
notoriously baseless. Rather, the motivations appear to have been primarily concern for 
“effective sovereignty” in this case as well.621  In order to see how the structure of the new war 
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powers derives from Blaiswell, we must clarify a few key themes at the outset: the hybrid 
mélange of police power and enmity at the basis of the detention itself and the judicial effort to 
normalize the exception by locating it within ordinary constitutional powers, and at the same 
time contain the exception by subjecting it to time and breadth restrictions.  
 
Police powers 
The paradigm of police powers, exercised for the benefit of the affected population not only 
shaped the administration of the program, it also guided the government’s legal defense of the 
order when it was challenged in court. Peter Irons, in his classic study of the internment, explains 
that the two pillars of the government’s legal strategy were “constitutional” argument based on 
war powers, and “factual” argument based upon police powers: 
 
Government lawyers would first urge on the courts an expansive reading of the President’s vaguely defined 
war powers, justifying the application of DeWitt’s orders to a single “class” of citizens by analogy to the 
police powers of the states. The factual basis for the orders would rest on the argument that the distinctive 
“racial characteristics of Japanese Americans predisposed them to disloyalty... sabotage and espionage, 
thereby supporting the “military necessity” claim on which the orders rested.622 
 
By the time of the Korematsu hearings a year and a half later, the government dropped the 
military necessity defense altogether, and submitted documents demonstrating that the exclusion 
was necessary for the security of the Japanese Americans themselves. As the defense council put 
it, the purpose of the order was to “prevent incidents involving violence between Japanese 
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migrants” and their white compatriots who blamed them for Pearl Harbor. The Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu decisions do not inquire into the grounds for the “pressing public necessity.” But the 
security of the Japanese-Americans appears to play a role in Stone’s reasoning in the earlier 
Hirabayashi decision, upon which the Korematsu is almost entirely based.  
 
As a result of all these conditions [preventing assimilation] affecting the life of the Japanese, both aliens 
and citizens, in the Pacific Coast area, there has been relatively little social intercourse between them and 
the white population. The restrictions, both practical and legal, affecting the privileges and opportunities 
afforded to persons of Japanese extraction residing in the United States have been sources of irritation, and 
may well have tended to increase their isolation, and in many instances their attachments to Japan and its 
institutions.623 
 
In this case as well, the actual grounds for determining Japanese Americans to be  “a menace to 
the national defense and safety” are not military necessity per se but a kind of military necessity 
as determined by a judgment about effective sovereignty.624 In other words, the justification has 
shifted here from something based on the state’s right to self-preservation against immanent 
threat to the state’s right to establish overall security of the social order.625  
The Court heard three different cases involving different aspects of the military orders, 
and insisted that each decision applied only to the specific issue involved. Hirabayashi, decided 
in June 1943, upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating a curfew that applied only to persons 
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of Japanese descent.626 Korematsu, decided in December of the following year, upheld 
Korematsu’s conviction for remaining in his native city in violation an “exclusion order” that 
“excluded” all persons of Japanese descent from a designated military zone. Endo, decided on 
the same day as Korematsu, concerned the detention itself, holding that the War Relocation 
Authority had no power to a citizen once her loyalty was confirmed and she was cleared for 
release.  
These decisions are almost universally criticized today,627 and Korematsu’s sanction of 
the exclusion order, which comes closest to authorizing the camps themselves, has 
understandably stood out in comparison to the other decisions. The denunciation of Korematsu is 
correct, but the grounds for it are distorted. Read in isolation, as a single decision, Korematsu 
appears to stand for the principle of extreme judicial deference in war, so that the war power, 
defined as the power to wage war successfully, is effectively unlimited in whatever the executive 
determines is required for more successful warfare. The three cases together, however, yield a 
different conclusion: the basis of Korematsu and its companions is not extreme judicial 
deference; it is temporary and limited judicial accommodation through a framework of 
emergency powers. The limits in terms of both time and scope, and therefore the significance of 
Korematsu derive from its relationship to the companion cases. The stakes, therefore, of the 
relationship between the cases is very high, which accounts for why they were the source of the 
most bitter controversy among the dissenting justices. Moreover, they are also important for our 
                                                
626 in fact, Hirabayashi was also convicted for violating an exclusion order. His sentences for violating both orders 
were to be run concurrently. In an obvious attempt to dodge the weightier implications of the exclusion order, the 
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purposes, because they illustrate the reappearance of the dialectic of accommodation and 
limitation in the emergency doctrine following Blaiswell.  
 
Between crime and war 
Unlike in Hawaii (then a territory rather than a state) and other Pacific colonies, martial law was 
not declared in the West Coast, nor were military tribunals involved in the Japanese internment. 
Instead, both Hirabayashi and Korematsu were convicted of a crime, in violation of a statute 
passed by Congress, not with the military and executive orders establishing the detention. In both 
cases, the majority insisted on the technical distinction between the statutory basis of the 
criminal conviction, and the internment itself. The internment, based on the logic of preventative 
detention rather than retributive justice, was a wholesale departure from the crime paradigm 
Indeed, the majority opinions and even the government itself openly acknowledged that the 
majority of the detainees were inevitably loyal citizens and residents who did not pose any 
security risk. The argument was that racial and cultural characteristics made it impossible to 
distinguish the loyal population from dangerous saboteurs, and the urgency of the emergency 
made preventing “false positives” more important than “false negatives.”628  
The paradigm of crime remained relevant to the internment cases because of the Act of 
March 24, 1942, passed by Congress shortly after most of the West Coast had been declared a 
military zone, but before the military issued any specific orders to residents of Japanese ancestry. 
Without mentioning any particular orders or groups affected, the Act made it a crime to disobey 
                                                
628 Douglas’ concurring opinion is particularly anxious to justify abandoning the crime paradigm out of concern for 
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all military orders within the declared military zone. After the statute was passed, the military 
issued the curfew, exclusion or internment orders, but did not enforce them through military 
justice. Instead, disobedience to the orders would be treated as ordinary crimes, tried in civilian 
courts. Though Hirabayashi and Korematsu disobeyed different military orders at different times, 
were both convicted in ordinary civilian courts of violating the March 24th statute. Since the 
statute itself did not suspend habeas corpus or single out Japanese ancestry, and since those 
accused of violating it were not deprived of their due process rights to contest the charges, it 
remained within the crime paradigm in terms of its form.   
Its content, however, derived from the military orders themselves, which radically and 
explicitly dispensed with the crime paradigm. By providing blanket legislative sanction to 
subsequent military orders, the March 24 Act effectively delegated to military commanders the 
authority to pass criminal laws. It gave legal authorization to the deprivation of more than a 
hundred thousand citizens and legal residents of their liberty, on the basis of “racial 
characteristics” alone. The legal basis of the Japanese internment, therefore, itself expressed the 
simultaneous presence of the two mutually exclusive paradigms in terms of a contradiction 
between the Act’s form as a criminal statute, and its content as a measure of (supposed) military 
necessity.  
 
The return of Blaiswell and the emergency doctrine 
Hirabayashi challenged his conviction under the March 24 statute of violating a military curfew 
order on two separate constitutional grounds, both of which pertain to the problem of the war and 
crime paradigms implied by the contradictions between the form and content of the statute. The 
first challenge, explicitly invoking the New Deal delegation precedents from the Hughes Court 
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discussed in the previous section,629 argued that Congress had failed to provide any standards to 
guide the military authorities in issuing their orders. The formal generality of the statute 
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the military command. The 
second argument targeted the content. By singling out only persons of Japanese descent, the 
military curfew order discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.  
Stone’s opinion rejected these arguments by dismissing the relevance of Milligan and 
replacing it with the emergency doctrine developed in the early 1930s. Noting that the 
restrictions were “an emergency war measure” that “involves no question of martial law or trial 
by military tribunal,” Stone quotes Blaiswell directly: “The war power of the national 
government” authorized by the Constitution “is ‘the power to wage war successfully.’”630 The 
means that fall within this constitutional power cannot be fixed in advance but depend upon the 
external conditions that determine the means necessary to achieve the end that the Constitution 
establishes for that power. Just as social conditions in 1934 were urgent enough to make 
mortgage regulation fall within the scope of the state’s police powers, the military conditions of 
the war against Japan could be urgent enough to make the curfew fall within the scope of the 
government’s constitutional war powers.631   
In a scathing critique of the decisions published in 1945, Eugene Rostow aptly noted the 
continuity with the police powers cases: “[t]he test followed the lines of the Court’s familiar 
doctrine in passing on the action of administrative bodies: was there “reasonable ground” for 
those charged with the responsibility of national defense to believe that the threat was real, and 
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the remedy useful?”632 Moreover, as Pactrick Gudridge points out, the test of “equal protection” 
also analogizes from the police powers considerations in Plessy v. Ferguson: “every exercise of 
the police power must be… enacted in good faith for the protection of the public good, and not 
for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”633 
Korematsu reproduces the emergency police powers framework and the “good faith” test 
for racial discrimination in Hirabayashi. Indeed, Frankfurter’s concurring opinion puts the 
matter even more starkly:  
 
we have had recent occasion [citing Hirabayashi] to quote approvingly the statement of former Chief 
Justice Hughes that the war power of the Government is "the power to wage war successfully." [citing 
Blaiswell]… If a military order such as that under review does not transcend the means appropriate for 
conducting war, such action by the military is as constitutional as would be any authorized action by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission within the limits of the constitutional power to regulate commerce. 
 
Despite the identical framework, there were two important differences between the two cases. 
The year and a half that separated the two decisions meant not only that the period of wartime 
urgency and uncertainty had passed, but that there was considerably more evidence available that 
the detention at the time was an unjustified overreaction fueled by racist paranoia rather than any 
military necessity.634 Even the minimalist “good faith” test for the racial discrimination imposed 
a considerably higher bar with an additional 18 months of hindsight. For this reason, it was 
crucial that the majority emphasize the temporary, time-sensitive emergency conditions in which 
the exclusion order was made. The order must be judged in light of the time it was promulgated, 
                                                
632 Rostow, 506. 
633 Plessy, 531, 550. Quoted in Gudridge. 
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not with “the calm perspective of hindsight.”635 In response to the Murphy’s dissenting argument 
showing that military leaders were driven by racial bias rather than military calculation, the 
majority insists that “time was short” and the determination was made in “the critical hour” when 
military authorities “feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper 
security measures” without delay.636 Under attack from the dissenting justices, the majority 
places nearly the entire justificatory weight on the temporal aspect of the emergency doctrine. 
The reasonableness and “good faith” of the racial discrimination, doubtful in retrospect, can be 
established exclusively on the basis of recognizing the shortness of time and urgency of the 
situation.  
The second important difference is that the earlier decision was able to dodge the 
exclusion order – and hence the inevitable question of the internment itself – by focusing 
narrowly on the less-drastic curfew order. In Korematsu, the issue of exclusion was unavoidable. 
This too posed a major problem for the majority’s reliance on the emergency doctrine. The 
majority’s strategy was to insist –to the outraged incredulity of the dissents – that the only issue 
under consideration was the exclusion order requiring Korematsu to leave the area, not the 
detention program itself. This distinction is strained to say the least, since complying with the 
exclusion order meant reporting to a detention center. While the majority conceded that detention 
and confinement were necessarily the means of exclusion, the incidental fact that exclusion 
implied detention was irrelevant to the decision.  It is obvious why the Court clung so stubbornly 
to this distinction. If ruling on the exclusion order meant considering the detainment program as 
a whole, the majory’s “emergency” rational based would fall apart. The exclusion order itself 
could be confined to a single moment, in the midst of urgent circumstances and the shortness of 
                                                
635 Korematsu (J. Murphy, dissent), 224.  
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time. By 1943, the ongoing detention was a long-term policy that extended far beyond any 
“reasonable ground” in emergency conditions. In a viciously circular logic, the constitutionality 
of the exclusion order required temporary emergency conditions; the order could remain 
constitutional after the emergency had passed by distinguishing the moment of temporary 
emergency powers from the long-term, non-emergency machinery of detention established by 
the emergency powers.   
Finally, in Endo, released on the same day as Korematsu, the detention itself could no longer be 
avoided. Unlike the other two cases, Endo, a citizen and California civil servant, had complied 
with the military orders and had filed a habeas corpus petition before being transferred to a Utah 
camp. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that once a determination has been made of a detained 
citizen’s loyalty, she is entitled to unconditional release.637 The grounds for the holding served to 
strengthen the revived emergency doctrine. The Court avoided the “underlying constitutional 
grounds” for the decision and upheld the executive order and March statute as temporary 
emergency measures “against espionage and sabotage.”638  Thus, “we may assume for the 
purposes of this case that initial detention in Relocation Centers was authorized,” but only on the 
basis of an authority implied in by the statute. In order to preserve “the greatest possible 
accommodation of the liberties of the citizen with this war measure, any such implied power 
must be narrowly confined to the precise purpose of the evacuation program,” namely, to 
respond to the immediate emergency condition at the outset of the war.639 
 
                                                
637 Endo was one of the 61,000 Japanese Americans who, by July of 1944, were kept in detention by the War 
Relocation Authority even though their “loyalty” had already been confirmed and they had been cleared for release 
by camp administrators. Supposedly, the Authority dragged its feet out of concern that former detainees who 
returned to their ordinary lives would enflame the racial prejudices and hostility of the white population. Gudridge, 
1947. 
638 Endo, 300. My italics. 




So far we’ve seen, in two key cases from the Second World War, the convergence of New Deal 
realist jurisprudence – what I called the Blaisdell paradigm – and blurring of the boundary 
between the categories of crime and war. This trend accelerated in the US accession to global 
harmony and the atmosphere of atomic threat during the Cold War. Jules Lobel, in a helpful 
overview, has associated the post-WWII period with the culmination of what he considers the 
overcoming of the “liberal” minimalist model of emergency powers.640 Lobel characterizes this 
period as an overturning of “the assumption that non-emergency peacetime conditions were the 
normal state of affairs and that emergency was an exception…”641 In other words, this period was 
marked by a profound and pervasive sense of crisis, a nearly permanent and ongoing condition of 
global threat. Underlying this shift from the exception to the more or less ordinary nature of 
external crisis is the shift to the discourse of national security. The term national security, 
virtually unused before the late 1940s, quickly became a hegemonic, both institutionally and as a 
field of knowledge, beginning with the National Security Act and the creation of the National 
Security Council, both in 1947. As Mark Neocleous points out, an important distinction 
introduced by the replacement of national defense with national security is the considerably more 
comprehensive and flexible implications of the latter, encompassing defense within a broader 
field of vision.642 Indeed, what national security referred to was not a narrowly national 
perspective alone but one that coupled that perspective with a conception of a hegemonic global 
order that required continual management and cultivation. National security referred to a 
prospective project of order creation and maintenance as much as it did to threats of a more 
immediate and specific kind. Such a project radically shifts the character of emergencies 
                                                
640 Lobel, “Emergency Powers and the Decline of Liberalism,” 1399. 
641 Ibid., 1399-1400. 
642 Neocleous, Critique of Security, 77. 
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encountered therefore, from immanent threats to the state to an array of challenges that may be 
encountered in the project of international order maintenance. Such emergencies are endemic in 
such a conception since every potential or prospective threat to American global hegemony 
factors as a threat to national security. Thus, according to the most important document setting 
forth this new vision, the National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68, issued in 1950, the US is 
entering “an indefinite period of tension and danger,” calling for what Truman referred to as “a 
great change in our normal peacetime way of doing things.”643 
 Tracing this continual theme in US executive rhetoric from the post-WWII ear to the 
1980s, Lobel notes that “ironically, the era of our greatest international power and security has 
coincided with a mentality of great fear for our own national survival.”644 In fact, this assessment 
aptly captures what I referred to as the “paradox of security” in Chapter Two – the dynamic in 
which security, conceived as a comprehensive social good, acquires the character of an infinite 
aspiration rather than a quantifiable possession. In this case, the more “security” is acquired, the 
more vividly felt the need for security becomes. In any case, this atmosphere of global hegemony 
and ongoing security crisis had the effect of decoupling the link between a state of peace and the 
condition of normalcy. Instead, not war but permanent ongoing intervention and quasi-
intervention became synonymous with the condition of normalcy, leading to what scholars have 
referred to as a mode of warfare curiously similar to the pre-modern period, in which “private 
and public armies were not distinct, peace and war were not distinct legal regimes, and 
intermittent warfare was constant.”645 
 
Conclusion 
                                                
643 Cited in Lobel, “Emergency Powers and the Decline of Liberalism,” 1401.  
644 Ibid., 1402. 
645 Ibid., 1404. 
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Throughout this dissertation I have been exploring a single set of questions, applying them to a 
variety of different historical and political contexts. The questions are: how are exceptional 
emergencies distinguished from quotidian political events? What is the vision of political 
“normalcy” in relation to which a state of exception can be declared, and in light of which the 
legitimate ends of exceptional, emergency powers defined? How do the background conceptions 
that define an “emergency” also shape the political dynamics of emergency powers? As I argued 
in chapter one, these questions push beyond the two predominant approaches in the 
contemporary literature: the first was the “naïve realist” view that emergencies have a self-
evident, objective character, so that identifying an event as an “emergency” is a straightforward 
matter of accurately perceiving some factual state of affairs. The second was the decisionist or 
“deconstructive” view, which argues that emergencies can never be identified or verified 
factually, but rather are constituted independently of any “facts,” for example by a valid legal 
procedure for declaring a state of emergency, or by a sovereign decision on the exception. 
Neither of these two approaches, however, can provide us with an adequate account of the 
politics of emergencies, that is, the sense in which the definition of what counts as an emergency 
can be a dynamic arena of persuasion, justification and conflict, not only over the temporary 
consequences of emergency powers, but over the identity and content of normalcy as well. 
Distinguishing between normalcy and a state of emergency is not just a matter of perception (as 
in the realist account) or decision (in the skeptical account); it is also, crucially, an act of 
interpretation and a process of political judgment, where the determination of an emergency is at 
the same time an evaluative claim about the identity of political normalcy. In other words, the 
definition of what counts as an emergency is simulations a way of defining what is the state of 
affairs that is being threatened, which also implies a judgment about the value of preserving a 
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state of affairs that would justify exceptional measures. Thus, while the realist approach obscures 
this political realm of interpretation and judgment by reducing the definition of to a self-evident 
determination of facts, the skeptical approach dissolves the concrete political content and stakes 
of the definition of emergencies by abstracting and isolating the subjective decision on the 
exception from the broader ideological or normative context that determines whether such a 
decision will be considered authoritative, or legitimate.  
 Thus, the historical and contextual approach adopted in these chapters is motivated by 
two basic theoretical claims of the dissertation: first, that the what counts as an emergency is 
neither a self-evident fact nor the product of an unconstrained decision, but is constructed 
through a set of background assumptions and political judgments about the identity and value of 
normality. Secondly, the different ways that emergencies are defined and understood play a 
decisive role in shaping the political outcomes of emergency powers, so that for example the 
same institutional framework of emergency powers may produce very different political 
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